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Abstract	
Aimed	 at	 lowering	 forest	 carbon	 emissions	 through	 financing	 improved	 forest	governance	 and	 socially	 inclusive	 land	 and	 natural	 resources	 use,	 the	 REDD+	(Reducing	Emissions	 from	Deforestation	 and	Forest	Degradation	Plus)	 program	 is	attracting	widespread	interest	and	investment	in	Indonesia.	REDD+	introduces	new	governmental	rationalities,	in	which	forest	carbon	is	used	as	a	standard	to	measure	a	 country’s	 performance	 in	 keeping	 its	 tropical	 forests	 intact	 and	 defines	 the	financial	rewards	the	country	will	receive.	REDD+	is	one	factor	in	an	emergent	new	political	 conjuncture	 in	 Indonesia	 that	 is	 opening	 up	 to	 the	 possibilities	 for	reworking	 forest	 governance.	 This	 thesis	 employs	 Foucault’s	 concept	 of	governmentality	to	examine	how	governmental	technologies	are	formed,	contested	and	 implemented	 through	 REDD+	 and	 some	 of	 the	 early	 impacts	 the	 program	 is	having	(Foucault,	1991a).			Drawing	on	grounded	empirical	data	and	inspired	by	a	‘not-quite	neoliberal	nature’	framework	 (de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015)	 I	 show	 how	 place-based	discourses,	 politics,	 actors,	 and	 interests	 are	 shaping	 the	 way	 REDD+	 unfolds	 in	Indonesia.	 This	 is	 achieved	 through	 three	 case	 studies	 focused	 on	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce;	the	One	Map	Initiative;	and	an	Indigenous	land	claim	in	a	community	in	Central	 Kalimantan.	 Findings	 from	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 show	 how	 current	deficiencies	 in	 forestland	 governance	 have	 been	 problematized	where	 there	 is	 no	clarity	over	who	has	rights	to	forestland,	who	owns	the	concessions	and	where	they	are.	 Thus,	 addressing	 current	 complexities	 is	 becoming	 the	 Taskforce’s	 priority	through	 series	 of	 governmental	 technologies	 including	 the	 One	 Map	 Initiative.	Meanwhile,	activists	are	making	use	of	this	opportunity	to	render	visible	Indigenous	land	 rights	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 subvert	 focused	 technical	 fixes	 to	 more	 open	 social	justice	 ends.	 By	 discussing	 the	messy	 actualities	 of	 developing,	 implementing	 and	responding	 to	 governmental	 technologies	 the	 thesis	 problematizes	 pro-	 and	 anti-REDD+	debates.				Rather	 than	 view	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 through	 “a	 programmer’s	view”	(Death,	2013)	as	a	finished	or	rigid	project	implemented	on	others,	I	see	it	as	
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an	 ongoing	 attempt	 to	 govern	 human	 –	 forest	 relationships	 that	 are	 shaped	 by	contestations	and	resistances.	Thus,	 the	thesis	makes	an	 important	contribution	to	neoliberal	 nature	 literature	 by	 showing	 that	 neoliberal	 governmental	 programs,	such	 as	 REDD+,	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 sites	 of	 struggle,	 with	 different	 actors	experiencing	 and	 engaging	 the	 program	 in	 different	 ways.	 As	 such,	 this	 thesis	highlights	how	neoliberal	mechanisms	can	be	co-opted	by	particular	actors	in	order	to	achieve	diverse	economic,	social	and	environmental	goals.		Through	engagement	with	 governmental	 technologies	 the	 landscapes	 of	 forest	 politics	 change	 in	 both	enabling	and	constraining	ways.			
Keywords:	governmentality,	REDD+,	governmental	technology,	subjectivity,	neoliberal	
nature,	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature,	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce,	 the	 One	 Map	 Initiative,	
Indigenous	land	claims,	Indonesia.	
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1 Introduction	~	REDD+	at	the	Intersection	of	
Neoliberal	and	Not-Quite-Neoliberal	Natures		
1.1 Introduction	
“Get	 down…get	 down..!!!	 Neoliberalism	 comprador!!	 Capitalism	 accomplice!!!	 Get	
down…get	down!!!	Comprador...comprador!!!”		This	was	what	the	crowds	at	the	Indonesian	Civil	Society	Forum	for	Climate	Justice	chanted	 at	 Emil	 Salim,	 Head	 of	 Indonesian	 Delegation	 at	 the	 United	 Nations	Conference	of	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	meeting	in	Bali	in	2007.	Emil	Salim	came	to	the	 activists’	 compound	 to	 calm	 down	 escalating	 tensions	 that	 had	 been	 brewing	between	 a	 group	 of	 Indonesian	 activists	 and	 the	 government	 after	 several	 failed	attempts	 to	 enter	 the	 negotiation	 site.	 I	 was	 amazed	 to	 witness	 some	 activists	shouting	loudly	at	a	figure	whose	reputation	commands	widespread	respect	among	domestic	 and	 international	 environmental	 activists.	 They	 were	 agitated	 by	 his	speech	that	was	questioning	the	activists’	stand	in	rejecting	the	government’s	efforts	in	negotiating	Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	Plus	(REDD+)	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	mechanisms	 in	 climate	mitigation.	 In	 his	 speech,	 Emil	Salim	emphasised	the	need	to	collaborate	with	developed	countries	to	tackle	climate	change	as	a	global	problem,	a	statement	that	triggered	the	accusation	that	he	was	an	accomplice	 of	 the	 developed	 countries	 and	 a	 neoliberalism	 comprador	 (see	media	coverage	in	Detik.com,	2007;	Kompas,	2007).			The	chant	grew	louder	and	more	insistent.	A	red	faced	Emil	Salim	left	the	stage	and	got	into	his	car,	no	doubt	feeling	betrayed	and	humiliated.	Later	that	night,	I	heard	that	 some	 senior	 environmental	 activists	 came	 to	 Emil	 Salim’s	 hotel	 room	 to	apologize.	According	to	one	of	these	activists,	this	was	done	out	of	respect	for	Emil	Salim’s	position	as	one	of	 Indonesia’s	most	 trusted	 senior	environmental	 activists,	who,	despite	his	busy	schedule	leading	the	negotiation,	was	nevertheless	willing	to	come	to	calm	down	the	 tensions.	The	apology,	however,	also	highlighted	a	 tension	between	activists	who	were	supporting	Indonesia’s	REDD+	proposal	and	those	who	
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weren’t	 (Hartiningsih	 and	 Arif,	 2007).	 For	 opponents,	 REDD+	 is	 part	 of	 the	developed	 countries’	 ploy	 to	 colonize	 rainforests	 in	 developing	 countries.	 It	functions	 as	 a	 capitalist	 machine	 for	 them	 to	 profit	 through	 carbon	 trading	 and	evade	 their	 ethical	 responsibilities	 to	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	(watchindonesia.org,	 2008).	 However,	 for	 others,	 REDD+	 provides	 a	 political	opening	 to	 articulate	 visions	 of	 transformation	 and	 justice	 in	 forest	 governance.	These	tensions	and	dynamics	have	rewritten	Indonesia’s	forest	politics	and	will	be	the	focus	of	this	thesis.		My	curiosity	about	REDD+	was	sparked	by	the	above	encounter.	I	was	intrigued	by	the	 simple	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 REDD+	 market	 mechanism	 could	 potentially	solve	 the	 global	 environmental	 problems	 that	 have	 been	 caused	 by	 markets	themselves.	Since	then,	this	simple	question	has	transformed	into	multiple	complex	queries	 that	 inspire	 this	 PhD	 research.	 Paraphrasing	 Buscher,	 Dressler,	 and	Fletcher’s	 (2014)	 analysis	 of	 the	 neoliberalization	 of	 conservation	 practices,	 my	academic	 inquiry	 starts	with	 the	 question	 of	whether	 REDD+	 has	 the	 potential	 to	address	the	capitalist	market’s	own	ecological	contradiction?	Can	it	be	the	terrain	on	which	 the	 seeds	 of	 ecological	 and	 social	 justice	 are	 sown	 within	 seemingly	inhospitable	neoliberal	ideology?			In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 see	 REDD+	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 neoliberal	 governmentality	 that	 is	underpinned	by	the	logic	of	market	environmentalism	(Beymer-Farris	and	Bassett,	2012;	 Stephan,	 2012;	 Dixon	 and	 Challies,	 2015;	McGregor	 et	al.,	 2015).	 It	 aims	 to	incorporate	 market	 rationalities	 in	 governing	 the	 environment	 by	 advocating	multiple	 win	 discourses	 oriented	 at	 overcoming	 climate	 crises,	 while	 acting	 as	 a	biodiversity	and	poverty	saviour	(Angelsen	et	al.,	2012;	Gupta,	2012;	Phelps,	Friess	and	 Webb,	 2012,	 2012).	 As	 a	 project	 of	 climate	 governance,	 however,	 REDD+	operates	 not	 only	 through	 market-based	 incentives	 but	 also	 disciplinary	technologies	 expressed	 through	 the	 sovereign	 power	 of	 the	 state’s	 juridical	apparatuses.				This	 thesis	 will	 investigate	 how	 forest	 governance	 is	 being	 re-oriented	 through	REDD+	governmentalities	in	Indonesia.	It	will	do	so	by	analysing	at	how	REDD+,	as	a	
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global	environmental	program,	shapes	and	is	shaped	by	the	existing	forest	politics	in	Indonesia.	I	am	interested	to	see	how	the	state	and	non-state	actors	respond	to	the	new	opportunities	and	risks	associated	with	REDD+.	I	do	this	by	exploring	the	new	technologies	 of	 forest	 governance	 that	 are	 being	 produced	 and	 employed	 to	mainstream	 REDD+	 rationalities	 and	 new	 subjectivities	 that	 are	 emerging	 on	different	scales	around	these	politics.	 	Through	such	an	approach	I	hope	to	engage	constructively	with	the	debates	between	pro-	and	anti-REDD+	actors	by	seeing	their	positions	that	are	fluid	and	contested.			I	 employ	 governmentality	 as	 the	 main	 theoretical	 framework	 to	 analyse	 how	power/knowledge	 is	used	 to	problematize	existing	 forest	 governance	and	 support	the	production	of	new	governmental	technologies	(Foucault,	2009;	Winkel,	2012).	I	adopt	 a	 case	 study	 approach	 to	 analyse	 how	 REDD+	 governmentality	 unfolds	 in	particular	 places	 at	 particular	 times.	 	 Using	 three	 interrelated	 case	 studies,	 this	thesis	points	to	the	importance	of	studying	the	empirical	implementations	of	REDD+	to	apprehend	not	only	their	discursive	contestation	but	also	their	messy	actualities.			REDD+	is	defined	by	the	United	Nations-REDD	Programme	as	“an	effort	to	create	a	financial	 value	 for	 the	 carbon	 stored	 in	 forests,	 offering	 incentives	 for	 developing	countries	to	reduce	emissions	from	forested	lands	and	invest	in	low-carbon	paths	to	sustainable	 development”	 (un-redd.org,	 2015).	 The	 spectacular	 ecological	 and	economic	benefits	promised	by	REDD+	programme	have	compelled	governments	in	tropical	 countries	 to	 initiate	 REDD+	 readiness	 activities	 aimed	 at	 building	infrastructures	for	implementation	(Cerbu,	Swallow	and	Thompson,	2011;	Pistorius,	2012;	Minang	et	al.,	2014).	In	Indonesia,	for	example,	REDD+	is	positioned	as	the	key	to	the	country’s	 transformation	to	a	 low	carbon	economy	(Jupesta	et	al.,	2011;	Lal,	2012;	 Mulyani	 and	 Jepson,	 2013).	 This	 is	 not	 without	 challenges	 from	 inter-ministerial	agencies	and	other	actors,	such	as	the	Indonesian	Palm	Oil	Association,	as	 REDD+	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 hindrance	 to	 the	 growth	 and	 expansion	 of	 agriculture	 and	mining	 industries	 (Luttrell	 et	al.,	 2012;	 Astuti	 and	McGregor,	 2015).	Nevertheless,	the	head	of	Indonesia’s	REDD+	Taskforce	has	anticipated	this	contestation	and	links	it	to	the	way	certain	stakeholders	perceive	forests	as	merely	a	source	of	timber	and	land.	 He	 says	 that,	 “the	 old	 thinking	 has	 been	with	 us	 for	 40	 years,	 [now	we	 are	
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developing]	this	new	way	of	thinking”	(Lal,	2014,	p.	3),	that	sees	economic	benefits	in	trees	standing	rather	than	when	they	are	cut	down.			Shifting	this	old	paradigm	is	one	of	 the	main	pillars	of	 Indonesia’s	REDD+	national	strategy	and	employs	a	set	of	governmentalities	 to	enact	change.	 I	 refer	 to	REDD+	governmentalities	 as	 the	 set	 of	 technologies,	 practices	 and	 activities	 oriented	 at	guiding	forest	stakeholders’	conduct	towards	forest	carbon	conservation	(McGregor	
et	al.,	 2015).	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 argue	 that	 REDD+	 governmentalities	 are	 helping	 to	render	 carbon	 and	 forests	 governable	 and	 apolitical	 entities.	 New	 scientific	knowledges	 are	 being	 produced	 and	 those	 that	 can	 align	with	 all	 these	 emerging	norms,	 expertise	 and	 rules	 can	 benefit	 from	 new	 opportunities,	 while	 those	 that	don’t	risk	being	marginalized	and	“let	die”	(Foucault,	1990).			This	chapter	provides	an	introduction	to	my	doctoral	thesis	by	outlining	key	themes.	In	the	remaining	four	sections	I	first	introduce	the	concept	of	REDD+	and	link	it	to	arguments	 regarding	 the	 neoliberalization	 of	 nature.	 In	 light	 of	 recent	 scholarly	attempts	to	interrogate	the	variegated	versions	and	ambiguity	of	post-neoliberalism	(Bakker,	 2013;	 McElwee	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	 2015;	 de	 Freitas,	Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015),	 I	 also	 discuss	 the	 possibility	 of	 studying	 REDD+	implementation	 in	 Indonesia	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 not-quite-neoliberalization	 of	nature.	 	 I	 draw	 on	 empirical	 studies	 that	 show	 how	 projects	 with	 neoliberal	rationalities	 can	be	 continuously	 shaped,	 co-opted	and	 strategically	 repurposed	 to	express	broader	socio-ecological	justice	interests.	The	second	section	introduces	the	two	research	objectives	 that	underpin	 this	 study	and	briefly	 introduces	 three	case	studies	 that	 are	 being	 employed	 to	 illuminate	 the	 empirical	 study	 of	 REDD+	governmentality.	The	third	section	briefly	examines	REDD+	using	a	governmentality	lens	by	highlighting	 its	 theoretical	advantages	 in	apprehending	“neoliberalism	as	a	discourse	productive	of	a	particular	kind	of	society	and	particular	kinds	of	subjects”	(McCarthy	and	Prudham,	2004,	p.	280).	This	theme	is	expanded	upon	in	Chapter	2	as	shown	in	the	final	section	of	the	chapter	that	outlines	the	structure	of	the	thesis.				
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1.2 Situating	REDD+	in	Indonesia	REDD+	 emerged	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 call	 to	 address	 global	 climate	 change.	 The	destruction	of	 the	world’s	 tropical	 forests	 is	 responsible	 for	about	12%	 to	17%	of	total	anthropogenic	global	carbon	emissions	(IPCC,	2007).	Thus,	REDD+	is	expected	to	 effectively	 tackle	 the	 dwindling	 of	 forest	 cover	 as	 well	 as	 act	 as	 an	 affordable	mechanism	to	halt	carbon	emissions.	REDD+	is	a	market	mechanism	works	based	on	the	logic	that:			 1)	 quantification	 of	 forest	 carbon	 stocks	 enables	 a	 mechanism	 to	 pay	 for	measurable	 reductions	 in	 forest	 carbon	emissions,	2)	 investors	will	 pay	 for	such	 reductions	 because	 they	 will	 be	 cost-competitive	 compared	 to	 other	forms	 of	 emission	 mitigation,	 and	 3)	 as	 a	 result	 developing	 countries	 will	adopt	REDD+	because	it	provides	financial	incentives	for	policies	to	maintain	and	 sustainably	 manage	 forest	 resources	 more	 efficiently	 (Mulyani	 and	Jepson,	2013,	p.	2)	
REDD+	 was	 initially	 designed	 to	 focus	 on	 reducing	 emissions	 from	 deforestation	forest	 degradation	 (REDD).	 However,	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan,	 agreed	 at	 the	 COP	 13	meeting	 in	 Bali	 in	 2007,	 proposed	 that	 a	 comprehensive	 approach	 to	 mitigating	climate	change	should	include	“[p]olicy	approaches	and	positive	incentives	on	issues	relating	 to	 reducing	 emissions	 from	 deforestation	 and	 forest	 degradation	 in	developing	 countries;	 and	 the	 role	 of	 conservation,	 sustainable	 management	 of	forests	and	enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks	in	developing	countries”	(UNFCCC,	2008).	Three	year	later,	at	COP	16,	as	formulated	in	the	Cancun	Agreements,	REDD	was	 upgraded	 to	 REDD+,	 to	 reflect	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 conservation,	sustainable	 management	 of	 forests	 and	 enhancement	 of	 forest	 carbon	 stocks	 in	reducing	forest	carbon	emissions	(UNFCCC,	2011).	
The	specifics	of	a	REDD+	mechanism	continue	to	be	negotiated	under	the	UNFCCC,	and	 the	 substantial	 financial	 costs	 for	 full-scale	 implementation	have	not	yet	been	met	either.	 	A	mandatory	mechanism	 for	REDD+	under	 the	auspices	of	UNFCCC	 is	therefore	 not	 yet	 in	 place	 or	 operating	 at	 scale.	 However,	 in	 response	 to	 this	drawback,	 REDD+	 initiatives	 have	 already	 been	 started	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	
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voluntary	 mechanism	 in	 anticipation	 of	 a	 formal	 one	 under	 the	 UNFCCC.	 Carbon	credits	coming	from	these	REDD+	initiatives	are	sold	 in	voluntary	carbon	markets.	Voluntary	 carbon	 markets	 function	 outside	 of	 the	 compliance	 market	 (outside	 of	UNFCCC).	They	enable	industries,	NGOs,	governments,	and	individuals	to	offset	their	emissions	 by	 purchasing	 Verified	 Emissions	 Reductions	 (VERs)	 from	 voluntary	REDD+	projects	in	the	tropical	developing	countries. 	
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 Government	 of	 Indonesia	 (GoI)	 has	 taken	 steps	 to	 tackle	environmental	 issues	 and	 climate	 change	 in	 which	 REDD+	 plays	 a	 key	 role.	Indonesia’s	 interest	 to	 REDD+	 was	 started	 in	 2006	 prior	 to	 COP	 13	 in	 Bali.	Sponsored	by	the	World	Bank,	and	the	British,	Australian,	and	German	governments,	the	MOF	prepared	a	document	detailing	the	potential	of	REDD+	in	reducing	carbon	emissions	 from	 the	 land	 use	 and	 forestry	 sector.	 The	 MOF	 established	 a	 multi-stakeholder	forum	called	Indonesia	Forest	Climate	Alliance	(IFCA)	in	July	2007	as	a	coordination	 centre	 for	 Indonesia’s	 REDD	 related	 activities	 (IFCA,	 2008).	 IFCA’s	most	significant	deliverables	are	the	development	of	the	Indonesian	National	Carbon	Accounting	System	(INCAS)	and	the	preparation	for	Indonesia’s	role	as	the	host	for	UNFCCC’S	COP	13	meeting	that	was	to	be	held	in	Bali	in	December	2007.	INCAS	is	a	system	of	measurement,	 reporting	and	verification	(MRV)	specifically	designed	 for	the	quantification	of	carbon	reduction	from	REDD+	projects.			COP	 13	 in	 Bali	 brought	 a	 positive	 result	 for	 REDD+	 by	 suggesting	 that	 all	 parties	explore	 further	 actions	 and	 identify	 options	 to	 implement	 REDD+	 through	demonstration	 activities	 (see	 Decision	 2/CP.	 13	 article	 3).	 Follow	 up	 action	 was	taken	by	the	Government	of	Indonesia	in	collaboration	with	Australian	Government	through	Indonesia	Australia	Forest	Carbon	Partnership	(IAFCP)	to	develop	a	REDD+	demonstration	 activity	 in	 Central	 Kalimantan	 Province	 in	 2008.	 Another	 REDD+	demonstration	 activity	 in	 Central	 Sulawesi	 Province	 was	 also	 underway	 through	collaboration	between	the	MOF	and	the	UN-REDD	Indonesia	programme	(Indarto	et	
al.,	 2012).	The	 aim	of	 the	demonstration	activities	 is	 to	 enable	 the	Government	of	Indonesia	 to	 identify	 the	 most	 effective	 mechanisms	 to	 reduce	 deforestation	 and	forest	 degradation	 through	 sustainable	 management	 of	 forests.	 	 In	 addition	 to	REDD+	demonstration	activities,	the	MOF	also	developed	Reference	Emissions	Level	
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(REL)	that	is	a	benchmark	for	assessing	Indonesia’s	performance	in	reducing	carbon	emissions.	 REL	 is	 expressed	 in	 tonnes	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 equivalent	 per	 year.	 In	2009,	the	MOF	issued	Ministerial	Decree	No	36/2009	that	outlines	mechanisms	on	the	 distribution	 of	 income	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 carbon	 credits	 according	 to	 forest	category.	However,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	has	contested	the	decree	and	argued	that	the	MOF	has	no	authority	and	 legal	 jurisdiction	 to	govern	REDD+	 financial	benefit	sharing	mechanisms	(Ituarte-Lima,	McDermott	and	Mulyani,	2014).		REDD+	 is	 positioned	 as	 a	 key	 element	 in	 realizing	 Indonesia’s	 pledge	 to	 reduce	emissions	by	26%	by	2020	 (or	41%	 reduction	with	 international	 support)	 (Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015).	The	pledge	 then	became	official	 in	2011	when	the	President	passed	 Decree	 No.	 61	 on	 the	 National	 Action	 Plan	 to	 Reduce	 Green	 House	 Gas	Emissions.	Since	then,	several	international	donors	have	offered	their	support	to	the	Government	of	Indonesia	(GoI)	for	its	readiness	activities.	In	May	26th	2010,	a	Letter	of	 Intention	 (LoI)	 worth	 1US$	 billion	 was	 signed	 by	 both	 the	 GoI	 and	 the	Government	 of	 Norway	 under	 the	 Norway’s	 International	 Climate	 and	 Forest	Initiative	(NICFI).	The	signing	of	the	LoI	has	paved	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	a	REDD+	Taskforce	through	Presidential	Decree	No.	19,	2010,	which	aims	to	accelerate	the	 national	 REDD+	 readiness	 processes	 (Indarto	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	 head	 of	 the	President’s	 Delivery	 Unit	 for	 Development	 Monitoring	 and	 Oversight1	(Unit	 Kerja	
Presiden	 Bidang	 Pengawasan	 dan	 Pengendalian	 Pembangunan,	 hereafter	 UKP4),	Kuntoro	Mangkusubroto,	was	tasked	to	lead	the	REDD+	Taskforce.			The	 LoI	 outlines	 three	 phases	 of	 Indonesia’s	 REDD+:	 preparation,	 transformation,	and	 full	 implementation	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010b).	 The	 Taskforce’s	main	role	 during	 the	 preparation	 phase	 was	 to	 develop	 the	 required	 policies	 and	measures	 for	 REDD+	 implementation	 in	 Indonesia.	 This	 phase	 is	 also	 known	 as	REDD+	readiness	-	when	a	country	builds	its	capacity,	action	plan,	and	strategy	to	be	ready	 to	 implement	 REDD+.	 The	 LoI	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 permanent	REDD+	Agency,	the	appointment	of	REDD+	pilot	provinces,	the	development	of	MRV																																																									1	UKP4	is	a	special	ad-hoc	body	that	was	formed	during	President	Yudhoyono’s	presidency	to	 address	 silos	 among	 ministries	 and	 monitor	 the	 completion	 of	 national	 strategic	programs.	The	UKP4	was	heavily	 involved	 in	REDD+	through	 the	appointment	of	Kuntoro	Mangkusubroto,	 the	head	of	UKP4,	as	 the	head	of	 the	REDD+	Taskforce.	 Since	 then,	UKP4	played	a	key	role	as	REDD+	proponent	in	Indonesia.	
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mechanisms,	and	 the	 implementation	of	 forest	moratorium	policy	 for	 Indonesia	 to	receive	performance-based	payment	 from	NICFI.	Figure	1.1	below	summarizes	 the	transition	of	REDD+	implementation	in	Indonesia.			
	Figure	1.1	REDD+	transition	in	Indonesia		REDD+	initiatives,	like	those	in	Indonesia,	are	being	unrolled	across	forested	parts	of	the	majority	world.	Hopes	are	high	that	REDD+	will	provide	a	means	of	addressing	forest	 emissions	by	 creating	 financial	 incentives	 for	 improved	 forest	management.	Its	 negotiations,	 however,	 have	 proved	 controversial	 (Beymer-Farris	 and	 Bassett,	2012;	 Eilenberg,	 2015)	with	 a	 divide	 emerging	 between	 those	 seeking	 to	 develop	practical	mechanisms	to	implement	the	program,	and	critics	concerned	with	issues	associated	with	the	neoliberalisation	of	nature	(McGregor,	2010;	Arsel	and	Büscher,	2012;	 Beymer-Farris	 and	 Bassett,	 2012;	 Corson,	 MacDonald	 and	 Neimark,	 2013;	McGregor	et	al.,	2014a).	I	discuss	neoliberal	critiques	of	REDD+	in	the	next	section.		
IFCA	(2006	- 2008)	
Milestones:Hosted	COP	13Development	of	INCAS
Key	actors:	MOF,	the	World	Bank,	Australia,	United	Kingdom,	Germany IAFCP,	UN-REDD	(2008	- 2013)
Milestones:Demonstration	activitiesReference	Emissions	levelBenefit	sharing	mechanism
Key	actors:MOF,	Australia,	Ministry	of	Development	Planning,	UN-REDD NICFI	(2010	- present)
Milestones:G-20	Emissions	reduction	targetsNational	REDD+	StrategyREDD+	Pilot	ProvincesREDD+	AgencyMRV	&	Financial	instrumentsForest	Moratorium
Key	actors:	UKP4,	the	REDD+	Taskforce,	Norway
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1.3 REDD+	and	the	Neoliberalization	of	Nature	Economics	 scholars	 such	 as	 Friedman	 and	 Hayek,	 along	with	 think	 tanks	 such	 as	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	promoted	neoliberalism	in	the	20th	century	as	an	ideology	that	is	based	on	the	reorganization	of	governance	according	to	market	rationalities	(Peck	and	 Tickell,	 2007).	 Despite	 being	 one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 ideologies	 of	contemporary	 society,	 neoliberalism	 is	 rarely	 defined	 in	 a	 consistent	manner	 that	shows	 one	 homogeneous	 and	 coherent	 explanation	 (Peck	 and	 Theodore,	 2007;	Brenner,	Peck	and	Theodore,	2010a,	2010b).		Rather	than	seeing	this	heterogeneity	as	 a	 limitation,	 critical	 scholars	 analyse	 neoliberalism	 in	 its	 varied	 empirical	 and	discursive	 expressions	 occurring	 at	 multiple	 geopolitical	 scales	 through	 diverse	spatio-temporal	 practices	 and	 agencies	 (Liverman,	 2004;	 Brenner,	 Peck	 and	Theodore,	2010a;	Castree,	2010a;	While,	 Jonas	and	Gibbs,	2010;	Bakker,	2013).	As	an	 ideology,	 neoliberalism	 emerges	 as	 a	 response	 to	 a	 perceived	 failure	 of	 the	Keynesian	model	 of	 governance,	where	 the	 state	 is	 seen	 to	 have	 the	main	 role	 in	governing	society	and	economy.			Critical	 debates	 on	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	 markets	 in	 environmental	management	have	 led	 to	 the	emergence	of	 scholarly	works	on	neoliberalization	of	nature	(McCarthy	and	Prudham,	2004;	Bakker,	2010;	Castree,	2010b,	2010d,	2011;	Arsel	 and	 Büscher,	 2012).	 These	 works	 discuss	 the	 infiltration	 of	 market	rationalities	and	capitalism	in	conservation	practices	and	environmental	governance	and	the	ramifications	of	this	for	affected	communities	(Heynen	and	Robbins,	2005;	Brockington	and	Duffy,	2010;	Büscher	et	al.,	2012).	Environmental	economists	and	multilateral	 institutions,	 such	as	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	 (UNEP),	advocate	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 green	 economy	 based	 on	 neoliberal	 principles	 as	 an	alternative	 to	 unsustainable	 forms	 of	 economic	 development	 which	 do	 not	 value	nature	 (Victor	 and	 Jackson,	 2012;	 unep.org,	 2015).	 For	 its	 defenders	 the	 green	economy	carries	with	it	the	healing	pill	to	address	what	Polanyi	refers	to	as	capital’s	double	 movement.	 	 The	 term	 “double	 movement”	 is	 employed	 to	 describe	 a	condition	where	 the	 attempts	 to	 expand	 liberal	 capitalism	 are	 faced	with	 various	forms	of	resistance.	In	the	context	of	nature	commodification,	the	double	movement	refers	 to	 the	 contradiction	 between	 the	 rise	 of	 global	 economic	 growth	 and	 its	
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inevitable	side	effects	-	the	dwindling	of	the	earth’s	resources	and	massive	ecological	destruction	(Polanyi,	1944;	Stroshane,	1997;	Low,	2002;	O’Hara,	2009).			Green	 economy	 campaigners	 see	 the	 pricing	 of	 nature’s	 services	 and	 goods	 as	 a	mechanism	 that	 will	 allow	 the	 incorporation	 of	 environmental	 externalities	 into	production	 costs.	 In	 theory,	 this	 calculative	mechanism	will	 incite	 green	 business	practices	 to	 proliferate.	 Ecological	modernization	 explains	 that	 trade-offs	 between	economic	 growth	 and	 environmental	 protection	 can	 be	 diminished	 through	 the	adoption	of	calculative	economic	measures	and	efficient	cross	cutting	 technologies	(Bäckstrand	and	Lövbrand,	2006).			Fairhead,	Leach,	and	Scoones	(2012,	p.	242)	note	how	notions	of	scarcity,	 loss	and	repair	 are	 employed	 to	 form	 what	 they	 call	 “the	 economic	 of	 repair”	 that	 is	 a	paradigm	in	natural	resources	management	that	sees	the	“unsustainable	use	 ‘here’	can	be	repaired	by	sustainable	practice	‘there’”	(Fairhead	and	Leach,	2003;	Leach	et	
al.,	 2012).	 The	 economics	 of	 repair,	 according	 to	 Fairhead,	 Leach	 and	 Scoones	(2012)	proposes	 the	double	valuation	of	nature:	 “for	 its	use	and	 for	 its	 repair”	 (p.	242).	This	principle	aligns	with	the	banner	of	saving	nature	by	putting	a	price	tag	on	it	(McAfee,	1999).	What	is	problematic	from	this	process	of	valuation	is	the	potential	for	the	appropriation	of	capital	by	actors	who	are	interested	in	accumulating	profits	from	the	valuation	of	both	the	use	of	nature’s	services	and	the	subsequent	efforts	to	repair	the	nature’s	damages.			The	 economics	 of	 repair	 is	 the	 underlying	 principle	 of	 REDD+	 carbon	 offsets.	Activists	often	frame	their	opposition	to	REDD+	by	highlighting	the	uneven	policies	that	prolong	privilege	in	northern	countries	to	emit	more	carbon	emissions	as	long	as	they	can	pay	the	developing	countries	to	apply	particular	policies	and	measures	that	will	ensure	the	cessation	of	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	(Bumpus	and	Liverman,	 2008;	 Stephan,	 2012;	 Stephan	 and	 Paterson,	 2012;	 McGregor	 et	 al.,	2014b).	 Furthermore,	 critics	 highlight	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 additionality	 (that	 is	 a	principle	 that	 a	 particular	 offset	 project	 should	 have	 an	 additional	 benefit	 for	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	compared	to	the	baseline	situation	where	there	is	no	project)	 is	hard	to	prove	 in	actual	project	 implementation	(Streck,	2011;	van	
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Oosterzee,	Blignaut	 and	Bradshaw,	 2012).	 This	 is	 explained	well	 by	Welch	 (2007)	who	writes,	 “offsets	 are	 an	 imaginary	 commodity	 created	 by	 deducting	what	 you	hope	happens	from	what	you	guess	would	have	happened”	(cited	in	The	Guardian,	2007).	 At	 best	 offsets	 only	 postpone	 or	 displace	 environmental	 degradation	 from	one	place	to	another.	Critics	further	caution	that	the	valuation	and	commodification	of	carbon	 in	REDD+	is	not	a	neutral	scientific	undertaking,	but	rather	political	and	value-laden	 processes	 which	 privilege	 particular	 knowledges	 and	 knowledge	holders	over	others	(Corbera,	2012;	Gupta	et	al.,	2012).			In	 the	 governance	 of	 nature,	 neoliberalism	 is	 advocating	 for	 the	 incorporation	 of	market	 rationalities	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 the	world’s	 resources	 in	meeting	 people’s	needs	 by	 adopting	 principles	 such	 as	 efficiency,	 effectiveness,	 transparency,	 and	competitiveness	(Peck,	2010).	The	implementation	of	this	ideology	in	managing	the	biophysical	 world	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 what	 Heynen	 and	 Robbins	 (2005)	classify	 as	 four	 streams	 of	 neoliberal	 nature	 practices:	 governance,	 privatization,	enclosure,	and	valuation.	Castree	(2008a,	2008b)	elaborates	other	strategies	such	as	privatization,	 deregulation,	 re-regulation,	marketization,	 commodification,	 flanking	mechanisms	in	civil	society,	the	creation	of	market	oriented	individuals	and	spatial	expansion.	These	calculative	technologies	are	mixed	and	combined	to	 facilitate	 the	re-institutionalization	 of	 environmental	 governance	 toward	 market	 rationalities.	According	to	several	scholarly	views	these	practices	tend	to	aggravate	existing	social	inequalities	and	disadvantage	the	poor	(Harvey,	2006,	2009;	Castree,	2010a,	2011).	Employing	a	Marxist	perspective,	Harvey	(2009)	points	to	the	political	 intention	of	the	elites	 in	 the	society	of	using	neoliberalization	as	a	mechanism	of	accumulating	profits	and	retaining	authority	at	various	scales	(Harvey,	2009,	p.	19;	Peck,	2010).		Drawing	 on	 Polanyi’s	 notion	 of	 “fictitious	 commodities”,	 Castree	 (2010c)	 explains	the	 process	when	 particular	 ecosystem	 services	 are	 detached	 from	 their	 complex	ecological	 system	 to	 render	 them	 visible	 and	 quantifiable	 and	 therefore	 tradable	(Polanyi,	1944;	Castree,	2010c).	Polanyi	coined	the	term	“fictitious	commodities”	to	describe	any	commodities	(nature,	workers,	etc)	which	are	subjected	to	devaluation	process	 within	 a	 capitalist	 system.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 that	 the	 real	 values	 of	 these	commodities	 exceed	 those	 values	 assigned	 by	 the	 market.	 According	 to	 Castree	
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(2010c),	nature’s	ecosystem	services,	such	as	carbon	sequestration,	are	 impossible	to	be	equated	purely	with	monetary	values,	as	ecosystems	also	hold	intrinsic	social,	cultural,	 and	 biological	 values.	 The	 valuation	 of	 environmental	 services	 thus	 can	cause	 the	 restructuration	 of	 human	 –	 environment	 relationships	 in	 a	 way	 that	simplifies	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 relationship	 into	 a	 mere	 monetary	 expression	(Corbera,	 2012).	 Other	 criticisms	 of	 the	 neoliberalization	 of	 nature	 emerge	 from	Marxist	 thinking	 that	 problematizes	 the	 ramification	 of	 neoliberalization	 on	 the	principle	 of	 distributive	 justice	 in	 resource	 allocation	 (McCarthy	 and	 Prudham,	2004;	Harvey,	2009;	Arsel	and	Büscher,	2012).	In	the	context	of	REDD+,	for	instance,	the	 new	 economic	 opportunity	 from	 carbon	 commodification	 is	 legitimising	 the	formation	 of	 new	 agencies	 and	 governance	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 these	 new	 agencies	cornering	 a	 disproportionate	 share	 of	 REDD+	 financial	 benefits	 while	 further	marginalising	 the	 poor,	 leading	 to	 what	 Harvey,	 (2009)	 terms	 “accumulation	 by	dispossession”.	 Several	 scholars	 working	 on	 issues	 of	 green	 grabbing	 draw	 on	Harvey’s	 notion	 to	 understand	 the	 linkage	 between	 processes	 of	 capital	accumulation	 and	 territorialisation	 (Benjaminsen	 and	 Bryceson,	 2012;	 Fairhead,	Leach	 and	Scoones,	 2012;	Holmes,	 2014).	Green	grabbing	 is	 the	process	by	which	lands	 are	 enclosed	 and	 their	 rightful	 owners	 are	 displaced	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	capital	 accumulation,	 which	 usually	 intersects	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	commodification.			The	 proliferation	 of	 market	 hegemony	 is	 usually	 accompanied	 by	 lesser	 state	interferences	 in	distributing	nature’s	 goods	 and	 services	 (McCarthy	 and	Prudham,	2004).	This	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 however,	 that	 states	 lose	 their	 significance.	 Instead	 they	emerge	with	new	roles	to	develop	market	friendly	laws	and	regulations	and	ensure	the	 endorsement	 of	 such	 policies,	 albeit	 tainted	 occasionally	 with	 cronyism	 and	political	 collusions	 (Castree,	 2011).	 In	 explaining	 neoliberalism	 as	 state	governmental	strategy,	Foucault	(2009,	p.	132;	cited	in	Fletcher	and	Breitling,	2012)	eloquently	warns	scholars	that,	“neoliberalism	should	not	be	identified	with	laissez	faire,	but	rather	with	permanent	vigilance,	activity	and	intervention”.	 In	this	thesis	then,	while	paying	attention	to	non-state	actors’	 involvements	in	REDD+,	one	of	its	core	 concerns	 is	 investigating	 how	 the	 GoI	 has	 attempted	 to	 normalize	 REDD+	market	mechanisms	as	a	calculative	technique	in	governing	Indonesia’s	forests.			
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	Proponents	of	neoliberal	nature	advocate	for	the	potentiality	of	market	mechanisms	in	 providing	 additional	 livelihood	 opportunities	 for	 rural	 and	 forest	 dependent	communities	(Wunder,	2001;	Kerr,	2002;	Pagiola,	Arcenas	and	Platais,	2005;	Bulte	
et	 al.,	 2008;	 Engel,	 Pagiola	 and	 Wunder,	 2008;	 Jindal,	 Kerr	 and	 Carter,	 2012).	Conversely,	McAfee	(2012)	asserts	that	market	environmentalism	cannot	go	hand	in	hand	with	poverty	alleviation,	as	often	the	principles	of	efficiency	and	effectiveness	significant	to	a	markets	oppose	poverty	alleviation	initiatives.	Critical	scholars	warn	of	 the	 emergence	 of	 “inclusionary	 neoliberalism”	 as	 a	 deceptive	 mechanism	 that	tries	 to	 hide	 the	 ideology	 of	 capitalism	 behind	 the	 curtain	 of	 caring	 and	 inclusive	neoliberal	 nature	 (Weyland,	 2003;	 Fletcher	 and	 Breitling,	 2012;	 McAfee,	 2012).	Milne	and	Adams(2012)	call	 this	process	a	market	masquerade.	REDD+	as	market	environmentalism	 is	 seen	 by	 its	 critics	 as	 being	 built	 upon	 an	 image	 of	 inclusive	mitigation	 that	 offers	 benefits	 not	 only	 for	 climate	 change	 mitigation,	 but	 also	biodiversity	protection	and	poverty	alleviation.			As	 explored	 above,	 critical	 scholars	 discuss	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 escalating	growth	of	the	neoliberalization	of	nature	 in	environmental	governance	by	drawing	on	 concepts	 such	 as	 marginalization,	 justice,	 and	 hegemony.	 Most	 of	 these	literatures	however	tend	to	adopt	a	perception	that	the	neoliberalization	of	nature	is	homogeneous	and	static,	and	as	such,	oppressive	and	hegemonic	(K.	Bakker,	2009).	Castree	 (2010d)	 cautions	 scholars	 not	 to	 be	 trapped	 in	 this	 rather	 premature	analysis	 and	 for	 them	 not	 to	 jump	 to	 a	 conclusion	 coming	 from	 a	 shallow	investigation	 that	 overlooks	 the	 underlying	 political	 context	 of	 a	 particular	 case.	Drawing	 on	 this	 advice,	 the	 next	 section	 discusses	 the	 emerging	 concept	 of	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	 as	 a	 new	 way	 of	 seeing	 the	 grounded	 implementation	 of	neoliberal	nature	that,	given	the	right	political	condition,	can	potentially	become	the	seeds	for	progressive	transformation.			
1.4 REDD+	and	Not-Quite-Neoliberal	Nature	Following	 Foucault’s	 post-structuralist	 approach,	 I	 view	 neoliberalization	 in	environmental	 governance	 as	 manifested	 not	 only	 in	 the	 economic	 principles	 of	
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governance	but	expressed	in	all	aspects	of	human	and	environment	relationships,	be	they	 social,	 cultural	 or	 political.	 Thus,	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 neoliberalism	 is	 an	ideology	 that	works	 by	 shaping	 our	way	 of	 thinking	 and	 being	 a	 “general	 style	 of	thought,	 analysis	 and	 imagination”	 (Foucault,	 2009,	 p.	 218	 cited	 in	 Fletcher	 and	Breitling,	 2012).	This	 ideology	aims	 to	produce	 rational	neoliberal	 subjects	whose	decisions	regarding	particular	actions	are	based	upon	their	capacities	to	identify	any	possible	risks	and	opportunities	and	whom	in	the	end	can	be	held	accountable	 for	any	possible	impacts	(Dean,	2009;	Fletcher,	2010).	In	such	a	view,	neoliberalism	is	not	 necessarily	 oppressive	 but	 selectively	 empowers	 particular	 subjectivities	 and	forms	of	action	(Dean,	2009).			Based	on	grounded	analysis	of	several	neoliberalization	of	nature	projects	 in	Latin	America,	 de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker	 (2015,	 p.	 4)	 develop	 a	 concept	 of	 “not-quite-neoliberal	 nature”	 to	 explain	 the	 variegated	 “ambiguity	 of	 putatively	 post-neoliberal	responses,	given	that	they	may	be	simultaneously	strategic,	co-opted,	and	counter-hegemonic”.	The	three	authors	edit	a	special	issue	of	the	journal	Geoforum,	which	was	published	in	July	2015,	and	point	to	three	similar	themes	that	repeatedly	emerge	 throughout	 the	 articles	 that	 characterize	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	projects:	 1)	 concomitant	 and	 evolving	 political	 processes,	 2)	 tensions	 and	contradictions,	 and	3)	dynamism.	 In	 explaining	 concomitant	 and	 evolving	political	process,	 de	 Freitas,	Marston	 and	Bakker	 (2015)	 highlight	 how	 contributors	 in	 the	issue	 broaden	 their	 analysis	 beyond	 the	 neoliberalization-centric	 account	 by	capturing	the	multifaceted	political	and	socio-natures	context	in	which	their	projects	unfold.			Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe	 (2015)	 provide	 an	 example	 of	 a	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	project	from	the	Indigenous2	territorial	struggle	in	Bolivia	to	demand	special	rights	to	own	 land	by	 subverting	a	neoliberal	nature	project.	The	authors	 argue	 that	 the	special	titling	demanded	by	a	Bolivian	Indigenous	communities	to	divide	citizenship	and	give	them	specific	land	title	is	not	a	racial	policy	that	discriminates	against	and	render	these	communities	unfit	to	manage	lands	but	more	of	a	strategy	to	tackle	the																																																									2	Adjective	“Indigenous”	is	capitalised	throughout	the	thesis	as	a	form	of	recognition	to	the	formation	and	struggle	for	international	Indigenous	identity	(Johnson	et	al.,	2007)	
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“dispossessionary	 effects	 of	 capitalism”	 (Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	 2015,	 p.	 5).	 They	further	 argue	 that	 the	 governmental	 schemes	 employed	 by	 NGOs	 and	 Indigenous	communities	 to	 protect	 their	 territory	 through	 the	 marketization	 of	 high	conservation	 value	 areas	 has	 created	 spaces	 for	 a	 more	 radical	 Indigenous	movement	 rather	 than	 resulting	 in	 neoliberal	 co-optation	 of	 Indigenous	subjectivities.		They	use	the	term	“ethno-environmental	fix”	to	explain	governmental	techniques	 applied	 by	 NGOs	 and	 Indigenous	 communities,	 expressed	 through	articulation	 of	 green	 Indigenous	 subjectivities	 and	 territorialisation,	 as	 a	 struggle	against	land	appropriation.			The	same	situation	can	be	observed	in	Indonesia,	the	Indigenous	Peoples	Alliance	of	the	 Archipelago	 (AMAN)3	succeeds	 in	 centralizing	 discourse	 on	 Indigenous	 tenure	rights	 in	 the	 national	 REDD+	 debates	 (Agung	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Astuti	 and	 McGregor,	2015).	Aligning	with	the	REDD+	Taskforce’s	intention	to	produce	governable	spaces	and	 subjectivities	 for	 REDD+	 implementation,	 AMAN	 secured	 support	 from	 the	REDD+	proponents	 for	 their	 Indigenous	mapping	programmes.	Donors	 lined	up	 to	support	AMAN’s	efforts	 to	secure	and	clarify	conflicts	over	 Indigenous	 land	tenure	for	 successful	 carbon	 conservation	 implementations.	 This	 example	 reveals	 that	political	 spaces	 in	 environmental	 governance	 can	 be	 claimed	 from	 below.	 The	example	also	points	 to	 the	 first	 theme	that	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker	(2015)	explain,	 that	 is,	 the	 multifaceted	 context	 where	 a	 neoliberal	 project	 unfolds,	 and	underlines	the	significance	actor	agency	in	shaping	the	project.		Tensions	 and	 contradictions	 are	 the	 second	 theme	 that	 can	be	 found	 easily	 in	 the	not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	 projects	 (de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015).	 The	tensions	and	contradictions	arise,	for	instance,	from	the	differences,	inconsistencies	and	 incongruities	of	 laws,	 regulations,	and	norms	at	multiple	 scales	 that	are	being	utilised	by	actors	to	serve	their	interests	(de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).	In	the	 context	 of	 REDD+	 governance	 in	 Indonesia,	 activists	mobilised	 a	 campaign	 to	scrutinize	the	forest	moratorium	processes,	meaning	the	cessation	of	the	issuance	of	new	forest	concessions	for	any	types	of	forest	investment	activities	except	for	new																																																									3	AMAN	 is	 a	 national	 non-profit	 organization	 whose	 focus	 is	 to	 struggle	 for	 Indonesia’s	Indigenous	peoples	to	get	recognition	of	their	identities	and	rights.	
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carbon	 forestry	 projects	 and	 for	 activities	 that	 are	 seen	 to	 have	 a	 great	 positive	impact	to	the	society.	From	a	Marxist	perspective,	the	moratorium	can	be	seen	as	the	state’s	 spatial	 fixes	 to	 generate	 governable	 spaces	 for	 market	 environmentalism	projects	 (Harvey,	 1999),	 while	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 the	 moratorium	 is	 claimed	 by	environmental	 activists	 to	 be	 pushing	 the	 agenda	 of	 reform	 in	 Indonesia’s	 forest	governance	(see	Chapter	6).	The	moratorium	facilitates	a	new	level	of	transparency	and	public	participation,	thus	enabling	a	process	of	criticism	and	control.	Chapter	6	discusses	these	contradictions	using	the	case	study	of	the	One	Map	Initiative	(OMI).	Following	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker	(2015,	p.	5),	I	position	these	tensions	and	contradictions	as	a	possibility	for	“generating	the	potential	for	transformation”	and	justice.		The	 last	 characteristic	 of	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	 is	 dynamism	 (de	 Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).	Reflecting	on	REDD+	implementation	in	Indonesia,	the	REDD+	 Taskforce	 promotes	 the	 tagline	 “Beyond	 Carbon,	 More	 than	 Forest”	 to	emphasize	that	non	carbon	benefits	are	the	main	interest	of	the	GoI	(see	Chapter	5).	This	 strategy	 has	 proven	 effective	 in	 assembling	 wider	 support	 from	 Indonesia’s	civil	society.		While	the	civil	society’s	engagement	is	the	source	of	legitimacy	for	the	REDD+	Taskforce’s	 authority,	 for	 activists	 this	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 opportunity	 to	 claim	political	 space	 in	 order	 to	 be	 more	 involved	 in	 the	 policy	 making	 processes	 (see	Chapter	 5).	 This	 dynamism	 of	 REDD+	 implementation	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 prompted	various	 discussions	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 REDD+	 readiness	 activities	 in	 advancing	 an	agenda	 for	 forest	 governance	 reform	 (see	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6).	 Indeed,	 de	 Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker	(2015,	p.	5)	have	highlighted	that	“to	foster	social	change	-	or	merely	favourable	conditions	-	actors	may	be	forced	to	sow	the	seeds	in	seemingly	inhospitable	 conceptual	 terrain	 or	 cultivate	 its	 early	 instars	 to	 mimic	 would-be	predatory	ideologies”	(see	also	Pieck,	2015).	Dynamism	allows	actors	to	continually	shape	 projects	 and	 policies	 that	 are	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 neoliberal	 ideology.	 It	creates	spaces	for	political	manoeuvring	that	are	essential	for	actors	to	pursue	their	interests	 (de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015;	 Pieck,	 2015).	 Taking	 into	consideration	the	dynamism,	tensions,	and	contradictions	of	REDD+	implementation	in	 Indonesia,	 this	 research	 adopts	 this	 not-quite-neoliberal	 perspective	 to	 analyse	REDD+	governmentalities	in	Indonesia.	
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1.5 Research	Objectives	and	Questions	Taking	 into	 account	 the	 theoretical	 discussion	 above	 and	 drawing	 from	 three	interrelated	 case	 studies	 on	 REDD+	 implementation	 in	 Indonesia	 this	 research	 is	guided	by	two	objectives:			 1. To	 examine	 how	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 are	 being	 developed,	applied,	 and	 contested,	 and	 with	 what	 effects,	 within	 three	 different	 case	studies.		
a. Case	study	1:	the	REDD+	Taskforce	To	 examine	 a	 selection	 of	 governmental	 technologies	 (or	 a	 set	 of	means,	techniques,	mechanisms,	procedures,	tactics)	being	developed	and	 applied	 by	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 to	 mainstream	 REDD+	 in	Indonesia	–	particularly	at	 the	national	 scale.	The	case	study	 focuses	on	 the	 participatory	 technologies	 being	 developed,	 the	 politics	surrounding	these	technologies	and	the	new	subjectivities	emerging.			
b. Case	study	2:	the	One	Map	Initiative	(OMI)	To	analyze	the	production	and	application	of	OMI	as	a	governmental	technology	 employed	 to	 produce	 governable	 space	 for	 REDD+	investment.	 The	 case	 study	 focuses	 on	 the	 design	 of	 OMI	 and	 the	selective	 engagement	 by	 activists	 seeking	 to	 reorient	 OMI	 towards	more	progressive	forest	governance.		
	
c. Case	study	3:	an	Indigenous	land	claim	assemblage	To	track	how	REDD+	technologies	are	contributing	to	the	formation	of	new	 political	 conjuncture	 in	 forest	 governance	 and	 to	 subsequently	trace	the	effect	of	this	new	conjuncture	to	a	particular	Indigenous	land	claim	assemblage	in	Central	Kalimantan.			 2. To	 examine	REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 using	 a	 not-quite-neoliberal	nature	 framework	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 constraints	 but	 also	 remain	 open	 to	
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strategic	and	progressive	possibilities	embedded	in	this	mechanism	of	forest	governance	reform.		To	 answer	 the	 above	 questions,	 this	 study	 engages	 with	 the	 theory	 of	governmentality	which	I	will	briefly	introduce	in	the	following	section	and	elaborate	in	Chapter	2.	The	three	case	studies	were	chosen	through	a	process	of	following	the	translation	of	the	metaphor	“Beyond	Carbon,	More	than	Forest”.	This	metaphor	was	created	 by	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 to	 politically	 declare	 that	 instead	 of	 exclusively	focusing	 on	 carbon	 offsets,	 REDD+	 is	 to	 be	 symbolically	 employed	 to	 advance	 the	forest	governance	reform	and	low	carbon	economic	development	in	Indonesia.	The	three	 case	 studies	 represent	 the	key	 sites	where	 the	metaphor	 is	being	 translated	into	REDD+	governmental	technologies	(see	Chapter	3).				The	thesis	 is	 informed	by	Anna	Tsing’s	(2005)	ethnography	of	global	connection.	 I	study	the	“friction”	or	awkward	interconnections	across	geographical	scales,	actors	and	 political	 difference.	 Case	 study	 1	 on	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 represents	 the	interconnection	 between	 REDD+	 global	 discourses	 and	 its	 translation	 and	normalization	at	the	national	scale.	Case	study	2	on	OMI	sketches	the	production	of	“technological	 fixes”	 and	 its	 messy	 actualities	 at	 the	 national	 and	 district	 levels	(Scott,	1998;	Li,	2005).	This	case	study	also	illustrates	the	agency	of	non-state	actors	in	proposing	an	alternative	to	the	state’s	technological	fixes.	The	final	case	study	on	Indigenous	 land	 claims	 shows	 the	 awkward	 engagement	 between	 local	 actors	struggling	against	land	appropriation	and	REDD+	proponents’	interest	in	producing	governable	spaces	and	pro-REDD+	subjectivities.	Chapter	3	will	provide	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	three	case	studies	and	the	research	methodology.	Each	of	the	case	studies	will	be	addressed	in	Chapters	5,	6	and	7	respectively.				The	 research	 is	 also	 informed	 by	 the	 work	 of	 geographers	 Julie	 Graham	 and	Katherine	 Gibson	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 Gibson-Graham,	 their	 joint	 pen	 name)	who	emphasize	the	notion	of	hopeful	geographies	-	to	not	be	rendered	powerless	by	naming	 neoliberal	 ideologies	 but	 to	 instead	 focus	 our	 energies	 on	 producing	 and	highlighting	alternatives	(Gibson-Graham,	2005,	2008).	Drawing	on	these	politics	of	hope	and	the	not-quite	neoliberal	nature	framework,	Chapter	8	discusses	the	second	
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objective	 of	 the	 research	 that	 aims	 to	 understand	 how	 REDD+	 is	 being	 co-opted,	challenged	 and	 subverted	 by	 diverse	 actors	 to	 carry	 within	 it	 the	 socio-environmental	 justice	 agenda	 that	 challenges	 simple	 neo-liberal	 readings.	 The	remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 governmentality	 and	 lays	 out	the	structure	of	the	thesis.		
1.6 REDD+	Governmentality	Governmentality	is	a	theoretical	approach	introduced	by	Foucault	in	the	1970s	that	has	 re-oriented	 thinking	 about	 governance	 and	 power.	 Governmentalities	 can	 be	understood	“in	the	broad	sense	[as]	techniques	and	procedures	for	directing	human	behavior”	(Foucault,	1998,	p.	82).	Stripple	and	Bulkeley	(2013b,	p.	32)	explain	that	“governmentality	 deals	with	 how	particular	mentalities	 –	 or	ways	 of	 thinking	 and	acting	 –	 are	 invested	 in	 the	 process	 of	 governing”.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	governmentality	 as	 a	 form	 of	 power	 scholars	 have	 to	 examine	 its	 empirical	articulations	 through	 the	 investigation	 of	 governmental	 rationalities	 and	programmes	 (Dean,	 2009).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 governance,	governmentality	has	been	widely	applied	in	the	examination	of	climate	governance	(Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006;	 Lövbrand	 and	 Stripple,	 2011;	 Stripple	 and	Bulkeley,	2013a;	Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015),	 forest	policies	(Winkel,	 2012),	 carbon	 economies	 (Lovell	 and	 Liverman,	 2010;	 Descheneau	 and	Paterson,	2012;	Dixon	and	Challies,	2015),	carbon	science	and	modeling	(Lövbrand,	Stripple	and	Wiman,	2009;	Gupta	et	al.,	2012),	and	climate	risk	and	adaptation	(Oels,	2005).				Following	Stripple	and	Bulkeley	(2013b),	 I	argue	that	engaging	governmentality	 in	investigating	REDD+	enables	us	to	see	government	as	a	“hybrid,	non-hierarchical	and	network-like	mode	of	governing”	(p.	28).	In	doing	so,	it	denies	the	centrality	of	the	state’s	role	in	the	process	of	governing	and	opens	up	the	growing	role	of	non-state	actors	 in	 REDD+	 politics.	 Governmentality	 analysis	 sees	 power	 as	 diffuse	 and	immanent,	enabling	scholars	to	problematize	the	dichotomy	between	the	public	and	the	private	and	between	state	and	non-state	(Stripple	and	Bulkeley,	2013b,	p.	35).		Instead	environmental	governance	 is	seen	as	a	contested	terrain	 that	 is	shaped	by	
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diverse	 interests	 and	 tensions	 (Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006).	 Through	governmentality,	we	see	governing	not	as	a	totalizing	activity	but	various	attempts	aimed	at	managing	humans	and	their	relations	with	things	through	technologies	and	discursive	practices	(Dean,	2009;	Foucault,	2009;	Walters,	2012).		The	 inclusion	of	 the	private	sector	and	other	actors	 in	governing	 the	environment	have	 triggered	 extensive	 scholarly	 debates	 on	 advanced	 liberal	 government	 as	 a	mode	 of	 governance	 (Oels,	 2005;	 Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006;	 Bulkeley	 and	Schroeder,	 2012).	 Governmentality	 helps	 in	 investigating	 the	 emergence	 of	governmental	 assemblages	 in	 new	 sites	 and	 facilitates	 the	 examination	 of	 its	implications	and	impacts	(Fletcher,	2010;	Stripple	and	Bulkeley,	2013a;	McGregor	et	
al.,	2014b).	In	using	governmentality	theory	to	analyse	climate	change	governance,	Stripple	and	Bulkeley	(2013b)	argue	that	governmentality	provides	critical	scholars	with	 a	 toolbox	 to	 “grasp	 and	 highlight	 the	 existence	 of	 changing	 discursive	production	 of	 a	 warming	 world	 and	 its	 effects	 in	 mitigating	 or	 adapting	 to	 that	world”	(p.	33).			There	are	two	ways	of	understanding	governmentality:	as	a	form	of	power	and	as	an	analytical	 framework	 (Lövbrand	 and	 Stripple,	 2013).	 As	 a	 modality	 of	 power,	governmentality	 is	 loosely	defined	as	a	set	of	practices	and	 technologies	 to	enable	population	 and	 subjects	 to	 govern	 others	 and	 themselves	 (Foucault,	 1998,	 2009;	Dean,	2009;	Lövbrand	and	Stripple,	2013).	On	the	other	hand,	as	an	analytical	tool,	governmentality	 is	 described	 as,	 seeking	 to	 identify	 these	 “different	 styles	 of	thought,	 their	conditions	of	 formation,	 the	principles	and	knowledges	they	borrow	from	 and	 generate,	 the	 practices	 they	 consist	 of,	 how	 they	 are	 carried	 out,	 their	contestations	 and	 alliances	 with	 other	 arts	 of	 governing”	 (Rose,	 O’Malley	 and	Valverde,	2006,	p.	84	cited	in	Lovbrand	and	Stripple,	2013).		This	 thesis	 engages	 with	 both	 notions	 of	 governmentality.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 employ	governmentality	as	a	means	to	ask	about	a	way	of	government	that	pays	particular	attention	to	the	relationship	between	the	construction	of	truth	and	the	production	of	governmental	 techniques	 in	 REDD+	 implementation	 in	 Indonesia	 (Lövbrand	 and	Stripple,	 2013).	 In	 this	 case,	 governmental	 techniques	 are	 forms	 of	 self-
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enhancement	 technologies	 that	 are	 designed	 to	 systematically	 allow	 subjects	 to	regulate	 their	conduct	according	to	 the	REDD+	discourses,	 for	 instance,	discourses	on	green	economy	and	low	carbon	development.				Dean	 (2009)	 highlights	 that	 governmentality	 scholars	 ask	 the	 how	 of	 the	government	rather	than	the	who.	Rose	and	Miller	(1992)	point	to	the	importance	of	analysing	 “rationalities	 of	 government”	 that	 shape	 the	 way	 government	 is	 being	conducted	and	“technologies	of	government”	through	which	rationalities	are	applied	(Barry,	Osborne	and	Rose,	1996).	To	study	rationalities	of	government,	we	need	to	investigate	 the	 discursive	 fields	 upon	which	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 are	 represented	and	 employed	 (Lövbrand	 and	 Stripple,	 2013).	 To	 investigate	 technologies	 of	government,	 scholars	have	 to	 look	at	diverse	assemblage	of	 technologies,	material	artefacts	 and	 tools	 that	 make	 the	 conduct	 of	 conduct	 operable	 (Lövbrand	 and	Stripple,	 2013).	 These	 can	 be	 done	 through	 analyzing	maps,	 diagrams,	 accounting	and	statistical	methods	that	are	used	in	rendering	visible	the	object	of	governance	as	something	 that	 is	 measurable	 and	 governable	 (Scott,	 1998;	 Demeritt,	 2001;	 Li,	2007c;	Edwards,	2010).	In	the	context	of	REDD+,	for	instance,	researchers	focus	on	forest	 carbon	 through	 the	 representational	 techniques	 used	 by	 scientists	 and	climate	economists	(Baldwin,	2003).		Through	 what	 Lovbrand	 and	 Stripple	 (2011)	 call	 the	 “analytics	 of	 carbon	accounting”,	they	pay	attention	to	how	carbon	is	turned	into	objects	of	governance	in	 three	 different	 governmental	 domains:	 “the	 national	 carbon	 sink”;	 the	 “carbon	credit”,	 and	 “the	 personal	 carbon	 budget”,	 to	 render	 visible	 the	 governmental	technologies	applied	 in	 shaping	human	behaviors	 in	each	of	 these	domains.	These	processes	 of	 ordering,	 classifying,	 and	 representing	 constitute	 “particular	ways	 of	seeing,	knowing	and	acting	upon	nature	at	particular	times	in	history”	(Stripple	and	Bulkeley,	2013b,	p.	33).	For	example	Stephan	(2012)	and	Edward	(2010)	underline	the	advancement	of	 technology	 in	 climate	 science	 such	as	 remote	 sensing	and	GIS	software	 that	 facilitate	 the	 depiction	 of	 land	 use	 change	 and	 its	 impacts	 on	 the	amount	of	forest	carbon	emissions.	These	technologies	have	helped	in	enabling	the	governance	of	human	activities	relating	to	land	use	changes.		
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Emerging	literature	on	neoliberal	governmentality	focuses	attention	on	the	process	of	 subjectification,	 or	 the	 production	 of	 new	 subjectivities	 (Paterson	 and	 Stripple,	2010;	Rice,	2010).	As	a	form	of	power,	governmentality’s	key	feature	is	the	notion	of	“self-government”,	 that	 is	 the	 process	 through	which	 individuals	 are	motivated	 to	behave	and	act	according	to	state	objectives	without	coercion	or	force	but	because	it	is	seen	in	their	own	self-interest	(Dean,	2009).	Paterson	and	Stripple	(2010)	outline	the	proliferation	of	practices	and	technologies	that	target	individuals	and	companies	to	adopt	what	they	call	“carbon	conduct”.	This	type	of	governmentality	shapes	how	people	think	and	act	in	order	to	reduce	carbon	emissions.	A	classification	system	is	employed	to	embed	individual	behavior	with	certain	types	of	actions,	such	as	carbon	dieters,	emitters,	displacers,	or	 traders	 (Paterson	and	Stripple,	2010;	Bulkeley	and	Stripple,	 2013)	 and	 encourage	 them	 to	 adopt	 and	 shift	 their	 subject	 positions.	Skoglund	 (2014)	 calls	 this	 ideal	 vision	 of	 a	 subject	 position	 “homo	 clima”,	 or	 self-regulating	 actors	 based	 on	 carbon	metrics	 (Rutland	 and	 Aylett,	 2008),	 or	 carbon-conscious	consumers	(Goede	and	Randalls,	2009).	Policy	makers	and	activists	often	employ	discourses	of	apocalyptic	imaginaries	to	motivate	changes	in	human	conduct	and	subjectivities	(Methmann	and	Rothe,	2012).		In	 linking	 previous	 discussions	 on	 neoliberal	 nature,	 REDD+	 and	 governmentality	there	 has	 been	 a	 tendency	 to	 interpret	 many	 matters	 of	 REDD+	 policies	 as	expressions	 of	 a	 neoliberal	 rationality.	 Blok	 (2013)	 cautions	 however,	 about	generalizing	 all	 the	 narratives	 of	 environmental	 policy	 into	 one	 totalizing	 story	 of	neoliberal	policy	as	 this	denies	plurality	and	contestation	within	the	production	of	governmentalities.	 	 Instead	 governmentality	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 assemblage	 that	 is	unfinished	and	always	in	the	making.	Studies	of	governmentality	can	challenge	the	perceived	 fixedness	and	rigidity	of	REDD+	as	dogmatic	governmental	system	from	above.	 Instead	 REDD+	 governance	 is	 embedded	 in	 an	 evolving	 assemblage	 of	differently	positioned	and	competing	actors.			Seeing	 the	 (not	 quite)	 neoliberal	 governmentalities	 through	 this	 lens	 directs	attention	 to	 how	 government	 takes	 place,	 the	 diversity	 of	 actors	 and	 interests	involved,	and	the	new	subjectivities	being	produced	and	contested.	The	concept	of	not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	 helps	 recognizes	 the	 agency	 of	 actors,	 tensions,	
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contradictions	and	the	particular	place	based	political	dynamism	in	the	production	of	 governmental	 technologies.	 	This	helps	 avoid	becoming	prematurely	 trapped	 in	oppressive	homogeneous	narratives	of	hegemonic	neoliberal	systems.				
1.7 Chapter	Outline	This	 chapter	 has	 introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 REDD+	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 neoliberal	nature,	 not-quite-neoliberal	 nature	 and	 governmentality.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	thesis	 will	 be	 divided	 into	 seven	 chapters	 with	 four	 chapters	 detailing	 the	 core	findings	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Following	 Anna	 Tsing’s	 (2005)	 ethnographic	 approach	 that	focuses	 on	 the	 cross	 scale	 and	 “awkward	 engagement”	 of	 diverse	 elements,	 this	thesis	 presents	 a	 particular	 multiscalar	 analysis	 of	 REDD+	 governmental	assemblages	in	Indonesia.			In	 the	 subsequent	 chapter,	 I	 deepen	 my	 review	 of	 Foucault’s	 genealogical	understanding	of	power	and	draw	upon	Dean’s	(2009)	governmentality	framework	to	 further	 the	 conceptual	 framing	 of	 this	 thesis.	 This	 chapter	 explores	 how	governmentality	 scholars	 study	 a	 particular	 governmental	 regime.	 	 It	 focuses	 on	rationalities	 of	 government;	 fields	 of	 visibility;	 technologies	 of	 government;	 the	production	 of	 knowledge;	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 subjectivities;	 process	 of	problematization	and	rendering	technical	–	and	applies	them	to	the	field	of	green	or	environmental	governmentalities.	These	elements	underpin	the	investigation	of	the	case	studies	in	the	three	core	empirical	chapters	of	the	thesis.			Chapter	3	lays	out	the	methodological	approach	and	discusses	my	positionality	and	reflexivity.	Drawing	on	a	poststructuralist	approach	and	Gibson-Graham’s	notion	on	hopeful	 geography	 research,	 I	 reflect	 on	 the	 process	 of	 fieldwork,	 data	 collection	methods,	and	analysis	employed.	Furthermore,	by	claiming	a	political	position	as	a	scholar	 activist,	 I	 reflect	 on	 my	 positionality	 as	 part	 of	 REDD+	 governmental	assemblage	 that	 I	 studied.	 This	 reflective	 approach	 has	 helped	 to	 expand	 my	understanding	on	REDD+	governmental	assemblages	in	Indonesia.		
	 24	
Chapter	4	provides	the	broad	political,	ecological	and	economic	context	in	which	this	research	 is	 conducted	 by	 exploring	 the	 general	 implementation	 and	 overview	 of	forest	 governance	 in	 Indonesia.	 It	 reviews	 the	 historical	 process	 of	 land	appropriation	 from	 Indigenous	 peoples	 and	 forest	 dependent	 communities,	conducted	or	sponsored	and	legitimized	by	the	state	apparatuses.	The	chapter	also	charts	 the	process	of	REDD+	 inception	 in	 country.	This	 chapter	demonstrates	 that	REDD+	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 not	 implemented	 in	 a	 vacuum	 but	 rather	 has	 to	 negotiate	with	and	be	shaped	by	existing	political	ecologies.		The	subsequent	three	core	chapters	(Chapters	5,	6	and	7)	report	on	the	case	studies	with	 earlier	 versions	 all	 submitted	 as	 co-authored	 journal	 articles4.	 Chapter	 5	examines	 focuses	 on	 three	 participatory	 governmental	 technologies	 employed	 by	the	REDD+	Taskforce	to	mainstream	carbon	rationalities	at	the	national	scale.	These	are	processes	of	communicating;	visualisation;	and	engagement.	Particular	attention	is	 devoted	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 “Beyond	 Carbon,	More	 than	 Forest”.	This	 tagline	has	enabled	openings	 for	activists	 to	 critically	engage	broader	REDD+	audiences	with	 issues	of	 justice	and	governance	reform	rather	than	to	solely	 focus	on	market	mechanisms	and	carbon	offsets.	However	the	chapter	also	warns	of	 the	possibility	 of	 depoliticisation	 through	 an	 analysis	 of	 activist	 subjectivities	 that	 are	
																																																								4 An	earlier	version	of	Chapter	5	has	been	published	as	an	article	in	the	journal	Asia	Pacific	
Viewpoint	 and	 co-authored	with	Andrew	McGregor.	 See	Astuti,	 R.,	&	McGregor,	 A.	 (2015).	Governing	 carbon,	 transforming	 forest	 politics:	 A	 case	 study	 of	 Indonesia's	 REDD+	 Task	Force.	Asia	Pacific	Viewpoint,	56(1),	21-36.		An	earlier	version	of	Chapter	6	has	been	accepted	as	an	article	 in	 the	 journal	Third	World	
Quarterly	and	co-authored	with	Andrew	McGregor.	See	Astuti,	R.	&	McGregor,	A.	(Accepted).	Responding	 to	 the	 Green	 Economy:	 How	 REDD+	 and	 the	 One	 Map	 Initiative	 are	Transforming	Forest	Governance	in	Indonesia.	Third	World	Quarterly.	
	An	earlier	version	of	Chapter	7	has	been	reviewed	and	resubmitted	as	an	article	in	Journal	of	 Peasant	 Studies	 and	 co-authored	with	Andrew	McGregor.	 See	Astuti,	 R.	&	McGregor,	A.	Assembling	 Indigenous	 Land	 Claims	 or	 Land	 Grabs?	 Opportunities	 and	 Constraints	 in	Indonesia’s	New	Forest	Carbon	Political	Conjuncture.	Journal	of	Peasant	Studies.			The	three	chapters	are	the	extended	version	of	the	submitted	articles.	They	contain	greater	empirical	data	and	broader	discussions	of	 theoretical	 framework.	 I	was	solely	 responsible	for	 the	 research	 fieldwork,	 data	 analysis	 and	 first	 full	 drafting	 and	 final	 versions	 of	 the	manuscripts	 of	 the	 articles.	 Andrew	 McGregor	 as	 a	 co-author/supervisor	 has	 generously	provided	feedback,	minor	editing	and	suggestions	for	the	three	articles.		
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becoming	 more	 open	 to	 the	 complexities	 of	 forest	 bureaucracies	 and	 more	permissive	of	the	government’s	inability	to	perform.			Chapter	6	draws	on	the	case	study	of	OMI,	a	technical	response	to	the	messiness	of	forestland	governance	where	there	is	no	clarity	over	who	has	the	rights	to	land,	and	where	and	what	kind	of	forest	activities	are	permissible.	By	closely	analysing	three	technologies	 of	 government	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 OMI,	 I	 reveal	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	REDD+	proponents	made	 to	problematize	current	 forest	governance	practices	and	in	 doing	 so	 legitimize	 new	 technologies	 that	 they	 propose	 and	 expect	 to	 produce	governable	spaces	for	market	environmentalism.	Taking	the	inspiration	from	Scott’s	(1998)	ontological	approach	in	Seeing	Like	a	State	and	extending	it	with	Li’s	(2005)	concept	 of	 looking	 beyond	 state	 failure,	 this	 chapter	 shows	 how	 the	 process	 of	rendering	technical	can	be	resisted,	co-opted	and	subverted	to	incorporate	issues	of	Indigenous	 tenure	 rights	 and	 Indigenous	 spatial	 knowledge	 in	 the	 governance	 of	Indonesia’s	forestland.			Chapter	 7	 assesses	 the	 impacts	 of	 forest	 carbon	 politics	 by	 connecting	 changes	 in	forest	 governance	with	 the	 assembling	of	 an	 Indigenous	 land	 claim.	By	 combining	governmentality,	 territoriality	 and	 assemblage	 approaches,	 this	 chapter	 is	 able	 to	analyse	 diverse	 discursive	 and	material	 practices	 that	 are	 required	 to	 assemble	 a	land	 claim.	 The	 chapter	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 current	 scholarly	 debates	 on	 land	grabbing	that,	among	others,	is	associated	with	carbon	conservation	projects	such	as	REDD+	(Borras	et	al.,	2011;	Fairhead,	Leach	and	Scoones,	2012;	Margulis,	McKeon	and	Borras,	2013).	By	looking	into	its	grounded	and	messy	actualities,	this	chapter	problematizes	the	assumed	divide	between	land	claims	and	land	grabs,	in	which	the	benevolent	 intention	 of	 the	 former	 can	 (un)intentionally	 transform	 into	 a	 form	of	land	 appropriation	 and	 grabbing	 (Hall,	Hirsch	 and	Li,	 2011).	Hence	 the	 chapter	 is	hopeful	but	cautious	about	the	grounded	outcomes	of	REDD+	governmentalities	for	emancipatory	forest	politics.		Chapter	8	recalls	the	research	objectives	and	the	findings	of	the	study	and	discusses	them	 in	 the	 relation	 to	 current	 debates	 on	 neoliberal	 and	 not-quite	 neoliberal	nature.	 In	 concluding	 the	 thesis,	 I	 present	 the	 contribution	 this	 thesis	proposes	 to	
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make	to	REDD+	theory	and	practice.	I	argue	that	REDD+	should	be	seen	as	an	arena	of	struggle	that	works	in	contradictory	and	complex	ways.			Figure	 1.2	 below	 summarizes	 the	 thesis	 chapters	 and	 illustrates	 the	 overall	structure	of	the	thesis.			
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	Figure	1.2	Thesis	structure	
(
Chapter 1: Introduction 
• Introduction to REDD+ through diverse frameworks: neoliberal nature, not-quite 
neoliberal nature and governmentality 
• Outline of research objectives and questions 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
• Outline of Foucault’s ontological understanding of power 
• Explanation of governmentality as an analytical framework for analysis in Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8 (
Chapter 3: Methodology 
• Description on the political framing of the thesis as a hopeful and critical research 
inspired by Gibson-Graham’s works 
• Outline of multi-sited and multi-scalar ethnographic methodology 
•  Reflections on positionality of the researcher as a scholar activist 
 
Chapter 6: Case study 2, the One Map Initiative 
• Exploration of the forest moratorium 
policy, the forest licence database, and 
participative mapping standard as 
governmental technologies that were used 
to both problematize deficiencies in forest 
governance and propose new solutions(
Chapter 7: Case study 3, the Indigenous land claims 
assemblage 
• Analysis of Indonesia’s new forest political conjuncture  
• Outline of diverse governmental technologies and other 
elements employed by the Bahanei and AMAN to 
assemble a land claim 
• Examination of frictions and tensions that can result in 
land claims being experienced, by some, as land grabs (
Chapter 8: Conclusion, to address research objective 2 
• Analysis of not-quite neoliberal nature of REDD+ governmentality in 
Indonesia 
• Outline of the contribution of the research 
Chapter 4: Context 
• Outline of the political ecology and economics context in which this research is 
conducted (
National scale of REDD+ implementation  
Multi-scalar implementation of REDD+ 
Chapter 5: Case study 1, the REDD+ 
Taskforce 
• Examination of the REDD+ 
Taskforce governmental strategies that 
were employed to normalize REDD+ 
rationalities 
• Analysis of emerging new REDD+ 
subjectivities among environmental 
activists 
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1.8 Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 introduce	 the	 theoretical	 approaches,	 research	objectives,	 and	 outline	 of	 the	 thesis.	 The	 chapter	 began	with	 a	 description	 of	 the	researcher’s	political	motivation	in	pursuing	this	study.	The	chapter	then	continued	with	exploration	of	REDD+	through	the	concepts	of	neoliberalization	of	nature,	and	not-quite-neoliberal	nature	and	governmentality.	The	three	concepts	have	provided	sufficient	background	for	the	introduction	of	the	research	objectives	and	questions.		To	 better	 grasp	 the	 approach	 of	 this	 study,	 I	 have	 briefly	 outlined	 the	 three	 case	studies	 that	 underpinned	 this	 empirical	 research	 and	 introduced	 this	 study	 as	 a	hopeful	yet	critical	inquiry.	A	short	discussion	on	governmentality	in	the	subsequent	section	was	intended	to	introduce	the	main	theoretical	framework	and	provide	the	opening	for	the	next	chapter.	The	chapter	is	concluded	with	the	outline	in	Figure	1.2	that	provides	the	road	map	to	navigate	through	the	eight	chapters	that	make	up	this	body	of	scholarship.			 	
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2 Theoretical	Review	~	The	Art	of	Governing	
Human	and	Forest	Relationships	
	
What	does	it	mean	to	govern	a	ship?	It	means	clearly	to	take	charge	of	the	sailors,	but	
also	of	the	boat	and	its	cargo;	to	take	care	of	a	ship	means	also	to	reckon	with	winds,	
rocks	and	storms;	and	it	consists	in	that	activity	of	establishing	a	relation	between	the	
sailors	who	are	to	be	taken	care	of	and	the	ship	which	is	to	be	taken	care	of,	and	the	
cargo	which	is	to	be	brought	safely	to	port,	and	all	those	eventualities	like	winds,	rocks,	
storms	and	so	on;	this	is	what	characterizes	the	government	of	a	ship	(Foucault,	1991a,	pp.	93	–	94).	
		
2.1 Introduction	Foucault	 (1991a,	 p.	 93)	 employed	 the	 above	 illustration	 on	 governing	 a	 ship	 to	explain	 the	 core	 concept	 of	 government.	 Following	 Guillaume	 de	 la	 Perriere,	 he	defined	government	as	 “the	right	disposition	of	 things,	arranged	so	as	 to	 lead	 to	a	convenient	end”.	Through	this	notion	of	government,	Foucault	argued	that	the	object	of	government	is	no	longer	confined	by	territorial	borders	and	subjected	only	to	its	inhabitants	as	 initially	characterized	 in	Machiavelli’s	elaboration	of	 the	power	of	a	prince.	On	the	contrary,	Foucault	(1991a)	asserted	that	what	government	has	to	be	concerned	with	 is	 “men	 [sic]	 in	 their	 relations,	 their	 links,	 their	 imbrication	with	those	other	things	which	are	wealth,	resources,	means	of	subsistence,	the	territory	with	 its	 specific	qualities,	 climate,	 irrigation,	 fertility,	 etc…”	 (p.	93).	To	 this	 list	we	could	add	forest	carbon,	in	which	the	core	challenge	is	to	manage	the	relationships	between	humans	and	forests.			In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 introduced	 REDD+	 as	 the	 latest	 type	 of	 governmental	mechanism	directed	at	human	 -	 forest	 relationships.	 	 It	 is	 inspired	by	 the	popular	notion	 that	 market	 mechanisms	 are	 effective	 in	 solving	 global	 environmental	problems	 (Mcafee	 and	Shapiro,	 2010;	Osborne,	 2011;	Corbera,	 2012;	Fletcher	 and	Breitling,	 2012;	 McElwee,	 2012).	 Critical	 geography	 scholars	 are	 concerned	 such	
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approaches	 for	 neoliberal	 nature,	 involving	 processes	 of	 commodification,	 re-regulation,	 privatization	 and	 re-territorialization	 are	 aimed	 at	 altering	 human	behavior	 and	 shaping	 how	 people	 see	 and	 value	 the	 environment	 (Mcafee	 and	Shapiro,	2010;	Osborne,	2011;	Büscher	et	al.,	2012;	Büscher	and	Fletcher,	2015).			However,	 as	 the	 previous	 chapter	 has	warned,	 the	 neoliberalization	 of	 nature	 is	 a	contested	concept	in	geography	(Ferguson,	2010;	Yates	and	Bakker,	2014;	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).		Diverse	scholarly	attempts	have	been	made	to	establish	a	 link	 between	 studies	 of	 the	 neoliberalization	 of	 nature	 and	 empirical	 REDD+	policies	 and	 implementation	 (McElwee,	 2012;	Milne	 and	 Adams,	 2012;	 Astuti	 and	McGregor,	2015;	McGregor,	Eilenberg	and	Coutinho,	2015).	These	empirical	studies	argue	 that	 market-oriented	 mechanisms	 to	 protect	 nature,	 such	 as	 Payment	 for	Environmental	 Services	 (PES)	 and	 REDD+,	 do	 not	 always	 follow	 the	 general	characteristics	 associated	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 theses	 in	 which	 accumulation	 by	dispossession	 and	 the	 capitalisation	 of	 nature	 become	 the	 main	 rationality	 of	government,	reducing	the	state	to	a	minimal	role.	REDD+	is	more	complex	than	that	–	 having	 shifted	 from	 a	 monofunctional	 perspective	 that	 centrally	 focuses	 on	sequestering	carbon	into	a	web	of	multifunctional	and	multi-actor	perspectives	that	involve	 Indigenous	 issues,	 biodiversity	 protection,	 livelihood	 improvement,	 and	forest	 governance	 reform	 (as	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 see	 also	 (Thompson,	Baruah	 and	 Carr,	 2011;	Mahanty,	 Suich	 and	 Tacconi,	 2013;	 Sunderlin	 et	al.,	 2014;	Atela	et	al.,	2015).			In	 this	 thesis	 I	 investigate	 these	shifting	governmental	narratives,	rationalities	and	technologies	 that	 are	 accompanying	 this	 change	 in	 forest	 governance	 through	 the	lens	of	governmentality.		REDD+	economies	require	new	ways	of	seeing	and	valuing	the	forests	which	are	being	mainstreamed	through	governmental	 technologies	and	rationalities	 (Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006;	 Gupta	 et	al.,	 2012;	McGregor	 et	al.,	2015).	 	The	concepts	and	approaches	from	governmentality	provide	useful	tools	to	examine	 these	 processes	 and	 understand	 how	 everyday	 encounters	 of	 power	 are	reshaping	 our	 most	 banal	 desires	 and	 dreams	 of	 co-existing	 with	 forests	(Rutherford,	 2007).	 Governmentality	 facilitates	 the	 examination	 of	 how	 the	production	and	circulation	of	particular	discourses	and	practices	shape	and	mould	
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our	 understanding	 of	 the	 forest	 as	 part	 of	 the	 socio-natural	 world	 we	 live	 in	(Rutherford,	 2007;	 Winkel,	 2012).	 	 As	 such	 it	 can	 inform	 neoliberal/not-quite-neoliberal	debates	regarding	human	-	forest	interactions.		This	chapter	expands	on	the	concept	of	governmentality	introduced	in	Chapter	1	as	the	main	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	 thesis.	 I	 start	with	 the	 examination	 of	 the	three	 types	 of	 power	 that	 Michel	 Foucault	 discussed	 in	 his	 various	 lectures:	sovereignty,	disciplinary	and	biopower,	before	leading	a	discussion	of	power	as	the	art	of	government	or	the	“conduct	of	conduct”	(Foucault,	1991a).	The	chapter	then	discusses	 the	 production	 of	 neoliberal	 subjectivities.	 It	 follows	 with	 a	 section	 on	discourse	analysis	as	a	means	of	studying	governmentality.	The	subsequent	section	presents	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	 analysing	 REDD+	 government	 employing	governmentality	theory	by	observing:	1)	governmental	rationales,	2)	technologies	of	government,	 3)	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge,	 4)	 the	 construction	 of	 new	subjectivities,	and	5)	 the	process	of	 rendering	 technical	(Dean,	2009).	The	chapter	then	outlines	some	critiques	and	limits	of	governmentality	as	a	theory	and	approach.	The	 chapter	 is	 completed	 with	 a	 conclusion	 that	 discusses	 REDD+	 as	 a	 form	 of	government	 –	 aimed	 at	 governing	 human	 -	 forest	 relationships.	 Throughout	 the	chapter	 examples	 are	 drawn	 from	 environmental	 governance	 with	 the	 goal	 of	showing	how	certain	governmental	rationalities,	discourses	and	subjectivities	have	become	 normalized	 and	 accepted	 as	 “truths”	 in	 governing	 human	 –	 environment	relationships.		
	
2.2 Three	types	of	power:	Sovereignty,	Disciplinary	and	
Biopower	Foucault	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 governmentality	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 traditional	understandings	of	power	that	saw	it	as	a	possession	that	was	held	by	the	sovereign	who	implemented	practices	of	coercion	and	discipline	to	achieve	their	goals	(Dean,	2009).	 Foucault’s	 conception	 of	 power	 is	 probably	 his	 biggest	 contribution	 to	 the	scholarly	 discourse	 on	 governance	 (Rutherford,	 2007).	 To	 understand	 Foucault’s	conception	of	power	and	governmentality,	I	will	examine	the	genealogy	of	power	out	
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of	 which	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 art	 of	 government	 grew	 (Dean,	 2009;	Walters,	 2012).	Therefore,	 in	 the	 section	 below	 I	 outline	 three	 types	 of	 power	 that	 together	 form	what	Foucault	called	“the	art	of	government”	or	governmentality	(Foucault,	1991a).	
	
2.2.1 Sovereign	Power	Through	his	 lecture	 in	Society	Must	Be	Defended,	 Foucault	 (2003)	 linked	 sovereign	power	 with	 disciplinary	 and	 biopower.	 Foucault	 (1991a)	 argued	 that	 sovereign	power	co-exists	other	newer	expressions	of	power	within	governance:		We	 need	 to	 see	 things	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 replacement	 of	 a	 society	 of	sovereignty	 by	 a	 disciplinary	 society	 and	 the	 subsequent	 replacement	 of	 a	disciplinary	society	by	a	society	of	government;	in	reality	one	has	a	triangle,	sovereignty-discipline-governmentality,	which	 has	 as	 its	 primary	 target	 the	population	 and	 as	 its	 essential	 mechanism	 the	 apparatuses	 of	 security	(p.102).		Foucault		(1990,	p.	136)	defined	sovereignty	as	the	power	that	comes	from	“the	right	to	take	life	and	let	live”	(p.136).	In	the	context	of	modern	state	governance,	Foucault	extended	 his	 definition	 of	 sovereignty	 as	 the	 state’s	 power	 that	 comes	 from	 its	juridical	 domains	 to	 govern	 a	 particular	 population	 in	 a	 particular	 geographical	territory.	 To	 link	 this	 concept	 of	 state’s	 juridical	 power	 with	 governmentality,	Foucault	(2009)	explained	that:		The	sovereign	is	no	longer	someone	who	exercises	his	power	over	a	territory	on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 geographical	 localization	 of	 his	 political	 sovereignty.	 The	sovereign	deals	with	a	nature,	or	rather	with	the	perpetual	conjunction,	 the	perpetual	intrication	of	a	geographical,	climatic,	and	physical	milieu	with	the	human	 species	 insofar	 as	 it	 has	 a	 body	 and	 a	 soul,	 a	 physical	 and	 a	moral	existence	(p.	38).		Through	 this	 notion	 of	 “perpetual	 conjunction”	 between	 humans	 and	 things,	Foucault	(2009)	showed	how	the	state’s	main	objective	in	practicing	its	sovereignty	
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is	 to	 secure	 governable	 spaces	 within	 which	 it	 seeks	 to	 achieve	 the	 correct	disposition	of	populations.	The	state’s	main	strategy	in	attaining	this	specific	aim	is	by	 employing	 laws	 as	 tactics,	 through	which	 law	 acts	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 state’s	authority	(Foucault,	1991a).		Fortress	conservation	 is	an	excellent	example	of	how	sovereign	power	operates	 in	the	 context	 of	 environmental	 governance	 (Fletcher,	 2010;	 Kelly,	 2015).	 The	conservation	 park	 is	 an	 enclosed	 space	 with	 clear	 demarcated	 boundaries	 –	 they	differentiate	 the	 type	 of	 governance	 for	 those	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 inside	 of	 the	boundaries	 and	 those	 that	 don’t	 (Kelly,	 2015).	 The	 conservation	 officers	 work	 to	police	the	demarcation,	subjecting	those	who	go	inside	the	park	to	specific	rules	and	codes	of	conducts.	Often	these	are	the	forest	dependent	communities	who	live	in	and	around	the	park	perimeter,	and	who	suddenly	found	themselves	being	governed	by	the	park’s	regulations,	and	punished	through	 imprisonment	and	fines	 for	breaches	(Fletcher,	2010).	In	Indonesia,	the	MOF	through	the	Park	Management	Office	as	the	state	 apparatus	 enacts	 fences	 and	 fines	 mechanism	 through	 diverse	 laws	 and	regulations	 to	criminalize	 those	who	 illegally	enter	 the	Park	(Fletcher,	2010;	Arsel	and	 Büscher,	 2012;	 Kelman,	 2013).	 The	 laws	 control	 the	 type	 of	 human	 -	 forest	relationships	allowed	(Agrawal,	2005;	Fletcher,	2010).		
	
2.2.2 Disciplinary	Power	Foucault	 (1979)	 discussed	 disciplinary	 power	 in	 his	 lecture	Discipline	and	Punish	through	the	elaboration	of	prison	as	an	enclosed	space	productive	of	docile	bodies.	The	 prison	 works	 through	 surveillance	 technologies	 to	 render	 visible	 all	 the	inmates’	 activities	 in	 order	 to	 supervise	 and	 control	 their	 behaviour	 at	 all	 times	(Foucault,	1979).	Bentham’s	Panopticon	is	analysed	as	a	technology	of	surveillance	aimed	at	disciplining	and	shaping	all	the	bodies	inside	the	prison’s	walls	through	the	normalization	of	particular	conducts	while	forbidding	other	ways	of	being	(Foucault,	1979).	Foucault	(1979)	extended	his	analysis	on	the	concept	of	disciplinary	power	through	the	examination	of	the	military,	the	clinic	and	the	school.	These	disciplinary	institutions	work	through	the	micro-physics	of	power	that	is	aimed	at	internalizing	particular	norms	and	values.		
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	Disciplinary	power	has	 the	characteristic	of	both	 totalizing	and	 individualizing	 the	governed	(Foucault,	1979).	An	example	of	this	is	the	way	the	school	disciplines	both	its	entire	student	body	and	each	student.	The	teachers	take	care	of	all	of	the	students	as	 a	 total	 object	 of	 government.	 However,	 the	 school	 also	 individualizes,	 as	 the	teachers	 know	 each	 of	 the	 students	 and	work	 through	 their	 particular	 needs	 and	objectives.	This	implies	the	specific	knowledge	the	teachers	have	about	each	of	the	students.				In	 the	 context	 of	 REDD+	 governance,	 the	 use	 of	 carbon	 standards	 attempts	 to	discipline	REDD+	proponents	(Lövbrand	and	Stripple,	2011;	Gupta	et	al.,	2012;	Boer,	2013;	 McGregor	 et	al.,	 2015).	 	 The	 Climate,	 Community	 and	 Biodiversity	 Alliance	(CCBA),	for	example,	is	a	platform	which	provides	a	standard	for	voluntary	REDD+	implementation	 at	 the	 site	 level	 (see	 http://www.climate-standards.org/).	 The	Climate	 Community	 and	 Biodiversity	 (CCB)	 standard	 requires	 REDD+	 project	proponents	 to	adopt	standardized	mechanisms	of	designing	and	 implementing	 the	project	 aimed	 at	 minimizing	 negative	 social	 and	 environmental	 impacts.	 The	standard	disciplines	and	governs	 the	proponent’s	conduct	 in	managing	 the	REDD+	project	 through	the	verification	and	validation	processes	 in	which	 the	proponent’s	compliance	 is	 analysed	 and	measured	 (Gupta	 et	al.,	 2012).	 The	 failure	 to	 comply	with	 the	 standard	will	 result	 in	 a	 failure	 to	 attain	 CCB	 verification	 and	 label.	 The	labels,	which	have	 to	be	combined	with	a	 carbon	accounting	standard,	are	key	 for	the	proponent’s	ability	to	obtain	quantified	emissions	reductions	certificates	(CERs)	–	which	is	the	only	commodity	in	a	REDD+	project	that	can	be	traded	in	the	carbon	market	(see	http://www.climate-standards.org/).	 	 In	 this	way	standards	discipline	project	developers	to	act	in	particular	ways.		Sovereign	power	is	often	coupled	with	disciplinary	power	in	order	to	generate	pro-conservation	 subjectivities	 (Agrawal,	 2005;	 Fletcher,	 2010).	 In	 community	 based	conservation	 management,	 researchers	 have	 shown	 how	 park	 management	 often	employs	groups	of	watchmen	 that	 involve	community	members	 to	police	 the	park	boundaries	(Mayaka,	2002;	Poppe,	2012).	Fiscal	incentives	are	employed	to	attract	the	 communities’	 involvement	 in	 implementing	 surveillance	 technologies	 and	
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reporting	 encroachment	 activities	 (Spiteri	 and	 Nepal,	 2008;	 Thapa	 Karki,	 2013).	These	imply	the	implementation	of	surveillance	technologies	are	not	just	by	those	in	authority,	 but	 also	 through	 more	 intimate	 monitoring	 by	 community	 members	themselves.	In	this	way	communities	come	to	self-govern	their	behaviour	in	order	to	avoid	 the	 risks	 of	 being	 criminalized.	 Foucault	 (Foucault,	 1991a)	 reminded	 us,	however,	 that	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 sovereign	 and	 disciplinary	 powers	 the	governed	subjects	still	have	agency.		Forest	communities	often	behave	outside	of	the	conducts	 being	 normalized	 by	 governing	 actors	 –	 a	 type	 of	 action	 that	 Foucault	termed	as	 “counter	conduct”,	 that	 is	attempts	brought	by	 the	governed	subjects	 in	order	to	create	different	forms	of	being	(Gordon,	1991).			
2.2.3 Biopower	Foucault	 (1990)	 developed	 the	 notion	 of	 biopower	 in	 his	 work	 The	 History	 of	
Sexuality,	 Vol.	1	 through	 his	 elaboration	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 the	population.	Foucault	used	the	term	biopower	to	explain	the	concept	of	power	as	the	art	 of	 government	where	 “wealth,	 longevity,	 health	 etc.”	 of	 the	 population	 are	 the	main	 aims	 of	 governing	 practices.	 In	 his	 lecture	 Security,	Territory	and	Population	delivered	 in	 College	 de	 France	 on	 11	 January	 1978,	 Foucault	 (2009)	 defined	biopower	as:		The	 set	 of	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 the	 basic	 biological	 features	 of	 the	human	species	became	the	object	of	a	political	strategy,	of	a	general	strategy	of	 power,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 how,	 starting	 from	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	modern	Western	societies	took	on	board	the	fundamental	biological	fact	that	human	beings	are	a	species	(p.	1).		Foucault	 discussed	 the	notion	of	 population	 to	 elaborate	 a	 different	 conception	of	the	 art	 of	 government.	 In	 biopower,	 population	 is	 no	 longer	 defined	 as	 people	confined	 in	 a	 particular	 territory	 and	 subject	 to	 the	 state’s	 sovereign	 power	 to	administer	 life.	 Population	 as	 the	 object	 of	 governance	 in	 biopower	 is	 defined	 in	relation	with	health,	disease	and	other	matters	essential	for	the	well	being	of	society	(Dean,	 2009).	 The	 government	 of	 the	 population	 is	 based	 on	 the	 knowledge	
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produced	 through	 statistical	 measurements,	 such	 as	 the	 census	 and	 demography	and	has	underpinned	the	growth	of	a	number	of	social	science	disciplines	(N.	Rose,	1999a).	However,	populations	are	not	simply	passive	groups	of	living	beings	subject	to	 the	 government’s	will;	 instead	 populations	 possess	 knowledge	 and	 agency	 that	play	a	big	role	in	enabling	the	process	of	government	(Dean,	2009).			Rabinow	(1984,	p.	17)	asserts	that	biopower	“brought	life	and	its	mechanisms	into	the	 realm	 of	 explicit	 calculations	 and	 made	 knowledge-power	 an	 agent	 of	 the	transformation	of	human	life”.	Biopower’s	focus	on	human	life	has	lead	to	studies	of	human	 society	 and	 the	 use	 of	 censuses,	 demography	 and	 statistics	 to	 govern	 life.		However	increased	awareness	of	the	importance	of	the	environment	to	human	life	has	 led	 to	 an	 interest	 in	 biopower	 and	 non-human	 life,	 or	 the	 government	 of	human/non-human	 relations.	 For	 Foucauldian	 scholars	 to	 understand	 the	governance	of	human	and	nature	relationships,	one	needs	to	study	how	discourses	about	 the	 environment	 are	 being	 produced,	 circulated,	 and	 employed	 to	 form	particular	 political	 truths	 about	 the	 nature	 (Rutherford,	 2007).	 Darier	 (1999)	explores	this	through	the	concept	of	ecopolitics	-	the	implementation	of	biopower	in	the	governance	of	the	nature/environment.			An	example	of	ecopolitics	 is	 the	use	of	 scientific	 forestry	 in	 shaping	 the	politics	of	forest	governance	 (Baldwin,	2003,	2013;	Cepek,	2011).	Originating	 from	Germany,	scientific	forestry	is	a	field	of	knowledge	that	is	taught	to	foresters	so	they	are	able	to	 intensify	 the	 forest’s	 capacity	 in	 producing	 forest	 commodities	 –	 particularly	timber	 (Hölzl,	 2010).	 Science	 in	 forestry	 management	 is	 a	 tool	 that	 is	 often	employed	by	the	state	and	the	private	sector	in	constructing	the	tropical	forest	as	a	wild	frontier	with	plentiful	resources	such	as	timber	and	minerals	that	are	ready	for	exploitation.	 Siscawati	 (2012)	 traces	 the	 colonial	 scientific	 forestry	 applied	by	 the	Dutch	Government	on	the	islands	of	Java	and	Madura,	in	Indonesia,	to	manage	and	intensify	 teak	 forests.	 Classification	 of	 land	 and	 trees	 as	well	 as	 the	 production	 of	maps	became	the	Dutch	government’s	main	tools	for	subjecting	forests	to	scientific	scrutiny	 (Peluso	and	Vandergeest,	2001;	Vandergeest	and	Peluso,	2006).	 Scientific	forestry	 facilitates	 the	 establishment	 of	 quantifiable	 and	 measurable	 plans	 in	designing	 and	 managing	 the	 forests	 as	 economic	 resources.	 Post-independence,	
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Indonesian	academic	foresters	have	developed	a	forest	management	system	through	the	 implementation	 of	 technologies	 such	 as	 timber	 felling	 methods,	 tree	regeneration	 techniques	 and	 silviculture	 system	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 modern	 and	effective	(Siscawati,	2012).	These	scientific	approaches	enable	the	state	to	perform	what	 Rose	 and	 Miller	 (1992)	 call	 “government	 at	 a	 distance”	 –	 a	 process	 of	governing	 many	 locales	 through	 inscribed	 forms	 of	 activities	 and	 conditions	 -	designating	what	is	or	isn’t	appropriate	–	which	consequently	allows	the	authorities	to	execute	government	 from	afar	 (Curtis,	1995).	The	state	often	employs	scientific	forestry	to	denigrate	swidden	culture	-	a	practice	of	Indigenous	agriculture	based	on	the	method	of	shifting	cultivation	-	as	ineffective,	harmful	and	backward	(Cramb	et	
al.,	 2009;	 Fox	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Dressler,	 2014).	 Many	 studies	 have	 found	 that	 state’s	implementation	of	scientific	forestry	–	with	its	maps,	rationalities	and	statistics	-	has	been	employed	as	the	main	narrative	to	assert	control	over	forest	land	and	used	to	legitimize	 land	 appropriation	 from	 Indigenous	 communities	 (Peluso,	 1995;	 Peluso	and	Vandergeest,	2001).			
2.2.4 Summarising	Power	Through	the	discussion	of	these	three	types	of	power,	we	can	see	that	power	is	not	something	 that	can	only	be	owned	by	 the	state	or	 the	king.	Power	 is	embedded	 in	the	 knowledge,	 the	 action,	 the	 practices,	 and	 the	 relations	 between	 humans	 and	things	(Dean,	2009).	The	art	of	government	involves	the	triad	of	powers	described	above.	 To	 conclude	 this	 section,	 following	 Rutherford	 (2007)	 I	 outline	 four	characteristics	of	power,	understood	as	the	art	of	government,	that	will	facilitate	the	subsequent	 discussion	 on	 governmentality.	 These	 characteristics	 defy	 the	traditional	 conception	 of	 power	 as	 something	 that	 is	 merely	 oppressive	 and	hegemonic:				 Power	is	defined	as	‘actions	on	others’	actions’:	that	is,	it	presupposes	rather	than	annuls	their	capacity	as	agents;	it	acts	upon,	and	through,	an	open	set	of	practical	and	ethical	possibilities.	Hence,	although	power	 is	an	omnipresent	dimension	in	human	relations,	power	in	a	society	is	never	a	fixed	and	closed	regime,	but	rather	an	endless	and	open	strategic	game	(Gordon,	1991,	p.	3).	
	 38	
	Foucault	 (1990)	 outlines	 four	main	 characteristics	 of	 power.	 First,	 he	 argues	 that	power	 is	 not	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 instead,	 power	 is	 everywhere	 and	exercised	through	many	practices,	discourses,	agents,	and	institutions	(Rutherford,	2007,	p.	296).	Foucault	(1990)	stressed	that	power	is	not	only	exercised	from	above,	but	instead	also	comes	from	below.	As	such,	it	can	be	said	that	the	exercise	of	power	produces	 webs	 of	 diverse	 power	 relations.	 Power	 is	 capillary	 and	 diffuse.	Consequently,	he	opposed	 the	notion	of	a	binary	power	 that	 segregates	 the	 leader	and	the	follower	(Rutherford,	2007,	p.	296).	Rather	than	seeing	power	as	exclusively	exercised	by	state	apparatuses,	Foucault	foresaw	power	as	a	thing	embedded	in	the	relational	 actions	 of	 the	 population.	 Thus,	 for	 Foucault	 (2001)	 “to	 govern	 in	 this	sense,	is	to	structure	the	possible	field	of	actions	of	others”	(p.	221).			Second,	Foucault	(1990)	argued	that	the	practices	of	the	modern	art	of	government	(governmentality)	 do	 not	 replace	 practices	 of	 state’s	 sovereign,	 biopower	 and	disciplinary	practices,	rather	to	govern	effectively	each	of	these	types	of	power	acts	as	a	precondition	of	the	others	(Dillon,	1995;	Dean,	2009).	The	art	of	government,	as	becomes	apparent	in	this	context,	is	essentially	concerned	with	the	art	of	exercising,	arranging	and	combining	different	types	of	power	“so	as	to	lead	to	a	convenient	end”	(Foucault,	1991a,	p.	93).	Thus,	power	is	not	necessarily	oppressive	but	can	also	be	productive.	Foucault	(2001)	further	argued	that	the	art	of	government	requires	the	concepts	of	freedom	and	agency	within	subjects	of	governance.	He	explained	that:		 Power	is	only	exercised	on	“free	subjects”	and	only	insofar	as	they	are	“free”	–	 understanding	by	 this	 claim	 individual	 or	 collective	 subjects	 faced	with	 a	field	of	possibility	 in	which	several	 conducts,	 several	 reactions,	and	various	modes	of	behavior	can	take	place	(Foucault,	2001,	p.	342).		The	conception	of	freedom	and	agency	in	the	practices	of	power	bring	our	attention	to	the	third	characteristic	of	power	-	resistance.	Foucault	(1990)	stated	that	where	there	 is	 power,	 there	 is	 resistance.	 However,	 Foucault	 highlighted	 that	 resistance	cannot	be	seen	as	 the	outside	part	of	power,	but	 instead	as	one	of	 its	components	that	 seeks	 to	 transform	 and	 reshape	 power	 to	 be	 conducted	 differently.	He	 called	
	 39	
this	 resistance	 “counter	 conduct”	 (Foucault,	 2009,	 p.	 202),	 that	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	resist	 the	 established	 conduct	 and	 a	 struggle	 to	 create	 different	 practices	 of	conducting	conduct	(Foucault,	2009).			The	 last	 characteristic	 of	 power	 is	 “intentional	 but	 non-subjective”	 (Rutherford,	2007,	p.	296).	He	argued	that	while	there	are	purposes	behind	the	exercise	of	power,	these	 objectives	 cannot	 be	 associated	 with	 the	 wishes	 of	 particular	 people,	 but	rather	with	the	discursive	dynamic	of	society,	which	often	results	in	a	diverse	array	of	 unpredictable	 consequences,	 effects	 and	 outcomes	 (Foucault,	 1990).	 Indeed	Foucault	 specifically	said	 that	 the	exercise	of	power	 “implies	a	plurality	of	 specific	aims”	rather	than	one	dogmatic	goal	(Foucault,	1991b,	p.	95).	Understanding	these	four	characteristics	of	power	is	important	for	Foucault’s	interlocutors	to	employ	his	conception	 of	 governmentality.	 The	 subsequent	 section	 endeavors	 to	 explain	governmentality,	the	main	theoretical	framework	employed	in	this	thesis.			
2.3 Governmentality	Citing	Guillaume	de	 la	 Perriere,	 Foucault	 (1991a)	defined	 governmentality	 as	 “the	conduct	of	 conduct”.	 It	operates	 through	calculated	means	and	rational	activity	by	“educating	desires	and	configuring	habits,	aspirations	and	beliefs”	of	individuals	and	groups	(Li,	2007a,	p.	279).	Thinking	through	a	governmentality	lens	allows	us	to	see	that	governance’s	main	aim	is	to	shape	human	conduct,	and	its	target	is	to	produce	“the	welfare	of	the	population,	the	improvement	of	its	condition,	the	increase	of	its	wealth,	longevity,	health	et	cetera”	(Foucault,	1991a,	p.	100).	In	order	to	achieve	its	aim,	a	governmental	intervention	employs	a	variety	of	techniques	and	certain	forms	of	knowledge.	Dean	(2009,	p.	25)	argues	that	governmentality	is	a	representation	of	“collective	 mentalities”	 created	 through	 “the	 bodies	 of	 knowledge,	 belief	 and	opinion”	 in	 which	 our	 individual	 minds	 and	 consciousnesses	 are	 immersed.	 In	 a	broad	sense,	Foucault	(1991a,	p.	102)	summarized	governmentality	as:		 The	 ensemble	 formed	 by	 the	 institutions,	 procedures,	 analyses,	 and	reflections,	 the	 calculations	 and	 tactics	 that	 allow	 the	 exercise	 of	 this	 very	specific	albeit	complex	form	of	power,	which	has	population	as	its	target,	and	
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apparatuses	of	security	[or	calculative	technologies	employed]	as	its	essential	mechanism	 and	 political	 economy	 as	 its	 form	 of	 knowledge	 (emphasis	added).			Drawing	 on	 this	 definition	 to	 apprehend	 REDD+	 governmentality	 means	 seeing	REDD+	 as	 an	 art	 of	 government	 that	 works	 through	 the	 development	 of	 new	calculated	 strategies,	 practices	 and	 institutions,	 aimed	 to	 promote	 and	 sustain	particular	discourses	and	practices	amongst	forest	stakeholders.	This	assemblage	of	government	(or	a	set	of	discursive	and	material	strategies	and	mechanisms)	aims	to	shape	human	 conduct	 and	educate	people	 to	protect	 forest	 carbon	and	associated	“ecosystem	services”	(McGregor	et	al.,	2015).				In	 the	 context	 of	REDD+,	 governmentality	 theory	provides	 an	 innovative	means	of	analysing	both	 traditional	 state	 and	non-state	 actors’	 attempts	 to	 influence,	 define	and	 reshape	 REDD+	 policies	 and	 programmes	 (Rutherford,	 2007;	 Winkel,	 2012;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015).	Governmentality	recognises	that	governmental	interventions	are	 undertaken	 not	 only	 by	 the	 state	 apparatuses	 but	 also	 by	 non-state	 actors,	including	but	not	 limited	 to	NGOs,	scientists,	 researchers,	bankers,	and	 the	private	sector	–	anyone	who	is	involved	in	attempts	to	shape	the	conduct	of	the	population	(Li,	 2007a,	 2007d;	Dean,	 2009).	 The	 concept	 of	 governmentality	 provides	 insights	into	 how	 assemblages	 of	 practices,	 agents,	 knowledge	 and	 techniques	 work	 to	produce	governable	subjects	(Hart,	2004).	To	employ	governmentality	in	analysis	is	to	 explore	 regimes	of	government	 that	 try	 to	 shape	 human	 conduct	 by	 examining	
how	and	the	conditions	under	which	we	are	governed	and	through	which	we	govern	ourselves	 and	others	 (Dean,	 2009).	 	 In	 the	 following	 section	 I	 focus	on	how	 these	concepts	have	been	used	to	analyse	environmental	issues.	
	
2.4 Green	Governmentality		Environmental	problems	similar	to	'madness',	'sexuality'	and	'criminality'	are	not	 'out	 there'	 in	 a	 pure	 and	 unmediated	 form,	 but	 various	 techniques,	procedures	 and	practices	 construct	 and	produce	 these	 fields	 in	 such	 a	way	that	 they	 become	 both	 objects	 for	 knowledge	 and	 targets	 for	 regulation	
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(Bäckstrand,	2004,	p.	703	cited	in	Rutherford	2007;	Rutherford,	2007)			As	an	art	of	government,	governmentality	disposes	us	toward	the	understanding	of	forests	in	particular	ways	and	produces	calculated	technologies	in	ways	that	enable	that	disposition	(Rutherford,	2007).	Green	governmentality	is	a	term	coined	by	Luke	(1999)	to	define	the	government	of	multifaceted	relationships	between	people	and	environment.	 Green	 governmentality	 focuses	 on	 the	 practices	 of	 power	 that	inherent	in	politics,	knowledges	and	practices,	as	well	as	everyday	discourses,	which	actors	 attempt	 to	mainstream	 in	 order	 to	 arrange	 “things”	 correctly	 (Luke,	 1999;	Rutherford,	2007).	The	“things”	in	this	particular	study	are	humans	and	non-humans	relations,	 such	 as	 human	 relationships	 with	 forest,	 carbon,	 peatland	 and	biodiversity.	 	 Green	 governmentality	 emphasises	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 new	environmental	 subjectivities	 as	 the	 result	 of	 the	mainstreaming	of	 green	practices	and	knowledges	at	different	scales	(Agrawal,	2005;	Fletcher,	2010;	Skoglund,	2014).		Green	 governmentality	 researchers	 are	 interested,	 for	 example,	 in	 how	 the	environmental	 crisis	 is	 being	 represented	 and	 manufactured	 in	 the	 age	 of	 the	carbon-constrained	 world,	 and	 how	 new	 interventions	 are	 invented	 as	 solutions	(Oels,	2005;	Bäckstrand	and	Lövbrand,	2006;	Bulkeley	and	Newell,	2010).	Another	area	 of	 interest	 for	 green	 governmentality	 is	 how	 lands	 in	 far	 away	 places	 –	 in	locations	 some	 explorers	 classified	 as	 new	 “untouched”	 resource	 frontiers	 -	 are	subjected	to	statistical	picturing	(Demeritt,	2001).	This	refers	to	a	set	of	processes	to	render	 them	manageable	 and	 investable	 for	 extensive	 agriculture,	 a	 phenomenon	critiqued	as	a	land	rush	(Li,	2014c)	or	land	grab	(Borras	et	al.,	2012;	Fairhead,	Leach	and	Scoones,	2012;	McCarthy,	Vel	and	Afiff,	2012).	In	short,	green	governmentality	focuses	on	attempts	to	create	regimes	of	environmental	governance	in	which	people	govern	 themselves	 and	 others	 according	 to	 particular	 environmental	 rationalities	and	objectives	(Rutherford,	2007).		A	 similar	 concept	 developed	 by	 Agrawal	 (2005)	 is	 environmentality.	 He	 uses	 the	term	to	explain	the	making	of	new	environmental	subjectivities	 in	his	study	of	 the	people	 of	 Kumaon	 in	 India.	 He	 defines	 ‘environmentality’	 as	 “the	 knowledges,	politics,	 institutions,	 and	 subjectivities	 that	 come	 to	 be	 linked	 together	 with	 the	
	 42	
emergence	of	the	environment	as	a	domain	that	requires	regulation	and	protection”	(Agrawal,	2005,	p.	226).	Agrawal	(2005)	highlights	how	the	Forest	Department	used	particular	 forms	 of	 scientific	 forestry	 knowledge	 to	 render	 visible	 the	 objects	 of	governance,	 such	 as	 a	 forest	 classification	 system,	 accounting,	 and	 reporting	mechanisms.	These	webs	of	practices	and	knowledges	are	employed	by	 the	Forest	Department	 in	 fostering	 the	 adoption	 of	 pro-conservation	 subjectivities	 among	community	members	(Agrawal,	2005).			Fletcher	(2010)	uses	the	concept	of	environmentality	in	analysing	the	governance	of	forest	 conservation.	 He	 outlines	 four	 types	 of	 environmentalities	 –	 neoliberal,	disciplinary,	sovereign,	and	truth	in	his	examination	of	the	strategies	being	used	to	regulate	 human	 -	 environment	 interactions.	 Fletcher	 (2010)	 defines	 neoliberal	environmentality	 as	 governance	 through	 market	 rationales	 and	 the	 use	 of	incentive/disincentive	 technologies	 in	 fostering	 peoples	 to	 get	 involved	 in	conservation	 practices.	 Disciplinary	 environmentality	 refers	 to	 the	 governance	 of	subjects	 through	 the	 internalization	 of	 particular	 pro-conservation	 norms	 and	values.	 Disciplinary	 approaches	 aim	 to	 produce	 docile	 subjects	 who	 will	 act	according	to	shared	values	and	ethics	that	are	considered	to	be	in	the	best	interests	of	 the	 society	 (Dean,	 2009).	 Sovereign	 environmentalities	 are	 pursued	 through	regulations	 and	 laws	 that	 will	 be	 effective	 in	 “forcing”	 populations	 to	 behave	accordingly	–	the	fences	and	fines	approach	of	fortress	conservation	for	example.	A	final	environmentality	is	exercised	based	on	‘particular	conception	of	the	nature	and	the	order	of	the	universe’	derived	from	forest	communities.		For	example	beliefs	in	a	non-material	 relationship	 between	 humans	 and	 nature	 is	 common	 in	 some	Indigenous	 societies	 and	 used	 to	 claim	 authority	 over	 behavior	 or	 encourage	particular	 subjectivities	 (Fletcher,	 2010,	 p.	 178).	 These	 environmentalities	 work	dynamically	and	reciprocally	by	intersecting,	complementing,	or	even	negating	each	other	within	particular	contexts	(Li,	2007c).		They	are	pursued	through	a	variety	of	techniques	and	forms	of	knowledge	to	achieve	their	aims	(Dean,	2009).		
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2.5 Neoliberal	governmentality	and	the	formation	of	new	
subjectivities	Dean	(2009)	elaborates	on	the	formation	of	new	subjectivities	through	what	he	has	called	the	“technologies	of	agency”.	These	technologies	aim	to	sustain	how	subjects	perform	through	a	series	of	training	or	capacity	building	activities	to	improve	their	skills.	Cruikshank	(1999)	addresses	these	enhancement	techniques	as	“technologies	of	 citizenship”.	 These	 are	multiple	 forms	 of	 self-enhancement	 techniques	 that	 are	designed	 to	 systematically	 prevent	 citizen’s	 dependency	 on	 the	 state	 (Cruikshank,	1999).	Dean	(2009)	warns	Foucauldian	interlocutors,	however,	that,		 The	 manipulation	 of	 [a]	 population’s	 agency	 doesn’t	 mean	 to	 cancel	 out	agency	but	seeks	to	show	how	it	is	produced,	how	it	is	inserted	into	a	system	of	 purpose,	 and	 how	 it	 might	 overrun	 the	 limits	 established	 for	 it	 by	 a	particular	 programme	 or	 even	 the	 strategic	 purpose	 of	 a	 regime	 of	government”	(p.	196).			He	 further	 explains	 that	 these	 technologies	 of	 agency	 will	 often	 be	 employed	 to	particular	targeted	populations	that	according	to	the	state’s	standard	are	classified	as	being	in	high	risk	or	incapable	of	governing	themselves	(Dean,	2009).			An	example	in	the	context	of	Indonesia’s	forest	governance	is	the	state’s	“schemes	to	divide	 citizenship”	 (Li,	 2014a).	 The	 state	 often	 classifies	 Indigenous	 peoples	 and	forest	dependent	communities	as	populations	that	endure	high	risks	of	 falling	 into	the	 trap	of	backwardness	characterised	by	 “poor”	 living	standards	and	 inability	 to	effectively	manage	 resources	 (Li,	 2014a).	 Thus,	 legitimised	 by	 this	 rationale,	 state	and	non-state	actors	often	 implement	racialised	governmental	policies	 intended	to	“improve”	 the	 life	 of	 these	 “backward”	 peoples	 and	 govern	 their	 relation	with	 the	land	and	resources	they	depend	upon	(Li,	2007c).	Such	populations	are	understood	to	 be	 part	 of	 society	 that	 have	 no	 interest	 in	 making	 financial	 profit,	 inability	 to	manage	risks	and	on	the	brink	of	losing	their	knowledge	about	living	harmoniously	with	 nature	 (Li,	 2014a).	 For	 the	 state,	 this	 understanding	 of	 Indigenous	 peoples	motivates	them	to	appropriate	their	lands	and	lease	them	to	parties	that	are	deemed	
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to	have	the	capacity	to	maximize	profits	and	manage	risks	(Peluso,	1995;	Peluso	and	Vandergeest,	2001;	Fay	and	Sirait,	2005).	On	the	other	hand,	non	state	actors	such	as	NGOs	have	been	 trying	 to	 fix	 tribal	peoples	 through	various	 interventions	 that	are	aimed	 at	 restoring	 more	 “authentic”	 ways	 of	 living	 (Li,	 2000).	 As	 a	 target	 of	government,	 these	 forest	 people	 are	 not	 passive;	 they	 express	 their	 agencies	 by	deciding	 to	 embody	 particular	 subjectivities	 that	 will	 enable	 them	 to	 secure	particular	goals	–	often	related	to	land	and	livelihoods.			Technologies	of	agency	are	closely	related	to	other	techniques	of	subject	formation	in	neoliberal	government,	referred	to	as	“technologies	of	performance”.	Dean	(2009)	defines	technologies	of	performance	as	techniques	of	subjectification	through	which	citizens’	 conduct	 is	 shaped	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 effective,	 accountable	 and	“calculating	individuals”	within	“calculable	spaces”	subject	to	particular	“calculative	regimes’’	 (p.	 197).	 The	 establishment	 of	 both	 technologies	 of	 agency	 and	technologies	 of	 performance	 enable	 what	 Miller	 and	 Rose	 (1990;	 1992)	 termed	“government	at	a	distance”.			In	 governance	 based	 on	 carbon	 rationality,	 this	 government	 at	 a	 distance	 is	facilitated	by	the	standardization	of	carbon	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	–	or	 carbon	 accountability.	 Gupta	 et	 al	 (2012)	 propose	 the	 notion	 of	 carbon	accountability	to	“denote	both	how	forest	carbon	is	accounted	for	in	REDD+	and	the	need	 to	 hold	 to	 account	 those	who	 are	 doing	 so”	 through	 calculative	 practices	 (p.	726).	 This	 practice	 of	 carbon	 accounting	 is	 aimed	 at	 achieving	 public	 trust,	rendering	 carbon	 accountable	 and	 visible	 as	 well	 as	 fungible	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	global	 trading	 (Gupta	et	al.,	 2012;	Boer,	 2013;	McGregor	et	al.,	 2015).	 	 Gupta	 et	 al	(2012)	point	to	the	possible	benefit	of	this	accountability	mechanism	for	more	than	just	 forest	 governance	by	arguing	 that	while	 carbon	accountability	 is	 a	practice	of	homogenization	 this	also	provides	means	 to	hold	REDD+	managers	accountable	 to	forest	dependent	communities	and	Indigenous	peoples.		As	 a	 technology	of	 governance,	 carbon	accounting	paves	a	new	way	of	 seeing	and	connecting	forest	and	human	relationships	(Boer,	2013;	Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015).	New	 types	 of	 responsibility	 are	 introduced	 wherein	 the	 private	 sector	 has	 an	
	 45	
opportunity	 to	 directly	 contribute	 to	 conserving	 forest	 carbon	 through	 a	(dis)incentive	 based	 mechanism.	 In	 introducing	 this	 responsibility,	 the	 state	entrenches	the	responsibility	for	mitigating	climate	risks	“into	the	domain	for	which	the	 individual	 [or	 collective]	 is	 responsible	 and	 transforming	 it	 into	 a	 problem	 of	“self–care’’	 (Lemke,	 2002,	 p.	 59).	 The	 underlying	 basis	 of	 neoliberal	 rationality	 is	located	 in	 the	 incentive	 technologies	 through	 which	 responsible	 individuals	 are	motivated	 to	 be	 economically-rational	 subjects	 whose	 acts	 and	 behavior	 can	 be	modeled	 on	 cost-benefit	 analysis.	 In	 her	 research	 on	 neoliberal	 governmental	technologies,	 Cruikshank	 (1999)	 elaborates	 what	 she	 has	 called	 the	 “self-esteem”	movement.	 The	movement’s	 objective	 is	 to	 build	 “a	 new	politics	 and	 a	 new	 social	order”	 through	 the	 governing	 of	 ourselves	 according	 to	 neoliberal	 rationalities	(Lemke,	2002,	p.	60).	Lemke	argues	that	the	new	order	is	not	going	to	transform	the	status	quo	imbued	by	“capitalism,	racism,	the	patriarchy	etc…”	but	rather	will	focus	on	the	empowerment	of	individuals	to	be	able	to	continuously	govern,	measure,	and	judge	themselves	against	a	set	of	social	norms	(Lemke,	2002,	p.	60).		
2.6 Discourse,	Knowledge	and	Power	Dean	 (2009)	 does	 not	 propose	 a	 practical	 methodology	 on	 how	 to	 undertake	governmentality	 analysis,	 however	 Feindt	 and	 Oels	 (2005)	 suggest	 that	governmentality	 scholars	 employ	 discourse	 analysis.	 Through	 his	 interest	 in	 the	study	 of	 human	 behaviour,	 Foucault	 developed	 a	 scholarly	 approach	 to	 discourse	and	 its	role	 in	conducting	populations.	Foucault	defined	discourse	as	a	set	of	rules	which,	 at	 a	 given	 period	 and	 for	 a	 given	 society,	 delineate	 the	 regimes	 of	 truth	(Winkel,	 2012).	 According	 to	 Foucault,	 truth	 is	 something	 contextual	 and	 relative,	subject	 to	 constant	 economic	 and	 political	 stimulation	 (Feindt	 and	 Oels,	 2005;	Winkel,	2012).	Discourse	is	strongly	related	to	governmentality,	as	discourse	allows	some	things	to	become	normalised	and	seen	as	commonsense,	it	also	legitimises	the	authority	of	particular	organisations	(Bäckstrand	and	Lövbrand,	2006).	Aside	from	being	 capable	 of	 rendering	 visible	 the	 relation	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge,	discourse	 analysis	 also	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 notion	 of	 agency,	 through	 concepts	such	as	discourse	coalition	and	knowledge	broker	(Hajer,	1995).			
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Lees	 (2004)	 differentiates	 between	 two	 streams	 of	 discourse	 analysis:	 first	 is	 the	analysis	 rooted	 in	 the	 Marxist	 thinking	 that	 seeks	 to	 untangle	 the	 articulation	 of	hegemony	and	the	work	of	ideology,	and	the	second	one	is	the	Foucauldian	analysis	that	focuses	on	unravelling	the	practices	that	gave	birth	to	particular	truth	and	how	these	 practices	 could	 (and	 could	 not)	 engender	 new	 subjectivities.	 Rutherford	(2008)	 argues	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 latter	 stream	 of	 analysis	 is	 not	 to	 determine	which	 discourses	 are	wrong	 or	 right,	 but	 rather	 to	 identify	 how	 these	 discourses	operate	 and	 come	 to	 be	 known	 as	 truth	 and	 its	 associated	 impacts.	 I	 follow	Rutherford’s	in	approaching	discourse	analysis	as	a	methodology	to	understand	the	way	particular	truths	on	forest	and	climate	change	are	formed	and	implemented.		Hajer	 (1995)	 proposes	 three	 key	 terms	 in	 discourse	 analysis	 to	 study	governmentality.	 First,	 the	metaphor	 is	highlighted	by	Hajer	 (1995)	 as	 the	way	 to	express	one	kind	of	thing	in	terms	of	another	in	which	both	the	messenger	and	the	recipient	will	share	the	same	understanding	on	the	thing	discussed.	Second	is	story	line,	defined	as	“a	condensed	form	of	narrative	in	which	metaphors	are	used”	(Hajer,	2005,	p.	301).		Third	is	discourse	coalition	described	by	Hajer	(2005)	as	“a	group	of	actors	 that,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 identifiable	 set	 of	 practices,	 shares	 the	usage	of	 a	particular	set	of	story	lines	over	a	particular	period	of	time”	(p.	302).	 	Through	the	analysis	 of	 narratives,	 which	 contain	 story	 lines,	 metaphors,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	discursive	 construction	 and	 institutionalization,	 governmentality	 scholars	 can	observe	distinct	features	of	REDD+	as	a	regime	of	government,	explore	the	nature	of	the	 coalitions	 that	have	 formed,	 and	 the	dominant	narratives	 and	absent	 voices	 in	the	struggle	over	REDD+	ideas	and	concepts.			In	 shaping	 the	 policy	making	 process	 and	 its	 content,	 actors	 engage	 in	 discursive	practices	 by	 arguing	 and	negotiating	 causes	 that	 reflect	 their	 interests	 and	beliefs	(Benford	 and	 Snow,	 2000;	 Bulkeley,	 2000).	 Hajer	 (1995)	 argues	 that	 discourse	occupies	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 policy	 making	 processes.	 It	 renders	 legible	particular	policy	problems	while	obscuring	others,	 it	 consequently	 also	empowers	and	 signifies	 certain	 solutions	 as	 the	 right	 choices	 while	 obfuscates	 other	alternatives	 (Hajer	 and	 Versteeg,	 2005).	 	 As	 a	 policy	 subject,	 there	 are	 multiple	discourses	on	REDD+,	and	particular	REDD+	actors	may	form	coalitions	with	other	
	 47	
actors	whose	discursive	stance	is	similar	to	them.	Brockhaus	et	al	(2014)	argue	that	discourse	coalitions	are	a	key	component	of	REDD+	politics.		According	to	them,	the	stronger	 the	coalition	building	 that	 takes	 form,	 the	better	 the	chance	 for	 the	allied	actors	 to	 shape	 REDD+	 policy	 making	 and	 negotiation	 processes	 (Brockhaus,	 Di	Gregorio	and	Mardiah,	2014).			
2.7 Analyzing	REDD+	Governmentality	How	 then	 does	 one	 study	REDD+	 governmentality?	Dean	 (2009,	 p.	 40)	 points	 the	need	 for	scholars	 to	 think	of	governmentality	not	as	an	“expression	of	a	particular	principles,	as	reducible	to	a	particular	set	of	relations,	or	as	referring	to	a	single	set	of	 problems	 and	 functions”	 but	 instead	 as	 consisting	 of	 different	 practices	 and	discursive	logics.	As	an	art	of	government,	governmentality	entails	not	only	regimes	of	materials	and	discursive	elements	but	is	also	characterized	by	fluid	and	unstable	process.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 outline	 some	 of	 the	 tools	 that	 governmentality	 scholars	have	 used	 when	 analysing	 the	 art	 of	 government	 and	 drawn	 upon	 these	 tools	 to	analyse	the	three	case	studies	of	this	research.		McKee	 (2009)	 	 proposes	 two	 interrelated	 approaches	 to	 study	 governmentality:	analysis	of	the	discursive	field	and	examination	of	the	actual	interventionist	practices	through	 ethnographic	 inquiries.	The	 latter	 approach	 goes	 beyond	 the	 traditional	text-based	discourse	analysis	by	undertaking	empirical	ethnography	to	reveal	how	the	 “conduct	 of	 conduct”	 is	 implemented,	 contested,	 and	 challenged,	 as	well	 as	 to	disclose	 their	unintended	 consequences	 and	effects	 (Hart,	 2004;	Li,	 2007c;	Mckee,	2009).	In	doing	so,	this	approach	offers	detailed	analysis	of	“the	exercise	of	power	in	
situ	 that	 is	 sensitive	 to	 both	 time	 and	 place”,	 and	 captures	 tensions,	 conflicts	 and	multiple	struggles	between	various	actors	and	agencies	(Mckee,	2009).		According	 to	 Li	 (2007a)	 governmentality	 inquiries	 into	 the	 regime	of	government	combines:		 The	analysis	of	governmental	interventions	(their	genealogy,	their	diagnoses	and	 prescriptions,	 their	 boundaries	 and	 exclusions)	 with	 analysis	 of	 what	
	 48	
happens	when	attempts	to	achieve	the	“right	disposition	of	things”	encounter	–and	produce-	a	“witches	brew”	of	processes	and	practices	that	exceed	their	scope	(p.	279).			Scholars	 in	 this	 area	 focusing	 their	 analysis	 of	 governmental	 intervention	 through	the	 discursive	 examination	 of	programmes	(Oels,	 2005;	 Li,	 2007a;	Dean,	 2009).	 In	Foucauldian	terminology,	programmes	are	the	rationality	of	government,	 that	 is	“a	way	or	system	of	thinking	about	the	nature	of	the	practice	of	government,	capable	of	making	some	form	of	that	activity	thinkable	and	practicable	both	to	its	practitioners	and	to	those	upon	whom	it	is	practised”	(Gordon,	1991,	p.	3).			Following	 Foucault,	 Li	 considers	 programmes	 as	 “fragments	 of	 reality”	 because	programmes	form	into	institutions,	they	inform	individual	behaviour,	and	generate	a	series	 of	 effects	 (Li,	 2007a,	 p.	 28).	 Therefore,	 programmes	 help	 describe	 many	otherwise	 unobservable	 practises,	 processes,	 and	 events.	 An	 ethnography	 of	government,	 according	 to	 Li	 (2007a)	 will	 analyse	 how	 programmes	 shape	 and	reshape	 things,	 while	 also	 considering	 how	 programmes	 are	 compromised	 and	changed	 to	 accommodate	 failure	 and	 contestation.	 Rose	 (1999b)	 argues	 that	 the	domain	 to	 be	 governed	 must	 be	 rendered	 technical	 to	 create	 a	 governmental	programme.	 This	 is	 what	 Dean	 termed	 “fields	 of	 visibility”,	 in	 which	 truth	 is	constructed	 and	made	visible	 via	 a	 “grid	 of	 intelligibility”	 (Dean,	 2009,	 p.	 41).	 For	example,	 how	 in	 a	REDD+	project	 forest	 is	mapped	 and	 zoned	 renders	 the	 forest-carbon	viewable	and	understandable	while	restricting	alternative	understandings	–	such	 as	 Indigenous	 cosmologies	 (see	 Chapter	 Five	 for	 further	 discussion	 on	 this	process).	 For	 Dean	 (2009),	 the	 first	 step	 or	 dimension	 in	 analysing	 governance	mechanisms	from	a	governmentality	perspective	is	to	unravel	this	field	of	visibility.			The	second	dimension	 is	 the	analysis	of	 the	technical	 tools	of	government	or	what	Dean	called	as	the	techne	or	technologies	of	government.	In	the	same	vein,	Li	(2007a,	p.	 279)	 termed	 this	 technical	 aspect	 practices	 or	 “an	 arena	 of	 intervention”	 that	functions	as	the	technical	rendition	of	programmes.	Scholars	analyzing	the	techne	of	government	will	 assess	 the	 “means,	mechanisms,	 procedures,	 instruments,	 tactics,	techniques,	 technologies,	 and	 vocabularies”	 that	 are	 used	 by	 agencies	 to	 govern	
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human	 conduct	 (Dean,	 2009,	 p.	 41).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 REDD+,	 an	 example	 of	 the	
techne	 of	 government	 is	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Free	 Prior	 Informed	 Consent	Protocol	 (FPIC).	The	protocol	 is	an	 instrument	 that	governs	how	 forest	dependent	communities	and	REDD+	managers	engage	with	 the	REDD+	project	 (Li,	2014a).	Li	(2007a,	 p.	 279)	 suggests	 another	 important	 set	 of	 practices	 that	 should	 be	 given	attention:	 “informal	 practices	 of	 compromise	 and	 accommodation,	 everyday	resistance	or	outright	refusal”.			The	third	dimension	of	analysing	governmentality	is	the	episteme	of	government	or	the	concern	around	the	form	of	knowledge	that	is	constituted	from,	and	enables,	the	practice	 of	 governing	 (Dean,	 2009,	 p.	 42).	 Consequently,	 governmentality	 analysis	will	 look	 at	 how	 certain	 regimes	 of	 truth	 are	 constructed	 that	 define	 how	 we	perceive	 reality	 (Oels,	 2005).	 For	 example,	 how	 discourses	 on	 ecological	modernization	 enables	 particular	 “truths”	 to	 be	 asserted	 which	 then	 become	incontestable	 beliefs	 to	 be	 acted	 upon.	 In	 REDD+,	 the	 ‘truth’	 is	 that	 market	mechanisms	 provide	 incentives	 that	 will	 incite	 particular	 “good”	 behavior	 and	increase	new	technology	that	will	solve	ecological	crises	(Mcafee	and	Shapiro,	2010;	Osborne,	2011;	Milne	and	Adams,	2012).	The	analysis	of	the	episteme	of	government	is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 techne	 of	 government.	 Therefore,	governmentality	 scholars	will	 observe	how	particular	 constructed	 “truths”	employ	assemblages	of	 technologies,	 agencies	and	 institutions	 to	operate	on	and	maintain	that	truth	(Dean,	2009).		
	As	 an	 example	 the	 high	 level	 attention	 devoted	 to	 global	 environmental	 threats	 -	such	 as	 climate	 change	 and	 biodiversity	 extinction	 -	 has	motivated	 discussion	 on	ecological	 knowledge	 and	 its	 role	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 new	governmental	 technologies	 in	 governing	 the	 environment	 (Biermann,	 2007;	Biermann	 et	 al.,	 2009,	 2012).	 The	 discourse	 on	 “green	 economy”	 serves	 as	 an	example	 of	 how	 the	 construction	 of	 truth	 about	 the	 world’s	 unsustainable	development,	together	with	environmental	economics	as	a	new	form	of	knowledge	and	field	of	expertise,	has	 legitimised	the	 invention	of	new	domains	of	governance	and	 interventions	 (Cook	 and	 Smith,	 2012).	 This	 new	 domain	 is	 the	 production	 of	space	for	non-state	actors	 in	contributing	to	global	efforts	to	save	the	planet	while	
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profiting	 through	 the	 commodification	 of	 ecosystem	 services	 (Jenkins,	 Scherr	 and	Inbar,	2004;	Vignola	et	al.,	2009;	Farley	and	Costanza,	2010).	Ecosystem	services	as	a	new	“boom	commodity”	has	transformed	the	practices	and	technologies	of	forests	and	 biodiversity	 governance	 (Vignola	 et	al.,	 2009).	 The	 key	 to	 the	 survival	 of	 the	planet	is	seen	as	being	located	in	the	production	of	new	global	supply	chains	based	on	 nature’s	 services	 –	 rendering	 invisible	 alternative	 understandings,	 that	 could	instead	 emphasise	 reform	 of	 the	 mode	 of	 developed	 countries’	 production	 and	consumption	behaviour	(Bumpus	and	Liverman,	2008).			The	 last	 element	 in	 analyzing	 governmentality	 programmes	 pays	 attention	 to	 the	formation	of	new	identities	and	subjects	(Agrawal,	2005;	Dean,	2009;	Cepek,	2011).	To	study	this	final	component,	scholars	ask	“what	forms	of	person,	self,	and	identity	are	 presupposed	 by	 different	 practices	 of	 government	 and	 what	 sorts	 of	transformation	 do	 these	 practices	 seek?”	 (Dean,	 2009,	 p.	 43).	 In	 the	 context	 of	REDD+,	 the	 proliferation	 of	 reformist	 subjectivities	 in	 the	 green	 movement	 is	 an	example	of	 the	 formation	of	new	subjects.	The	 reformists	differentiate	 themselves	from	 the	 radical	by	believing	 that	 in	order	 to	 solve	ecological	 crises,	 one	needs	 to	employ	market	mechanisms	and	that	civil	society	has	to	“complement	state-centric	practices”	 through	 critical	 engagement	 (Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006,	 p.	 56).	Radical	subjectivities	are	also	reified,	where	there	is	a	refusal	to	believe	the	viability	of	market	mechanisms	in	solving	environmental	crises	that	caused	by	the	capitalist	economies	 themselves	 –	 instead	 favouring	 changes	 in	 the	 pattern	 of	 consumption	and	production	as	a	more	equitable	approach	(Bäckstrand	and	Lövbrand,	2006).			Dean’s	 governmentality	 framework	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 paragraphs	 is	 the	mean	of	analysis	employed	in	the	first	case	study	on	the	REDD+	Taskforce.	I	draw	on	the	 notion	 of	 techne	 or	 governmental	 technology	 to	 apprehend	 the	 techniques,	means	 and	 procedures	 that	 are	 created	 by	 the	 Taskforce	 to	 normalize	 REDD+	 in	Indonesia.	 In	 addition,	 the	 concept	 of	 subjectivity	 in	 Dean’s	 governmentality	framework	enables	the	identification	of	new	pro-REDD+	subjects	formed	as	a	result	of	 the	mainstreaming	of	REDD+	as	a	new	mechanism	of	governing	human	–	 forest	relations.	 The	 understanding	 of	 different	 types	 of	 governmentalities:	 sovereign,	disciplinary	and	neoliberal	governmentality	also	 informs	 the	process	of	examining	
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the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 (see	 Chapter	 5).	 For	 case	 study	 2	 on	 OMI,	 I	 extend	 Dean’s	governmentality	framework	with	Rose’s	notion	on	rendering	technical	and	process	of	 “problematization”	 (N.	 Rose,	 1999b;	 Li,	 2007c;	 Dean,	 2009).	 According	 to	 Li	(2007c),	 these	are	 two	common	sets	of	practices	experts	adopt	 to	 seek	 to	dispose	things	 –	 human	 and	 non	 human	 in	 	 “the	 right	 manner”	 (Foucault,	 1991b,	 p.	 95).	According	to	Dean	(2009),	problematization	is	a	process	of	 identifying	defects	that	need	to	be	fixed.	Problems	are	framed	in	particular	ways	to	enable	“certain	sorts	of	diagnoses,	 prescriptions,	 and	 techniques”	 (Li,	 2007c,	 p.	 7)	 to	 be	 proposed	 as	solutions.	 Effective	 government	 requires	 that	 these	 solutions	 are	 achievable	 and	non-political	–	thereby	seen	as	being	in	the	interests	of	all	(Li,	2007c).	This	requires	empowering	particular	authoritative	but	apolitical	knowledges	and	approaches	 -	a	practice	known	as	rendering	technical	(N.	Rose,	1999a;	Li,	2007c).			James	Scott	argues	that	states	deliberately	generate	simplified	forms	of	selected	data	that	 will	 facilitate	 the	 effective	 governance	 of	 populations	 rather	 than	 factually	representing	 society	 (Scott,	 1998).	 By	 combining	 selected	 data	 with	 diverse	governmental	technologies,	the	state	is	able	to	depict	the	reality	they	represent	as	a	universal	truth,	and	hence	outline	apolitical	and	appropriate	solutions	(Scott,	1998).	Li	(2005)	extends	Scott’s	argument	by	acknowledging	the	need	to	look	beyond	state	simplification	 to	 analyse	 the	 complexities	 hidden	 behind	 state	 governance	initiatives.	By	examining	the	messy	assemblages	informing	state	approaches	we	can	generate	“something	new	–	new	ways	of	seeing	oneself	and	others,	new	problems	to	be	 addressed,	 new	modes	 of	 calculation	 and	 evaluation,	 new	knowledge,	 and	new	powers”	(Li,	2005,	p.	389).			The	 identification	 of	 problems	 and	 construction	 of	 solutions	 exemplify	 “expertise	and	 constitutes	 the	 boundary	between	 those	who	 are	 positioned	 as	 trustees,	with	the	capacity	to	diagnose	deficiencies	in	others,	and	those	who	are	subject	to	expert	direction”	 (Li,	 2007c,	 p.	 7).	 Li	warns	of	 the	 tendency	of	 the	 trustees	 to	 render	 the	domain	to	be	governed	as	non-political	as	an	attempt	to	take	out	political-economic	concerns	and	reposing	them	using	the	“neutral	language	of	science”	(Li,	2007c,	p.	7).	Such	attempts	privilege	those	with	access	to	scientific	and	technical	knowledge	and	marginalise	 those	 that	 don't.	 Li	 (2007c)	 explains	 further	 that	 the	 process	 of	
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rendering	technical	will	always	be	accompanied	with	practices	of	confrontation.	As	I	will	discuss	in	case	study	2	(see	Chapter	6),	practices	of	confrontation	has	been	the	case	in	Indonesia	where	the	introduction	of	OMI	as	a	technical	means	to	resolve	long	standing	political	economic	conflicts	has	engendered	oppositional	actions	amongst	some	 Indigenous	 and	 environmental	 activists	 who	 actively	 contest	 and	 disrupt	policy	making	processes.	However,	overt	and	radical	moves	opposing	OMI	are	rare,	instead	contestation	takes	the	form	of	“subtle	slippages	and	subversions”	(Stratford,	2002,	 p.	 2)	 oriented	 at	 centralizing	 principles	 of	 socio-ecological	 and	 Indigenous	justice	within	the	new	technical	framework.		Governmentality	 theories	 assist	 us	 in	 understanding	 broad	 practices	 of	 forest	governance,	but	are	less	relevant	in	appreciating	how	a	particular	practice,	such	as	Indigenous	claims-making,	 emerges	 in	a	particular	 context.	Li	 (2007b)	argues	 that	this	 gap	 can	 be	 filled	 by	 adopting	 an	 assemblage	 approach.	 By	 combining	governmentality	 and	 assemblage	 approaches	 I	 aim	 to	 develop	 a	 comprehensive	theoretical	framework	for	case	study	3	that	will	 look	at	how	Indigenous	territories	and	 associated	 forms	 of	 technological	 ordering	 are	 emerging	 in	 the	 context	 of	REDD+.	 Assemblages	 describe	 the	 gathering	 of	 diverse	 elements,	 incorporating	more-than-human	 relationships,	 and	 disjointed	 practices	 into	 coherent	 temporal	formations	 that	 make	 particular	 propositions	 or	 forms	 of	 government	 possible	(DeLanda,	2006;	Li,	2007b;	Anderson	and	McFarlane,	2011;	McCann,	2011).			As	 a	 term,	 assemblage	 emphasises	 emergence,	 provisional	 unity,	 dispersion	 and	multiplicity	 (Anderson	 and	 McFarlane,	 2011).	 French	 philosophers,	 Deleuze	 and	Guattari	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 assemblage	 “to	 highlight	 the	 way	 in	 which	material	 content	 (bodies,	 actions,	 passions)	 and	 enunciations/articulation	(statements,	 plans,	 laws)	 are	 linked	 not	 in	 linear	 fashion	 but	 rhizomatically	 as	reciprocal	presuppositions	and	mutual	insertions	play	themselves	out”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	 1987,	 pp.	 85	 –	 91	 cited	 in	 Li,	 2007b).	 This	 depiction	 of	 assemblages	 as	rather	chaotic	and	sprawling	collection	of	linkages	between	socio-material	elements	is	useful	in	connecting	the	complexities	of	the	new	political	conjuncture	with	place-based	 Indigenous	 land	 struggles.	 Governmentality	 focuses	 attention	 on	 human	agency,	 while	 assemblages	 remind	 us	 of	 the	 agency	 of	 non-human	 actors,	 in	 the	
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production	of	 territory	 (Anderson	and	McFarlane,	2011;	Bear,	2013).	Following	Li	(2007b,	p.	264)	I	focus	on	the	practice	of	assembling,	that	is	“the	hard	work	required	to	 draw	 heterogeneous	 elements	 together,	 forge	 connection	 between	 them	 and	sustain	 these	 connections	 in	 the	 face	 of	 tension”,	 rather	 than	 approaching	assemblage	as	a	final	and	complete	product	of	actions.			Assemblages	are	characterised	by	processes	of	territorialisation	(Bear,	2013).	In	the	context	 of	 assembling	 Indigenous	 land	 claims,	 territorialisation	 is	 a	 process	 of	defining	 spatial	 boundaries,	 be	 it	 through	 implementation	 of	 policy,	 formation	 of	social	identity,	or	arrangement	of	jurisdictional	and	administrative	borders	(Peluso,	1995).	Territorialisation	can	also	signify	exclusion	and	omission	through	processes	of	 intensifying	 homogeneity	 within	 an	 assemblage,	 such	 as	 the	 process	 through	which	a	particular	community	comes	to	declare	itself	as	a	specific	Indigenous	entity	(Li,	2000;	Afiff	and	Lowe,	2007).	Governmentality	researchers	are	interested	in	how	spaces	 and	 territories	 are	 created	 and	 governed	 and	 can	 themselves	 becomes	technologies	 of	 government	 (Sanchez,	 2003).	 Most	 research	 on	 this	 theme	 has	explored	 spatial	 dimensions	 of	 governmentality	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 escalating	 use	 of	physical	 and	 sociospatial	 ordering	 in	 urban	 lifestyle	 (Merry,	 2001;	 Robins,	 2002;	Sanchez,	 2003).	 Spatial	 ordering	 is	 the	 production	 of	 “space	 within	 which	movements	and	flows	are	regulated	in	ways	which	enable	authorities	to	act;	a	space	that	 is	 measured,	 directed	 and	 standardized”	 (Barry,	 Osborne	 and	 Rose,	 1996,	 p.	127).	 	Hannah	(2000)	points	out	that	spatial	ordering	is	not	only	repressive	power	but	is	also	an	empowering	means	for	people	to	govern	themselves.			Taking	into	account	the	theoretical	discussion	so	far,	Figure	2.1	below	summarizes	the	theoretical	 framework	and	 literature	that	are	drawn	upon	to	approach	each	of	the	three	case	studies.	The	understanding	of	governmentality	both	as	a	modality	of	power	 and	 as	 an	 analytical	 framework	 lays	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 thesis’	 core	conceptual	framework.	McKee’s	(2009)	proposal	to	approach	governmentality	study	by	analysing	both	 the	discursive	 field	and	actual	material	practices	are	adopted	 to	study	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	
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	Figure	2.1	Theoretical	framework	of	the	research		
2.8 Critiques	and	Limits	of	Governmentality	O’Malley	and	Clifford	(1997)	highlight	the	tendency	of	Foucauldian	interlocutors	to	limit	 their	 governmentality	 studies	 to	 discursive	 analysis	 of	 governmental	rationalities	and	policies.	This	tendency	has	ignored	the	diverse	possible	outcomes	when	governmental	approaches	are	being	implemented	upon	targeted	populations.	Thus,	they	demand	govermentality	scholars	go	beyond	discursive	text	of	policies	by	investigating	how	governmental	practices	are	being	executed	and	contested.	McKee	(2009)	 asserts	 that	 when	 a	 researcher	 ethnographically	 inquires	 into	 the	implementation	of	governmental	approaches,	they	have	to	take	into	account	the	in-situ	 socio-political	 context	 where	 they	 are	 being	 implemented.	 By	 taking	 into	
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account	 this	 particular	 condition	 and	 context,	 researchers	 can	 highlight	 the	importance	of	place	and	time	to	the	operation	of	power	and	governance.			The	 second	 common	 critique	 to	 governmentality	 study	 is	 the	 inclination	 of	 its	scholars	to	focus	on	the	state	as	their	object	of	investigation.	Li	(2007c)	argues	that	governmental	practices	especially	those	of	neoliberal	governmentality	work	through	multiple	dominions	that	go	beyond	the	confinement	of	the	state.	Rutherford	(2007)	similarly	endeavours	to	influence	green	governmentality	scholars	to	pay	attention	to	the	role	on	non-state	actors,	such	as	NGOs,	community	based	organisations,	and	the	private	 sector	 in	 mainstreaming	 new	 conduct	 and	 engender	 new	 green	subjectivities.	She	also	warns	scholars	to	be	aware	of	the	nature	of	governmentality	as	an	incomplete	project,	always	contested,	synchronized,	and	subject	to	an	endless	revitalization	 of	 approaches	 and	 rationalities	 (Rutherford,	 2007).	 Indeed	 Foucault	(2001)	pointed	to	the	characteristic	of	power,	understood	as	an	art	of	government,	as	an	infinite	strategic	game	of	“permanent	provocation”	by	saying	that;			 At	the	very	heart	of	the	power	relationship,	and	constantly	provoking	it,	are	the	 recalcitrance	 of	 the	will	 and	 the	 intransigence	 of	 freedom.	 Rather	 than	speaking	of	an	essential	freedom,	it	would	be	better	to	speak	of	an	'agonism'	-	of	a	relationship	which	is	at	the	same	time	reciprocal	incitation	and	struggle;	less	 of	 a	 face-to-face	 confrontation	 which	 paralyzes	 both	 sides	 than	 a	permanent	provocation	(pp.	221	–	222)		For	example,	Li’s	 (2007c)	work	analyses	 the	MOF’s	and	The	Nature	Conservancy’s	(TNC)	 efforts	 to	 shape	 community	 subjectivities	 in	 areas	 affected	 by	 the	establishment	 of	 Lore	 Lindu	 National	 Park	 in	 the	 hilly	 interior	 of	 North	 Sulawesi	Province,	 Indonesia.	 TNC,	 a	 major	 player	 in	 conservation	 circles,	 had	 worked	through	 various	 approaches	 to	 engendering	 environmental	 subjectivities	 in	 local	communities.	One	of	the	projects	was	sponsored	by	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB)	and	was	 implemented	 through	a	set	of	calculated	practices	 intended	 to	achieve	an	‘integrated	conservation	and	development	project’.	 In	her	study,	Li	shows	how	the	project	 of	 subject	 formation	 is	 contested	 by	 its	 targeted	 population.	 Communities	grew	 unhappy	 with	 the	 TNC’s	 approach	 in	 managing	 the	 project	 and	 refused	 to	
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adopt	 the	 ‘conservation	 subjectivities’	 despite	 various	 disciplinary	 and	 incentive	mechanisms	 applied.	 Thus,	 Li’s	 analysis	 contributes	 to	 the	 understanding	 on	governmentality	 as	 an	 unfinished	 project	 subject	 to	 political	 provocation	 and	contestation	by	targeted	populations.			In	proposing	the	notion	of	‘governmentality’s	limits’,	Li	(2007c)	points	to	the	feature	of	governmentality	as:		 Being	irreducibly	utopian,	governmental	 interventions	can	never	achieve	all	they	seek.	An	important	reason	promised	improvements	are	not	delivered	is	that	 the	 diagnosis	 is	 incomplete	 …	 it	 cannot	 be	 complete	 if	 key	 political-economic	 processes	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 bounded,	 knowable,	 technical	domain.	 Furthermore,	 governmental	 interventions	 produce	 effects	 that	 are	contradictory,	even	perverse.			Li	(2007c)	addresses	three	key	factors	that	bound	and	challenge	the	implementation	of	governmental	approaches,	these	are:	politics,	population,	and	knowledge.	Politics	refers	 to	 “the	 ever-present	 possibility	 that	 a	 governmental	 intervention	 will	 be	challenged	 by	 critics	 rejecting	 its	 diagnoses	 and	 prescriptions”	 (Li,	 2007c,	 p.	 17).	Similarly	populations	“are	not	passive	objects	…	they	are	…	actants,	dynamic	forces	that	constantly	surprise	those	who	would	harness	and	control	them	…	[thus]	men	in	their	 relations	 with	 things	 ‘cannot	 be	 reconfigured	 according	 to	 plan”	 (Li,	 2007c,	p.17).	Knowledge	 failings	 in	 rendering	 intelligible	 society’s	 complex	 socio	 political	reality	places	 a	 further	 limit	 on	 governmental	 strategies	 (Li,	 2007c).	Reflecting	on	these	limits,	governmentality	research	needs	to	be	conducted	with	the	awareness	of	its	messy	actuality.		
2.9 Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 described	 Foucault’s	 genealogical	 conception	 of	 power	 and	what	constitutes	 governmentality	 analysis.	 The	 chapter	 began	 by	 outlining	epistemological	 characteristics	of	power	 in	 relation	 to	 the	art	of	 government.	This	discussion	 drew	 on	 Foucault’s	 discussion	 of	 three	 forms	 of	 power	 -	 sovereign,	
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disciplinary	and	biopower.	The	discussion	then	moved	on	to	explain	how	to	employ	governmentality	 as	 a	 lens	 for	 observing	 the	 practice	 of	 REDD+	 government.	 I	specifically	 followed	 Dean’s	 (1999)	 framework	 in	 focusing	 on	 four	 aspects	 of	analysis:	 the	rationality	of	government,	 the	techne,	 the	episteme,	and	the	formation	of	 new	 subjectivities	 as	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 2.1.	 I	 have	 drawn	 on	 this	 analytical	framework	in	my	research	analysis	and	present	 it’s	results	 in	Chapters	5,	6,	and	7.	The	 next	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 methodology	 of	 this	 research	 and	 specifically	highlights	 the	 qualitative	 methods	 that	 I	 used	 in	 collecting	 fieldwork	 data	 and	apprehending	the	messy	actualities	of	REDD+	implementation.	The	next	chapter	also	introduces	scholar	activism	as	the	positionality	that	I	chose	to	embody	as	an	attempt	to	reflect	a	more	hopeful	inquiry	and	engaged	scholarship.			 	
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3 Navigating	Hopeful	and	Critical	Geography	
Research		
“To	be	truly	radical	is	to	make	hope	possible,	rather	than	despair	convincing”	
(Raymond	Williams,	Sources	of	Hope,	1989)	
		
3.1 Introduction	The	previous	chapter	 sought	 to	 introduce	governmentality	as	 the	main	 theoretical	concept	and	framework	underpinning	this	research.	Through	understanding	power	as	 an	 immanent	 element	 in	 everyday	 relations,	 the	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 role	 of	governmental	 technologies,	 knowledge	 production	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 new	subjectivities	in	governing	human	and	forest	relationships	(Li,	2007c;	Winkel,	2012).	The	current	chapter	develops	this	post-structuralist	account	and	discusses	the	ethos	and	values	that	 inspire	the	research.	This	chapter	 is	divided	into	five	sections.	The	first	section	discusses	the	epistemological	approach	through	the	notions	of	scholar	activism	and	“hopeful”	geographic	research.	The	second	section	lays	out	the	multi-sited	 and	multi-scalar	 critical	 inquiry	method	 employed	 to	 collect	 fieldwork	 data.	The	 third	 section	 describes	 the	 analytical	 and	writing	methods	 used	 in	 a	 creative	attempt	 to	 assemble	 bits	 and	 fragments	 of	 material	 and	 theoretical	 data	 into	 a	comprehensible	 argument	 (Crang,	 2003).	 The	 fourth	 section	 reflects	 on	 my	positionality	 as	 a	 scholar	 activist	 and	 some	 challenges	 that	 I	 encountered	 in	adopting	 this	 subjectivity.	 The	 fifth	 section	 briefly	 discusses	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	methods.	The	chapter	is	then	finalized	with	a	conclusion.		
3.2 A	Slippery	Attempt	to	Undertake	Critical	yet	Hopeful	
Geographical	Research	In	embarking	on	a	research	journey,	a	scholar	usually	aims	to	produce	research	that	will	 be	 beneficial	 and	 useful	 for	 people	 or	 things.	 However,	 how	 does	 one	
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characterize	useful	 research?	For	whom	should	research	be	useful?	And	how	does	one	 suppose	 to	 undertake	 useful	 and	 critical	 research?	 These	 kinds	 of	 questions	always	 emerge	 during	 the	 phase	 of	 designing	 a	 piece	 of	 research	 that	 aims	 to	 go	beyond	 producing	 knowledge	 and	 a	 mere	 exercise	 in	 scholarship.	 In	 answering	these	queries,	I	draw	from	literature	on	scholar	activism	and	follow	the	Autonomous	Geographies	 Collective’s	 (2010)	 definition	 of	 scholar	 activism	 as	 an	 activity	 that	seeks	to	align	one’s	academic	work	with	political	ideas:	“to	further	social	change	and	work	 directly	 with	 marginal	 groups	 or	 those	 [engaged]	 in	 struggle”	 (p.	 246).	Derickson	 and	 Routledge	 (2015)	 define	 scholar	 activist	 as	 a	 person	who	 engages	with	“theoretical	and	conceptual	questions	 in	ways	 that	are	always	 insistently	and	dialectically	 rooted	 in	 the	 struggles	 of	 everyday	 life”	 (p.	 2).	 The	 adoption	 of	positionality	 as	 scholar	 activists	 is	 usually	 driven	 by	 the	 scholars’	 deep	 emotional	responses	to	the	social	and	ecological	injustices	and	inequalities	and	the	desire	that	motivate	 them	 to	 politically	 engage	 in	 social	 struggles	 (Derickson	 and	 Routledge,	2015).		
	In	adopting	positionality	as	a	scholar	activist,	I	have	found	it	useful	to	examine	the	work	of	geographers	Gibson-Graham	(2005,	2006,	2008)	who	emphasize	the	notion	of	hopeful	geographies	and	Routledge	&	Derickson’s	 (2015)	concept	regarding	 the	politics	of	resourcefulness.	The	work	of	these	geographers	have	guided	this	research	and	 informed	 the	 ethos	 of	my	 personal	 attempt	 to	 undertake	 hopeful	 and	 critical	geography	 research.	 Routledge	 and	 Derickson	 (2015)	 identify	 three	 ways	 of	practicing	the	politics	of	resourcefulness.	The	first	way	is	to	commit	to	advancing	the	work	of	our	 collaborators	 through	 the	 resources	 that	academics	are	often	granted	through	 their	position.	Examples	of	 this	are	specific	expertise	 related	with	writing	and	research,	technological	innovation	and	time	management,	and	access	to	donors.	The	 second	 way	 is	 to	 design	 research	 that	 examines	 questions	 and	 addressing	concerns	that	are	also	in	the	interest	of	our	collaborators.	The	third	way	is	to	design	research	that	addresses	the	challenges	that	our	collaborators	face	in	their	struggle	to	pursue	 progressive	 changes	 and	 identify	 conditions	 that	 will	 sustain	 their	 social	movements.	 In	conducting	 this	 research	 I	practiced	 the	 first	and	 the	 third	ways	of	performing	 the	 politics	 of	 resourcefulness,	 as	 I	 will	 discuss	 further	 in	 the	 section	below	on	researcher’s	positionality.		
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		Gibson-Graham	are	known	as	scholars	who	actively	advocate	the	need	for	academic	research	 to	 go	 beyond	 criticism	and	 to	 start	 thinking	 about	 alternatives	 and	hope	(Gibson-Graham,	2005,	2006,	2008).	This	is	difficult	in	the	sometimes	tense	REDD+	research	 environment	 in	 which	 a	 multitude	 of	 discourses	 regarding	 neoliberal	natures	circulate,	 including	the	not-quite-neoliberal	approach	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	However	De	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker	(2015)	remind	scholars	to	recognize	the	dynamism	and	tension	that	shape	the	particularity	of	neoliberal	nature	in	a	different	contexts.	 	 This	 dynamism	 and	 tension	 can	 possibly	 be	 utilized	 by	 actors,	 such	 as	activists,	 to	 serve	 their	 interests	 (de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015).	 I	 am	interested	in	responding	to	Gibson-Graham’s	call	for	hopeful	research	by,	in	addition	to	 critically	 exploring	 the	 uneven	 effects	 of	REDD+	neoliberal	 rationalities,	 to	 also	focusing	on	how	the	neoliberal	agenda	in	REDD+	can	be	resisted	and	repurposed.		Following	 Gibson-Graham’s	 (2008)	 suggestion,	 I	 have	 navigated	 the	 research	 to	adopt	a	“weak	form	of	theory”.	Accordingly,	I	see	the	practice	of	using	theory,	as	not	being	about	 forecasting	 failure	and	validating	 impossibility,	but	 instead	 it	 is	 about	seeing	 possibility	 and	 opportunity.	 According	 to	 Gibson-Graham	 (2008,	 p.	 621),	practicing	 weak	 theory	 can	 open	 new	 perspectives	 in	 seeing	 power	 as	 “a	differentiated	 landscape	of	 force,	constraint,	energy,	and	 freedom”	that	 is	useful	 in	producing	 political	 possibilities.	 In	 performing	 weak	 theory	 in	 a	 piece	 of	 REDD+	research,	 I	 resist	 the	 urge	 to	 jump	 into	 a	 premature	 judgement	 by	 labelling	 every	REDD-related	activity	as	the	extension	of	capitalist	interests.	I	perform	what	Gibson-Graham	 (2008)	 define	 as	 “a	 reparative	 motive	 that	 welcomes	 surprise,	 tolerates	coexistence,	 and	 cares	 for	 the	 new”	 (p.	 619).	 Following	 Robbins’	 (2011)	 advice,	 I	undertook	this	research	as	an	attempt	to	go	beyond	merely	describing	a	“hatchet”	by	also	 recognizing	 “seeds”	 in	 performing	 critical	 yet	 hopeful	 research.	 This	 is	 a	practice	Gibson-Graham	 	eloquently	state	as	being	the	need	to	read	“for	difference	rather	than	dominance”	(p.	623).			Performing	 a	 hopeful	 and	 critical	 geography	 research	 was	 not	 a	 straightforward	task.	It	is	a	commitment	that	involves	careful	consideration	of	how	one	is	involved	in	
	 61	
producing	knowledge	and	struggling	against	 injustice	(Castree	et	al.,	2010).	Taylor	(2014)	 suggests	 that	 a	 scholar	 activist’s	 positionality	 is	 “performed,	 fluid	 and	changing”	 (p.	 307,	 see	 also	 Askins,	 2009).	 Indeed,	 positionality	 is	 socially	constructed	and	shifts	according	to	the	change	in	power	relations	(Gibson-Graham,	1994).	In	the	section	further	below	I	will	reflect	on	performing	the	positionality	of	a	scholar	activist	and	discuss	the	multiple	challenges	that	I	encountered	both	during	the	 fieldwork	 and	 when	 I	 was	 completing	 research	 analysis	 and	 writing.	 In	 the	subsequent	 section	 I	will	discuss	 the	 research	method	employed	 in	 this	 study	and	detailing	 the	 data	 collection	 method	 as	 well	 as	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 that	underpinned	this	critical	inquiry.			
3.3 Multi-sited	and	Multi-Scalar	Critical	Inquiry:	
Following	“Beyond	Carbon,	More	than	Forest”	REDD+	consists	of	a	multitude	of	governmental	 technologies,	actors,	 interests,	and	institutions.	 The	 cross-scalar	 process	 of	 REDD+	 implementation	 can	 only	 be	rendered	intelligible	by	studying	the	network	of	programs	and	policies	rather	than	the	 isolated	 node	 of	 a	 particular	 project.	 Drawing	 on	 an	 increasingly	 influential	study	 on	 global	 policy,	 Peck	 and	 Theodore	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 researchers	 do	 not	need	to	abandon	ethnography	methods	in	a	globalising	world	but	re-think	what	type	of	 ethnography	 is	 suitable	 for	 unraveling	 fast	 moving	 policy.	 In	 the	 field	 of	geography,	 this	 tradition	 started	 through	 the	 study	 of	 trans-local	 and	 cross	 scalar	movements	 of	 policy	 and	 technologies	 using	 a	 multi-sited	 ethnographic	 method.	Multi-sited	ethnography	is	a	concept	coined	by	Marcus	(1995)	to	better	capture	the	relations	 of	 flows,	 links,	 places,	 and	 processes	 that	 shape	 a	 certain	 event	 in	 a	particular	place.	 It	 is	a	response	to	the	challenge	of	conducting	ethnography	in	the	contemporary	world	where	everything	is	connected	and	space	is	a	product	of	social	construction	rather	than	merely	particular	geographical	location.			Drawing	on	the	same	concern	of	understanding	how	globalization	has	affected	local	politics,	 Tsing	 (2005)	 proposes	 the	 ethnography	 of	 global	 connection,	 which	 is	 a	method	built	to	understand	“spatially	far	flung	collaborations	and	interconnections”	
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and	 to	 recognize	 “awkward	engagements”	 (p.	 ix).	Through	her	 fieldwork	on	 forest	politics	 in	 Indonesia,	 Tsing	 (2005)	 shows	 how	 the	 extent	 of	 forest	 destruction	 in	South	Kalimantan	is	not	an	expression	of	isolated	political	conjuncture,	but	a	result	of	assembly	of	connections,	frictions	and	encounters.	To	apprehend	these	chains	of	engagements,	 Tsing	 (2005)	 goes	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 examining	 the	 specific	locales	of	her	study	and	tracing	along	the	diverse	scales	and	chain	of	events,	policies	and	peoples	that	have	connections	with	her	study	sites.	In	so	doing,	Tsing	(2005,	p.	ix)	demonstrates	that	a	story	about	socio	nature	in	a	village	in	South	Kalimantan	is	simultaneously	also:			 A	 story	 of	 North	 American	 investment	 practices	 and	 the	 stock	 market,	Brazilian	rubber	tappers’	forest	advocacy	and	United	Nations	environmental	funding,	 international	 mountaineering	 and	 adventure	 sports,	 and	democractic	politics	and	the	overthrow	of	the	Suharto	regime.		Reflecting	 on	 Tsing’s	 ethnography	 concept	 of	 global	 connection,	 we	 come	 to	understand	 that	 a	 multi-scalar	 ethnography	 is	 as	 important	 as	 a	 multi-sited	 one.	Therefore,	 in	 this	 research,	 I	 follow	 the	 concept	 initiated	 by	 Xiang	 (2013)	 to	complement	 a	multi-sited	 ethnography	with	 a	multi-scalar	perspective.	The	multi-scalar	perspective	helps	in	organizing	fieldwork	and	provides	a	means	of	analysis	to	apprehend	 the	 relations	 of	 things	 across	 scales.	 In	 thinking	 through	 multi-scale	ethnography,	 I	 found	 Xiang’s	 two	 scale	 classifications	 useful	 to	 understand	 how	REDD+	shapes	and	is	being	conversely	shaped	by	the	existing	forest	politics.	These	two	 scale	 systems	 are:	 taxonomical	 scales	 (Delaney	 and	 Leitner,	 1997)	 and	emergent	 scales.	Reading	REDD+	 through	 taxonomical	 scales	 could	be	 interpreted	into	the	conventional	hierarchical	systems	that	divide	scales	of	REDD+	jurisdictional	arenas	 into	 global,	 national,	 sub-national	 and	 project	 scales.	 Understanding	 the	flows	 and	 links	 of	 REDD+	 policies,	 rationalities	 and	 calculations	 among	 these	hierarchical	scales	is	important	to	understand	why	REDD+	governmental	techniques	work	in	certain	scales	while	not	in	others.			Seeing	REDD+	only	through	taxonomical	scales	 is	of	course	problematic.	Similar	to	the	notion	of	space,	scale	as	a	geographical	concept	is	also	socially	constructed	and	
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relational.	 In	 seeing	 the	 concept	 of	 scales	 through	post-structuralist	 accounts,	 one	can	argue	that	what	matters	is	how	scales	can	be	rendered	legible	and	thus	“made	into	reality”.	This	is	where	the	second	type	of	scale	–	the	emergent,	can	be	employed	in	 seeing	 the	 complex	 intersection	 between	 knowledge	 and	 power	 in	 the	 REDD+	governmental	 system.	 Xiang	 (2013)	 notes	 that	 taxonomical	 and	 emergent	 scales	intersect	 with	 each	 other,	 and	 through	 the	 exploration	 of	 these	 intersections,	 an	ethnographic	method	can	“study	up”	to	interrogate	centres	of	power	(Nader,	1972),	“study	 down”	 to	 examine	 everyday	 interactions,	 and	 most	 importantly	 “study	through”		(Reinhold,	1994,	pp.	477	–	479;	cited	in	Shore	and	Wright,	1997)	to	“trace	ways	 in	which	power	 creates	webs	and	 relations	between	actors,	 institutions,	 and	discourses	across	time	and	space”	(Xiang,	2013,	p.	14).	Taking	 into	 account	 the	 notions	 of	multi	 scalar	 and	multi	 sited	 ethnography	 from	Marcus	 (1995),	 Tsing	 (2005),	 and	 Xiang	 (2013),	 I	 created	 a	 method	 of	 critical	inquiry	 that	 is	 relevant	 for	 this	 qualitative	 research.	 REDD+	 is	 constituted	 by	 a	multitude	of	materials	that	are	discursive,	metaphorical,	and	spatial,	expressed	on	a	range	 of	 scales.	 Multi	 sited	 and	 multi	 scalar	 ethnographic	 methods	 provide	appropriate	 strategies	 to	 apprehend	 REDD+	 as	 an	 assemblage	 of	 governmental	systems.	Marcus	(1995)	warns,	however,	that	multi-sited	ethnography	should	not	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	represent	the	whole	system	of	the	studied	object,	but	rather	that	 the	 capacity	 of	 a	 researcher	 to	 engage	with	 different	 scales	 and	 sites	 is	what	makes	the	multi-sited	ethnography	an	interesting	method.	Given	governmentality	is	the	 main	 theoretical	 framework	 in	 this	 study,	 and	 so	 it	 focuses	 on	 exploring	 the	modes	 of	 thought	 in	 governmental	 practices,	 I	 followed	 Marcus’	 suggestion	 to	“follow	the	metaphor”	 in	applying	multi-sited	ethnogaphy.	This	method	also	aligns	with	Hajer’s	(1995)	suggestion	 in	using	discourse	analysis	by	examining	metaphor	to	 study	 governmentality	 (see	 Chapter	 2).	 According	 to	 Marcus,	 “following	 the	metaphor”	is	employed	“when	the	thing	traced	is	within	the	realm	of	discourse	and	modes	of	thought,	then	the	circulation	of	signs,	symbols,	and	metaphors	guides	the	design	of	ethnography”	(Marcus,	1995,	p.	92).			In	 undertaking	 a	 “follow	 the	 metaphor”	 method,	 I	 traced	 the	 circulation	 and	translation	of	Indonesia’s	REDD+	rationales	represented	in	the	metaphor	of	“Beyond	
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Carbon,	 More	 than	 Forest”	 into	 things	 such	 as	 governmental	 technologies,	institutions,	 initiatives,	 and	 coalitions.	 This	metaphor	 is	 the	 tagline	 of	 Indonesia’s	REDD+	 program	 which	 has	 been	 used	 to	 politically	 show	 that,	 instead	 of	 solely	focusing	 on	 carbon	 conservation	 and	 offset,	 REDD+	 is	 broadly	 defined	 as	 a	 new	mode	of	Indonesia’s	economic	development,	based	on	“green”	growth	rationalities.	Using	 this	method,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 strategically	 navigate	my	 research	 to	 follow	 the	circulation	 of	 the	 metaphor	 and	 establish	 representative	 case	 studies	 where	 the	metaphor	was	 influential.	 It	brought	me	 to	 three	cross	scalar	 sites	of	engagement:	the	 REDD+	 Taskforce,	 the	 One	 Map	 Initiative,	 and	 an	 Indigenous	 land	 claim	assemblage	 in	 a	 community	 called	 the	Bahanei,	which	 I	will	 discuss	 further	 in	 the	next	section.			Despite	its	many	potentials,	multi-sited	ethnography	is	not	immune	to	criticism.	The	most	common	critic	 is	 its	 lack	of	depth,	a	characteristic	 that	 is	usually	 tackled	 in	a	“traditional”	ethnographic	approach	(Falzon,	2009).	However,	Marcus	(1995)	argues	that	 the	 “thick	 description”	 in	 multi-sited	 approach	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 networks	 between	 sites	 of	 studies	 and	 cross	 scalar	encounters	 that	 are	 located	 in	 diverse	 places	 rather	 than	 in	 an	 isolated	 place	 of	fieldwork.	However,	 in	 employing	multi-sited	 critical	 inquiry,	 I	 did	 not	 attempt	 to	simplify	 the	 binary	 between	 single	 and	multi	 sited	 qualitative	 research.	 Instead,	 I	tried	 to	 express	 the	 way	 I	 inhabited	 and	 co-produced	 a	 number	 of	 sites	 of	engagement	simultaneously.			
3.4 Three	Sites	of	Engagement		Following	 the	 metaphor	 of	 “Beyond	 Carbon,	 More	 than	 Forest”,	 in	 the	 first	 case	study	I	trace	how	the	REDD+	Taskforce	worked	to	normalize	REDD+	rationalities	in	Indonesia	through	diverse	governmental	technologies.	I	investigated	the	translation	of	 the	 “Beyond	 Carbon”	 rationality	 of	 REDD+	 government	 into	 ten	 imperative	programmes	which	include:		1)	Moratorium	monitoring	and	One	Map	Policy	Implementation,		2)	Forest	licensing	management,		3)	Law	enforcement,		
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4)	Support	for	Indigenous	mapping,		5)	Forest	fire	control	and	management,		6)	Green	village,		7)	Green	school,		8)	Support	for	integrated	spatial	planning,		9)	Conflict	resolution	road	map,	and		10)	Strategic	program	for	national	park	and	conservation	forests.			Two	 programmes	 were	 then	 selected	 as	 the	 case	 studies	 two	 and	 three	 in	 this	doctoral	thesis:	the	One	Map	Policy	and	Indigenous	mapping.	The	selection	of	these	two	 programmes	 was	 based	 on	 the	 consideration	 that	 they	 represent	 two	 of	 the	most	 contested	 themes	 in	 Indonesia’s	 REDD+	 governance:	 land	 tenure	 and	forestland	governance.	Studying	One	Map	Policy	and	 Indigenous	Mapping	has	also	provided	opportunity	to	enter	the	multi-sited,	multi-actor	and	multi-scalar	arenas	of	REDD+	 implementation.	 Each	 case	 study	 is	 developed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 findings	chapters	that	configure	the	core	of	this	thesis	(see	Chapters	5,	6	and	7).	Figure	3.1	below	points	the	location	of	the	case	studies.			
	Figure	3.1	Locations	of	the	case	studies		
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3.4.1 Case	Study	1:	The	REDD+	Taskforce	The	first	site	of	engagement	was	the	REDD+	Taskforce.	Instead	of	a	location	or	place,	this	site	 is	a	national	 institution	 that	works	 in	a	cross-scale	way	 in	mainstreaming	and	 normalizing	 REDD+	 as	 a	 governmental	 system.	 The	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 was	 a	government	 owned	 ad-hoc	 agency	 formed	 to	 accelerate	 the	 development	 of	infrastructure	 for	 REDD+’s	 full	 implementation	 (see	 Chapter	 5	 for	 a	 detailed	elaboration).	 The	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 was	 formed	 through	 Presidential	 Decree	Number	 19/2010	 in	 September	 2010	 and	mandated	 to	 carry	 out	 its	 tasks	 for	 ten	months,	which	was	eventually	extended	for	another	two	years	from	July	2011	–	June	2013.			The	Taskforce	was	replaced	with	the	new	REDD+	Agency	that	was	designed	to	act	as	a	 more	 permanent	 institution	 responsible	 for	 the	 full	 implementation	 of	 REDD+.	However,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2014,	 the	 Agency	 merged	 with	 the	 newly	 formed	Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Forestry	 (MOEF)	 under	 a	 newly	 elected	 political	regime.	In	the	rest	of	this	thesis,	I	used	the	“REDD+	Taskforce”	and	“REDD+	Agency”	both	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 Government	 of	 Indonesia’s	 REDD+	 institution.	 The	 use	 of	 the	“Taskforce”	mainly	refers	to	the	ad-hoc	 institution	that	worked	from	2010	–	2013.	Meanwhile,	whenever	the	term	“REDD+	Agency”	is	employed	in	the	text,	it	refers	to	the	agency	that	was	formed	in	September	2013	to	replace	the	Taskforce.				Having	 chosen	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 as	 a	 site	 of	 engagement,	 I	 studied	 the	governmental	strategies	that	the	Taskforce	implemented	to	mainstream	both	carbon	and	non-carbon	 rationalities	 into	 the	governance	of	 Indonesian	 forests.	 I	 collected	the	 data	 through	 semi	 structured	 interviews	 and	 observations.	 A	 total	 of	 54	interviews	were	 conducted	with	 both	 representation	 from	 the	REDD+	Taskforce’s	staff	 and	 actors	 that	 were	 connected	 or	 were	 implicated	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	institution	 (see	 Table	 3.1).	 Most	 of	 my	 informants,	 especially	 those	 classified	 as	national	 actors,	 were	 being	 interviewed	 not	 only	 for	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 case	study	but	also	for	two	other	case	study	sites.	I	started	the	fieldwork	in	May	2013	and	arranged	 interview	 appointments	 with	 the	 Taskforce’s	 working	 group	 members	who	 included	 representation	 from	 government	 and	 ministerial	 agencies	 (MoF,	
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Ministry	of	Environment	 (MOE),	Ministry	of	Agriculture	 (MOA),	 the	National	 Land	Agency	(NLA),	Geospatial	Information	Agency	(GIA),	and	UKP4	(see	Appendix	A	for	an	extended	explanation	about	each	of	this	government	body),	NGOs	(environmental	NGOs	and	Indigenous	based	mass	organisations)	academics,	and	the	private	sector.			In	 addition	 to	 the	 Taskforce’s	 working	 group	 members,	 the	 interviews	 were	conducted	 with	 other	 institutions,	 such	 as	 research	 organizations,	 a	 palm	 oil	plantation	 association,	 a	 logging	 companies	 association	 and	 a	 pulp	 and	 paper	industry	association.	I	also	observed	multiple	workshops,	seminars,	and	conferences	on	REDD+	and	its	related	issues	organized	by	different	stakeholders	(see	Table	3.2).	Aside	from	interviews	and	observation	I	relied	on	secondary	data	coming	from	the	Taskforce	and	the	REDD+	Agency’s	publications	and	reports.	As	I	was	working	as	a	consultant	 for	 the	 Agency,	 I	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 read	 other	 consultants’	 and	grantees’	reports	and	minutes	of	meetings.	Although	I	did	not	employ	these	internal	data	directly	 in	my	analysis,	 they	shaped	my	overall	understanding	of	how	REDD+	unfolded	in	Indonesia	as	I	will	discuss	further	below	in	the	section	on	positionality	and	reflection.			
3.4.2 Case	Study	2:	The	One	Map	Initiative	The	second	site	of	engagement	was	with	a	program	called	OMI.	The	Initiative	is	the	government’s	attempt	to	fix	the	messiness	of	forestland	governance	where	there	is	no	clarity	over	who	has	rights	to	own	and	use	Indonesia’s	forestland.	The	Initiative	aimed	to	address	the	problem	by	producing	a	single	common	map	of	 forestland	 in	Indonesia	 that	 would	 serve	 as	 a	 reference	 in	 the	 decision	 making	 processes	regarding	 spatial	 planning.	 OMI	was	 overseen	 by	UKP4	 and	 the	REDD+	Taskforce	and	 has	 been	 implemented	 across	 agencies	 and	 scales.	 The	 Initiative	 became	 the	means	for	the	REDD+	proponents	to	problematize	existing	forest	governance	and	to	propose	new	governmental	technologies.					In	making	 the	 Initiative	 a	 site	 of	 engagement,	 I	 followed	how	new	 technologies	 of	government	 were	 produced	 and	 contested,	 and	 their	 on-the-ground	implementation.	 This	 approach	 enabled	 me	 to	 investigate	 how	 diverse	 ranges	 of	
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actors	 responded	 to	 the	new	governmental	 technologies.	Similar	 to	case	study	1,	 I	collected	 data	 through	 semi	 structured	 interviews	 with	 actors	 that	 were	 directly	involved	 in	 the	 Initiative.	 I	 interviewed	 government	 officials,	 NGOs	 staff,	Working	Group	members	of	the	OMI,	academics	and	the	staff	of	research	centres	(see	Table	3.1).	 In	 addition	 to	 57	 semi	 structured	 interviews,	 data	 was	 collected	 through	observation	 (see	 Table	 3.2).	 I	 joined	multiple	 discussions	 and	workshops	 on	 OMI	and	 I	visited	Barito	Selatan	District	 in	Central	Kalimantan	where	 the	pilot	 for	OMI	activities	 was	 being	 rolled	 out.	 The	 visit	 was	 first	 conducted	 for	 three	 days	 in	November	2013	during	which	time	I	joined	a	workshop	organized	by	the	Provincial	Forestry	Agency	to	discuss	the	forest	gazettement	process	with	five	affected	villages.	The	 second	 and	 third	 visits	 were	 in	 March	 2014	 to	 interview	 local	 government	agencies.	Secondary	data	consisted	of	various	reports	and	presentations	provided	by	the	REDD+	Agency.			
3.4.3 Case	 Study	 3:	 The	 Indigenous	 Land	 Claim	 Assemblage	 in	
Bahanei	The	 third	site	of	engagement	 is	an	 Indigenous	mapping	activity	 carried	out	by	 the	Bahanei	 community,	 in	 Gunung	 Mas	 District,	 Central	 Kalimantan	 Province.	 The	Indigenous	mapping	was	conducted	 in	order	 to	establish	 the	status	of	 the	 land	on	which	 the	 Bahanei	 live	 as	 being	 Indigenous	 territory.	 Obtaining	 the	 status	 of	Indigenous	territory	is	a	necessary	strategy	for	a	struggle	against	land	appropriation	by	 a	 logging	 company	 that	 has	 been	 given	 a	 forest	 concession	 by	 the	 MOF.	 The	concession	area	overlaps	with	the	Bahanei	village	and	has	caused	tension	between	the	villagers	and	the	logging	company.	Together	with	other	elements,	the	formation	of	a	series	of	REDD+	policies	and	programs	has	produced	a	political	conjuncture	that	is	 more	 open	 to	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights.	 AMAN	 Central	 Kalimantan	 and	 the	Bahanei	 utilized	 this	 new	 opening	 to	 gather	 political	 support	 and	 resources	 from	REDD+	proponents	in	order	to	assemble	a	land	claim.			The	Bahanei	was	chosen	as	the	third	case	study	because	it	was	the	first	Indigenous	community	 that	 received	 support	 from	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 to	 carry	 out	Indigenous	mapping	in	Central	Kalimantan	as	the	first	REDD+	pilot	province.	Similar	
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to	 the	 two	 case	 studies	 above,	 the	 means	 for	 data	 collection	 included	 semi	structured	 interviews,	 observation,	 and	 secondary	 data.	 The	 interviews	 were	conducted	 with	 members	 of	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 staff,	 the	 AMAN	 National	Secretary	and	AMAN	CK	staff,	members	of	the	Bahanei	community,	NGOs	in	Central	Kalimantan,	 local	 government	 agencies	 in	 Gunung	 Mas	 District	 and	 government	agencies	at	the	Provincial	level.	In	addition	to	a	total	of	55	interviews	(see	Table	3.1),	I	 visited	Bahanei	 in	October	2013	which	was	 then	 followed	by	my	 engagement	 in	their	 advocacy	 activities,	 a	 positionality	 that	 I	 will	 elaborate	 further	 in	 the	 later	section	of	this	chapter.			
3.5 Discussion	on	Data	Collection	Methods	
3.5.1 Semi	Structured	Interviews	Semi-structured	interviews	were	conducted	to	acquire	the	main	data	for	this	thesis.	This	method	suits	 the	need	 for	research	based	on	 the	co-production	of	knowledge	(Whatmore,	 2003).	 Semi-structured	 interviews	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	participants	 targeted	 by	 the	 research	 and	 I	 to	 form	 a	 two-way	 conversation	 that	would	 potentially	 lead	 to	 rich	 materials	 that	 give	 attention	 not	 only	 to	 the	researcher’s	 need	 for	 valuable	 and	 “thick”	 empirical	 data	 but	 also	 to	 participants’	concerns.	This	method	also	enabled	me	to	quickly	gain	the	trust	of	the	informants.	This	trust	is	important	so	that	the	researcher	is	able	to	understand	the	role	that	each	informant	has	 and	 their	perceptions	of	 the	REDD+	governmental	 assemblage.	 It	 is	important	 to	 note	 that	more	 than	 50%	 of	 the	 participants	 had	 had	 some	 form	 of	professional	encounter	with	me	as	I	used	to	work	for	several	environmental	NGOs	before	starting	my	doctoral	study.	In	this	case,	most	of	the	interviews	went	very	well	as	 it	 was	 easy	 to	 win	 their	 trust	 and	 the	 interviews	 were	mostly	 conducted	 as	 a	dialogue	rather	than	a	series	of	questions.	Going	through	this	dialogue	facilitated	an	exchange	of	discursive	and	material	knowledge,	and	felt	less	exploitative.			The	interview	participants	were	recruited	with	a	“snow	balling”	method,	where	an	interviewee	would	 suggest	other	potential	 informants.	This	method	has	proven	 to	be	very	effective	as	I	could	reach	out	to	diverse	participants	and	follow	new	leads.	
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Sometimes,	 potential	 interviewees	 were	 recruited	 during	 a	 workshop	 or	 a	conference,	as	it	is	easier	to	reach	“elite”	informants	when	they	attend	a	seminar	as	resource	persons.	Interviews	were	conducted	either	in	participants’	offices,	in	cafes,	or	 in	 their	 homes.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 recruiting	 informants	 during	 a	 workshop,	 the	interviews	 were	 conducted	 during	 a	 break	 in	 the	 sessions.	 Each	 interview	 was	carried	out	for	around	60	to	90	minutes	mostly	in	Bahasa	Indonesia	or	English	for	foreign	 informants.	 In	 total	 64	 participants	 were	 interviewed,	 of	 which	 23	participants	were	interviewed	multiple	times	(see	Table	3.1).	Most	of	the	informants	provided	 insights	 into	 all	 three	 case	 studies,	 except	 for	 the	 community	 members	whom	 I	 interviewed	 specifically	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 case	 study	 3	 on	 Indigenous	mapping.	In	addition	I	immersed	myself	in	REDD+	for	a	year	and	mixed	with	people	at	 multiple	 conferences	 and	 workshops	 who	 informed	 my	 perspective,	 albeit	informally.	 	Similarly	 the	 list	does	 it	 include	members	of	 the	community	that	were	present	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 talks	 whenever	 I	 interviewed	 community	representatives.				 Table	3.1	List	of	interviewees	
No	 Name	
(pseudonym)	
Position	in	REDD+	
Networks	
Case	Study	 Date	of	interview	
1	 2	 3	1	 Artodius	 Manager	of	REDD+	Investor		 ✓	 ✓	 	 October	2013	2	 Stefano	 Country	representative	of	an	international	donor	agency	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	3	 Dormano	 Head	of	local	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	4	 Nurmanto	 Program	officer	of	a	UN	Body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	5	 Hendarto	 Academic	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	6	 Rojiman	 Coordinator	of	a	local	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	7	 Maryanti	 Program	officer	of	REDD+	local	office	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	8	 Bredana	 Manager	of	a	local	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013,	November	2013,	January	2015	9	 Yandiman	 Academic	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013,	August	2013	10	 Cokorda	 Director	of	an	international	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013	
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conservation	NGO	11	 Mursidi	 Adviser	to	an	international	financial	institution	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013	12	 Ovyana	 Program	officer	of	an	international	donor	agency	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013	13	 Wanmarda	 REDD+	Investor	 ✓	 ✓	 	 May	2013,	July	2013	14	 Galungan	 Researcher	in	an	international	research	centre	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013	15	 Kipeli	 Staff	in	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013	16	 Nagara	 Director	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013	17	 Usman	 Program	manager	of	a	UN	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013	(2x)	18	 Andika	 Staff	of	a	government	ministry	 ✓	 ✓	 	 June	2013,	January	2015	19	 Jodi	 Member	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce’s	Working	group	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013	(2x),	May	2013	20	 Ginting	 Executive	Director	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013	21	 Armando	 Staff	of	a	local	NGO	 	 ✓	 ✓	 Juni	2013	22	 Yamadhi	 Head	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce	Working	group	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 Juni	2013,	January	2014;	January	2015	23	 Hartono	 Staff	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 	 	 May	2013,	Juni	2013	24	 Erwinda	 Staff	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce		 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 Juni	2013,	March	2014	25	 Josyana	 Staff	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 Juni	2013,	July	2013,	September	2013	26	 Yunus	 Head	of	the	Advocacy	division	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	27	 Afifah	 Academic	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	28	 Shinta	 Program	coordinator	of	a	UN	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	29	 Yusliana	 Expert	staff	to	a	government	agency	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	(2x)	30	 Rukmina	 Community	member	 	 	 ✓	 July	2013	31	 Hartadi	 Academic	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013,	February	2014	32	 Marina	 Director	executive	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	33	 Dewanti	 Program	coordinator	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	34	 Yunanti	 Head	of	a	division	in	a	government	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	35	 Hasan	 Program	manager	of	a	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 May	2013,	July	
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national	donor	institution	 2013	36	 Nurdina	 Community	member	 	 	 ✓	 July	2013	37	 Wandi	 Staff	of	a	government	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	(2x),	September	2013	38	 Taksaka	 Deputy	Director	to	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013,	December	2014	39	 Laura	 Senior	researcher	to	an	international	research	organization	 ✓	 ✓	 	 July	2013	40	 Dhartono	 REDD+	investor	 	 	 	 July	2013	(3x)	41	 Dandi	 Staff	of	a	national	government	agency		 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	42	 Kuswanto	 Deputy	of	a	government	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013,	October	2014,	January	2015	43	 Nisa	 Communication	officer	of	a	donor	agency	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	44	 Sumarjono	 Representation	of	a	logging	industry	association	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	45	 Randy	 Head	of	a	division	in	a	government	body	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013,	February	2014	46	 Nurwajono	 Director	of	a	division	in	a	government	body	 	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013,	April	2014	47	 Suwardiyanto	 Head	of	a	division	in	a	government	body	 	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	48	 Patrick	 Representation	of	an	international	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 July	2013	49	 Rizaldi	 Representation	of	Indonesian	Chamber	of	Comerce	 ✓	 ✓	 	 July	2013	50	 Januarto	 Representation	of	palm	oil	industry	association	 ✓	 ✓	 	 July	2013	51	 Mulyono	 Staff	of	a	pulp	and	paper	industry	 ✓	 ✓	 	 July	2013	52	 Aryo	 Head	of	a	local	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	53	 Hersri	 Staff	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 September	2013,	October	2013	(2x),	December	2014	54	 Bonar	 Secretary	General	of	a	national	NGO	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 October	2013	(2x)	55	 Trigunawan	 District	Secretary	 	 ✓	 ✓	 November	2013	56	 Bapa	Nandita	 Community	member	 	 	 ✓	 April	2013,	October	2013	(2x)	57	 Bapa	Rara	 Community	member	 	 	 ✓	 October	2013	58	 Ojiyanto	 Academic	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 November	2013	59	 Bapa	Zuli	 Community	member	 	 	 ✓	 November	2013,	April	2014	60	 Bandana	 Head	of	REDD+	local	secretariat	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 June	2013,	November	2013	61	 Bapa	Samadikun	 Province	Secretary	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 November	2013	
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62	 Yuwono	 Local	forestry	agency	official	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 March	2014	63	 Arnie	 REDD+	investor	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 December	2013	64	 Poniman	 Local	forestry	agency	official	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 November	2013,	April	2014			I	 prepared	 a	 general	 guiding	 list	 of	 questions	 before	 each	 of	 the	 interviews	 to	stimulate	but	not	to	direct	the	discussion.	I	approached	each	of	the	interviews	with	a	different	 prompt	 sheet	 because	 each	 of	 the	 informants	 had	 their	 own	 specific	expertise,	experience	and	concern	in	relation	to	three	of	my	case	studies.	I	provided	a	consent	sheet	and	a	pager	containing	general	information	on	the	objectives	of	the	research	 for	 all	 research	 participants	 for	 their	 references	 (see	 Appendix	 C).	 	 In	presenting	the	interview	results,	I	decided	to	use	pseudonyms	to	create	a	degree	of	anonymity,	 due	 to	 the	 politically	 sensitive	 nature	 of	 this	 research	 topic.	 Although	efforts	have	been	made	to	keep	the	informants	identity	confidential,	anyone	close	to	the	 issues	 may	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 them	 through	 the	 informants’	 particular	comments	 or	 positions.	 The	 interviews	 were,	 when	 possible,	 recorded	 and	transcribed.	 Permissions	 were	 requested	 prior	 to	 it	 being	 recorded.	 Two	transcribers	who	had	signed	confidentiality	agreements	assisted	me	in	transcribing	the	interview	records	(see	Appendix	D).			The	use	of	transcribers	in	aiding	the	transcription	of	interview	records	has	been	an	interesting	 process	 that	 I	 can	 reflect	 on	 several	 ways.	 First,	 the	 two	 transcribers	have	saved	hours	of	my	 limited	 time	by	doing	 the	 laborious	works	of	 transcribing	around	85	hours	of	 recording.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	not	 all	 of	 the	 interview	records	have	been	translated,	only	those	interviews	conducted	in	Bahasa	Indonesia	were	transcribed	by	the	two	transcribers	due	to	the	language	limitation.	Meanwhile,	I	 have	 been	 solely	 responsible	 to	 transcribed	 interviews	 that	 were	 conducted	 in	English	and	Dayaknese.	Secondly,	the	two	transcribers	that	I	have	sought	assistance	from	are	fellow	activists	working	for	local	NGOs	and	community	based	organisations	that	 I	 wholeheartedly	 support.	 Working	 with	 local	 and	 community	 based	organizations	often	means	 low	 to	 almost	no	 routine	 salary.	 Committed	 to	 support	other	fellow	activists	I	commissioned	the	tasks	of	transcribing	the	interviews	in	the	hope	to	share	my	financial	resources	and	temporarily	sustain	their	livelihood,	one	of	
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the	expression	in	which	I	embody	the	politics	of	resourcefulness	 in	doing	research	(Derickson	 and	 Routledge,	 2015).	 Thirdly,	 hiring	 fellow	 activists	 rather	 than	professional	 transcriber	 means	 comparatively	 low	 quality	 of	 work.	 This	 situation	provided	a	significant	challenge	during	which	I	found	many	errors	in	the	transcripts.	The	nature	of	debates	in	REDD+	that	contains	scientific	terminologies	particular	to	carbon	 and	 economic	 knowledge,	 have	 added	 layer	 of	 complexity	 for	 the	 two	transcribers	 to	 fully	 comprehend	 the	 interviews	 that	 they	 tried	 to	 transcribe.	Therefore,	I	had	to	go	back	and	forth	between	the	recording	and	the	transcripts	to	ensure	that	there	were	no	errors	in	my	data.			
3.5.2 Observation	Participant	 observation	 enabled	 the	 collection	 of	 empirical	 data	 that	 would	 have	been	difficult	to	obtain	from	one	on	one	interviews.	In	the	case	of	this	research,	for	instance,	 the	 interaction	 among	different	 forest	 stakeholders,	 each	with	 their	 own	interests,	 can	easily	be	 rendered	 intelligible	 through	observing	 a	multistakeholder	meeting.	 Participant	 observation	 has	 also	 facilitated	 the	 identification	 of	 silences	and	omissions,	and	who	 is	being	marginalized	and	prioritized	 in	 the	REDD-related	decision	making	or	project	policy	 implementations	by	 showing	what	 concerns	 are	(not)	 being	 addressed	 in	 the	 meeting.	 Observation	 is	 one	 of	 the	 keys	 in	 the	qualitative	 research	 method.	 In	 this	 research	 it	 has	 enabled	 the	 investigation	 of	mundane	 forms	 of	 power,	 in	 which	 it	 is	 the	 aim	 of	 a	 governmentality	 study	 to	critically	inquire	into	how	people	are	subjected	to	daily	technologies	of	government	that	enabled	them	to	govern	themselves	and	others.		Observation	 data	 was	 collected	 in	 the	 form	 of	 field	 notes	 both	 from	 the	 various	meetings	 and	when	 I	 stayed	with	 the	 Bahanei	 (see	 Table	 3.2	 for	 list	 of	 observed	events).	These	 field	notes	are	a	source	of	analysis	 for	 this	 thesis	and	 informed	the	results	 chapters.	 Claiming	 a	 position	 as	 a	 scholar	 activist,	 I	 was	 never	 purely	observing;	I	also	asked	questions,	expressed	opinions	and	sometimes	had	the	role	of	facilitator	for	the	discussion.	These	blurred	boundaries	served	as	scholar	activism	in	action	where	I	contributed	to	the	advancement	of	social	and	environmental	 justice	agendas.	 	 The	 multiple	 positionalities	 that	 I	 had	 during	 the	 field	 work	 made	 me	
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oscillate	between	observer-as-participant	and	participant-as-observer.	Thus	 I	have	never	 been	 entirely	 “inside”	 or	 “outside”.	 I	 will	 further	 elaborate	 this	 multiple	positionalities	and	reflect	on	how	it	has	affected	the	research	in	the	later	section	of	this	chapter.	I	will	now	discuss	the	methods	I	employed	in	data	analysis	and	writing	to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 messy	 actualities	 of	 REDD+	 material	 and	 discursive	implementation	in	Indonesia.			 	Table	3.2	REDD+	events	observed	
Organizer	 Theme	of	the	
workshop/meeting	
Scope/Scale	
of	the	
meeting	
	
Date	and	Location	
REDD+	Taskforce	 Financial	institution	for	REDD+	implementation		 National	 Jakarta,	May	2013	CIFOR	 National	workshop	on	REDD+	context,	elements	and	dynamic	in	Indonesia		
National	 Jakarta,	May	2013	
REDD+	Taskforce	 Legal	review	and	law	enforcement	related	with	forest	crimes		
National	 Jakarta,	May	2013	
UNORCID		 REDD+	and	Indigenous	rights	recognition		 National	 Jakarta,	May	2013	AMAN		 Adat	forest	recognition	 National	 Jakarta,	May	2013		Clinton	Climate	Initiative		 Annual	Partners	meeting		 National	 Bogor,	May	2013	Participative	Mapping	Network	 Participative	mapping	and	sustainable	land	use	planning		
Local	 Kapuas,	June	2013	
Civil	Society	Coalition	for	Saving	Indonesian	Forest	and	Global	Climate		
REDD+,	climate	mitigation	in	general	and	the	role	of	civil	society	organizations		
National	 Jakarta,	June	2013	
Geospatial	Information	Agency	 The	One	Map	Policy	and	Participative	Mapping	Standard		
National	 Jakarta,	June	2013	
UN-REDD	 Gender	and	REDD+	 National	 Jakarta,	July	2013	
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Programme	Indonesia		UN-REDD	 REDD+	global	partnership	workshop	 International	 Palangkaraya,	October	2013		Participative	Mapping	Network	Central	Kalimantan	Branch		
REDD+,	safeguards	and	FPIC	implementation	 Local	 Palangkaraya,	November	2013	
AMAN	Central	Kalimantan	 Indigenous	mapping	and	Indigenous	tenure	rights		 Local	 Barito	Selatan,	October	2013	CIFOR	 Forest	Asia	Summit	 International	 Jakarta,	May	2014		Central	Kalimantan	Forestry	Agency		 Forest	gazettement	process	and	conflict	resolution		
Local	 Barito	Selatan,	November	2013	
Clinton	Climate	Initiative		 Annual	partners	meeting		 National	 Jakarta,	December	2013	Kotawaringin	Barat	Forestry	Agency		 Community	forestry	 Local	 Kotawaringin	Barat,	September	2013		REDD+	Agency	 National	meeting	with	REDD+	provinces		 National	 Jakarta,	March	2014	REDD+	Joint	Secretariat	Central	Kalimantan	 Discussion	on	REDD+	programs	with	REDD+	districts		
Local	 Palangkaraya,	April	2014	
AMAN	Central	Kalimantan	 Indigenous	mapping	and	its	formal	recognition		 Local	 Gunungmas,	April	2014	REDD+	Agency	 National	meeting	with	REDD+	stakeholders		 National	 Jakarta,	December	2013		
3.6 Data	analysis	and	writing	In	making	sense	of	the	fieldwork	data,	I	follow	Crang’s	(2003)	suggestion	who	likens	the	analysing	process	to	a	creative	practice	of	producing	meaning	and	making	order.	Analysis	 is	 a	 task	 that	 requires	 a	 researcher	 to	orchestrate,	manipulate,	 and	make	connections	 in	 the	 fieldwork	material.	 For	me	 it	 involves	 a	 process	 of:	 going	back	and	forth	through	the	notes,	translating	and	transcribing	the	materials,	interpreting	
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and	connecting	 fragments	of	data,	 coding	 these	notes	 systematically	and	 following	the	 evolution	of	 thought	while	 going	 through	 the	 fieldwork	notes.	 Crang	 (2013,	 p.	130)	 argues	 that	 analysing	 and	 writing	 are	 an	 embedded	 process	 that	 cannot	 be	separated,	“it	is	thinking	by	writing	that	tends	to	reveal	the	flaws,	the	contradictions	in	our	ideas,	forcing	us	to	look,	to	analyse	in	different	ways	and	rethink”.			One	 can	argue	 that,	 in	 short,	 analysis	 is	 a	process	of	 teasing	out	bits	or	 fragments	from	 a	 set	 of	 data	 and	 recognising	 patterns	 that	 emerge	 in	 order	 to	 assemble	 an	intelligible	answer	for	a	particular	question.	For	post-structuralist	research,	one	has	to	go	beyond	identifying	patterns	in	the	set	of	fieldwork	data,	and	to	start	analysing	why	 this	particular	pattern	emerges	 and	not	 another,	 how	does	one	 relate	 to	 that	particular	 pattern,	what	 other	 patterns	 are	 not	 represented	 in	 the	 fieldwork	data,	and	 so	 on.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 this	 research,	 the	 governmentality	 approach	 focuses	 the	study	 on	 how	 a	 particular	 development	 initiative	 is	 being	 employed	 to	 create	 a	world	order	governing	humans	use	and	relations	to	forests.	Throughout	my	thesis,	the	governmentality	framework	has	guided	the	analysis	of	how	this	system	of	order	has	been	created	through	diverse	disciplinary,	incentive,	and	regulation	techniques.	A	governmentality	analysis	 thinks	carefully	about	how	knowledge	 is	being	used	to	classify	and	simplify	social	reality	into	“bits	of	commensurable	information”	(Crang,	2003).			De	Certeau	suggests	that	analysis	and	writing	are	a	process	of	assembling	a	mosaic	of	 ideas	 together.	 Following	 de	 Certau’s	 (1986)	 suggestion,	 I	 did	 not	 push	 my	analysis	and	writing	to	be	linear	arguments,	rather	I	worked	through	“juxtaposition	and	collage	that	would	alter	the	meaning	of	each	fragment”	(cited	in	Crang,	2003,	p.	136),	to	build	a	new	way	of	seeing	things.	Employing	a	post-structuralist	account	in	this	 research	 has	 critically	 framed	my	 analysis	 and	writing	 process	 as	 a	 reflective	moment	 where	 I	 look	 back	 into	 how	 some	 data	 have	 been	 rendered	 legible	 and	labelled	as	knowledge	at	the	expenses	of	silencing	others.	As	de	Certeau	puts	it,	“it	would	 be	wrong	 to	 think	 that	 these	 tools	 are	 neutral,	 or	 their	 gaze	 inert:	 nothing	gives	 itself	up,	everything	has	 to	be	seized,	and	the	same	 interpretive	violence	can	either	 create	 or	 destroy”	 (de	 Certeau,	 1986,	 p.135	 cited	 in	 Crang	 2012).	 It	 is	 this	critical	awareness	that	was	indeed	a	very	important	element	of	conducting	scholar	
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activism.			
3.7 Positionality	and	Reflection:	Being	an	Engaged	
Scholar	Activist	by	Practising	the	Politics	of	
Resourcefulness	This	research	is	grounded	in	a	post-structuralist	approach	which	acknowledges	the	role	 of	 the	 researcher	 in	 constituting	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 and	 of	 power	relations	within	research	(Gibson‐Graham,	1994;	Rose,	1997;	Panelli,	2004).	This	involves	 recognizing	 how	 particular	 discourses	 have	 become	 the	 medium	 of	understanding	in	the	world	system	and	the	role	of	the	researchers	in	co-constituting	the	 production	 of	 these	 discourses	 (Kitchin	 and	 Tate,	 2000).	 Discourses	 create	power	 structures	 by	 prohibiting	 certain	 interpretations	 of	 reality	 and	 creating	“temporary	truths”	as	this	truth	will	be	the	subject	of	constant	discursive	struggles	and	 specified	 by	 its	 time	 and	 space	 boundaries	 (Panelli,	 2004).	 Researchers	 are	encouraged	 to	 reflect	 on	 how	 their	 positions	 affect	 the	 way	 research	 is	 being	conducted	and	research	outcomes	are	constructed	from	empirical	evidence	(Bondi,	2009;	 Scheyvens,	 2014).	 Rose	 (1997)	 calls	 this	 process	 reflexivity,	 which	 partly	consists	of	understanding	the	relationship	between	researchers	and	their	research	participants,	 and	acknowledging	 the	way	 research	participants	might	position	and	engage	with	them.	Castree	et	al	(2010)	emphasize	that	being	reflexive	also	includes	a	 process	 of	 enabling	 the	 production	 of	 equal	 power	 relation	 between	 the	researchers	 and	 their	 collaborators.	One	way	of	doing	 this	 is	by	being	 clear	 about	our	motivation	for	doing	the	research,	being	critical	and	respectful	in	engaging	with	our	research	collaborators,	and	being	willing	to	be	open	to	the	possibility	of	our	own	subjectivity	being	transformed	(Butler	and	Davies,	2008).			Browne	et	al	suggest	(2010)	that	being	reflexive	includes	a	process	of	making	sense	of	 our	 multiple	 positionalities	 in	 the	 research	 process.	 Derickson	 and	 Routledge	(2015)	warn,	 however,	 that	 being	 too	 reflexive	 can	 trigger	 a	 sense	 of	 guilt	 that	 is	counter-productive	 to	 the	wider	call	 for	 researchers	 to	engage	 in	scholar	activism.	Butler	and	Davies	(2008)	also	highlight	the	risk	of	being	too	self-conscious	in	a	way	
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that	 will	 limit	 the	 researcher’s	 creativity	 and	 capacity.	 Furthermore,	 Butler	 and	Davies	 (2008)	 raise	 concerns	 over	 the	 impossibility	 for	 researchers	 to	 ever	 give	their	 true	 identities	and	positionalities	as	 these	are	 fluid	and	changing.	With	 these	concerns	in	mind,	I	will	now	reflect	on	my	many	positionalities,	and	how	these	may	have	shaped	the	research	process.		I	am	a	 female	 Indonesian	who	was	born	 in	a	 Javanese,	 lower	middle	class,	Muslim	family.	Having	these	social,	ethnic,	and	religious	identities	meant	I	was	granted	with	all	 the	 privilege	 of	 being	 part	 of	 majority	 groups	 in	 Indonesia.	 I	 grew	 up	 in	Yogyakarta,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 well-developed	 provinces	 in	 Indonesia,	located	on	Java	Island.	Growing	up	 in	Yogyakarta	meant	 I	had	fairly	easy	access	to	education	compared	to	the	rest	of	Indonesians	living	on	the	outer	islands.	I	received	tertiary	 education	 in	 a	 well-respected	 public	 university.	 Whilst	 pursuing	 my	undergraduate	 studies,	 I	was	 involved	 in	 student	 journalism	and	movements.	This	was	 the	 time	 when	 I	 learned,	 through	 direct	 encounters	 with	 the	 student	movements	 how	 to	 problematize	 my	 privilege	 and	 practice	 politics	 (belajar	
berpolitik).	I	joined	direct	street	demonstrations	and	rallies,	critical	discussions,	and	engagement	 with	 the	 wider	 women,	 labour,	 human	 rights	 and	 environmental	movements.	Despite	my	educational	training	in	Industrial	Engineering,	I	then	chose	to	formally	join	several	NGOs	as	my	formal	occupation	and	this	was	motivated	by	my	commitment	to	be	part	of	the	struggle	for	a	more	just	society.			My	 experience	 with	 NGOs	 (including	 working	 with	 a	 women’s	 organization,	 an	international	conservation	organization	and	United	Nations	bodies)	has	shaped	the	way	 I	perceive	 the	world	and	 its	problems	 in	 idealistic	ways.	On	 the	other	hand,	 I	worked	as	a	consultant	for	government	ministries	and	the	House	of	Representatives.	These	experiences	provided	me	with	pragmatic	views	regarding	development	issues	and	policy	making	processes.	These	two	views	–	idealistic	and	pragmatic	–	create	my	social	 and	 political	 identity,	 norms	 and	 values.	 While	 this	 description	 is	 very	reductive	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 portrays	 my	 positionality	 only	 by	 describing	 my	occupations,	I	am	aware	that	this	influenced	the	way	I	developed	and	conducted	my	research	 and	 also	 how	 this	 shaped	 the	way	my	 research	 collaborators	 positioned	and	 understood	 me.	 Inspired	 by	 Gramsci’s	 work,	 Hall	 proposes	 that	 one’s	
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positionality	and	interests	are	continuously	shaped	during	one’s	active	engagement	with	struggle,	therefore,	one’s	positionality	is	a	“product	of	articulation”	(Li,	p.	22).	This	proposition	counters	the	argument	that	positionality	is	fixed,	and	rather	argues	that	 one’s	 positionality	 is	 influenced	 by	 the	 specific	 and	 situated	 political	engagements	and	power	relations	that	one	is	encountering.			Taking	 into	account	Hall’s	 argumentation	on	positionality,	 in	what	 follows,	 I	 recall	some	of	the	reflections	that	I	considered	relevant	and	important	to	this	research	and	highlight	 some	 of	 the	 challenges	 that	 I	 encountered	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 multiple	positionalities	assumed	during	the	study.			As	 noted	 earlier,	 a	 politics	 of	 resourcefulness	 guides	my	 attempts	 to	 conduct	 this	research	as	a	form	of	scholar	activism.	Following	Derickson	and	Routledge’s	(2015)	advice,	 this	 politics	 is	 manifested	 in	 a	 commitment	 to	 share	 the	 resources	 and	privilege	 that	 my	 position	 as	 an	 academic	 affords	 me	 in	 contributing	 to	 social	struggles.	 In	 practicing	 this	 commitment,	 Taylor	 (2014)	 suggests	 an	 ethics	 of	reciprocity,	 which	 I	 chose	 to	 implement	 by	 strategically	 engaging	 with	 the	environmental	 and	 Indigenous	movements	 in	 Indonesia	 through	my	 collaboration	with	AMAN,	the	REDD+	Taskforce/Agency,	and	the	Bahanei.	I	offered	ideas,	not	as	a	prescription,	but	more	as	contributions	to	broader	activism.	I	was	directly	involved	as	 a	 consultant	 for	 both	AMAN	 and	 the	REDD+	Agency	 during	my	 fieldwork.	 This	position	 provided	 both	 opportunities	 and	 challenges.	 I	 was	 presented	with	major	opportunities	to	contribute	directly	to	the	work	and	concerns	of	two	organizations	that	link	closely	to	my	study	and	my	politics.			Offered	with	an	opportunity	 to	be	a	Senior	Specialist	 for	Program	Development	 in	the	REDD+	Agency,	 I	 contributed	 to	 the	work	of	 the	Agency	 in	developing	REDD+	activities	 in	 two	REDD+	pilot	 provinces:	 Central	 Kalimantan	 and	 East	 Kalimantan.	The	position	was	a	paid	consultancy	job	and	the	work	that	I	delivered	to	the	Agency	was	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 my	 research	 objectives.	 However,	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	practice	 the	 politics	 of	 resourcefulness,	 I	 sought	 to	 engage	 directly	 in	 shaping	 the	production	and	 implementation	of	REDD+	governmental	 technologies	 so	 that	 they	would	 align	 with	 the	 vision	 of	 socio-ecological	 justice.	 My	 positionality	 as	 a	
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consultant	 facilitated	 a	 deeper	 engagement	 and	 access	 to	wider	 data	 that	weren’t	initially	accessible.	During	fieldwork,	district	officials	were	more	willing	to	talk	after	they	learned	that	I	also	worked	as	a	consultant	for	the	REDD+	Agency.	This	position	helped	 in	 opening	 some	difficult	 doors	while	 also	 closing	doors	 to	 other	 potential	engagements.			The	second	direct	opportunity	 to	practice	 the	politics	of	 resourcefulness	 is	when	 I	was	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 assist	 AMAN	 in	 developing	 a	 concept	 of	 an	appropriate	 REDD+	 benefit	 sharing	 mechanism	 for	 Indigenous	 peoples.	 This	position	was	 pro-bono	 although	 AMAN	 facilitated	 and	 paid	 the	 travel	 cost	 to	 two	Indigenous	 communities	 located	 in	 Jambi	 and	 North	 Sulawesi	 Provinces	 where	 I	facilitated	 focus	 group	 discussions	 and	 conducted	 interviews.	 As	 a	 consultant	 for	AMAN	 I	was	 responsible	 for	gathering	data,	 analysing	 it	 and	developing	a	 concept	note	 based	 on	 the	 empirical	 situations	 of	 the	 two	 Indigenous	 communities	 that	 I	visited.	AMAN’s	agenda	to	develop	a	concept	of	REDD+	benefit	sharing	mechanism	is	not	directly	linked	to	my	research	focus.	However,	I	see	this	as	part	of	implementing	scholar	activism	where	I	was	directly	engaged	in	the	struggle	to	repurpose	REDD+	to	 benefit	 the	 Indigenous	 communities	 (Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	 2015;	 de	 Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).			The	 third	opportunity	 to	practice	 the	politics	of	 resourcefulness	came	 through	 the	collaboration	 with	 two	 local	 communities	 that	 I	 had	met	 during	 the	 fieldwork	 in	Central	Kalimantan.	The	first	community	was	the	Bahanei,	which	eventually	became	one	of	my	main	research	collaborators	(see	Chapter	Seven).	The	second	community	was	 the	 Tehang,	 a	 neighbouring	 community	 of	 the	 Bahanei.	 Unlike	 the	 formal	collaborations	with	the	REDD+	Agency	and	AMAN	that	were	formalized	through	the	signing	of	 contracts,	my	 collaboration	with	 the	 two	 communities	 took	 form	 in	 the	daily	 encounters	 during	my	 fieldwork	 and	beyond.	 I	was	 involved	 in	 the	 series	 of	meetings	 with	 local	 government	 agencies	 in	 Gunung	 Mas	 District	 and	 Central	Kalimantan	Province	in	which	the	Bahanei	advocated	for	the	Indigenous	land	claim.	Together	with	activists	from	AMAN	Central	Kalimantan,	my	presence	in	the	meeting	as	 part	 of	 the	 Bahanei	 “advocacy	 team”	 was	 strategically	 employed	 to	 prevent	intimidation	 by	 the	 government	 officials	 against	 the	 Bahanei.	 My	 multiple	
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positionalities	 as	 a	 PhD	 candidate,	 a	 REDD+	 Agency	 official,	 and	 part	 of	 AMAN’s	team,	were	seen	as	quite	strategic	to	put	pressure	on	the	local	government	officials.	Following	 the	 feminist	 geography	 approach,	 I	 sought	 to	 develop	 and	 extend	 my	research	praxis	so	that	it	was	more	participatory	in	nature,	and	promoted	dialogue	and	 collaboration	 between	 academics,	 activists,	 and	 the	 researched	 subjects.	 This	approach	 requires	mutual	dialogues	 to	develop	 respect	and	understanding	 (Cahill,	Sultana	 and	 Pain,	 2007).	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 many	 critical	geographers	 challenge	participatory	 research	because	 sometimes	 it	 is	 exploited	 to	mask	unequal	power	relations	and	legitimise	processes	of	appropriation	(Cooke	and	Kothari,	2001).		Drawing	on	a	radical	geography	perspective,	Graeber	(2004,	p.	11)	exhorts	scholars	to	be	“self	consciously	aware	and	reject	any	trace	of	vanguardism”,	 in	order	not	to	form	a	group	of	elites	for	others	to	follow.	Whilst	contemplating	these	warnings,	this	research	has	been	a	constant	process	of	negotiation	between	my	own	expectation	to	perform	 	 a	 piece	 of	 ethical	 scholar	 activism	 research	 and	 the	 reality	 of	 an	 aid	industry	 where,	 as	 a	 consultant,	 I	 was	 expected	 to	 offer	 a	 positionality	 to	 be	“consulted”	 which	 implied	 a	 “higher”	 level	 of	 knowledge	 than	 my	 research	collaborator.	Thus,	in	conducting	the	research,	I	had	to	negotiate	a	messy	complexity	of	emotions,	ethics,	positions,	boundaries,	and	inconsistencies	that	led	to	confusion	in	 analysing	 and	 writing	 the	 research	 results	 (The	 Autonomous	 Geographies	Collective,	2010).			Having	both	carried	out	research	and	provided	consultancy	to	AMAN	created	a	close	relationship	with	 the	AMAN	activists	 that	 I	worked	with.	 I	 share	 the	same	passion	and	concern	as	they	have	but	I	became	uneasy	when	the	critical	analysis	I	undertook	made	me	feel	that	I	may	have	betrayed	their	trust.	There	is	a	tension	caused	by	the	feeling	 that	 what	 I	 have	 written	 is	 probably	 going	 to	 weaken	 the	 social	 struggle.	Chapter	 Seven	 of	 this	 thesis	 presents	 my	 critical	 analysis	 on	 how	 a	 particular	Indigenous	land	claim	assemblage	can	potentially	exclude	other	communities’	access	to	land.	I	have	concerns	that	this	critical	scrutiny	can	be	employed	by	the	opponents	of	 Indigenous	 movement	 to	 justify	 their	 political	 position	 and	 weaken	 the	
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Indigenous	activists	struggles	using	the	critical	knowledge	that	has	been	produced	by	this	research.			Being	part	of	the	social	activism	in	Indonesia	means	I	knew	most	of	the	Indigenous	and	environmental	activists	both	professionally	and	personally.	I	had	concerns	that	critical	analysis	in	this	research	would	negatively	affect	both	my	future	professional	and	 personal	 relationships	 with	 the	 Indigenous	 movement	 and	 activists	 in	Indonesia.	I	addressed	this	tension	carefully	by	discussing	my	initial	draft	of	writing	with	several	AMAN	activists	and	created	ways	of	coming	together	in	understanding	a	 politically	 sensitive	 issue.	 I	 communicated	 my	 true	 intention	 and	 stated	 my	expectation	that	the	critical	analysis	coming	from	this	thesis	might	potentially	incite	positive	discussion	on	Indigenous	movement	and	REDD+.	Using	a	post-structuralist	account,	Cameron	and	Gibson	(2005)	suggest	that	scholar	activists	acknowledge	the	messy	and	multiple	realities	of	a	participatory	approach,	to	embrace	the	confusion	and	 be	 ready	 for	 both	 the	 rewarding	 and	 difficult	 processes.	 As	 Pain	 and	 Kindon	(2007,	 p.	 2809)	 explain,	 “participatory	 research	 is	 explicitly	 about	 the	 openness,	emergence,	surprise,	 tensions,	and	irreconcilability	that	often	make	up	the	process	of	 co-researching	with	 non-academics.”	 Acknowledging	 this	messiness	 of	working	with	 my	 research	 collaborators	 and	 continuously	 practicing	 scholar	 activism	 had	driven	this	tiring	but	rewarding	research	process.	 	 In	addition,	to	avoid	choosing	a	harmful	 framing,	 I	 continuously	asked	 for	my	primary	supervisor’s	 suggestions	on	the	approach	that	I	chose,	and	discussed	the	diverse	implications	of	these	research	findings	to	both	the	social	movement	and	my	future	career	opportunities.		Reflecting	on	my	three	engagements	above,	I	can	conclude	that	I	was	able	to	access	people,	 events,	 and	 networks	 that	 I	 wouldn’t	 have	 been	 able	 to	 if	 I	 had	 not	 been	acting	as	a	consultant	to	both	the	REDD+	Agency	and	AMAN,	as	well	as	by	becoming	a	member	of	the	Bahanei	advocacy	team.	I	worked	in	the	“space	of	in	between-ness”,	by	personally	acting	and	responding	to	the	opportunities	that	REDD+	had	brought	to	pursue	 progressive	 changes	 that	 correspond	 with	 my	 political	 vision	 of	 socio-ecological	 justice,	as	well	as	a	researcher	who	was	entangled	in	the	awkward	local	spatial	 politics.	 	 However	 this	 position	 also	 created	 challenges	 in	 doing	 research	with	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 research	 participants.	
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Despite	 attempting	 to	decolonize	my	 research	praxis	by	not	 speaking	on	behalf	 of	my	research	subjects,	having	the	position	of	a	consultant	sometimes	required	me	to	act	otherwise	(Howitt	and	Stevens,	2010).			
3.8 Limitations	of	the	Methods	This	research	was	conducted	with	rapid	changes	in	government	policy	taking	place	in	 the	 background.	 Researching	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 similar	 to	 investigating	 a	moving	target.	Such	a	situation	creates	many	challenges	for	a	social	researcher,	not	least	around	the	temporal	boundaries	for	the	study.	I	found	myself	carried	away	by	the	 political	 dynamic	 and	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 set	 the	 time	 limit	 when	 the	 research	should	be	stopped.	The	second	constraint	derived	from	researching	a	moving	target	was	the	difference	in	pace	between	the	slow	and	reflective	academic	process	and	the	swift	 changes	 seen	 in	 forest	 politics.	 Given	 this	 situation	 and	 the	 spirit	 of	 a	 post-structuralist	 approach,	 this	 research	 is	 not	 attempting	 to	 represent	 the	 whole	REDD+	political	ecology	but	rather	to	explore	the	particular	expressions	of	REDD+	as	they	unfolded	during	my	research.			A	 third	 constraint	 derived	 from	performing	 the	 role	 of	 consultant	 for	 both	AMAN	and	 the	 REDD+	 Agency.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 section	 above,	 there	 were	 both	challenges	and	opportunities	in	relation	to	these	multiple	positionalities	.	I	wonder	if	performing	 a	 more	 participatory	 and	 engaged	 scholar	 activism	 would	 have	 been	better	without	the	role	as	a	consultant.	The	paid	role	as	a	consultant	requires	certain	deliveries	and	performance	that	are	not	always	in	line	with	the	principles	of	scholar	activism.			
3.9 Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 describe	 the	 approach,	 methods	 and	 ethos	 that	 have	inspired	this	thesis.	I	have	also	discussed	multi-sited	ethnography	as	a	mechanism	to	explore	 and	 collect	 data	 on	 REDD+	 as	 a	 governmental	 system.	 Through	 engaging	with	 three	 case	 studies,	 I	 have	 been	 able	 to	 explore	 the	 dimensions	 of	 of	 REDD+	
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governmentality	in	Indonesia.	The	multi-sited	and	cross	scalar	ethnographic	method	has	 provided	 a	 mechanism	 to	 understand	 how	 governmentality	 works	 to	 govern	human	 and	 forest	 relationships.	 This	 research	 has	 been	 guided	 by	 the	 ethos	 of	scholar	activism	and	informed	by	a	politics	of	hope.	As	a	piece	of	scholar	activism,	this	 research	 is	 mainly	 driven	 by	 the	 emotional	 effect	 of	 the	 researcher’s	commitment	to	contribute	to	the	struggle	for	social	and	environmental	justice.		 	
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4 Context	~	Forest	Politics	in	Indonesia:	Actors,	
Interests	and	Contestations			
4.1 Introduction	In	introducing	new	rationalities	to	forest	governance,	REDD+	proponents	needed	to	engage	 with	 the	 complexities	 of	 forest	 politics	 in	 Indonesia.	 REDD+	 is	 a	 abstract	program	 designed	 by	 international	 climate	 scientists	 and	 economists	 (Wertz-Kanounnikoff	 and	 Angelsen,	 2009).	 Its	 main	 governing	 rationale	 is	 to	 conserve	forest	carbon	by	offering	incentives	for	developing	countries	to	reduce	deforestation	and	 forest	 degradation	 (Corbera	 and	 Schroeder,	 2011;	 Boer,	 2013).	 In	 so	 doing,	REDD+	will	play	a	significant	role	in	reshaping	Indonesia’s	forest	governance	and	is	conversely	shaped	by	its	existing	political	ecology	and	economic	context	(Indarto	et	
al.,	2012;	Agung	et	al.,	2014;	Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015).			This	chapter	 introduces	the	social	and	political	context	upon	which	the	research	is	situated.	 It	 describes	 the	 shifting	 governmental	 rationalities,	 technologies,	 and	practices	of	governing	forest	and	forest	people	in	Indonesia	over	time.	The	chapter	focuses	 on	 how	 the	 narratives	 of	 development	 have	 played	 out	 in	 managing	forestland	 post-colonialization	 (Li,	 1999;	 Dove	 and	 Kammen,	 2001).	 The	 chapter	explains	the	political	ecology	of	forests	in	Indonesia	–	with	which	REDD+	is	required	to	engage.	In	doing	so	the	chapter	attends	to	the	idioms	and	discourses	employed	by	the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 to	 legitimize	 their	 rationales,	 policies	 and	programmes	while	at	the	same	time	contest	others’	rationales	and	objectives	(Colfer,	2010).	 	 The	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 sections:	 the	 first	 section	discusses	 forest	governance	during	post-independence	 and	 the	New	Order	 era;	 the	 second	 section	examines	 forest	 governance	 during	 post-Soeharto	 era	 and	 REDD+	 inception	 in	Indonesia.			
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4.2 Post-independence	and	the	New	Order	Era	Indonesian	 forests	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 contestation	 between	 many	 forest	stakeholders	 since	 pre-colonial	 times	 (Resosudarmo,	 2005;	 Saich	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 A	range	 of	 forest-related	 discourses	 have	 been	 used	 to	 justify	 certain	 interests.	Stakeholders	 use	 a	 variety	 of	 techniques	 and	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 to	 develop	discourses	and	practices	to	advance	their	interests	while	obstructing	the	objectives	of	others	(Peluso,	1992;	Wunder,	2001;	Moeliono	and	Limberg,	2012).	This	section	attends	 to	 the	 politico-economic	 rationales	 of	 forest	 governance	 during	 the	 New	Order	era	(1966	–	1998)	when	former	President	Soeharto	was	in	power.	It	focuses	on	the	technologies	employed	by	the	MOF	to	produce	what	constitutes	state	forest	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000;	Barr,	2006).	The	state	claims	over	more	than	70%	of	Indonesia’s	 lands	 and	 obscures	 other	 forms	 of	 land	 entitlements,	 including	Indigenous	tenure	rights	(Fay	and	Sirait,	2005,	2010;	McWilliam,	2006).			My	starting	point	 is	 the	historical	analysis	of	 the	mechanism	by	which	 Indonesia’s	state	Forest	Estate	(Kawasan	Hutan)	was	established	to	pave	the	way	for	President	Soeharto’s	 political	 objectives	 and	 tracing	 its	 socio-political	 and	 ecological	implications.	 Soeharto	 rose	 into	power	 in	1965	 to	 replace	Soekarno	as	 the	 second	president	 of	 Indonesia.	 To	 distance	 his	 political	 regime	 with	 the	 previous	government,	 Soeharto	 termed	 his	 regime	 as	 the	 New	 Order	 era	 while	 Soekarno’s	was	referred	to	as	the	Old	Order	(Ross,	2001).			
4.2.1 The	Making	of	the	State	Forests	In	 1967,	 the	 New	 Order	 passed	 Law	 Number	 5	 on	 forestry	 (Basic	 Forestry	 Law,	hereafter	 BFL).	 The	 law	 defined	 forest	 area	 as	 “a	 particular	 area	 gazetted	 by	 the	government	 to	 be	maintained	 as	 permanent	 forest	 (Hutan	Tetap)”.	 This	 definition	shows	 that	 what	 is	 constituted	 as	 forest	 area	 is	 not	 defined	 purely	 by	 scientific	forestry	 and	 environmental	 sciences,	 but	 encompasses	 a	 political	 process	 and	objectives	 by	 which	 the	 government	 (represented	 by	 the	 MOF)	 has	 authority	 to	decide.	Particular	truths	about	 forest	were	formed	using	various	forestry	practices	implemented	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 BFL:	 including	 a	 forest	 classification	 system,	
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modern	 forest	management,	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Forestry	Department	 in	1964	 (Fay	 and	 Sirait,	 2005;	 Siscawati,	 2012).	 This	 construction	 of	 forests	 was	particularly	 shaped	 to	 serve	 Soeharto’s	 political	 objective	 to	 lay	 claim	 on	 the	majority	 of	 Indonesia’s	 lands.	 Accordingly,	 other	 versions	 of	 ‘truth’	 proposed	 by	forests’	 owners	 and	 users	 were	 rendered	 invisible.	 Indigenous	 people’s	 rights	 to	forest	 tenure,	 for	 instance,	were	obscured	 through	 the	nationalist	discourse	of	 the	state	 that	 proposed	 a	 unification	 of	 Indonesian	 national	 culture	 and	 identity	 by	classifying	 all	 Indonesians	 as	 national	 citizens	 (pribumi)	 (McWilliam,	 2006;	 L.	Bakker,	 2009).	 This	 prevented	 Indigenous	 communities	 from	 claiming	 indigeneity	and	its	associated	rights	to	land	and	other	natural	resources	(Afiff	and	Lowe,	2007;	Pramono,	2013).			The	 management	 of	 forests	 and	 other	 natural	 resources	 were	 characterized	 by	patrimonialism	 and	 clientelism	 (Ross,	 2001;	 L.	 Bakker,	 2009).	 In	 his	 research	 on	timber	 politics	 in	 South	 East	 Asian	 countries,	 Ross	 (2001)	 examines	 the	 link	between	 the	 enactment	 of	 several	 forestry	 policies	 and	 Soeharto’s	 strategies	 to	solidify	the	military’s	political	support	for	him.	After	the	coup	in	1965	that	trumped	Soekarno’s	 leadership	 and	 killed	 six	 out	 of	 seven	 of	 the	 most	 senior	 military	generals,	Soeharto	took	the	chair	as	the	country’s	president	(Ross,	2001).	However,	as	the	leader	of	the	Army	Strategic	Command	(Komando	Strategis	Angkatan	Darat	or	
Kostrad)	Soeharto	was	barely	known	among	the	military.	According	to	Ross	(2001),	after	 the	 coup	 the	 military	 was	 divided	 into	 two	 factions;	 on	 one	 side	 were	Soekarno’s	followers,	and	on	the	other	side	was	what	was	known	as	‘green’	faction	in	the	military	inclined	towards	the	Islamic	movement.	Realizing	the	fragile	situation	and	 his	 weak	 position	 as	 a	 relatively	 young	 and	 inexperienced	 technocrat,	Soeharto’s	first	priority	was	to	solidify	the	military’s	political	support	(Ross,	2001).	One	 of	 Soeharto’s	 strategies	 was	 to	 ‘buy’	 loyalty	 from	 senior	 military	 officials	 by	providing	 them	 with	 personal	 wealth	 and	 ‘pension’	 schemes	 (Ross,	 2001).	 Three	quarters	 of	 Indonesia’s	 outer	 islands	 were	 covered	 in	 dipterocarpaceae	 forests	consisting	of	mature	trees	that	could	be	quickly	liquidated	for	Soeharto’s	plan.			Soeharto’s	plan,	however,	was	hampered	by	the	Basic	Agrarian	Law	Number	5/1960	(Undang-undang	 Pokok	 Agraria,	 hereafter	 BAL)	 that	 was	 enacted	 during	 the	
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pinnacle	of	agrarian	reform	spirit	 in	 Indonesia	under	Soekarno	and	acknowledged	Indigenous	(adat)	rights	to	land	in	1960	(Thorburn,	2002;	L.	Bakker,	2009).	The	BAL	was	 formed	 with	 idealistic	 visions	 on	 how	 the	 nation	 should	 govern	 their	 land.	‘Agraria’	refers	to	more	than	just	 land,	 it	also	covers	the	governance	of	the	natural	resources	contained	in	it	(L.	Bakker,	2009).	The	writers	of	the	law	proposed	the	BAL	to	 be	 an	 overarching	 policy	 for	 the	management	 of	 land	 and	 natural	 resources	 to	replace	 the	 socially	 unequal	 Dutch	 Colonial	 Law	 (L.	 Bakker,	 2009).	 The	 BAL	 was	designed	 to	 accommodate	 the	 diversity	 of	 land	 tenure	 systems	 in	 Indonesia’s	Indigenous	 communities	 as	 well	 as	 to	 provide	 a	 universal	 legal	 system	 that	 was	required	to	unite	the	young	nation	(L.	Bakker,	2009).	The	BAL	was	followed	by	the	establishment	of	National	Land	Agency	(Badan	Pertanahan	Nasional,	hereafter	NLA)	in	 1960.	 The	NLA	was	mandated	 to	manage	 land	 administration	 according	 to	 the	principles	prescribed	by	the	BAL.	However,	when	Soeharto	introduced	the	BFL	the	BAL	 no	 longer	 governed	 forest	 land	 (L.	 Bakker,	 2009).	 BFL	 was	 strategically	employed	by	Soeharto’s	regime	to	render	BAL	ineffective.			The	BFL	was	enacted	in	1967	in	the	same	year	as	the	Foreign	Investment	Law.	The	two	policies	were	part	of	the	legal	architecture	in	the	New	Order	era	that	were	made	to	legitimize	the	rent	seeking	practices	of	Soeharto’s	allies	(Ross,	2001).	The	law	was	followed	in	1970	with	Government	Regulation	No.33/1970	on	forest	land	use	policy	
(Tata	Guna	Hutan	Kesepakatan)	 that	demarcates	70%	of	Indonesia’s	 land	into	state	forest	 estate	 (Kawasan	 Hutan)	 (Siscawati,	 2012).	 However,	 decisions	 on	 forest	boundaries	were	often	made	without	a	complete	public	participation	processes	and	based	on	maps	that	were	often	created	without	examining	the	facts	on	the	ground	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000;	Fay	and	Sirait,	2005,	2010).		In	the	1980s	the	MOF	developed	biophysical	criteria	to	define	the	State	Forest	Zone	for	the	outer	islands	of	Indonesia	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000).	The	biophysical	characteristics	used	were	slope,	soil	type,	and	rainfall	level	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000).	 The	 criteria	were	 then	 being	 employed	 to	 classify	 forests	 into	 three	major	functions:	protection,	production,	and	conservation	(see	Table	4.1)	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000).	Important	species	and	potential	for	tourism	were	also	considered	for	zoning	classification	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000).	According	to	the	policy,	the	
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state	forest	area	was	classified	into:	64.3	million	ha	of	production	forest	where	the	aim	was	for	it	to	be	exploited	for	its	timber	resources,	30.7	million	ha	of	protection	forest,	18.8	million	ha	of	natural	conservation	areas	and	nature	preserve	forest,	and	26.6	 million	 ha	 of	 convertible	 forest	 that	 generally	 would	 be	 converted	 into	production	 forest	 (Siscawati,	 2012).	 This	 zoning	 technology	 is	 the	 government’s	territorialisation	 strategy	 in	 producing	 spatial	 units	 which	 it	 could	 claim	 control	over	natural	 resources	 (see	eg	Peluso,	1995;	Scott,	1998;	Peluso	and	Vandergeest,	2001).	According	to	Peluso	and	Vandergeest	(2001)	the	process	of	territorialisation	is	the	key	component	in	both	the	pre-colonial	and	post-colonial	government	efforts	to	centralise	control	over	natural	resources.			Table	4.1	Forest	category	and	definition	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000)	
Forest	category	 Definition	
	Production	forest	(Hutan	
Produksi	-	HP)	 State	Forestland	designated	for	production	purposes	Protection	Forest	(Hutan	
Lindung	-	HL)	 Forestland	designated	for	protecting	soil	and	hydrology	Conservation	Forest	(Hutan	
Konservasi	-	HK)		
Forestland	designated	for	conservation	purposes.	In	this	class	include	national	park,	nature	reserved,	wildlife	reserved,	other	protected	areas				Scientific	 forestry	 knowledges	were	 orchestrated	 to	 develop	 rationalities	 that	 see	Indonesian	forests	as	merely	sources	of	timber	(Rhee,	2006;	Siscawati,	2012).	New	practices	in	managing	forest	as	sources	of	timber	were	introduced,	such	as	reduced	impact	 logging	 (RIL),	 selective	 cutting	 and	 limitation	 on	 cutting	 allocation	 in	 the	1970s	 (Siscawati,	 2012).	The	new	practices	 claimed	 to	 render	 logging	activities	 in	Indonesia	sustainable	as	a	pillar	of	 the	nation’s	economic	growth.	However,	 the	de	facto	 logging	 activities	 were	 far	 from	 the	 vision	 the	 policies	 were	 seeking	 to	establish.	Ross	(2001)	notes	that	between	1967	and	1980	the	MOF	issued	 licenses	for	 around	3.785	million	ha	 a	 year	 for	 timber	 extraction,	 turning	 Indonesia	 into	 a	very	 profitable	 place	 to	 extract	 resources.	 This	 earned	 Indonesia	 $3.2	 billion	 in	
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revenue	 from	 timber	 products	 in	 the	 1970s,	 making	 it	 the	 second	 biggest	 export	commodity	 after	 oil	 (Ross,	 2001).	 In	 the	 next	 section	 I	will	 discuss	 the	 social	 and	environmental	ramifications	of	this	vast	timber–based	‘development’	project.		
4.2.2 Governing	Indigenous	Peoples	and	Rights	The	 BFL	 differentiates	 between	 state	 forest,	 that	 is	 a	 region	 of	 forest	 that	 is	 not	subjected	to	private	rights,	and	proprietary	forest	or	a	region	that	is	sanctioned	with	private	property	rights	(Wright,	2011).	According	to	BFL	a	private	right	over	land	is	usually	indicated	by	the	presence	of	cultivation	activities.	This	classification	system	led	to	fallow	fields	or	adat	forest	owned	by	Indigenous	communities	being	classified	as	 state	 forest	 (Rhee,	 2006).	 Moreover,	 a	 new	 Government	 Regulation	 Number	21/1971	 that	 was	 issued	 in	 1971	 as	 a	 follow	 up	 to	 the	 BFL	 further	 weakened	Indigenous	rights	by	subordinating	them	to	the	rights	of	commercial	loggers.	Article	six	in	the	government	regulation	states	that,			 1.	 The	 rights	 of	 the	 adat	 community	 and	 its	 members	 to	 harvest	 forest	products...shall	be	organized	in	such	a	manner	that	they	do	not	disturb	forest	production;	2.	 Implementation	 of	 the	 above	 provision	 is	 [delegated	 to	 the	 Company]	which	is	to	accomplish	 it	 through	consensus	with	the	adat	community,	with	supervision	from	the	Forest	Service;	3.	In	the	interests	of	public	safety,	adat	rights	to	harvest	forest	products	in	a	particular	 area	 shall	 be	 frozen	while	 forest	 production	 activities	 are	 under	way	(Barber,	1990	cited	in	Ross,	1996,	p.	140).		To	 further	 marginalize	 Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities,	 the	 New	 Order	stigmatized	 the	 idea	 of	 being	 Indigenous	 as	 meaning	 “backwards”,	 “primitive”	 or	“wasteful”	 (Li,	2001;	Rhee,	2006;	L.	Bakker,	2009).	The	stereotype	had	become	an	efficient	 technology	 to	 humiliate	 Indigenous	 identity.	 Hence,	 communities	 were	reluctant	to	openly	declare	their	identities	and	utilizing	it	as	a	basis	for	land	claims	(L.	 Bakker,	 2009).	 The	 classification	 of	 Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities	 as	deficient	subjects	has	justified	state	interventions	that	are	concealed	in	the	notion	of	
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“development”	and	“modernization”	(Dove,	1993,	2006;	Dove	and	Kammen,	2001).	These	“development”	processes	rearrange	people	and	their	resources	in	a	way	that	gave	 privileges	 to	 Soeharto	 and	 his	 closest	 allies’	 authority	 to	 decide	 how	 and	 by	whom	forest	resources	can	be	used	(Li,	1999,	2007d;	Tsing,	2005;	McWilliam,	2006).	To	 effectively	 run	 the	 “development”	 schemes	 and	 to	 make	 the	 government’s	authority	felt	throughout	the	outer	islands,	a	law	on	Village	Governance	was	enacted	in	1979.	The	Village	Law	effectively	“transformed	local	leaders	from	representatives	of	villagers	to	representatives	of	the	state”	(Rhee,	2006,	p.	86).			The	 reorganization	 of	 Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities’	 property	 rights	 to	 the	forest	 through	the	above	 legal	apparatuses	paved	the	way	 for	 timber	 industries	 to	flourish	in	Kalimantan	and	Sumatra	(Ross,	1996).	High	ranking	army	officials	owned	many		of	these	timber	industries	(Ross,	1996).	They	formed	business	alliances	with	Chinese	 tycoons,	 whose	 business	 skills	 boosted	 the	 military’s	 lack	 of	 business	experience,	 yet	 because	 of	 Soeharto’s	 patronage,	 the	 military	 retained	 exclusive	access	 to	 contracts	 and	 concessions	 (Ross,	 1996;	 Siscawati,	 2012).	 The	 army’s	companies	 also	 often	 acted	 as	 the	 domestic	 partner	 of	 foreign	 investments	 that	swarmed	after	the	enactment	of	the	Foreign	Investment	Law	in	1967	(Ross,	1996).			While	 some	of	 Indonesia’s	Chinese	 tycoons	 joined	 the	 ranks	of	 the	world’s	 richest	men,	 millions	 of	 Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities	 lost	 access	 to	 their	 land	 and	agricultural	crops	(Siscawati,	2012).	Before	Indonesia’s	independence	in	1945	these	communities	possessed	more	flexible	mobility	in	expanding	land	and	opening	forest,	however,	 the	 construction	 of	 state	 brought	 limitations	 and	 law	 enforcement	 “to	which	 their	 interests	 would	 be	 subjected”	 (L.	 Bakker,	 2009,	 p.	 63).	 A	minority	 of	these	communities	organised	resistance,	however	this	has	led	to	oppression	and,	in	some	cases,	assassination	(L.	Bakker,	2009).	Other	communities	pragmatically	chose	to	 engage	 with	 the	 timber	 industries	 either	 as	 a	 cheap	 source	 of	 labour	 or	 as	collaborators	by	supplying	additional	illegal	timbers	coming	from	the	forest	located	outside	of	the	concession	areas	(Ross,	1996).		
	The	 marginalization	 of	 Indigenous	 communities	 in	 Kalimantan	 and	 Sumatra	 was	further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 transmigration	 policy	which	 began	 in	 the	 early	 1970s	
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(Fearnside,	1997).	The	policy	was	intended	to	rationalise	land	use	and	management	to	achieve	land	efficiency	and	effectiveness	by	expanding	the	agricultural	area	in	the	outer	 islands	 and	 reduce	 population	 density	 on	 the	 islands	 of	 Java	 and	 Bali	(Fearnside,	 1997;	 O’Connor,	 2004;	 Rhee,	 2006).	 Millions	 of	 Javanese	 migrated	 to	forest	 areas	 in	 the	 remote	parts	of	 Sumatra	 and	Kalimantan	 in	 the	hope	 that	 they	would	 start	 clearing	 forests	 and	 cultivating	 rice	 and	 other	 agricultural	 products.	Millions	 of	 hectares	 of	 forests	 were	 opened	 through	 ‘pioneer	 slash-and-burn’	 for	agricultural	practices	(Vayda,	Colfer	and	Brotokusumo,	1985).			The	modern	farming	methods	adopted	by	Javanese	farmers	was	seen	as	superior	to	the	 collective	 management	 approach	 commonly	 used	 in	 the	 adat	 communities	(Dove,	1993).		The	communalistic	nature	of	land	ownership	and	swidden	culture	in	these	 communities	were	 deemed	 by	 the	 state	 as	 inefficient	 and	 thus	 subjected	 to	several	modernization	programmes	 and	policies	which	 included	 exposing	 them	 to	‘better	and	civilized’	Javanese	migrant	farmers	(Dove,	1993;	Cramb	et	al.,	2009;	Fox	
et	al.,	 2009).	 This	 created	new	pressures	 and	 tensions	 for	 the	 forest	 and	 the	 local	Indigenous	 communities.	 When	 the	 initiated	 new	 modern	 agricultural	 activities	were	unsuccessful,	transmigrants	had	no	other	options	than	to	work	as	labourers	for	logging	 companies	 or	 taking	 shortcuts	 by	 supplying	 timber	 from	 illegal	 logging	(Ross,	1996).			In	the	early	1980s	the	MOF	banned	the	selling	of	raw	log	timber	and	encouraged	the	development	of	plywood	industries	to	extract	additional	value	from	forest	resources	(Ross,	 1996).	 However,	 despite	 the	 logging	 limitation,	 Indonesia	 had	 risen	 to	become	 the	 biggest	 producer	 and	 exporter	 of	 plywood	 in	 the	world	 (Ross,	 1996).	This	was	made	possible	by	the	continuous	supply	of	timber	from	illegal	logging	that	supported	 the	 plywood	 industry	 (Ross,	 1996).	 The	 environmental	 implications	 of	the	 illegal	 logging	 practices	 were	 particularly	 concentrated	 in	 Sumatra	 and	Kalimantan	 (McCarthy,	 2010).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 environmental	 destruction,	 there	were	the	rent	seeking	practices	of	the	forestry	officials	both	at	the	national	and	local	levels	who	 intentionally	 overlooked	 forestry	 crimes	 due	 to	 bribes	 and	 sometimes	committing	crimes	themselves	(A.	Dermawan	et	al.,	2011).	Corruption,	collusion	and	nepotism,	 a	 set	 of	 corrupt	 practices	 that	 is	 well	 known	 in	 Indonesia	 as	 Korupsi,	
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Kolusi,	 dan	 Nepotisme	 (KKN)	 have	 been	 common	 throughout	 forest	 governance	(Robertson-Snape,	1999).	The	next	section	discusses	the	rise	of	environmental	and	Indigenous	 activism	 that	 responded	 to	 the	 messiness	 of	 Indonesia’s	 forest	governance.			
4.2.3 Environmental	and	Indigenous	Activism	The	 accumulation	 of	 socio-political	 and	 ecological	 problems	 triggered	 the	emergence	 of	 environmental	 activism	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1970s	 (Aditjondro,	 2003).	Initiated	 by	 student	 movements	 and	 encouraged	 by	 Emil	 Salim	 -	 	 then	 the	 State	Minister	 on	Development	 Supervision	 and	Environment	 -	 an	 environmental	 group	Wahana	 Lingkungan	 Hidup	 Indonesia	 (Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	 Indonesia,	 hereafter	WALHI)	 formed	 in	 1980	 (Aditjondro,	 2003).	WALHI	was	 established	 as	 a	 hub	 for	NGOs	 focused	 on	 and	 concerned	 about	 issues	 related	 to	 environmental	 problems	and	natural	resources	management	(Aditjondro,	2003).	During	the	New	Order	era,	the	 most	 pressing	 issue	 was	 environmental	 destruction	 caused	 by	 industrial	activities	and	exploitation	of	forests	resources	(Aditjondro,	2003).	The	movement	in	Indonesia	was	influenced	and	inspired	by	events	and	discourses	in	the	international	context,	 such	 as	 the	 publication	 of	 Silent	 Spring	 by	 Rachel	 Corson	 and	 the	Brundtland	report	on	sustainable	development	(Pramono,	2013).			Widely	supported	and	funded	by	the	Ford	Foundation,	an	environmental	movement	in	 Indonesia	 emerged	 and	 advocated	 the	 concept	 of	 community	 based	 natural	resource	management	(CBNRM)	that	fostered	the	principle	of	participation	in	forest	governance	 (Siscawati,	 2012).	 The	 CBNRM	 principles	 were	 translated	 for	 the	national	 context	 and	 formed	 what	 is	 known	 as	 Sistem	 Hutan	 Kerakyatan	 which	translates	as	community	 forestry	system	(hereafter	SHK)	(Siscawati,	2012).	SHK	is	designed	as	forest	management	practices	that	allow	for	greater	community	control	and	access.	SHK	asserts	that	forest	communities	have	the	knowledge	and	wisdom	to	sustainably	manage	forests	that	have	long	been	part	of	their	life,	not	only	in	relation	to	 economic	 matters	 and	 livelihoods,	 but	 also	 often	 including	 social,	 cultural	 and	spiritual	aspects	(Siscawati,	2012).	By	respecting,	acknowledging	and	protecting	the	
	 95	
community’s	 rights	 over	 their	 land	 and	 forest,	 SHK	 proponents	 argue	 that	 the	community	will	have	more	incentive	to	protect	the	forests	(Siscawati,	2012).			This	notion,	about	the	importance	of	intimate	human-forest	relationships	has	drawn	environmental	and	 Indigenous	activists	 together.	 In	1993	a	 small	 group	of	WALHI	networks	 and	 activists	 gathered	 to	 discuss	 the	marginalisation	 and	 dispossession	faced	 by	 Indigenous	 communities	 in	 Indonesia	 under	 the	New	Order	 regime	 (Fay	and	Sirait,	2010).	The	meeting	resulted	in	two	important	decisions	that	have	shaped	the	 character	 of	 the	 Indigenous	 movement	 in	 Indonesia.	 First,	 responding	 to	growing	 international	 Indigenous	 activism	 that	 culminated	 in	 the	 United	 Nations	Declaration	of	Indigenous	Peoples’	Rights	(UNDRIP),	the	activists	agreed	on	the	term	of	 ‘masyarakat	adat’	as	 an	 Indonesian	 translation	 for	 Indigenous	peoples	 (Fay	and	Sirait,	 2010;	Pramono,	 2013).	The	 adoption	of	 the	 term	was	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘safe’	move	during	 the	 precarious	 political	 situation	 under	 Soeharto’s	 authoritarian	 regime	 as	the	government	 itself	had	started	to	use	the	term	adat	during	the	establishment	of	
Adat	Council	in	some	of	the	outer	island	provinces	as	part	of	the	state’s	strategy	to	control	Indigenous	peoples	(Fay	and	Sirait,	2010;	Pramono,	2013).	To	delineate	the	position	 of	 masyarakat	 adat	 from	 other	 local	 people,	 the	 activists	 introduced	 a	normative	definition	of	the	term,	which	is	“a	human	group	from	the	same	ancestral	lineage	who	 inhabit	 a	 certain	 geographical	 area	 and	has	 a	 distinctive	 set	 of	 value,	ideological,	 economic,	 political,	 cultural,	 and	 social	 systems	 as	well	 as	 a	 territory”	(Pramono,	2013,	p.	xx).		The	 second	 agreement	 of	 the	 meeting	 was	 the	 formation	 of	 Japhama	 (Jaringan	
Pembela	 hak-hak	 Masyarakat	 Adat,	 or	 Network	 for	 the	 Defence	 of	 Indigenous	Peoples’	Rights)	(Fay	and	Sirait,	2010;	Pramono,	2013).	The	network	was	expected	to	be	able	to	provide	help	and	advocacy	services	for	dispossessed	and	marginalized	Indigenous	people	that	were	victimized	by	the	regime’s	policies.	Toward	the	end	of	the	 Soeharto	 era	 in	 1998,	 Japhama	 activists	 organized	 several	 small	 meetings	 to	strengthen	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Indigenous	movement	 in	 Indonesia	 (Fay	 and	 Sirait,	2010).	The	meetings	culminated	 in	1999	 in	 Jakarta,	a	year	after	Soeharto	resigned	from	 his	 presidency	 and	 amidst	 the	 euphoria	 surrounding	 the	 desire	 for	 political	reform	which	 ignited	 the	birth	of	hundreds	of	new	civil	 society	organizations.	The	
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meeting	 in	 Jakarta	 led	 to	 the	 formation	of	AMAN,	a	member-based	organization	of	Indigenous	people	whose	main	mandate	was	 to	struggle	 for	 the	acknowledgement	and	rights	of	masyarakat	adat	in	Indonesia	(Fay	and	Sirait,	2010;	Pramono,	2013).	A	famous	 line	 was	 introduced	 in	 the	 meeting	 that	 illustrates	 how	 the	 Indigenous	movement	positions	itself	with	regard	to	the	state:	‘if	the	state	doesn’t	recognize	us,	we	do	not	recognize	the	state’	(Fay	and	Sirait,	2010).	This	line	shows	the	freedom	of	expression	and	level	of	democratisation	that	civil	society	in	Indonesia	enjoyed	in	the	post-Soeharto	era	and	 the	 changing	 strategies	of	 engagement	with	 the	 state.	 I	will	discuss	this	in	the	next	section.			
4.3 Post-Soeharto	Era	and	the	Inception	of	REDD+	The	 economic	 crisis	 in	 1997	 that	 affected	 several	 countries	 in	 Asia	 triggered	 a	widespread	mass	protest	in	Indonesia	that	peaked	with	the	resignation	of	Soeharto	as	 Indonesia’s	 president	 in	 1998.	 The	 country	 underwent	 political	 change	 and	adopted	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 development	 (McCarthy,	 2000;	 Resosudarmo,	 2004).	Groups	 started	 to	 use	 indigeneity	 and	 ethnicity	 as	 mechanisms	 to	 reclaim	 and	reoccupy	lands	grabbed	by	the	state	and	private	companies	during	the	Soeharto	era	(L.	 Bakker,	 2009;	 Colfer,	 2010).	 After	 32	 years	 of	 silence	 under	 Soeharto’s	authoritarian	 regime,	 strong	 and	 loud	dissent	was	 now	audible	 all	 over	 Indonesia	(Thorburn,	2002;	L.	Bakker,	2009).	The	State	had	no	other	option	but	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	 aspirations	 for	 change	 in	 governing	 forests	 and	 land	 in	 Indonesia	(Resosudarmo,	2004).			New	policies	were	 introduced	 to	 reflect	 the	change	 that	was	being	demanded.	For	instance,	adat	 forest	existence	was	recognized	and	classified	under	the	state	forest	in	 the	 revised	BFL	 in	 1999	 (Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 This	 recognition	 also	 convinced	the	state	to	establish	a	national	commission	to	address	agrarian	conflict	(Pramono,	2013).	 The	 new	 policies,	 however,	 often	 weren’t	 reflected	 on	 the	 ground.	Deforestation	reached	its	highest	rate	and	corruption	was	prevalent	in	the	forestry	sector.	This	section	analyses	the	political	dynamic	from	1998	until	the	inception	of	REDD+	in	the	country.			
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4.3.1 Reformasi	and	Decentralization		In	 his	 resignation	 speech,	 to	 calm	 the	 widespread	 protests	 that	 had	 paralyzed	Jakarta	 and	 other	 big	 cities	 in	 Indonesia,	 President	 Soeharto	 appointed	 Vice	President	Baharuddin	Jusuf	Habibie,	a	technocrat	who	had	no	political	background	and	support,	as	his	successor	(Resosudarmo,	2004).	Perhaps,	to	cut	the	ties	with	the	previous	authoritarian	governmental	regime,	Habibie	initiated	a	lot	of	breakthrough	reform	programmes	(Thorburn,	2002;	Resosudarmo,	2004).	Strict	censorship	of	the	media	 was	 lifted,	 political	 prisoners	 were	 released,	 and	 to	 gain	 international	support,	 a	 referendum	 to	 determine	 East	 Timor’s	 future	 was	 conducted	(Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 The	 economic	 and	 political	 crisis	 triggered	 a	 wave	 of	 new	aspirations	 regarding	 local	 government,	 especially	 in	 the	 regions	 with	 abundant	natural	 resources,	 including	 demands	 for	 a	 more	 decentralised	 administrative	system	and	 fiscal	 autonomy	(McCarthy,	2000).	The	aspirations	were	catered	 to	by	the	 enactment	 of	 two	 decentralisation	 laws	 in	 April	 1999:	 Law	 No.22/1999	 on	Regional	 Governance	 and	 Law	No.25/1999	 on	 Fiscal	 Balance,	 both	 of	which	were	signed	by	President	Habibie	and	officially	came	into	effect	on	the	first	day	of	2001	(Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 The	 World	 Bank	 and	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 put	pressure	 on	 the	 government	 to	 pass	 the	 laws	 as	 a	 requirement	 to	 access	 loans	(Hadiz	and	Robison,	2005).			Albeit	with	ambiguities,	the	two	laws	gave	authority	to	local	governments,	especially	district	 governments,	 to	 manage	 their	 own	 natural	 resources,	 including	 forest	resources	 and	 forestland	 (McCarthy,	 2000;	 Barr,	 2006).	 Those	 who	 supported	decentralization	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 given	 the	 context	 of	 Indonesian	geographical	 and	 socio-cultural	 conditions	 to	 conduct	 governance	 closer	 to	 the	people	that	would	benefit	from	it.	The	argumentation	is	based	on	the	perception	that	the	 local	 government	possesses	 better	 knowledge	 for	managing	 their	 own	natural	resources	 and	 have	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 local	 citizens	(Resosudarmo,	 2004;	 Barr,	 2006).	 Another	 argumentation	 in	 favour	 of	decentralisation	also	highlights	the	opportunity	for	voters	to	hold	their	local	leaders	accountable	 through	 local	 election	 processes.	 However,	 later	 in	 1999,	 due	 to	widespread	ecological	impacts	from	hundreds	of	logging	and	mining	licences	issued	
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by	 local	 governments,	 a	 revision	of	BFL	was	passed	which	made	provision	 for	 the	central	government	to	retain	its	role	in	managing	Indonesian	forests	(Resosudarmo,	2004).	The	passing	of	the	revised	law	met	with	strong	resistance	from	the	regions.	Thus,	instead	of	referring	to	the	BFL	law,	local	governments	legitimized	their	actions	by	claiming	the	rights	to	manage	and	exploit	forests	based	on	Law	Number	22/1999	on	Regional	Governance	(Resosudarmo,	2004).			Despite	 the	 centralising	 character	 of	 the	 BFL	 law,	 the	 MOF	 issued	 and	 promoted	policies	that	apparently	took	into	account	the	demand	for	greater	participation	and	access	by	local	government	in	managing	forests	(Aspinall	and	Fealy,	2003;	Moeliono	and	 Limberg,	 2012).	 In	 1999,	 the	 government	 issued	 Regulation	 Number	 6/1999	concerning	 forest	 exploitation,	which	granted	authority	 to	district	 governments	 to	issue	 small-scale	 timber	 concession	 licenses	 for	 up	 to	100	hectares	 to	 individuals,	national	corporations,	or	 local	co-operatives	in	the	forests	area	that	were	intended	to	be	converted	into	other	land	uses	or	Areal	Penggunaan	Lain	(APL),	the	category	of	land	 in	 Indonesia	 that	 is	 governed	 under	 the	 NLA	 (Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 Another	policy	was	 issued	 in	2000	 that	gave	authority	 to	 the	district	governments	 to	 issue	licenses	for	the	harvesting	of	forest	products	including	timber	in	Natural	Production	Forests	for	up	to	50,000	hectares	(McCarthy,	2000;	Thorburn,	2002).	The	MOF	also	stated	in	its	policy	that	the	governors	of	the	province	would	be	authorized	to	issue	licenses	 that	 spanned	 the	 boundaries	 of	 two	 or	 more	 districts	 while	 the	 central	government	 jurisdiction	 applied	 for	 concessions	 that	 included	 areas	 that	 spanned	more	 than	 one	 province	 (Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 Given	 the	 authority	 to	 issue	concessions,	 the	 district	 governments	 used	 these	 windows	 of	 opportunity	 to	increase	local	revenue	by	issuing	hundreds	of	new	logging	licenses.			Researchers	have	highlighted	 	 that	 the	policies	enabled	 rampant	abuse	by	corrupt	district	 leaders	 and	 officials	 (Robertson-Snape,	 1999;	 A.	 Dermawan	 et	 al.,	 2011).	District	 leaders	(Bupati)	often	 issued	concessions	 in	exchange	 for	political	support	from	the	members	of	local	parliaments	or	public	figures.	Burgess	et	al	(2011)	argue	that	there	is	a	linear	correlation	between	the	increase	in	the	rate	of	deforestation	in	a	 particular	 district	 and	 its	 local	 election	 period.	 The	 study	 found	 that	 near	 the	election	time,	district	leaders	would	issue	concessions	as	gifts	for	their	supporters	or	
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to	obtain	the	political	and	financial	capital	needed	to	retain	their	positions	(Burgess	
et	al.,	2011).	The	environmental	implications	of	these	concessions	being	issued	were	very	 serious.	 Resosudarmo	 (Resosudarmo,	 2004)	 lists	 some	 examples	 of	 the	extensive	number	of	concessions	issued	in	some	districts	in	Kalimantan.	Kutai	Barat	District	 in	 East	 Kalimantan	 issued	 622	 small-scale	 logging	 permits	 and	 Sintang	District	 in	West	Kalimantan	 authorized	 409	 licenses	 to	 be	 granted	 (Resosudarmo,	2004).	Just	three	years	since	its	implementation,	the	total	forest	area	that	had	been	over-logged	reached	around	2	million	hectares	nationally	(Resosudarmo,	2004).		
	
4.3.2 Drivers	of	Deforestation	In	 2009,	 the	 MOF	 (Regulation	 Number	 30/2009,	 Article	 1	 Point	 10)	 defined	‘deforestation’	as	a	permanent	change	from	a	forested	to	a	non-forested	area	caused	by	human	activity	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012,	p.	2).	Meanwhile,	Article	1	point	11	defines	‘degradation’	as	a	reduction	in	the	quantity	of	forest	cover	and	carbon	stock	over	a	certain	 period	 caused	 by	 human	 activity	 (Indarto	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 p.	 3).	 Based	 on	historical	 data,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Development	 Planning	 estimates	 the	 annual	deforestation	 rate	 in	 Indonesia	 to	 be	 around	 1.125	 million	 ha,	 while	 the	 annual	degradation	 rate	 is	 estimated	 at	 0.626	million	 ha	 (Indarto	 et	al.,	 2012).	 The	MOF	identifies	several	activities	that	directly	cause	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	(Indonesian	 REDD+	 Task	 Force,	 2012).	 These	 include	 conversion	 of	 forests	 into	other	land	uses,	such	as	mining	and	plantation;	logging	(both	legal	and	illegal);	and	forest	 and	 peatland	 fires	 all	 of	 which	 are	 discussed	 below.	 	 The	 Strategy	 also	highlights	 underlying	 factors	 that	 contribute	 indirectly	 to	 the	 increasing	 rate	 of	deforestation	 and	degradation,	 such	 as	 rising	 global	 demand	 for	 timber	 and	other	forest	products,	population	and	demographic	changes,	and	weak	forest	management	(Indonesian	REDD+	Task	Force,	2012).		
Competing	Land	Uses	for	Plantation	and	Mining	Data	from		a	national	NGO,	Sawit	Watch,	shows	a	swift	 increase	in	palm	oil	estates	covering	an	area	of	1.6	million	ha	in	1989	rising	to	8.4	million	ha	in	2010.	Another	main	 driver	 of	 land	 use	 change	 is	mining.	 Prior	 to	 2008,	 data	 from	 the	MOF	 only	show	344,000	ha	of	forest	under	lease-use	permits,	i.e.,	a	permit	that	grants	the	right	
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to	mine	within	state	forest	areas.	However,	researchers	argue	that,	in	reality,	mining	in	 forest	areas	covers	much	more	than	the	official	data	acknowledged	by	the	MOF.	This	argumentation	is	supported	by	the	unavailability	of	data	and	record	on	small-scale	illegal	mining	operations	in	forest	areas	(Resosudarmo	et	al,	2009).	Moreover,	due	to	decentralisation	policies	many	local	governments	have	issued	mining	permits	in	the	area	that	they	classify	as	being	for	other	land	uses,	while	according	to	the	MOF	are	part	of	the	state	forest.	In	2004,	the	government	prohibited	open-cast	mining	in	the	protection	areas,	however,	13	companies	managed	to	secure	a	total	of	850,000	ha	 of	 land	 before	 the	 ban	 took	 effect	 (Resosudarmo	 et	 al,	 2009).	 Aside	 from	 the	environmental	 impact	 on	 forest	 cover	 and	 biodiversity,	 mining	 and	 plantation	activities	often	triggered	conflicts	with	Indigenous	and	local	communities	(Mahanty	and	McDermott,	2013).	
	
Logging	and	Forest	Fires	Once	 known	 as	 the	 biggest	 exporter	 of	 plywood,	 Indonesia	 is	 also	 often	 seen	 as	holding	 the	 record	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 illegal	 logging	 that	 occurs	 (Steni	 and	Hadad,	2012).	 According	 to	 researchers	 there	 are	 two	 differences	 with	 regard	 to	 forest	types	regarding	how	illegal	logging	is	conducted.	In	the	protection	and	conservation	forests,	 illegal	 logging	 occurs	 without	 permits.	 In	 the	 production	 forest,	 illegal	logging	 ensues	 through,	 among	 others,	 the	 felling	 of	 timber	 outside	 the	 allocated	permit’s	area,	manipulation	of	felling	quotas,	and	the	clearance	of	the	forest	initiated	for	 plantation	 or	 mining	 where	 concession	 holders	 often	 failed	 to	 establish	 the	proposed	activities.			In	 the	areas	proposed	 to	be	crop	estates	and	 industrial	plantation	 forest,	once	 the	wood	has	been	logged,	the	forest	or	peatland	is	usually	cleared	using	fires	as	it	is	the	fastest	 and	 cheapest	 clearing	method	 (Colfer,	 2010).	 The	 government	 has	 banned	this	 slash	 and	 burn	 practice.	 However,	 without	 proper	 monitoring	 and	 law	enforcement,	many	companies	still	prefer	to	clear	their	plots	using	this	method.	The	MOF	 has	 established	 the	 Forest	 and	 Land	 Fire	 Management	 Centre	 (Pusat	
Pengendalian	 Kebakaran	Hutan	 dan	 Lahan	 or	 Pusdalkarhutla)	 and	 the	 Forest	 and	Land	Fire	Management	Unit	 (Satuan	Pelaksana	Pengendalian	Kebakaran	Hutan	dan	
Lahan	or	Satlakdalkarhutla),	 as	well	 as	 a	national	 coordination	 team	 for	managing	
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forest	and	land	fires.	In	addition,	many	donors	and	NGOs	have	tried	to	encourage	the	participation	 of	 local	 people	 in	 establishing	 community	 based	 forest	 fire	management	units.	Nonetheless,	almost	every	year	up	to	now,	in	several	provinces,	such	 as	 in	 Riau,	 Jambi,	 and	 Central	 Kalimantan,	 forest	 and	 peatland	 fires	 have	continued	to	be	a	routine	problem.	In	the	most	recent	forest	fires	in	Riau,	during	the	dry	 season	 in	 2014,	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	 obtained	 satellite	 images	 of	 forest	 fire	hotspot	 occurrences	 in	 regions	 belonging	 to	 some	 big	 concessionaires.	 However,	instead	of	revoking	the	companies’	permits,	the	police	officers	often	only	prosecuted	the	 companies’	 staff	 members	 that	 were	 tasked	 with	 clearing	 and	 burning	 of	 the	areas.	This	reflects	the	social	and	political	obstacles	in	enforcing	environmental	law	and	regulations.		
	
4.3.3 The	 Role	 of	 Social	 Movements	 in	 Reforming	 Forest	
Governance	In	 the	wake	 of	 the	New	Order’s	 demise,	 Non	Governmental	 Organizations	 (NGOs)	employed	conservation	and	sustainable	development	discourses	 to	draw	attention	to	 the	 escalating	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 its	 associated	 socio-political	impacts	(Resosudarmo,	2004,	2005).	Activists	were	actively	problematizing	several	policies	of	 the	New	Order’s	authoritarian	approach.	One	particular	 target	was	Law	Number	5/1979	on	Village	Government,	which	according	to	the	activists	was	trying	to	homogenize	local	communities	to	render	them	manageable	and	governable	(Ross,	1996).	 The	 law	 efficiently	 replaced	 adat	 structure	 and	 culture	 with	 a	 ‘Javanese	model’	 of	 social	 structure	 and	 local	 governance	 that	 resembled	 a	 ‘pseudo-military	model’	 that	depended	on	 the	hierarchical	 control	 and	 resources	 from	 the	national	government	(Ross,	1996).	Villages	were	established	and	their	borders	were	drawn	on	 a	 map	 often	 without	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 socio-cultural	 delineation	among	 communities.	 The	 borders	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 tensions	 and	contestations	horizontally	among	neighbouring	communities	and	vertically	between	the	 communities	 and	 the	 state	 or	 the	 private	 sector	 (Ross,	 1996;	 Fay,	 Sirait	 and	Kusworo,	2000).			Another	 significant	 milestone	 in	 problematizing	 the	 messiness	 of	 forest	 spatial	
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governance	 was	 through	 the	 publication	 of	 ICRAF’s	 (the	 World	 Agroforestry	Research	 Centre)	 research	 on	 the	 forest	 gazettement	 process	 (Fay,	 Sirait	 and	Kusworo,	 2000).	 The	 study	 highlighted	 that	 only	 11%	 of	 forest	 in	 Indonesia	 had	been	gazetted,	which	left	almost	90%	of	forest	with	unclear	boundaries	(Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000).	This	caused	multiple	 interpretations	of	 the	status	of	 the	 land	and	 induced	 overlapping	 claims	 at	 particular	 locations.	 Uncertainty	 and	inconsistencies	 in	national	and	 local	 spatial	planning	encouraged	corrupt	and	rent	seeking	practices	by	actors	that	benefited	from	retaining	the	status	quo	(Barr,	2006;	A.	Dermawan	et	al.,	2011;	Brockhaus	et	al.,	2012).			Article	1point	3	of	the	BFL	defines	the	process	by	which	state	forest	is	established.	State	 forest	 is	 defined	 as	 “a	 particular	 area	 designated	 and/or	 gazetted	 by	 the	government	 to	 be	 maintained	 as	 permanent	 forest”	 (hutan	tetap).	 The	 use	 of	 the	grammatical	conjunction	‘and/or’	in	the	article	above	means	that	state	forest	could	be	established	only	with	the	process	of	designation	(ditunjuk)	without	being	further	gazetted	(ditetapkan)	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	implication	of	this	rule	is	significant.	The	MOF	realized	that	the	BFL	had	given	them	authority	to	avoid	lengthy	processes	of	gazettal	and	rather	to	simply	chose	to	designate	a	particular	plot	of	land	as	part	of	the	state	 forests	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	As	of	2011,	only	around	14.24	million	ha	of	forests	had	been	fully	gazetted	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	This	has	major	ramifications	in	terms	of	unresolved	conflicts	over	forest	boundaries,	both	with	the	communities	and	local	governments.	Nevertheless,	the	MOF	still	persistently	issued	forest	concessions	for	areas	designated	as	state	forests	but	not	yet	gazetted,	and	let	the	concessionaires	directly	face	the	conflicts	on	the	ground	by	themselves	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012;	Agung	et	
al.,	2014).			In	2011,	five	district	heads	proposed	a	judicial	review	of	Article	1	point	3	of	the	BFL	Number	 41/1999.	 In	 2012,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 granted	 the	 request	 and	declared	 the	 phrase	 ‘designated	 and	 or’	 as	 unconstitutional	 and	 unenforceable	(Wells	et	al.,	2012).	The	article	now	reads:	“Forest	zone	is	a	particular	area	gazetted	
(ditetapkan)	 by	 the	 Government	 to	 be	 maintained	 as	 permanent	 forest	 (Hutan	
Tetap)”		(Wells	et	al.,	2012).	There	are	four	steps	to	be	taken	by	the	government	for	the	 gazettal	 process,	 these	 are;	 1)	 forest	 zone	 designation,	 2)	 administrative	
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demarcation	 of	 forest	 zone,	 3)	 forest	 zone	 mapping,	 and	 4)	 forest	 zone	determination	 (Wells	 et	al.,	 2012).	 The	 court	 ruling	 was	 expected	 to	 address	 the	question	 about	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 state	 forest	 areas	 and	 to	 promote	 the	clarification	of	conflict	over	land	tenure	between	the	state	and	the	communities	(see	Chapter	7).		The	 MOF	 together	 with	 the	 Indigenous	 and	 environmental	 activists	 organised	 an	international	 conference	on	 forest	 tenure	 in	Lombok	 in	2011	 (Agung	et	al.,	 2014).	The	 conference	 opened	 the	 opportunity	 for	 tenure	 reform	 in	 Indonesia.	 Activists	were	advocating	a	road	map	of	forest	tenure	reform	that	relies	on	three	interrelated	approaches:	harmonisation	of	policies,	 conflict	 resolution,	and	 the	advancement	of	community	 access	 to	 forest	 (Safitri	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 MOF	 established	 a	 special	division	for	tenure	conflict	and	adopted	a	two-way	dialogue	approach	in	addressing	conflict	 instead	 of	 more	 common	 legal	 prosecution	 of	 local	 and	 Indigenous	communities	 (Safitri	 et	al.,	 2011;	 Situmorang	 et	al.,	 2013).	 Despite	 these	 reforms,	there	are	still	many	challenges	 faced	by	environmental	and	 Indigenous	activists	 in	advancing	reform	in	 the	 forestry	sector,	 including	 ingrained	cultures	of	corruption	(Dermawan	et	al.,	2011).			The	 Anti-Corruption	 Commission	 (2012)	 conducted	 a	 study	 in	 the	 Directorate	General	of	Planning	in	the	MOF	to	understand	underlying	factors	that	drive	corrupt	practices.	 The	 study	 revealed	 17	 types	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	 forestry	 sector	 (KPK,	2012).	However,	it	was	clear	that	the	structural	problems	of	forestry	corruption	do	not	 only	 occur	 within	 the	 MOF,	 but	 involve	 other	 ministries	 and	 state	 agencies.	Based	on	the	findings	of	the	study,	the	Anti-Corruption	Commission	initiated	a	new	platform	 involving	12	ministries	 and	 state	 agencies	 to	 refine	 forest	 governance	 in	Indonesia	(Agung	et	al.,	2014;	Aspinall,	Mietzner	and	Tomsa,	2015;	Dermawan	and	Sinaga,	2015).	A	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU)	was	prepared	and	would	be	signed	by	each	of	the	ministers	to	show	their	commitment	to	getting	involved	with	the	 struggle	 to	 fight	 forestry	 corruption.	 The	 Anti-Corruption	 Commission	 asked	several	environmental	activists	to	be	involved	in	the	platform	to	provide	assistance	and	advice.	One	of	the	activists	I	interviewed	explained	that	it	was	initially	planned	to	call	the	platform	a	‘MoU	for	forest	governance	reform’,	however,	the	MOF	insisted	
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that	 the	name	was	 inappropriate	and	 implied	the	 inability	of	 the	MOF	to	carry	out	their	duties.	Finally,	to	find	common	ground	and	to	facilitate	the	MOF’s	aspirations,	the	platform	was	titled	‘MoU	of	12	ministries	and	state	agencies	in	accelerating	the	forest	gazzetement	process’	later	known	as	Nota	Kesepakatan	Bersama	(NKB).		The	NKB	was	translated	into	93	national	action	plans	that	were	divided	between	the	relevant	 ministries	 and	 were	 to	 be	 implemented	 between	 2013	 and	 2016	 and	monitored	 by	 UKP4	 (KPK,	 2013).	 One	 of	 the	 highlights	 of	 the	 platform	 was	 the	involvement	 of	 The	 Human	 Rights	 (HR)	 Commission	 as	 one	 of	 the	 signatories	(Widhiarto	and	Gunawan,	2014).	The	HR	Commission	advocated	a	national	inquiry	programme	 aimed	 at	 documenting	 the	 violation	 of	 Indigenous	 and	 local	communities’	 tenure	 rights	 (Widhiarto	 and	 Gunawan,	 2014).	 The	 national	 inquiry	has	 strengthened	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 approaches	 into	 the	 forest	governance.	 Thus,	 it	 has	 highlighted	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 Indigenous	 and	 local	communities	against	private	sector	interests.			According	to	an	environmental	activist	I	 interviewed,	one	of	the	biggest	challenges	in	 accelerating	 the	 gazettal	 of	 forest	 boundaries	 is	 to	 address	 land	 tenure	 claims	inside	the	forest	area.	There	are	some	issues	to	be	addressed	in	order	to	seek	clarity	over	land	claims	within	state	forest	areas.	First,	there	is	the	dichotomy	in	managing	land	 in	 Indonesia	 that	 is	 the	 separation	 between	 forest	 land	 and	 other	 land	uses	
(areal	penggunaan	lain	-	APL)	(Sahide	and	Giessen,	2015).	The	only	state	agency	that	has	 the	authority	 in	managing	 forest	areas	 is	 the	MOF,	while	 land	 located	on	non-forest	 areas	 is	 governed	under	 the	authority	of	 the	NLA	 (Safitri,	 2014;	 Sahide	and	Giessen,	2015).	However,	the	only	state	agency	that	has	the	authority	to	issue	land	ownership	 certificates	 is	 the	 NLA.	 Since	 the	 state	 forest	 areas	 are	 under	 the	jurisdiction	of	the	MOF,	the	NLA	could	not	enter	the	forest	and	issue	certificates	that	are	needed	to	give	legal	status	and	clarification	over	land	ownership	to	Indigenous	communities,	 local	peasants,	 and	 transmigrants	 (Safitri,	2014).	Second,	 there	 is	no	technical	mechanism	 for	 addressing	 conflict	 and	 claims	over	 land	within	 the	 state	forest	 areas.	 In	 order	 to	 address	 this	 problem,	 several	 activists	 who	 served	 as	advisors	 for	 the	NKB	proposal	 to	 the	Anti-Corruption	Commission	 initiated	a	 joint	
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regulation	 (Peraturan	 Bersama	 -	 Perber)	 between	 four	 related	 state	 agencies	 to	address	the	above	problems	(Safitri,	2014).			The	 joint	 regulation	 on	 ‘Procedures	 for	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Land	 Tenure	 in	 State	Forest	Area’	was	issued	in	October	2014	and	signed	by	four	ministries:	the	MOF,	the	NLA,	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	and	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	(Safitri,	2014).	The	 regulation	was	 expected	 to	 accelerate	 the	 finalization	 of	 land	 tenure	 conflicts	within	the	state	forest	areas	and	to	produce	forest	areas	that	would	be	free	of	land	conflicts	(Safitri,	2014).	Interviews	with	some	activists	suggest	that	the	regulation	is	quite	 progressive	 in	 terms	 of	 changing	 the	 old	 paradigm	 of	 monolithic-power	 in	governing	forestland.	The	regulation	gives	authority	to	the	NLA	to	issue	certificates	as	 soon	 as	 a	 parcel	 of	 land	 is	 given	 by	 the	 MOF	 to	 the	 third	 parties	 (successful	applicants)	 (Safitri,	 2014).	Previously	 it	was	 considered	 to	be	 a	 criminal	 act	when	the	 NLA	 encroached	 upon	 the	 MOF’s	 jurisdiction.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 changing	 of	authority,	 the	 regulation	 also	 advocates	 for	 bigger	 agrarian	 reform	 as	 the	 policy	clearly	 aligns	 with	 the	 BAL	 introduced	 in	 the	 Old	 Order	 period.	 The	 regulation	stipulates	that	if	the	land	has	been	cultivated	for	more	than	20	years	then	the	rights	to	 it	will	 automatically	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	 cultivator	 (Safitri,	 2014).	 This	 policy	opens	 the	 possibility	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	 reterritorialization	 and	 land	redistribution	in	Indonesia.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 conservationists	 are	 questioning	 whether	 the	regulation	would	be	used	to	‘legalize	deforestation’	and	function	as	a	‘time	bomb’	for	forest	 destruction	 (see	 eg	 Handadhari,	 2015;	 Meijaard,	 2015).	 Conservationists	allege	 that	 the	 regulation	 is	 just	 a	 disguise	 to	 allow	 forest	 conversion	 under	 a	morally	 ethical	 motivation	 to	 increase	 community	 rights	 and	 stimulate	 rural	development.	Meijaard	(2015)	argues	in	his	op-ed	as	follows,		
But	 realistically,	what	will	 communities	 or	 individual	 people	 do	when	 they	can	get	legal	title	to	what	was	previously	state	owned	land?	Your	guess	is	as	good	 as	 mine,	 but	 I	 would	 think	 many	 will	 immediately	 sell	 their	 land	 to	whoever	is	the	highest	bidder:	likely	industrial-scale	companies	investing	in	oil	palm,	pulp	and	paper,	rubber,	and	mining.	
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	He	further	argues	that	previous	similar	policies,	such	as	the	MOF	regulation	which	allowed	 district	 heads	 to	 allocate	 100	 ha	 for	 logging	 licenses	 to	 communities	through	 cooperatives	 or	 individually	 owned	 national	 companies	 has	 caused	extensive	deforestation	 (Meijaard,	2015).	An	environmental	activist	who	serves	as	the	advisor	to	the	NKB	and	the	initiator	of	the	joint	regulation,	Myrna	Safitri,	argues	in	 her	 article	 that	 the	 conservationists’	 arguments	 were	 based	 on	 the	 apolitical	paradigm	 which	 put	 the	 blame	 for	 Indonesia’s	 deforestation	 on	 the	 local	 and	Indigenous	 communities	 instead	 of	 plantation,	 logging	 and	 mining	 companies	(Safitri,	 2015).	 She	 further	 highlights	 the	 history	 of	 the	 state’s	 appropriation	 of	Indigenous	lands	as	a	fact	that	cannot	be	erased	from	the	nation’s	dark	past	and	it	becomes	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 to	undo	 the	 injustice	 that	had	been	done	such	as	through	the	Joint	Regulation	(Safitri,	2015).			
4.3.4 REDD+	Inception	It	is	within	this	fraught	political	context	that	REDD+	is	being	introduced.		Before	the	inception	of	REDD+,	various	multilateral	and	bilateral	initiatives	had	been	trialled	in	Indonesian	forests	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	Indonesia	is	one	of	the	world’s	richest	flora	and	 fauna	hotspots;	 its	 conservation	has	always	been	a	 focus	of	attention	of	many	multilateral	organizations	and	foreign	governments	(Wells,	1999;	Blom,	Sunderland	and	 Murdiyarso,	 2010).	 Moreover,	 often	 the	 ratification	 of	 a	 new	 policy	 or	 the	enactment	of	a	new	law	that	is	considered	to	be	part	of	good	governance	is	part	of	a	requirement	 for	 the	 commitment	 of	 international	 aid	 or	 debt.	 In	 1990,	 the	government	adopted	the	Convention	on	International	Trade	in	Endangered	Species	of	 Wild	 Fauna	 and	 Flora	 (CITES)	 through	 Law	 Number	 5/1990	 (Soehartono	 and	Mardiastuti,	 2002).	 CITES	 requires	 its	 country	 members	 to	 have	 a	 set	 of	 policies	aimed	at	controlling	and	monitoring	 the	 trade	of	endangered	animals	 (Soehartono	and	Mardiastuti,	2002).	 Indarto	et	 al	 (2012)	argue	 that	 Indonesia	has	yet	 to	enact	the	required	policies,	thus,	the	conservation	of	endangered	flora	and	fauna	are	still	at	 risk.	 Another	 important	 global	 environmental	 governance	 ratification	 was	 the	United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity	 (CBD).	 The	 ratification	 is	legalized	 through	 Law	 Number	 5/1994	 and	 translated	 into	 five	 targets	 for	
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government	 policies	 and	 programmes	 under	 the	 term	 Indonesian	 Biodiversity	Strategy	and	Action	Plan	 (IBSAP)	 (Indarto	et	al.,	 2012).	Despite	 its	 comprehensive	approach,	 IBSAP	 is	 a	 set	 of	 non-legally	 binding	 policies,	 hence,	 there	 is	 no	enforcement	ensuring	their	implementation.		In	2002,	 the	government	 joined	 the	United	Nations	Forum	on	Forests	 (UNFF)	and	adopted	 the	 principles	 of	 Sustainable	 Forest	 Management	 (SFM)	 (Indarto	 et	 al.,	2012).	 Five	 priority	 policies	 were	 established	 as	 the	 National	 Development	Programme	in	the	forestry	sector,	covering:	eradication	of	illegal	logging,	forest	fires	control,	 forestry	 sector	 restructuration,	 forest	 rehabilitation,	 forest	 conservation	and	 reforestation	 (Indarto	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Despite	 a	 very	 good	 and	 comprehensive	policy,	 its	 implementation	 was	 a	 different	 story.	 Nevertheless,	 Indonesia’s	involvement	 in	 the	UNFF	had	paved	 the	way	 for	 the	preliminary	Memorandum	of	Understanding	 with	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 in	 implementing	 Forest	 Law	Enforcement	Governance	and	Trade	(FLEGT)	programme	aimed	at	reducing	 illegal	logging	 and	 strengthening	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 governance	 (Indarto	et	al.,	 2012;	 van	Heeswijk	and	Turnhout,	2013;	Nurrochmat	et	al.,	2014).			The	 above	 narrative	 on	 the	 changing	 dynamic	 of	 forest	 politics	 will	 shape	 and	transform	 the	 way	 REDD+	 unfolds	 in	 Indonesia.	 The	 government	 of	 Indonesia,	through	the	MOF,	has	prepared	to	adopt	REDD+	since	2007.	It	is	proposed	that	the	implementation	 of	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia	 can	 reduce	 deforestation	 to	 50%	 of	 its	current	rate	and	bring	$2.5	to	$4.5	billion	in	carbon	credit	income	per	annum	to	the	nation	(Agung	et	al.,	2014).	REDD+	proponents	argue	that	the	credit	could	assist	in	reducing	 pressure	 on	 the	 forests	 from	 extractive	 industries	 while	 sustaining	 the	country’s	 economic	 growth.	 REDD+	 is	 also	 expected	 to	 improve	 the	 livelihood	 of	around	6	to	30	million	people	who	depend	directly	on	forests	in	Indonesia	for	their	economic	income	(Agung	et	al.,	2014).		Indonesia	 has	 committed	 to	 reducing	 its	 GHG	 emissions	 by	 26%	by	 2020	 or	 41%	with	 international	 support	 and	 has	 positioned	 forests	 as	 its	 key	mitigation	 sector	(Astuti	 and	McGregor,	 2015).	 Although	 the	 announcement	 of	 commitment,	 which	took	 place	 in	 the	 2009	 G20	meeting	 in	 Pittsburgh,	 had	 positioned	 Indonesia	 as	 a	
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global	leader	in	mitigating	climate	change,	the	commitment	got	a	mixed	reception	in	Indonesia	 (Indarto	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 commitment	 facilitated	 new	partnerships	with	donor	countries	to	support	the	MOF	in	reducing	carbon	emissions	from	the	 forestry	sector.	 Indonesia	 joined	two	multilateral	 initiatives	on	REDD+	 in	2009:	the	World	Bank’s	Forest	Carbon	Partnership	Facility	(FCPF)	and	the	UN-REDD	programme	(Dixon	and	Challies,	2015;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015).	The	UN-REDD	policy	board	approved	Indonesia’s	proposal	and	set	up	a	UN-REDD	Indonesia	programme	hosted	by	the	MOF	(Situmorang	et	al.,	2013).	The	Indonesia	programe	ran	for	three	years	from	2009	–	2011	with	a	total	fund	of	US$	5.6	million	and	its	objective	was	to	achieve	 three	 key	 outcomes:	 1)	 improving	 multistakeholder	 participation	 and	building	consensus	among	forest	actors	at	the	national	level,	2)	developing	national	REDD+	 architectures,	 such	 as,	 REDD+	 National	 Strategy	 and	 benefit	 sharing	mechanism,	3)	increasing	capacity	at	the	sub-national	level	in	implementing	REDD+	(Situmorang	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 UN-REDD	 in	 Indonesia	 supported	 the	 Ministry	 of	Development	Planning	 in	developing	 the	 first	 version	of	REDD+	National	 Strategy,	documenting	 and	 collecting	 historical	 carbon	 emissions	 data	 to	 establish	 initial	Reference	 Emissions	 Level	 (REL)	 at	 the	 province	 level,	 and	 designated	 and	supported	Central	Sulawesi	as	its	REDD+	pilot	province	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).			Through	 the	 Indonesia	 Australia	 Forest	 Carbon	 Partnership,	 the	 government	 of	Australia	signed	a	bilateral	agreement	on	providing	funding	for	the	development	of	REDD+	 demonstration	 activities	 (Atmadja	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Another	 country	 that	committed	to	assist	Indonesia	in	a	Joint	Programme	on	Adaptation	and	Mitigation	of	Climate	Change	in	forestry	through	afforestation	and	reforestation	mechanisms	was	South	Korea	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	However	the	most	significant	bilateral	agreement	on	 REDD+	was	 through	 the	 Letter	 of	 Intent	 (LoI)	 signed	with	 the	 government	 of	Norway	in	2010	(Government	of	Indonesia,	2010b)(Caldecott	et	al.,	2013).	The	US$1	billion	 cooperation	 agreement	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 phases;	 preparation,	transformation	and	contributions	for	verified-emission	reduction.	In	its	initial	phase	the	 tasks	 of	 implementing	 the	 LoI’s	 agreements	 were	 divided	 between	 three	different	state	agencies	and	 led	by	 the	Coordinating	Ministry	 for	Economic	Affairs.		They	are	the	Ministry	of	Development	Planning	to	prepare	for	the	REDD+	Strategy,	the	MOF	to	establish	the	pilot	provinces,	and	UKP4	to	prepare	for	the	REDD+	Agency	
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(Indarto	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 2010,	 a	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 was	 established	through	a	Presidential	Regulation	and	its	main	mandate	was	to	prepare	the	legal	and	institutional	infrastructure	for	REDD+	implementation	(see	Chapter	Five).	The	next	chapter	will	further	discuss	the	Taskforce’s	rationalities,	strategies	and	practices	in	implementing	and	governing	REDD+	in	Indonesia.			
4.4 Conclusion	This	chapter	has	explained	the	historical	transition	of	forest	politics	in	Indonesia.	It	has	shown	troubled	history	of	governance	issues	and	power	struggles.	The	chapter	discusses	various	governmental	policies,	 laws,	and	technologies	being	deployed	by	the	 state	 to	 manage	 human-forest	 relations	 and	 the	 rationalities	 employed	 to	legitimize	particular	approaches.	During	the	governance	of	the	New	Order	era,	forest	areas	 were	 established	 to	 cater	 to	 the	 regime’s	 political	 and	 economic	 interests.	Dozens	 of	 regulations	 were	 designed	 and	 enacted	 to	 circumvent	 the	 rights	 of	Indigenous	and	local	communities.	The	regime	relied	on	disciplinary	and	sovereign	technologies	enforced	by	the	state’s	apparatuses,	such	as,	the	police	and	the	military,	to	shape	the	conduct	of	communities	and	activists	and	how	they	could	engage	with	the	 state.	 Dissent	 and	 resistance	 were	 repressed	 by	 the	 New	 Order	 regime,	 thus,	leaving	the	regime	to	freely	exploit	forests	and	forest	resources	for	more	than	three	decades.	 The	 socio-ecological	 ramifications	 of	 this	 exploitation	 are	 extensive:	millions	 of	 Indigenous	 people	were	 displaced	 and	 oppressed	while	millions	 ha	 of	dense	forests	were	cleared.		The	post-Soeharto	period	beginning	in	1998	has	seen	rapid	changes	in	the	forestry	sector.	 Local	 government	 has	 had	 more	 participation	 in	 managing	 forests	 and	forests	resources	due	to	 the	decentralisation	policies.	This	doesn’t	mean,	however,	that	the	local	government’s	interests	were	compatible	with	the	socio-environmental	justice	 interests	 of	 the	 Indigenous	 and	 environmental	 activists.	 Research	 suggests	that	 during	 the	 Reformasi	 period	 deforestation	 reached	 its	 highest	 rate	(Resosudarmo,	 2004).	 Corruption	 and	 rent	 seeking	 practices	 were	 still	 prevalent	and	 have	 become	 part	 of	 the	 challenge	 civil	 society	 continuously	 battle	 against.	Nevertheless,	 the	 post-Soeharto	 period	 opened	 up	 new	 spaces	 of	 engagement	
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through	 which	 activists	 have	 influenced	 the	 policy	 making	 processes	 and	problematized	 the	 New	 Order’s	 unjust	 legacies.	 Multiple	 new	 regulations	 and	initiatives	 have	 emerged	 as	 the	 result	 of	 activists’	 involvement	 and	 advocacy	 on	democracy,	 Indigenous	 rights	 and	 sustainable	 development.	 These	 idioms	 of	 hope	are,	 of	 course,	 still	 confined	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 form	 of	 policies	 instead	 of	mainstreamed	in	the	practices	of	government.			REDD+	emerged	in	2007	as	a	new	opportunity	to	reform	forest	governance	and	soon	became	the	key	mitigation	strategy	 the	government	adopted	 to	achieve	 its	climate	commitment.	The	political	ecology	context	discussed	above	shapes	the	way	REDD+	unfolds	in	Indonesia.	Unless	REDD+	programs	are	designed	to	take	into	account	the	complexities	 of	 diverse	 interests	 driving	 national	 and	 local	 actors	 who	 currently	benefit	from	the	status	quo,	REDD+	will	struggle	as	a	strategy	for	carbon	reduction.	The	next	chapter	will	specifically	discuss	the	first	installment	of	REDD+	architecture	and	 the	 mainstreaming	 of	 its	 rationale	 as	 neoliberal	 environmental	 governance.	Central	 to	 these	 attempts	 were	 efforts	 by	 REDD+	 proponents	 to	 equate	 REDD+	implementation	 as	 a	 strategy	 for	 refining	 the	 messiness	 of	 Indonesia’s	 forest	governance.			 	
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5 Case	Study	One	~	The	REDD+	Taskforce:	
Governing	Carbon	and	Transforming	Forest	
Politics			
5.1 Introduction	The	 REDD+	 program	 seeks	 to	 reshape	 the	way	 people	 value,	 govern	 and	 interact	with	 forests.	 	 Rather	 than	 managing	 forests	 according	 to	 interests	 in	 timber,	conservation,	 land	 or	 livelihoods,	 REDD+	 encourages	 forms	 of	 forest	management	that	prioritise	carbon	(Angelsen	et	al.,	2012).	 	While	 international	negotiations	are	shaping	the	rules	of	the	program,	how	it	takes	place	on	the	ground	will	depend	on	its	interpretation	and	implementation	in	different	places.	Drawing	on	this	concern	and	aimed	 to	 address	 the	 first	 research	objective	 through	 case	 study	1,	 this	 chapter	 is	interested	 in	 the	 governmental	 technologies	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 (Satuan	Tugas	
REDD+),	 an	 ad-hoc	 body	 formed	 by	 Presidential	 decree	 to	 design	 and	 implement	REDD+	readiness	activities	 in	 Indonesia,	 created	 to	mainstream	 the	program	 from	2010-2013.	 Following	 the	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 research’s	 theoretical	framework	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 this	 chapter	 develops	 the	 governmentality	 approach	 to	focus	on	how	the	Taskforce	sought	to	introduce	REDD+	carbon	rationalities	to	forest	politics.	 Based	 on	 extended	 qualitative	 research	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 identify	three	governmental	strategies	that	the	Taskforce	employed	to	normalise	REDD+	in	Indonesia:	 adopting	 and	 promoting	 the	 carbon	 discourses	 circulating	 amongst	global	REDD+	communities;	making	carbon	visible	and	governable	through	mapping	technologies;	and	implementing	participatory	technologies	to	encourage	pro-REDD+	subjectivities.			I	argue	that	in	some	ways	the	Taskforce	has	been	successful	in	building	awareness	of	 forest	 carbon	 amongst	 forest	 stakeholders	 in	 Indonesia.	 National	 civil	 society	organisations,	 in	 particular,	 appear	 to	 be	 supportive	 of	 REDD+	 however	 they	emphasise	 the	 discourse	 of	 “co-benefits”	 informed	 by	 social	 and	 environmental	
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justice.		For	others	forests	remain	sources	of	timber	and	land,	and	new	strategies	are	required	if	REDD+	is	to	have	substantial	impacts	on	forest	governance	in	Indonesia.		The	Taskforce’s	 efforts	 reveal	 the	difficult	 and	 contested	processes	 through	which	global	climate	change	programmes	come	to	be	embedded	in	national	arenas.		
	The	rest	of	this	chapter	is	divided	into	five	sections.	The	first	section	introduces	the	REDD+	Taskforce.	The	second	section	reports	on	the	governmental	technologies	that	the	Taskforce	created	 to	 introduce	and	mainstream	REDD+	 in	 Indonesia.	The	 third	section	discusses	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 technologies	 on	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 politics.	 The	fourth	 section	 describes	 both	 the	 establishment	 and	 dissolution	 of	 the	 REDD+	Agency.	The	chapter	ends	with	conclusions	regarding	the	success	or	otherwise	of	the	REDD+	 Taskforce	 in	 mainstreaming	 carbon	 rationalities	 in	 forest	 governance	 in	Indonesia.		
	
5.2 The	REDD+	Taskforce	Seeking	 profits	 from	 extractive	 industries	 such	 as	 mining,	 logging	 and	 plantation	development	has	been	 the	dominant	 rationality	 governing	 Indonesian	 forests	 (see	Chapter	 4).	 This	 paradigm,	 tainted	 occasionally	 with	 rent	 seeking	 practices	 and	backed	 by	 political	 gangsterism,	 continues	 to	 weaken	 forest	 governance	 and	accumulate	 resources	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 small	 elite	 (Saich	 et	 al.,	 2010).	Consequently,	 an	 abundance	 of	 problems	 such	 as	 conflicts	 over	 tenure,	 forest	boundary	 disputes,	 concession	 overlaps	 and	 corruption,	 are	 typically	 found	 in	 the	country’s	 forest	 management	 (Indarto	 et	al.,	 2012).	 Taking	 the	 above	 issues	 into	account	 and	 considering	 the	 complexities	 and	 claims	 of	 cross-sectoral	bureaucracies,	preparing	REDD+	implementation	in	Indonesia	is	an	unenviable	task	(Caldecott	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Nevertheless,	 REDD+	 is	 positioned	 as	 a	 key	 element	 in	realizing	 Indonesia’s	pledge	 to	reduce	emissions	and	has	attracted	plenty	of	donor	attention	(Indarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	most	significant	offer	was	 from	Norway,	which	agreed	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 partnership	 worth	 US$1	 billion	 aimed	 at	 developing	Indonesia’s	 capacity	 to	 implement	REDD+	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010b).	 The	LoI,	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce	 through	Presidential	Decree	Number	19/2010,	which	 aims	 to	 accelerate	
	 113	
the	 national	 REDD+	 readiness	 processes	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010b).	 The	Decree	 mandates	 the	 Taskforce	 develop	 a	 REDD+	 National	 Strategy,	 a	 policy	document	 that	 outlines	 how	 the	 government	 can	move	 towards	 improved	 carbon	management	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010a).	 	 If	 the	REDD+	Taskforce,	 and	 the	REDD+	programme	more	generally,	is	successful,	it	will	have	widespread	impacts	on	human	-	forest	relations,	forest	politics	and	forest	subjectivities	in	Indonesia.			This	 chapter	 approaches	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	governmentality,	 which,	 as	 described	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 directs	attention	 to	 the	 techniques	 through	which	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 seek	 to	direct	the	conduct	of	populations	(for	related	work	on	climate	governmentality	see	Paterson	and	Stripple,	2010;	Lövbrand	and	Stripple,	2011,	2013;	Gupta	et	al.,	2012;	Boer,	2013).	This	is	achieved	through	calculative	technologies,	such	as	statistics	and	mapping	 technologies,	 to	 manage	 the	 health	 and	 productivity	 of	 populations	 by	disposing	 people	 towards	 things	 in	 particular	 ways	 (Dean,	 2009).	 Once	 disposed,	populations	 self-govern	 their	 behaviours	 according	 to	 shared	 norms,	 rationalities	and	 practices	 that	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 the	 common	 good	 (see	 Chapter	 2	Cruikshank,	 1999;	 Lemke,	 2001).	 With	 these	 insights	 in	 mind	 I	 now	 turn	 my	attention	 to	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce	 and	 how	 it	 sought	 to	 govern	 forest	 carbon	 and	transform	forest	politics	through	REDD+	in	Indonesia.		Having	strong	Presidential	support,	the	Taskforce	was	established	within	the	UKP4.	However	 its	 formation	as	an	ad-hoc	body	was	perceived	as	having	 little	 legitimacy	or	 authority	 to	 orchestrate	 REDD+	 governance	 among	 related	 ministries	 (Antara	News,	2011;	Adi,	2013).	One	of	the	Taskforce’s	deputy	stated	in	an	interview,		 It’s	 [REDD+	 implementation]	 like	 trying	 to	 solve	 all	 the	 political	 economic	problems	of	Indonesia’s	development.	On	one	hand,	we	[the	Taskforce]	have	to	convince	diverse	actors	to	support	our	intention	to	implement	low	carbon	economy	 through	 REDD+	 …	 On	 the	 other,	 we	 [the	 Taskforce]	 do	 not	 have	enough	legal	legitimacy	and	political	authority	compared	to	other	ministries	that	 were	 already	 in	 the	 [government]	 system	 for	 decades.	 You	 know	 …	
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sometimes	 they	 [other	ministries]	might	 think	 that	we	 [the	 Taskforce]	 are	just	a	“new	boy”	with	a	stubborn	will	(Interview,	Yamadhi,	June	2013).		Luttrell	et	al	(2012)	highlight	President	Yudhoyono’s	tendency	during	his	leadership	to	 create	 ad-hoc	 bodies	 and	 commissions	 to	 address	 bottlenecks	 in	 achieving	government’s	 goals,	 instead	 of	 tackling	 the	 appointed	 ministries	 head	 on.	 This	approach	 sparked	 tensions	 between	 the	 existing	 bureaucracies	 and	 the	 newly	established	institutions	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2012).	Awkward	relations	exist	between	MOF	and	 the	 Taskforce	 as	 there	 have	 been	 some	 instances	 in	 which	 the	 former’s	bureaucrats	 have	 been	 undermining	 and	 questioning	 the	 latter’s	 capacity	 and	authority	in	governing	REDD+	as	has	been	illustrated	by	the	above	quote.	However	strong	 the	 President’s	 support	 for	 the	 Taskforce,	 there	 remain	 bureaucracies	 and	political	constellations	that	have	little	 interest	 in	the	REDD+	agenda	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2012).			The	 appointment	 of	Kuntoro	Mangkusubroto	 as	 the	Taskforce’s	 leader,	while	well	received	by	donors	due	to	his	acclaimed	role	 in	post-tsunami	work,	contributed	to	further	tensions.		Ministries	were	reluctant	to	engage	too	openly	due	to	his	dual	role	as	 head	 of	 UKP4,	 the	 body	 authorized	 by	 the	 President	 to	 review	 how	ministries	performed	rather	than	to	execute	government’s	programmes.	One	of	the	informants	in	the	MOF	highlights	her	disappointment	by	saying,		 We	[Ministry	of	Forestry]	have	done	our	best	to	prepare	REDD+	inclusion	as	part	 of	 the	Bali	 outcomes	…	 and	now	 someone	 else	wants	 to	 take	 over	 the	result	from	us.	I	don’t	even	know	how	come	a	government	institution	[UKP4]	that	has	no	mandate	to	execute	a	program	suddenly	wants	to	be	in	charge	for	the	works	 that	 suppose	 to	be	 in	 the	 authority	of	 this	ministry…	 that	 is	 just	ridiculous!	(Interview,	Yusliana,	July	2013,	emphasis	added)		On	the	other	hand,	strong	support	for	the	Taskforce’s	work	comes	from	some	NGOs	(both	national	and	international	NGOs),	which	welcome	opportunities	for	wider	and	direct	 engagements	 in	 shaping	 the	 development	 of	 REDD+	 policies	 and	 broader	forest	governance.		Supportive	NGOs	indicated	in	interviews	that	the	formation	of	an	
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independent	 Taskforce	 was	 essential	 in	 ensuring	 the	 process	 was	 participatory,	something	 that	 would	 not	 have	 happened	 if	 it	 were	 led	 by	 an	 existing	 ministry.	Hence,	the	President’s	decision	to	establish	the	Taskforce	was	considered	by	many	to	 be	 a	 bold	 statement	 of	 a	 “business	 not-as-usual	 approach	 in	 forest	 governance	reform”	 (Interview,	 Yandiman,	May	 2013).	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 seen	 as	 potentially	creating	confusion	and	overlap	with	MOF	responsibilities	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2012).		The	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 originally	 had	 six	Working	 Groups	 focused	 on:	 the	 REDD+	National	 Strategy;	 REDD+	 Institutions,	 Funding	 Instruments;	 Measurement	Reporting	and	Verification	(MRV)	and	Moratorium	Implementation;	Pilot	Provinces;	and	 Communication	 and	 Multi-stakeholder	 Engagement	 (Satgas	 REDD+,	 2012).	Members	of	the	Working	Groups	were	representatives	from	technical	ministries	and	state	 agencies	 including	 the	 MOF,	 Ministry	 of	 Development	 Planning	 (Bappenas),	National	 Land	 Agency	 (NLA),	Ministry	 of	 Finance,	Ministry	 of	 Home	 Affairs,	MOE,	National	Council	on	Climate	Change,	Ministry	of	State	Secretary,	and	UKP4	(Satgas	REDD+,	 2012).	 Members	 were	 also	 drawn	 from	 environmental	 NGOs	 and	Indigenous	 community	 organisations,	 such	 as	 AMAN,	 ICEL	 (Indonesia	 Centre	 for	Environmental	 Law),	WWF	 (World	Wide	 Fund	 for	 Nature)	 Programme	 Indonesia,	and	 HUMA	 (Association	 for	 Community	 and	 Ecology-Based	 Law	 Reform)	 (Satgas	REDD+,	2012).	Supported	by	a	US$30	million	start-up	fund	as	part	of	 the	Norway-Indonesia	partnership	(Caldecott	et	al.,	2013),	the	Working	Groups	were	formed	as	technical	 teams	 within	 the	 Taskforce,	 responsible	 for	 delivering	 the	 preparatory	work	required	for	enabling	REDD+	implementation.			Due	to	slow	progress	in	completing	its	mandates,	the	Taskforce	had	its	nine-	month	appointment	 initially	 extended	 until	 December	 2012.	 An	 additional	 four	Working	Groups	were	formed	on	Legal	Review	and	Law	Enforcement,	REDD+	Mainstreaming,	Knowledge	 Management,	 and	 the	 Moratorium	 was	 separated	 from	 MRV	 to	 form	Working	Groups	of	their	own	(Satgas	REDD+,	2012).	A	third	version	of	the	Taskforce	maintained	the	10	WGs	and	finished	its	mandate	in	June	2013	(Satgas	REDD+,	2012)	(Satgas	 REDD+,	 2013a)	 (see	 Table	 5.1).	 	 The	 breadth	 of	 issues	 addressed	 by	 the	Working	Groups	emphasises	complexity	and	effort	involved	in	implementing	REDD+	
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in	Indonesia	and	the	challenge	of	introducing	carbon	rationalities	to	existing	forest	politics.	
	Table	5.1	Working	Groups	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce	
Taskforce	version	1	 Taskforce	version	2	 Taskforce	version	3	
	 Formation	 	Based	on	the	Presidential	Decree	No	19/2010	 Based	on	the	Presidential	Decree	No	25/2011	 Based	on	the	Presidential	Decree	No	5/2013		 Duration	 	September	2010	–	June	2011	 July	2011	–	December	2012	 January	2013	–	June	2013		 Working	Groups	 	REDD+	National	Strategy	 REDD+	National	Strategy	 REDD+	National	Strategy	REDD+	Institution	 REDD+	Institution	 REDD+	Institution	MRV	Strategy	and	Moratorium	Implementation	
MRV	Strategy	and	institution	 MRV	Strategy	and	Institution	
Pilot	Provinces	 Pilot	Provinces	 Pilot	Provinces	Communication	and	Stakeholder	Engagement	 Communication	and	Stakeholder	Engagement	 Communication	and	Stakeholder	Engagement	Funding	Instruments	 Funding	Instruments	 Funding	Instruments		 Moratorium	Monitoring	 Moratorium	Monitoring		 Legal	Review	and	Law	Enforcement	 Legal	Review	and	Law	Enforcement		 REDD+	Mainstreaming	 REDD+	Mainstreaming		 Knowledge	Management	 Knowledge	Management			During	the	three	years	of	its	appointment,	the	Taskforce	published	387	documents,	developed	a	REDD+	National	Strategy,	finalised	the	draft	of	MRV	National	Strategy5,																																																									5	The	 MRV	 National	 Strategy	 and	 Plan	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 Indonesia	 to	 implement	 an	incentive	based	carbon	reduction	mechanism.	The	Strategy	is	intended	to	guide	the	process	
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appointed	 pilot	 provinces	 –	 where	 REDD+	 activities	 will	 be	 trialled	 out,	 and	prepared	 the	architecture	of	 the	REDD+	Agency	 -	which	continued	 the	Taskforce’s	work	 from	2014.	 	 The	National	 Strategy	 outlines	 five	main	 pillars	 that	 have	 to	 be	completed	 to	 set	 high	 quality	 standards	 for	 forest	 carbon	 mitigation	 activities	(Indonesian	 REDD+	 Task	 Force,	 2012).	 One	 of	 the	 pillars	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	change	forest	governance	by	mainstreaming	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	The	formation	and	themes	 of	 the	Working	 Groups	 (particularly	 those	 on	 REDD+	Mainstreaming	 and	Communication	and	Multi-stakeholder	Engagement)	reflect	 the	embedded	political	and	 structural	 challenges	 that	 the	 Taskforce	 are	 facing	 to	 change	 the	 conduct	 of	forest	 stakeholders	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 oriented	 towards	 carbon	 conservation.	 The	following	section	details	three	of	the	influential	governmental	strategies	adopted.				
5.3 Normalising	Carbon	Rationalities		The	following	discussion	 identifies	three	governmental	 technologies	being	adopted	by	the	REDD+	Taskforce	to	mainstream	the	program	in	Indonesia.	Each	attempts	to	not	 only	 make	 the	 management	 of	 forest	 carbon	 possible,	 but	 also	 to	 make	 it	“normal”	 or	 “commonsense”	 within	 a	 forest	 politics	 context	 that	 has	 never	 been	concerned	about	carbon.	 	The	technologies	were	identified	through	interviews	and	analysis	 and	 involve	 the	 introduction	 and	 promotion	 of	 carbon	 concepts	 and	languages;	 rendering	 forest	 carbon	 visible	 through	 mapping	 practices;	 and	encouraging	the	production	of	pro-REDD+	subjectivities.		In	each	case	the	focus	is	on	
how	REDD+	is	being	introduced	to	Indonesia	(Dean,	2009).		
5.3.1 Communicating	Forest	Carbon	In	 Indonesia	 forest	 governance	 has	 traditionally	 been	 shaped	 by	 conflicting	discourses	variously	prioritising	economic	development,	community	livelihoods	and	environmental	 conservation	 (Resosudarmo,	 2005).	 To	 these	 themes	 the	 REDD+																																																																																																																																																																						of	calculation,	monitoring	and	reporting	of	REDD+	activities’	performance	 in	reducing	and	storing	green	house	gas	emissions.			
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Taskforce	 has	 sought	 to	 introduce	 and	 embed	 specialised	 carbon	 concepts	 and	languages	proliferating	amongst	REDD+	experts	internationally.		Through	the	use	of	scientific	 terminologies	and	particular	discourses	REDD+	 is	promoted	as	a	 form	of	ecological	 modernization	 -	 combining	 economic	 growth	 opportunities	 with	ecological	 conservation	 benefits	 (Lovell	 and	 Liverman,	 2010;	 Gupta	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Boer,	 2013;	 Lovell,	 2014).	 Discourses	 on	 the	 green	 economy	 and	 environmental	economics	for	instances,	are	employed	to	frame	forests	as	“terrestrial	infrastructure	for	global	capital”	(Luke,	1999,	p.	106).	In	other	words,	the	discourses	frame	that	it	is	the	interest	of	Indonesia’s	forest	stakeholders	to	adopt	REDD+	as	a	mechanism	to	prevent	climate	change	while	at	the	same	time	securing	economic	growth	from	the	forestry	sector	(eg	UNFCCC,	2011;	McDermott	et	al.,	2012).		In	international	REDD+	communities,	carbon	concepts	such	as	leakage,	additionality,	and	permanence	are	used	to	understand,	communicate	and	articulate	the	behaviour	of	 forest	 carbon	 (van	Oosterzee,	Blignaut	 and	Bradshaw,	 2012).	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	REDD+,	 leakage	 is	 a	 term	 used	 to	 define	 the	 increase	 in	 carbon	 emissions	 from	deforestation	that	happened	outside	the	REDD+	project	boundaries	(van	Oosterzee,	Blignaut	 and	 Bradshaw,	 2012).	 Permanence	 refers	 to	 the	 assurance	 that	 the	emissions	reduction	 in	a	REDD+	project	will	be	maintained	 for	 the	duration	of	 the	project	 (van	 Oosterzee,	 Blignaut	 and	 Bradshaw,	 2012).	 Meanwhile,	 additionality	denotes	 the	evidence	 that	a	REDD+	project	has	 to	show	the	potential	of	emissions	reduction	that	would	not	have	happened	without	the	implementation	of	the	project	(van	 Oosterzee,	 Blignaut	 and	 Bradshaw,	 2012).	 Such	 terminologies	 provide	 new	ways	 of	 constructing	 and	 valuing	 land	 use	 and	 types,	 as	 evident	 in	 the	 following	quote	involving	a	member	of	one	of	the	Working	Groups,			We	 [the	Working	Group]	 pay	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 to	 peatland	due	 to	 the	 high	amount	 of	 carbon	 stored,	 such	 as	 those	 in	 Central	 Kalimantan	 and	 Riau.	Having	REDD+	projects	on	peatland	are	good	 for	us	 [Indonesia]…	We	could	argue	 for	 the	 additionality	 of	 having	 these	 types	 of	 projects	 because	otherwise	 these	 forests	 will	 be	 opened	 for	 plantations.	 These	 precious	peatlands	will	be	dried	and	sometimes	even	burnt	to	make	it	easy	to	plant	…	It’s	 a	 massive	 problem…	 [Peatland	 fires]	 cause	 carbon	 leakage	 and	 haze	
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pollution…	It’s	not	good	for	our	reputation,	its	not	good	for	our	relations	with	neighbouring	countries	…	No	one	will	ever	believe	that	carbon	coming	from	REDD+	 projects	 in	 Indonesia	 will	 be	 permanently	 stored	 in	 the	 peatland	(Interview,	Yamadhi,	January	2014;	emphasis	added)			The	deployment	of	technical	and	scientific	concepts	and	vocabularies,	most	of	which	are	poorly	understood	by	non-REDD+	 forest	 stakeholders,	 has	become	a	powerful	tool	in	legitimising	and	envisioning	the	program.				The	promotion	of	carbon	concepts	is	particularly	apparent	in	the	draft	MRV	Strategy	that	was	developed	under	guidance	 from	the	REDD+	Taskforce.	The	MRV	Strategy	outlines	procedures	for	assessing	and	guiding	sub-national	programs	or	activities	at	the	project	level.	It	provides	a	level	of	accountability	for	carbon	buyers	knowing	that	carbon	produced	in	Indonesia	is	coming	through	certain	verification	and	validation	methods	 that	 comply	with	 international	 standards.	 In	 so	 doing,	 the	MRV	 strategy	functions	as	a	technology	to	shape	the	conduct	of	those	involved	in	a	REDD+	project.	Those	who	do	not	conduct	 themselves	according	 to	carbon	rules	and	concepts	are	excluded	 from	 certified	 emission	 reduction	 certificates	 and	 “let	 die”	 (Foucault,	1990),	 while	 those	 who	 do	 are	 rewarded	 with	 certificates	 and	 the	 potential	 of	financial	 gains.	 As	 an	 example	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Working	 Group	 on	 Funding	Instruments	explained:		It	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 the	 principle	 in	 place	 to	 discourage	 a	 sub-national	government	decision	 to	 implement	REDD+	 in	a	particular	area	while	giving	up	 neighbouring	 areas	 for	 logging	 or	 plantation	 that	 will	 result	 in	 carbon	
leakage	 which	 subsequently	 affects	 the	 incentive	 the	 sub-national	government	will	receive	(Interview,	Hersri,	September	2013).			Concepts	 like	 leakage,	 additionality	 and	 permanence	 establish	 particular	 “truths”	about	 forest	 carbon,	 asserting	 that	 it	 can	 be	 controlled	 and	 calculated,	 thereby	making	 its	 management	 appear	 achievable	 and	 commonsense	 (Bäckstrand	 and	Lövbrand,	 2006).	 	 Standards	 and	 guidelines	 create	 uniformity	 for	 carbon	 across	space	 and	 time	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 be	 traded	 through	 internationally	 recognised	
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mechanisms	 such	 as	 the	 Verified	 Carbon	 Standard6	(Government	 of	 Indonesia,	2012a).		The	Taskforce	also	created	a	national	social	and	environmental	safeguard	document	known	 as	 PRISAI	 (Prinsip,	 Kriteria,	 Indikator	 Safeguard	 Indonesia	 –	 Principles,	Criteria,	Indicators	Safeguard	Indonesia),	outlining	a	variety	of	procedural	measures	being	 implemented	 to	 ensure	 programs	meet	 social	 and	 environmental	 standards	(Satgas	REDD+,	2013c).		Through	the	PRISAI,	other	REDD+	terminologies	oriented	at	governing	 forest	 communities	 are	 apparent.	 The	 terms	 safeguards	 and	FPIC	 (Free	Prior	 Informed	Consent),	 for	 example,	position	 social	 and	environmental	 concerns	as	resolvable	through	the	application	of	a	set	of	processes	and	procedures.		FPIC	is	a	participation	and	 consultation	 technology	built	 to	 govern	both	REDD+	developers’	and	 forest	 communities’	 mechanisms	 to	 produce	 consent	 and	 express	 grievance.	Safeguards,	meanwhile,	are	a	set	of	normative	principles	that	have	to	be	adopted	by	REDD+	developers	 to	minimize	 the	negative	 impacts	REDD+	projects	may	have	on	community	 and	 environment.	 While	 FPIC	 and	 safeguards	 did	 not	 first	 emerge	through	REDD+,	they	have	become	vital	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	program.			From	 a	 governmentality	 perspective,	 the	 incorporation	 of	 new	 (and	 old)	 terms,	oriented	 at	 governing	 the	 behaviour	 of	 carbon	 and	 people	 living	 in	 carbon-rich	landscapes,	are	mechanisms	through	which	REDD+	proponents	seek	to	facilitate	the	“conduct	 of	 conduct”	 (Foucault,	 1991a).	 They	 provide	 norms	 and	 knowledges	through	 which	 human	 and	 non-human	 (forests	 and	 carbon)	 behaviours	 can	 be	calculated,	valued	and,	 if	necessary,	reoriented.	This	new	way	of	 talking	about	and	constructing	 forests	 is	 aided	 by	 high-resolution	 satellite	 images,	 computer	modelling,	 and	 sophisticated	 knowledge	 on	 carbon	 accounting	 (Gupta	et	al.,	 2012;	Stephan,	2012).	 	As	a	consequence	attention	naturally	flows	to	the	technical	 issues																																																									6	The	Verified	Carbon	Standard	(VCS)	is	a	voluntary	carbon	standardization	mechanism	(see	www.v-c-s.org).	 Voluntary	means	 this	mechanism	 is	 built	 outside	 the	 formal	 and	 binding	scenario	of	the	UNFCCC.	A	particular	REDD+	project	can	adopt	VCS	as	their	strategy	and	in	doing	 so	 the	 project	 has	 to	 follow	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 from	 VCS.	 After	 a	 complex	verification	and	validation	processes	performed	by	the	VCS	experts	to	quantify	the	amount	of	carbon	reduced,	a	project	can	be	issued	Verified	Carbon	Units	(VCUs).	VCUs	represent	the	removal	 of	 one	 ton	 of	 carbon	dioxide	 equivalent	 (CO2e)	 (www.v-c-s.org,	 2015).	 The	VCUs	can	be	traded	as	carbon	credits	in	the	voluntary	carbon	market.		
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such	 terminologies	 highlight.	 	 Hence,	 in	 the	 following	 example	 an	 Indonesian	academic	concentrates	on	the	difficulties	posed	by	additionality:			Papua	 and	 East	 Kalimantan	 provinces	 each	 has	 a	 very	 different	 historical	
emission,	 with	 the	 latter	 having	 high	 planned	 and	 unplanned	 deforestation	rates	 compared	 to	 the	 former.	 If	we	 are	 using	historical	reference	 to	 define	the	 baseline	 then	 how	 could	 we	 justify	 the	 additionality	 of	 having	 REDD+	project	in	Papua	compared	to	East	Kalimantan,	as	some	buyers	will	think	that	it	 is	 a	 false	 investment	 to	 make	 in	 an	 area	 that	 had	 no	 real	 danger	 of	deforestation?	(Interview,	Hartadi,	February	2014;	emphasis	added)		In	 this	 example	 the	 introduction	 of	 carbon	 terminologies	 provides	 a	 means	 to	discuss	 and	 frame	 forest	 management	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 far	 removed	 from	biodiversity,	 livelihood	 and	 economic	 concerns	 that	 would	 previously	 have	 been	used	 to	 consider	 deforestation	 (Boer,	 2013).	 	 As	 such	 REDD+	 is	 adding	 new	dimensions	 to	 the	 already	 complicated	 politics	 of	 Indonesia’s	 forests.	 	 Particular	scientific	and	economic	claims	about	carbon	are	being	authorised	and	promoted	in	place	 of,	 or	 at	 least	 in	 competition	 with,	 other	 ways	 of	 knowing	 and	 being.	 	 The	prioritisation	of	such	languages,	favours	some	over	others,	with	REDD+	being	driven	by	 specialist	 technical	 communities	 (Aicher,	2014).	 It	benefits	 those	national-scale	actors	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	 program,	 while	 marginalising	more	 distant	 forest	communities	who,	nevertheless,	will	be	deeply	affected	by	REDD+	decisions.			Prioritising	 forests	 as	 carbon	 sinks	has	been	 contested,	meeting	 resistance	 from	a	variety	of	stakeholders	including	those	with	vested	interests	in	forest	conversion.	A	high	 ranking	 palm	 oil	 plantation	 representative,	 for	 example,	 reflects	 broader	discontent	when	refuting	the	Taskforce’s	claim	of	there	being	a	sustainable	growth	opportunity	provided	by	REDD+,	claiming,			 REDD+	is	a	losing	battle	for	Indonesia’s	economic	and	energy	sovereignty	…	the	government	has	to	realise	this	reality	and	start	clearing	the	path	for	real	economic	development	 that	 brings	more	money	 and	provides	 thousands	of	job	opportunities	(Interview,	Januarto,	July	2013).			
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	This	 argument	 is	 echoed	 by	 the	 MOA,	 which	 highlights	 the	 negative	 impacts	 the	forest	 moratorium	 policy	 implementation	 has	 for	 economic	 growth	 in	 the	agriculture	 sector,	 since	 the	 policy	 has	 closed	 opportunities	 to	 open	new	palm	oil	plantations	on	peatland	(Astuti,	2013).			While	 those	 interested	 in	 forest	 conversion	 question	 the	 economic	 benefits	 of	 the	program,	 several	NGOs	have	also	 resisted	 the	 carbonisation	of	 Indonesia’s	 forests,	for	 different	 reasons.	 One	 group	 opts	 for	 critical	 resistance	 toward	 the	 neoliberal	characteristics	 of	 REDD+	 by	 framing	 it	 as	 a	 new	 “green	 colonialism”.	 An	 activist	expresses	her	disagreement	to	REDD+	by	saying	that,			 [REDD+	 is	 a]	 false	 solution	 for	 ecological	 crises	 offered	 by	 developed	countries	…	it	is	just	another	form	of	colonialism	hiding	behind	the	intention	to	 save	 the	 global	 climate	 and	 Indonesia’s	 forests.	 If	 they	 [developed	countries]	 really	 care	 about	 the	 environment,	 they	 should	 have	 stopped	consuming	so	much	fossil	fuels	(Interview,	Dewanti,	July	2013).				Civil	 society-led	 anti-REDD+	 arguments	 are	 now	 well	 established	 amongst	 some	global	 environmental	 and	 Indigenous	 networks	 (see	 Boas,	 2011)	 and	 represented	most	 visibly	 by	 WALHI	 (Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	 Indonesia	 –	 Wahana	 Lingkungan	
Hidup)	 in	 Indonesia.	 	 A	 second	 group	 opts	 for	 critical	 engagement	 with	 REDD+,	although	 emphasising	 the	 “co-benefits”	 regarding	 improved	 Indigenous	 rights	recognition	 and	 forest	 governance	 rather	 than	 carbon.	 	 Proponents	 of	 this	 view	believe	REDD+	has	“room	for	manoeuvre”	on	social	and	environmental	concerns:			 It’s	 the	time	for	NGOs	to	be	politically	strategic	on	what	they	do.	The	“wind	direction”	has	changed	and	we	[civil	society]	will	be	left	behind	if	we	are	not	adapting	to	the	new	reality	that	the	government	and	the	private	sector	are	no	longer	merely	our	enemies.	In	my	opinion,	we	could	achieve	more	if	we	could	work	 together	…	we	want	 them	[the	government	and	 the	private	sector]	 to	change	 their	 practices	 and	 be	 more	 concern	 to	 the	 environment,	 forest	communities	 and	 Indigenous	 people	 …	 for	 me	 REDD+	 is	 this	 opportunity.	
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Through	REDD+	I	see	the	possibility	to	force	the	government	and	the	private	sector	 to	 be	 accountable	 for	 social	 and	 climate	 justice	 agenda	 (Interview,	Marina,	May	2013).			The	 latter	 argument,	 which	 is	 the	 predominant	 position	 of	 national	 NGOs,	 has	influenced	the	narratives	emerging	from	the	Taskforce,	which	saw	NGOs	a	source	of	political	support	and	alliance.	Hence,	the	phrase	“Beyond	Carbon,	More	than	Forest”	was	 adopted	 by	 the	 Taskforce	 at	 the	 UNFCCC	 2012	 in	 Doha	 in	 response	 to	 civil	society	concerns.			The	“Beyond	Carbon”	strategy	was	well	received	by	the	NGOs,	which	see	it	as	a	step	towards	broader	acknowledgement	of	their	core	social	and	environmental	concerns.	As	 one	 interviewee	 argued,	 “the	 language	 framing	 of	 “Beyond	 Carbon”	 is	 the	Taskforce	manoeuvre	to	support	NGOs	struggles”	(Interview,	Jodi,	May	2013).	This	is	through	the	adoption	of	a	series	of	strategies	including	participatory	approaches,	addressing	environmental	crimes,	and	reviewing	illegal	forest	licences	(Government	of	 Indonesia,	 2012b;	 Lal,	 2012).	 Kuntoro	 Mangkusubroto,	 head	 of	 the	 Taskforce,	explains;			We	 are	 leaving	 the	 old	 paradigm	 of	 having	 trees	 cut	 and	 getting	 revenues	from	this,	and	entering	a	new	era:	the	trees	will	stand,	and	at	the	same	time	revenues	are	received	and	people’s	welfare	is	improved,	that	to	me	is	moving	beyond	carbon	…	that’s	the	essence	of	REDD+	(Lal,	2012,	p.	3).			Despite	 the	 “Beyond	 Carbon”	 framing,	 carbon	 rationalities	 are	 still	 central	 to	 the	approach,	as	emissions	reductions	ultimately	 finance	 the	 improvements.	 	However	the	 narrative	 has	 moved	 beyond	 purely	 financial	 incentives	 to	 associate	 REDD+	more	 closely	 with	 social	 and	 environmental	 justice,	 as	 evident	 in	 the	 images	frequently	 used	 in	 the	 Taskforce’s	 presentations	 (eg	 Figure	 5.1).	 	 Mainstreaming	these	 latter	 concerns	 has	 made	 REDD+	 more	 acceptable	 to	 civil	 society:	 REDD+	shifts	from	an	ecological	modernisation	framing	to	one	that	incorporates	the	ideals	of	 civic	 environmentalism	 (Bäckstrand	 and	 Lövbrand,	 2006),	where	 the	 emphasis	
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shifts	from	prioritising	carbon	towards	a	greater	focus	on	alleviating	crises	of	forest	governance,	poverty	and	biodiversity.	
	
	
	Figure	5.1	Images	represent	REDD+	"Beyond	Carbon"	approach		(Mangkusubroto,	2013)		
9 
…MORE THAN ONLY FORESTS 
•  Indigenous#people/customary#people/adat#community#
•  Biodiversity#
•  Ecosystem#services#
8 
What REDD+ means for us: BEYOND CARBON... 
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	The	attempts	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce	to	promote	carbon	rationalities	in	Indonesia	are	 incomplete,	 as	REDD+	 is	 still	widely	debated	and	 forest	governance	 remains	a	contested	space.		However	through	governmental	technologies	that	promote	REDD+	terminologies	 and	 concepts	 in	 policies,	 reports	 and	 consultations,	 carbon	rationalities	are	becoming	more	acceptable	and	mainstream.	So	 too	are	discourses	of	 social	 and	 environmental	 justice,	 which	 through	 the	 participatory	 strategies	 of	NGOs	 (discussed	 further	 below),	 are	 becoming	 more	 visible	 and	 apparent	 in	 the	REDD+	Strategy	and	Taskforce	activities.				
5.3.2 Visualising	Forest	Carbon		The	 Taskforce’s	 efforts	 to	 normalise	 carbon	 rationalities	 through	 introducing	specialist	languages	and	concepts	were	accompanied	by	mapping	practices	oriented	at	 making	 carbon	 visible.	 Maps	 that	 show	 the	 carbon	 density	 of	 forests	 were	frequently	used	in	Taskforce	presentations	to	highlight	narratives	regarding	REDD+	opportunities,	potentials,	and	threats	(eg	Figure	5.2).	The	maps	inform	stakeholders	of	 the	 forest	 types	 that	 store	 high	 amounts	 of	 carbon	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	made	profitable	through	REDD+.		In	some	cases	carbon	maps	are	overlaid	with	other	types	of	spatial	information,	such	as	mining	concessions	in	a	particular	province,	as	shown	in	a	map	produced	by	the	UN-REDD	Program	Indonesia	in	Central	Sulawesi	(Figure	5.3)	(Blyth	et	al.,	2012).	 	 In	this	map	overlapping	areas	of	high	carbon	density	and	mining	concessions	can	be	used	as	basic	information	to	discuss	the	economic	trade	offs	between	REDD+	and	mining	interests.					
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	Figure	5.2	Map	of	Indonesian	forest	carbon	stock		(IFCA,	2008;	cited	in	Masripatin,	2010)		
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	Figure	5.3	Mining	concessions	in	relation	to	total	carbon	in	Central	Sulawesi	(Blyth	et	al.,	2012)			Carbon	maps	function	as	important	visualisation	technologies	to	steer	forest	policy	development	and	decision-making	processes	towards	REDD+	goals.	In	an	interview,	a	 government	 official	 highlights	 her	 experience	 regarding	 the	 way	 she	communicates	the	urgency	of	the	REDD+	programme	to	her	intended	audience,			
ϯϭĐŽŵƉĞŶĚŝƵŵŽĨŵĂƉƐĨŽƌĞŶƚƌĂů^ƵůĂǁĞƐŝWƌŽǀŝŶĐĞ
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Since	COP	13	 in	Bali,	 it	 is	 common	 to	discuss	 sustainable	development	 and	green	 economy	 using	 a	 map	 of	 Indonesia	 that	 is	 overlaid	 with	 a	 map	 of	carbon	 potential	 stored	 in	 Indonesia’s	 forests.	 The	 audiences	 are	 usually	quick	to	make	a	connection	between	the	topic	that	I	 intended	to	speak	with	the	presentation	slide…	I	 think	this	map	speaks	for	 itself	(Interview,	Randy,	February	2014)			Carbon	maps	serve	as	“almost	everyday	images”	(O’Neill	and	Smith,	2014,	p.	79)	in	the	discussion	of	climate	mitigation	and	 forest	governance.	 In	visualizing	a	certain	element	within	 the	 forest	 they	 frame	 a	 particular	way	 of	 seeing.	 The	 carbon	map	hides	 the	 immense	 complexity	 and	 uncertainties	within	 carbon	measurement	 and	accounting	 (Gibbs	 et	al.,	 2007;	 Asner,	 2009),	 and	 renders	 an	 intangible	 molecule	visible	and	real,	while	potentially	obscuring	other	socio-ecological	data	and	ways	of	seeing.	 	 In	 the	 maps	 above,	 for	 example,	 carbon	 is	 clearly	 prioritised	 over	 other	forest	 interests	 in	biodiversity,	 livelihoods	and	timber.	 	Mapping	 technologies	help	in	drawing	boundaries	around	what	readers	should	consider	normal	and	important,	being	 essential	 in	 visualizing	 carbon	 as	 politically,	 economically,	 and	 scientifically	acceptable	and	governable	(O’Neill	and	Smith,	2014).				In	2011,	reflecting	the	country’s	REDD+	ambitions,	a	Presidential	Decree	imposed	a	moratorium	on	 new	 licences	 for	 the	 development	 of	 primary	 forest	 and	 peatland.		The	promotion	of	peatland	to	a	conservation	status	akin	to	forests,	despite	generally	being	much	less	biodiverse,	is	a	direct	reflection	of	the	high	amount	of	carbon	stored	in	these	areas,	and	reflects	the	changing	criteria	being	used	to	value	different	socio-ecological	 systems.	 However	 attempts	 to	 map	 primary	 forest	 and	 peatland	 has	proved	 difficult,	 with	 different	 actors	 referring	 to	 peatlands	 in	 different	 ways	(Caldecott	 et	al.,	 2013).	 	 Three	 different	 “official/authoritative	 definitions”	 of	 peat	have	 been	 issued	 by	 three	 different	 ministries,	 i.e.	 the	 MOF,	 MOA,	 and	 MOE.	Consequently,	 each	 of	 the	ministries	 has	 also	 released	 different	 thematic	maps	 of	peatland,	reflecting	their	own	visualisation	strategies	and	priorities.		In	 response	 the	 Taskforce	 has	 engaged	 with	 a	 national	 donor-funded	 strategy	known	as	One	Map	that	seeks	to	provide	a	single	authoritative	map	to	guide	all	land	
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use	 decisions	 in	 Indonesia	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 	 To	 seek	 consensus	 on	 One	 Map	 in	regards	 to	 peatlands	 a	 series	 of	 expert	 meetings	 were	 held	 by	 the	 Taskforce’s	Working	Group	on	the	Moratorium.	A	member	of	the	Working	Group	explains	that			Through	 the	 One	 Map	 processes	 we	 will	 have	 one	 source	 of	 spatial	information.	The	accuracy	of	which	will	not	be	doubted	by	any	actors.	If	we	could	 control	 one	 variable	 of	 the	 spatial	 governance	 debates	 in	 Indonesia,	including	 the	 definition	 of	 peatland,	 then	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 debates	 will	voluntarily	 follow	 the	 controlled	 variable	 (Interview,	 Suwardiyanto,	 July	2013).			One	Map	then	seeks	to	establish	 “one	truth”	about	 the	amount	of	carbon	stored	 in	different	 land	 types	 upon	which	 the	 practices	 of	 REDD+	 governance	 can	 be	 built.		Through	this	technology,	the	outcomes	of	which	are	accessible	through	public	web-portals7,	 the	 carbon	 values	 of	 different	 land	 types	 becomes	 standardised	 and	mainstreamed	 within	 land	 use	 planning.	 The	 technology	 thereby	 makes	 carbon	visible	 to	 authorities	 at	 all	 levels,	 requiring	 them	 to	 consider	 carbon,	 and	 REDD+	more	 generally,	 in	 their	 land	 use	 decisions.	 	 In	 the	 process	 the	 carbon	 values	calculated	and	embedded	 into	One	Map	are	 intended	 to	 influence	 the	conduct	and	decisions	 of	 land	 use	 authorities	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 govern	 human	 -	 forest	interactions.	 	 Those	 who	 may	 value	 forests	 for	 other	 reasons,	 such	 as	 forest	communities,	 or	developers,	 are	 invisible,	 and	potentially	disempowered,	by	 these	technologies.				In	 parallel,	 however,	 AMAN	 took	 the	 opportunity	 to	 show	 the	 importance	 of	recognizing	 and	protecting	 Indigenous	 forests	 by	overlaying	 the	 indicative	map	of	Indigenous	 territories	 with	 map	 of	 forest	 areas	 (Figure	 5.4).	 By	 using	 a	 map	 of	potential	forests	and	present	them	as	significant	carbon	sinks,	AMAN	renders	visible	the	Indigenous	territories	and	influenced	the	tone	of	REDD+	discourse	in	Indonesia	to	 be	 more	 centred	 on	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights.	 Furthermore,	 by	 employing	 the	slogan	“No	Rights	–	No	REDD+”,	AMAN	steers	the	way	REDD+	policies	and	programs																																																									7	A	 centralized	 database	 of	 spatial	 information	 is	 made	 publicly	 available	 in	 portal.ina-sdi.or.id.	The	website	Ina-Geoportal	is	part	of	the	One	Map	Initiative.	
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are	being	made	in	an	effort	to	attract	financial	and	political	support	for	their	agenda	(Howell,	 2014).	 Meanwhile,	 for	 the	 Taskforce,	 AMAN’s	 endorsement	 to	 REDD+	implementation	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 strong	 legitimacy	 and	 sign	 of	 acceptance	 (see	Chapter	Seven).	AMAN’s	attempt	to	produce	forests	map	shows	how	the	Taskforce’s	governmental	strategies	to	normalize	and	visualize	carbon	have	been	incorporated	by	other	forest	stakeholders.	It	also	demonstrates	elements	of	agency	on	the	part	of	AMAN	who	is	engaging	with	governmental	technologies	to	seek	progressive	goals	–	using	 carbon	 rationalities	 to	 highlight	 the	 relationships	 between	 Indigenous	communities	and	their	 land.	 In	 this	way	REDD+	governmental	 technologies	can	be	subverted	 by	 NGOs	 to	 produce	 not-quite-neoliberal	 strategies	 that	 facilitate	more	progressive	 possibilities	 (Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	 2015;	 de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	Bakker,	2015).				
	Figure	5.4	Overlay	of	Indigenous	territories	and	forest	areas		(AMAN,	2014)				
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5.3.3 Engaging	Forest	Carbon	A	further	governmental	technology	applied	by	the	Taskforce	sought	to	produce	pro-REDD+	 subjectivities	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 participative	 technologies.	 These	technologies	 are	 a	 type	 of	 disciplinary	 strategy,	 which	 rather	 than	 providing	financial	 incentives	 to	 shape	 behaviour	 as	 is	 common	 under	 neo-liberal	governmentalities,	sought	consensus	through	engagement	and	agreement	on	shared	norms	and	principles	(see	Fletcher,	2010).	Participation	is	considered	an	important	component	 of	 REDD+	 governance,	with	 researchers	 calling	 for	more	 collaborative	REDD+	policy	making	processes	between	public	authorities,	civil	societies	and	forest	communities.	Forsyth	(2009)	argues	equal	participation	of	all	REDD+	stakeholders	in	 the	 policy-making	 processes	 and	 project	 implementation	 is	 vital	 for	 good	governance.	 Donors,	 such	 as	 the	Norwegian	Agency	 for	Development	 Cooperation	(NORAD),	and	civil	society	actors	also	call	for	inclusive	policy	making	processes	that	will	open	windows	of	opportunities	for	public	monitoring.	The	inclusive	approaches	adopted	 by	 the	 Taskforce	 include,	 among	 other	 things,	 public	 consultations,	 focus	group	 discussions,	 working	 groups,	 and	 partnerships	 that	 were	 conducted	throughout	the	readiness	phase	(Satgas	REDD+,	2012).				Technologies	 of	 participation	 and	 consultation	 assembled	 multiple	 stakeholders	with	diverse	interests	to	reach	consensus	on	particular	political	decisions.	Examples	include	 the	Working	Groups	described	 earlier,	 one	of	which	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	public	 consultations	 to	 help	 develop	 the	 REDD+	 National	 Strategy.	 A	 government	official	involved	in	the	development	of	the	strategy	explains	that:			The	 first	 version	 of	 the	 REDD+	 National	 Strategy	 produced	 under	 the	coordination	of	Ministry	of	Development	Planning	was	deemed	as	too	critical	toward	the	MOF,	by	putting	almost	all	the	blame	of	the	ministry’s	weak	forest	governance	as	 the	underlying	cause	of	deforestation	and	 forest	degradation	in	 Indonesia.	 The	 second	 version	 developed	 under	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	REDD+	Taskforce	and	has	been	through	a	series	of	public	consultations	and	government	meetings	was	seen	as	a	product	 that	will	 less	 likely	offend	any	particular	institution	(Interview,	Dandi,	July	2013).		
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	Activists	described	the	‘countless’	meetings	and	dialogues	held	within	in	each	of	the	Working	 Groups	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 seeking	 agreement	 on	 policy	 drafts	 being	discussed.	 The	 internal	 processes	 were	 complemented	 with	 national	 and	 sub-national	 public	 consultation	 processes	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions	 with	 multiple	REDD+	 stakeholders	 (Satgas	 REDD+,	 2012,	 2013a).	 	 As	 such,	 the	 technologies	enabled	 the	Taskforce	 to	 introduce	REDD+	concepts	and	rationalities	 to	a	broader	group	 of	 forest	 stakeholders	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 justify	 the	 policy	 or	 decision	made	 as	 a	 product	 of	 democratic	 practices.	 Several	 environmental	 activists	 note	during	 interviews	 that	 they	 considered	 the	 Taskforce	 to	 have	 developed	 good	mechanisms	 for	 successfully	 engaging	 civil	 society,	 particularly	 through	 the	establishment	of	Working	Groups.	One	of	the	interviewees	highlights	the	processes,	saying,			 Despite	 still	 lacking	 transparency	 for	 the	 Taskforce’s	 high	 level	 political	decision	making,	NGOs	were	 present	 in	 almost	 all	 aspects	 of	 REDD+	policy	making	 within	 the	 Working	 Groups.	 These	 have	 been	 so	 far	 my	 best	experience	 of	 being	 engaged	 in	 the	 forest	 related	 policy	making	 processes	(Interview,	Taksaka,	July	2013)			Another	 environmental	 activist	 interviewed	 points	 out	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 “trusted	colleagues”	were	part	of	the	Working	Groups	and	that	he	has	no	doubt	about	their	commitment	 to	 fight	 for	 social	 and	 environmental	 justice	 concerns	 within	 these	structures	 (Interview,	 Hasan,	 May	 2013).	 However,	 as	 the	 two	 quotes	 highlight,	there	 are	 still	 transparency	 issues	particularly	 in	 the	higher	 level	decision	making	processes.	 In	 addition,	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 parliament’s	 involvement	 in	 the	REDD+	policy	 making	 together	 with	 the	 issues	 regarding	 the	 unclear	 legitimacy	 of	 NGOs	representation	has	been	criticised	as	undermining	democratic	process	and	violating	REDD+	procedural	justice	(see	eg	Luttrell	et	al.,	2012;	Sikor,	2013).			There	can	be	little	doubt	though	that	this	approach	has	provided	civil	society	access	to	 decision-making	 processes	 involving	 REDD+,	 and	 potentially	 influencing	 future	forest	management,	at	a	 level	 that	was	previously	out	of	reach.	 Interviews	suggest	
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that	Working	 Groups	 provided	 opportunities	 for	 vigorous	 discussions	 over	 policy	and	 principles	 that	 led	 to	 the	 “Beyond	 Carbon”	 narrative.	 However	 participatory	technologies	can	also	set	the	terms	of	the	debate	and	frame	the	structures	through	which	 issues	should	be	resolved.	 	Mirroring	what	Li	 (2007a,	p.	234)	observed	 in	a	different	 context,	 stakeholders	 tended	 to	 engage	 in	 these	 processes	 through	 “the	forms	 of	 maps,	 diagrams,	 charts	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 templates”	 supplied	 by	 those	organising	 the	 participatory	 activities.	 As	 such,	 participatory	 technologies	 can	 be	used	 to	 render	 the	political	 complexities	 of	REDD+	actors’	 positions	 and	 concerns	intelligible	 and	 calculable,	 as	 “only	 then	 can	 specific	 intervention	 be	 devised”	 (Li,	2007c,	p.	6;	Boer,	2013).	While	it	is	not	always	the	case,	the	content	of	the	templates	were	 usually	 prepared	 according	 to	 the	 interest	 best	 suited	 to	 the	 Taskforce’s	agenda,	narrowing	 the	 scope	of	debates	by	prioritising	 carbon	 for	example,	whilst	(quite	possibly	inadvertently)	marginalising	other	values	and	claims.		Within	 the	 Working	 Groups,	 civil	 society	 representatives	 were	 repositioned	 as	expert	 advisers	 rather	 than	 social	 or	 environmental	 activists,	 and	 given	 authority	and	 responsibility	 in	 shaping	 and	 legitimising	REDD+	policies	 and	 infrastructures.	According	to	the	interviews	this	new	subjectivity	sometimes	placed	representatives	in	 awkward	 situations,	 particularly	 when	 they	 represented	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	and	 sought	 to	 engage	 civil	 society	 colleagues	 in	 a	 process	 of	 policy	 or	 project	negotiation.	One	of	the	activists	interviewed	noted	his	experience	saying,		 Sometimes	we	get	caught	 in	a	 tense	discussion	process,	as	we	cannot	reach	an	agreement.	These	tensions	are	not	only	found	in	the	formal	discussion	in	the	meeting	rooms,	but	also	 in	the	social	media,	such	as	my	Facebook	page.	When	there	is	a	controversial	policy	made	by	the	Taskforce,	it	is	common	for	my	fellow	activists	to	question	the	Taskforce	action	by	posting	comments	in	my	 Facebook	 page	 to	 ask	 for	 my	 explanation.	 Otherwise	 it’s	 been	 a	 good	experience,	as	I	and	them	are	mostly	agreed	on	basic	principles	of	advancing	Indonesia’s	forest	governance	reform	(Interview,	Jodi,	May	2013).		Similar	awkwardness	was	related	by	activists	who	were	positioned	“outside”	of	the	bureaucratic	 system,	who	highlighted	 the	difficulties	 in	critiquing	 the	Taskforce	as	
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they	were	 “confronted	 by	 their	 friends	 and	 not	 the	 real	 government	 bureaucrats”	(Interview,	 Hartono,	 May	 2013).	 	 In	 addition	 many	 activists	 participating	 in	 the	Working	Groups	reported	that	it	made	them	less	critical	of	the	Taskforce	and	REDD+	in	general.	An	activist	that	was	a	member	of	the	Working	Group	on	REDD+	National	Strategy	explained,		After	knowing	the	complexity	of	bureaucracy	and	the	politics	involved	in	the	REDD+	policy	making	processes,	it	is	difficult	for	me	to	accuse	the	Taskforce,	especially	Kuntoro,	for	not	doing	his	best.		If	I	were	in	his	position	I	wouldn’t	be	able	to	achieve	what	he	has	achieved	so	far	(Interview,	Jodi,	May	2013).				A	subtle	shift	was	evident	amongst	some	members	of	the	Working	Groups	who	were	beginning	 to	 adopt	 more	 formal	 expert	 subjectivities	 over	 activist	 ones.	 	 These	members	took	on	consultancy	roles	working	under	professional	contracts	with	the	Taskforce,	 rather	 than	 working	 as	 activists	 representing	 their	 organisations.	 This	was	 evident	 in	 the	 conduct,	 vocabularies	 used,	 intonation,	 and	 sometimes	 the	agenda	 or	 interest	 that	 was	 prioritised	 during	 policy	 or	 project	 debates	 and	negotiations.	One	activist	who	has	adopted	an	expert	subjectivity	explained,			It	 is	 sometimes	 unavoidable	 to	 lower	 my	 expectation	 during	 policy	negotiations.	 Not	 only	 did	 I	 lower	my	 expectation,	 but	 also	 the	 tone	 of	my	voice…	 I	 realize	 that	 I	 speak	 not	 only	 to	my	 activist	 colleagues,	 but	 also	 to	other	 peoples	 who	 are	 coming	 from	 different	 backgrounds	 with	 different	agendas	and	interests...	This	is	what	I	mean	as	a	cost	for	negotiating	the	space	in	 order	 to	 reach	 consensus	 among	 diverse	 interests	 (Interview,	 Josyana,	March	2014).			Whereas	 shifting	 subjectivities	 were	 present	 amongst	 some	 civil	 society	representatives	 in	 the	 Working	 Groups,	 such	 shifts	 were	 less	 apparent	 amongst	government	 officials.	 Those	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 Working	 Groups	 did	 so	 as	individuals	rather	than	representatives	and	there	was	little	evidence	that	any	shift	in	their	 personal	 stance	 on	 REDD+	 was	 of	 influence	 within	 their	 Ministries.	 Three	consecutive	 Taskforce	 reports	 to	 the	 President	 cited	 this	 as	 a	 problem	 in	
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implementing	 political	 decisions	 agreed	 to	 by	 the	 Working	 Groups	 and	 to	 be	executed	 within	 the	 Ministries	 or	 state	 agencies	 (Satgas	 REDD+,	 2012,	 2013a).		Rather	than	buying	into	the	Taskforce’s	vision,	some	Ministries	appear	to	be	actively	resisting	 the	 carbonisation	of	 forests	by	questioning	 the	Taskforce’s	 authority	 and	capacity,	despite	the	participatory	approach	adopted.	The	most	apparent	example	is	the	 initiative	 to	 develop	 a	 REDD+	 registry	 and	 safeguard	 information	 system	initiated	by	MOF,	in	parallel	and	in	conflict	with	the	development	of	the	registry	and	safeguard	mechanism	proposed	by	the	Taskforce.	Another	example	is	the	difference	in	position	between	 the	Taskforce	and	MOF	concerning	 the	 implementation	of	 the	first	forest	moratorium	policy,	as	the	latter	chose	to	question	the	negative	impact	of	the	 policy	 for	 economic	 development.	 Despite	 having	 overlapping	 interactions	 in	various	meetings,	 the	 two	 institutions	 seem	 to	neglect	 each	other’s	 initiatives	 and	positions.	Consequently,	confusion	has	been	caused	among	REDD+	actors,	especially	project	 developers,	 regarding	 whose	 mechanisms	 they	 should	 follow.	 MOF’s	resistance	 towards	 the	 initiatives	delivered	by	 the	Taskforce	 is	 a	 good	example	of	the	limit	to	the	practice	of	government	the	Taskforce	has	tried	to	exercise	(Li,	2007c).			
5.4 Transforming	Forest	Politics?	The	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 had	 an	 unenviable	 task	 –	 to	 change	 the	 political	 ecology	driving	 Indonesia’s	 high	 rate	 of	 forest	 destruction.	 With	 contested	 legitimacy	 it	sought	to	mainstream	carbon	rationalities	within	hotly	contested	forest	landscapes.		It	 has	 made	 progress	 in	 building	 awareness	 about	 carbon,	 with	 most	 forest	stakeholders	 at	 the	 national	 scale	 now	 at	 least	 being	 aware	 of	 REDD+	 and	 the	potential	carbon	economies	involved	(Lillegraven	and	Sombolinggi,	2014).		Drawing	on	 the	notion	of	governmentality	and	based	on	extended	qualitative	 research,	 this	chapter	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce	 drew	 on	 three	 key	 strategies	 in	 its	attempts	 to	 mainstream	 carbon	 rationalities	 amongst	 forest	 stakeholders.	 These	involved	 the	 adoption	 and	promotion	of	 carbon	 languages	 and	 concepts;	mapping	strategies	 that	 make	 carbon	 visible	 and	 governable;	 and	 through	 participative	technologies	 that	 engaged	 stakeholders	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 and	consultation.	 Through	 these	 approaches	 a	 new	 episteme	 is	 evolving	 based	 on	 the	carbonization	of	Indonesia’s	forests.			
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	The	consequences	of	these	strategies	are	yet	to	become	fully	known	–	indeed	carbon	is	 simply	 the	 latest	 ingredient	 to	 be	 thrown	 into	 the	 heated	 arena	 of	 Indonesia’s	forest	 politics.	 	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 for	 example,	 some	 five	 years	 after	 the	Taskforce	was	formed,	and	after	many	millions	of	dollars	have	been	invested,	only	two	 REDD+	 projects	 located	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 been	 successful	 in	 selling	 carbon	credits.	Yet	some	things	have	changed.	The	governmental	technologies	applied	have	helped	REDD+	stakeholders	visualize	 carbon	as	a	governable	entity.	The	specialist	communities	 of	 scientists,	 economists	 and	 activists	 who	 produce	 REDD+	 maps,	concepts	and	approaches	are	becoming	empowered,	and	those	that	can	engage	with	these	 discourses	 have	 new	 opportunities	 to	 position	 themselves	 effectively	 in	 a	REDD+	 regime.	 Those	 that	 do	 not,	 including	 the	 thousands	 of	 forest	 communities	across	 Indonesia	 that	are	not	being	 facilitated	by	organization	such	as	AMAN,	 risk	marginalisation,	as	REDD+	decisions	may	be	made	that	affect	their	interests	without	their	knowledge	or	understanding.		New	 REDD+	 savvy	 public-private-community	 sector	 alliances	 have	 formed	 that	combine	 diverse	 interests	 from	 saving	 tropical	 rainforests,	 preventing	 global	warming,	protecting	 local	 livelihoods,	 and	pursuing	profit	 from	carbon	economies.		New	 rules,	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 are	 emerging,	 including	 the	 potential	 for	greater	 dialogue	 and	 alliances	 between	 civil	 society	 groups	 and	 forest	 authorities.	While	 this	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 that	 issues	 of	 social	 and	 environmental	 justice	will	be	addressed	 in	 forest	governance	 it	also	raises	 troubling	questions	about	 the	future	 role	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	 representatives	 if	 they	 become	incorporated	 into	 governmental	 processes	 rather	 than	 independent	 from	 them.	 A	key	challenge	will	be	to	ensure	the	non-carbon	interests	of	forest	communities	play	an	important	role	in	REDD+	futures,	and	their	struggles	are	recognised	and	engaged,	rather	than	reduced	to	a	set	of	technical	procedures.				Carbon	rationalities	are	becoming	more	common	and	understood,	yet	 they	are	 far	from	dominant	in	Indonesia’s	forest	politics.	Some	forest	stakeholders	are	opposed	to	carbon	trading	and	seek	changes	to	forest	governance	through	other	mechanisms.	Other	stakeholders	are	profiting	 the	existing	political	ecology	of	 forest	destruction	
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and	 are	 resistant	 to	 carbon	 rationalities.	 Clearly	 forest	 governance	 based	 on	managing	carbon	will	legitimise	some	actors	and	forms	of	expertise	and	knowledge	over	 others.	 The	 REDD+	 Agency	 that	 replaced	 the	 Taskforce	 as	 the	 authority	implementing	REDD+	in	Indonesia	faces	a	bumpy	road	ahead	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		It	will	need	to	harness	a	different	array	of	governmental	tactics	to	bring	 competing	 agencies,	 and	 most	 importantly,	 vested	 private	 sector	 interests,	into	REDD+	visions	of	human	-	forest	relationships.		
5.5 The	Short	Life	of	the	REDD+	Agency	In	 September	 2013,	 President	 Yudhoyono	 finally	 issued	 Presidential	 Regulation	Number	62/2013	that	cleared	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	a	more	permanent	REDD+	Agency.	 The	 formation	 of	 the	 new	Agency	 replaced	 the	 ad-hoc	 role	 of	 the	Taskforce	 and	 was	 expected	 to	 provide	 a	 stronger	 foundation	 for	 the	implementation	of	REDD+.	The	formation	of	the	Agency	took	more	than	a	year	since	the	 Taskforce	 submitted	 a	 concept	 report	 to	 President	 on	 the	 proposed	 role	 and	form	of	the	Agency.	Reflecting	on	the	long	political	process	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	Agency,	one	informant	from	the	REDD+	Agency	stated	in	an	interview,		 Everything	is	political	in	this	country.	There	will	be	a	lot	of	stakeholders	that	will	be	disadvantaged	by	 the	 formation	of	 the	new	agency.	 It’s	a	 tug	of	war	process	 -	 the	 President	 has	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 everyone	 [the	 ministries	affected]	is	happy	with	the	decision.	We	had	submitted	a	proposal.	However,	to	what	extent	the	content	of	the	proposal	will	be	accommodated	is	really	in	the	 hand	 of	 the	 President	 and	 the	 political	 talks	 between	 his	 ministers	(Interview,	Bandana,	June	2013).		This	statement	alludes	to	the	politics	that	took	place	behind	closed	doors.	A	similar	process	was	seen	during	the	formulation	of	the	forest	moratorium	policy	(discussed	in	 Chapter	 6),	 suggesting	 high	 level	 decision	 making	 is	 hidden	 from	 view.	Meanwhile,	commenting	on	the	President	Yudhoyono’s	decision,	Hadi	Daryanto,	the	Forestry	 Ministry’s	 General	 Secretary	 articulated	 his	 resentment	 toward	 the	establishment	of	the	Agency	by	highlighting	the	minimal	role	the	Agency	had	and	its	lack	of	authority,	saying,	
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	 However,	 the	REDD+	 council	 [Agency]	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 take	 any	 actions.	The	council	only	has	the	power	to	report	on	emissions	reduction	projects	and	any	 program	 irregularities	 to	 the	 related	 ministries.	 It	 is	 then	 up	 to	 the	appropriate	ministry	 to	 take	action…	It’s	merely	an	 independent	committee	that	 links	 institutions	so	 that	REDD+	 implementation	can	be	 integrated	and	free	from	overlap	among	ministries	and	institutions	(The	Jakarta	Post,	2015)		There	was	a	mixed	response	from	the	NGO	sector.	In	a	bid	to	strengthen	the	REDD+	Agency’s	 authority,	 a	 coalition	 of	 activists	 called	 Civil	 Society	 Coalition	 to	 Save	Indonesian	Forests	and	Global	Climate	issued	a	statement	criticising	the	Presidential	Regulation,	by	stating	that,			 The	Coalition	has	reminded	government	that	transitional	institutions	will	not	be	 able	 to	 change	 the	 corrupt	 system	 unless	 coupled	 with	 a	 fundamental	change	in	the	status	quo	institutions	that	have	been	trying	hard	to	ward	off	reform.	In	this	case,	the	REDD+	Agency,	whose	hands	have	been	tied	from	the	start,	 is	 in	all	probabilities	left	with	only	minor	and	insignificant	roles	when	faced	with	 established	 forces	 such	 as	 the	Ministry	 of	 Forestry,	Mining,	 and	Agriculture	that	are	supposed	to	be	the	main	target	institutions	in	emissions	reduction	efforts	(taken	from	fwi.or.id,	2013).		This	 support	 from	 the	 civil	 society	 coalition	 for	 REDD+	 programs	 demonstrates	 a	level	of	success	in	mainstreaming	REDD+	amongst	civil	society.	This	is	despite,	and	perhaps	 partly	 because	 of,	 limited	 political	 support	 from	 other	 government	ministries,	particularly	the	MOF.					The	establishment	of	the	Agency	has	drawn	much	appreciation.	Dubbed	the	first	of	its	kind,	the	Agency	was	expected	to	advance	Indonesia’s	forest	governance	reform	despite	its	limited	authority.	To	further	normalize	the	slogan	“Beyond	Carbon,	More	than	 Forest”,	 the	 Agency	 developed	 ten	 imperative	 programs	 as	 the	 Agency’s	priorities	during	its	planned	three	year	timeline	from	2014	-	2016.	These	were:				
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1. Moratorium	monitoring	and	One	Map	Policy	Implementation	2. Forest	licensing	management		3. Law	enforcement	4. Indigenous	mapping	5. Forest	fires	control	and	management	6. Green	village	7. Green	school	8. Support	for	integrated	spatial	planning	9. Conflict	resolution	road	map	10. Strategic	program	for	national	park	and	conservation	forest		The	 Agency’s	 strategies	 to	 further	 mainstream	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia	 extended	 the	three	governmental	techniques	described	in	the	previous	sections.	To	communicate	the	REDD+	vision	of	“Beyond	Carbon”,	the	Agency	employed	two	emerging	concepts	in	 the	 forest	 management	 approach	 known	 as	 the	 “landscape	 approach”	 and	“jurisdictional	approach”	to	highlight	the	cross	sectoral	nature	of	the	program.	The	landscape	approach	aimed	to	govern	the	socio-nature	relations	between	all	types	of	land	 uses	 (see	 eg	 Minnemeyer,	 Laestadius	 and	 Potapov,	 2009;	 DeFries	 and	Rosenzweig,	 2010;	 Sayer	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Meanwhile	 the	 concept	 of	 jurisdictional	approach	 was	 employed	 by	 the	 Agency	 to	 formulate	 the	 right	 scale	 of	 REDD+	implementation	in	the	decentralized	forest	governance	in	Indonesia	(see	eg	Nepstad,	Boyd,	 et	al.,	 2013;	 Nepstad,	 Irawan,	 et	al.,	 2013;	 Ashwin	 et	al.,	 2015).	 These	 two	concepts	provided	new	languages	and	concepts	for	REDD+	implementation.		In	 rendering	 REDD+	 visible	 as	 a	 governmental	 strategy,	 the	 Agency	 actively	 led	several	initiatives,	such	as	OMI	and	the	management	of	forest	fires.	These	attempts	are	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 the	 visibility	 of	 the	 REDD+	 program	 in	 Indonesia	 and	show	 the	 importance	 of	 REDD+	 Agency	 as	 an	 institution.	 In	 an	 interview	 with	 a	REDD+	Agency	official,	he	emphasized	the	importance	of	building	a	track	record	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	the	Agency	under	the	new	regime:		 We	 need	 to	 deliver	 tangible	 results	 in	 such	 a	 short	 time	 to	 convince	 the	upcoming	 elected	 president	 that	 this	 Agency	 is	 indeed	 needed	 in	 the	
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configuration	 of	 forest	 governance.	We	 chose	 to	 deliver	 low	 hanging	 fruits	programs	 by	 engaging	 as	 many	 district	 governments	 as	 possible	 …	 and	therefore	 developed	 a	 strong	 hold	 on	 the	 ground	 with	 real	 impacts	(Interview,	Erwinda,	March	2014).		As	such	the	Agency	sought	to	mainstream	REDD+	across	geographic	scales.		Efforts	were	 undertaken	 in	 71	 districts	 in	 11	 provinces	 that	 subsequently	 became	populations	 subjected	 to	 REDD+	 governmental	 tactics.	 Memorandums	 of	Understanding	 (MoUs)	 were	 signed	 between	 the	 Agency	 and	 the	 district	governments.	 The	 Agency	 also	 built	 a	 stronger	 relation	 with	 AMAN	 and	 other	environmental	organizations	by	granting	financial	support	 for	the	NGOs’	programs	that	were	seen	to	align	with	the	Agency’s	interests	and	recruiting	experts	that	were	mostly	 from	 environmental	 and	 other	 social	 NGOs	 for	 day-to-day	 operations.	 The	recruitment	of	activists	was	considered	as	an	example	of	it	being	a	less	bureaucratic	government	agency.			However,	 despite	what	 some	 of	 the	NGOs	 saw	 as	 a	 success,	 approximately	 a	 year	after	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Agency	 in	 January	 2015,	 the	 new	 regime	 under	President	 Joko	Widodo	decided	 to	merge	 the	Agency	under	 the	newly	 established	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry	(MOEF)8.	The	decision	was	made	after	a	tense	political	negotiation	between	the	Agency	and	the	President’s	secretarial	minister.	An	interview	with	a	member	of	the	President’s	special	staff	revealed	that	the	pressure	from	 what	 was	 previously	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Forestry	 had	 led	 to	 the	 secretarial	minister	 deciding	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Agency	which	was	 issued	 as	President	 Regulation	Number	 16/2015.	 The	Minister	 stated	 in	 the	media	 that	 the	dissolution	was	driven	by	the	need	to	avoid	overlapping	of	authorities	between	the	Agency	and	the	newly	established	MOEF.	This	dissolution	shows	how	forest	politics	in	Indonesia	is	very	dynamic	and	is	very	fragile	in	the	face	of	political	changes.																																																										8	Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Forestry	 (MOEF)	 is	 the	 newly	 formed	 government	 agency	under	 President	 Jokowi.	 The	 ministry	 is	 the	 result	 of	 merger	 between	 four	 government	bodies:	 the	Ministry	of	Forestry,	 the	Ministry	of	Environment,	 the	REDD+	Agency,	and	 the	National	 Council	 on	 Climate	 Change.	 The	 new	 ministry	 established	 a	 new	 Directorate	General	 on	Climate	Change	 to	 fill	 the	 vacuum	 left	 by	 the	REDD+	Agency	 and	 the	National	Council	on	Climate	Change.	
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The	 dissolution	 was	 met	 with	 a	 mixed	 response.	 One	 of	 AMAN’s	 staff	 expressed	disappointment	with	the	President’s	decision	by	stating,		 We	 are	 worried	 that	 this	 decision	 to	 merge	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	 under	 the	Ministry	of	Forestry	and	environment	will	undermine	 the	effort	 to	advance	forest	 governance	 reform.	We	 see	 the	Ministry	 to	be	part	 of	 the	 status	quo	that	wont	be	interested	to	the	agenda	that	the	Agency	has	developed.	As	we	have	been	collaborating	closely	with	the	Agency,	this	decision	will	definitely	affect	our	own	advocacy	agenda	(Interview,	Hersri,	January	2015).				The	above	statement	illustrates	the	wide	support	that	the	Agency	had	received	from	the	 civil	 society	 organizations.	 In	 an	 interview,	 an	 activist	 stated	 that	 the	 support	developed	out	of	 the	transformation	that	the	REDD+	program	had	delivered	in	the	last	three	years	in	advancing	Indigenous	rights	discourses	and	national	debates	on	forest	governance.	It	is	uncertain	that	the	agenda	for	forest	governance	reform	will	be	continued	under	the	new	President	–	and	beyond	the	scope	of	this	PhD	research	to	investigate	the	early	impacts	of	the	President’s	decision.	A	REDD+	Agency	official,	however,	warned	in	an	interview	about	the	possibility	of	hindering	the	progress	of	REDD+	implementation,	saying:			 What	 I	 can	 conclude	 is	 that	 the	 President’s	 Regulation	 [No	 16/2015]	 has	violated	 the	 LoI	 and	 will	 potentially	 hamper	 the	 progress	 of	 REDD+	implementation.	In	a	year,	there	have	been	more	than	8	provinces	that	signed	the	 MoU	 of	 REDD+	 implementation	 and	 also	 multiple	 NGOs	 currently	executing	our	ten	imperative	programs.	This	decision	will	definitely	obstruct	the	progress	that	we	have	achieved.	We	are	afraid	that	this	is	actually	a	step	back	for	forest	reform	(Interview,	Kuswanto,	January	2015).		The	President’s	Regulation	however	also	met	with	strong	support	from	WALHI	and	some	 governmental	 ministries.	 In	 an	 interview,	 a	 government	 official	 from	 the	Ministry	of	Development	Planning	expressed	his	support	 for	 the	decision	by	citing	“the	 need	 to	 address	 the	 forest	 reform	 head	 on	 through	 its	 own	 authoritative	institution	as	 the	best	way	 to	 strengthen	 the	 currently	weak	and	 corrupt	ministry	
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from	 the	 inside”	 (Interview,	 Andika,	 January	 2015).	 Efficiency	 is	 another	 reason	often	 cited	 by	 actors	 supporting	 the	 President’s	 Regulation	 as	 having	 two	governmental	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 forest	 carbon	 may	 make	 governance	more,	rather	than	less,	messy.	The	existing	political	ecology	in	Indonesia	appears	to	be	resisting	the	governmental	strategies	of	the	REDD+	assemblage.				 	
5.6 Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 answer	 research	 objective	 1(a),	 focusing	 on	 the	 case	study	 on	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce.	 I	 have	 detailed	 three	 governmental	 technologies	produced	 and	 applied	 by	 the	Taskforce	 and	 their	 effects	 on	 the	 transformation	 of	forest	politics	 in	 Indonesia.	The	Taskforce	has	 introduced	REDD+	as	a	 strategy	 for	forest	governance	reform	rather	than	merely	a	carbon	offset	mechanism.	It	has	done	so	 through	 the	adoption	of	 the	 “Beyond	Carbon,	More	 than	Forest”	 rationality	and	governmental	 strategies	 based	 on	 the	 adoption	 of	 scientific	 carbon	 terminologies,	visualization	techniques,	and	participatory	mechanisms.			The	chapter	has	also	examined	the	production	of	pro-REDD+	subjectivities	emerging	amongst	 activists	 who	 are	 closely	 involved	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce.	Activists	 have	 become	 closely	 aligned	 with	 parts	 of	 the	 government	 system	 and	perhaps	 risk	 being	 subordinated	 and	 co-opted.	 Others	 remain	 conscious	 of	 and	cautious	 about	 the	 neoliberal	 rationality	 embedded	 in	 the	 program,	 while	participating	in	ways	oriented	at	advancing	environmental	and	Indigenous	interests.	For	those	who	chose	to	engage	with	REDD+,	they	have	become	more	in	favour	of	the	implementation	of	the	program	and	see	the	political	space	that	could	be	created	to	pursue	 progressive	 possibilities.	 The	 next	 chapter	 will	 further	 discuss	 the	possibilities	 for	 the	 subversion	 of	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 in	 pursuing	environmental	and	social	justice	ends	through	the	examination	of	OMI.			 	
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6 Case	Study	Two	~	The	One	Map	Initiative:	
Producing	“Governable	Spaces”	for	Forest	
Reform?			
6.1 Introduction	In	 the	previous	chapter	 I	discussed	the	 technologies	of	government	applied	by	 the	REDD+	 Taskforce	 to	 normalize	 carbon	 rationalities.	 This	 chapter	 extends	 this	discussion	by	focussing	on	a	set	of	governmental	techniques	that	REDD+	proponents	are	 adopting	 to	 address	 the	messiness	 of	 forestland	 governance	 through	 OMI.	 To	answer	research	objective	1(b)	the	chapter	 focuses	on	OMI	that	 is	 the	second	case	study	 that	 underpin	 this	 empirical	 research.	 I	 focus	 on	 three	 aspects	 of	 OMI:	 the	forest	moratorium;	One	Database	of	forest	licensing;	and	a	new	common	standard	in	participative	 mapping.	 The	 findings	 show	 that	 the	 initiative	 has	 created	 new	opportunities	and	constraints	for	forest	reform.	New	disciplinary	and	participatory	technologies	 have	 emerged	 that	 have	 created	 political	 spaces	 for	 activists	 to	promote	social	and	environmental	justice	concerns.	However	the	chapter	also	shows	tensions	 for	 forest	stakeholders	between	engaging	 in	 the	new	opportunities	of	 the	green	economy	and	the	risk	of	having	political	issues	rendered	technical.			The	chapter	begins	with	the	discussion	on	the	production	of	governable	spaces	for	REDD+	 implementation	 as	 the	 main	 rationality	 driving	 the	 active	 engagement	 of	REDD+	proponents	in	OMI.	The	chapter	then	focuses	on	three	key	OMI	technologies	oriented	 at	 making	 forest	 space	 more	 governable	 -	 the	 forest	 moratorium,	 One	Database	and	One	Standard.	The	chapter	completes	with	a	conclusion.			
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6.2 The	Production	of	“Governable	Spaces”	for	REDD+	
Implementation	“Putting	 forests	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 a	 green	 economy”	 was	 the	 slogan	 of	 a	 high	 level	dinner	 hosted	 by	 the	 Indonesian	 REDD+	 Agency	 at	 the	 20th	 UNFCCC	 in	 Peru,	 in	December	2014.		At	the	event,	Heru	Prasetyo,	the	Head	of	the	REDD+	Agency,	vowed	to	 make	 REDD+	 a	 reality	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2016	 (Zwick,	 2014).	 He	 argued	 that	 the	REDD+	Agency	has	delivered	the	required	 institutional	and	governance	reforms	to	begin	a	 system	of	 result-based	payments	 for	 improved	 forest	 carbon	management	(Zwick,	2014),	one	of	which	 is	OMI.	OMI	 is	a	nationwide	governance	program	that	aims	 to	 consolidate	 spatial	 data	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 one	 integrated	 geographical	information	 system	 for	 Indonesia	 (Samadhi,	 2012).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 forest	governance,	 data	 discrepancies	 in	 the	 forestry	 sector	 have	 caused	 confusion	 over	forest	spatial	 information	and	contributed	to	land	tenure	conflicts	and	overlapping	concessions	(Galudra	et	al.,	2010).	The	“green	economy”	of	REDD+	requires	a	much	cleaner	and	more	stable	forest	landscape	to	attract	carbon	investors	(Brockhaus	et	
al.,	 2012).	 OMI	 aims	 to	 create	 this	 security	 by	 fixing	 the	 way	 forest	 spatial	information	is	produced	and	used	to	govern	forests	in	Indonesia.			Harvey	(1999)	argues	in	his	notion	of	‘the	spatial	fix’	that	for	capital	accumulation	to	effectively	operate	 it	 requires	various	practices	of	 spatial	 reorganization	 to	ensure	the	functioning	of	financial	investment.	This	is	the	case	with	REDD+	implementation	in	Indonesia.	It	demands	fixed	forest	territories	upon	which	climate	finance	can	be	securely	 invested	 and	 expanded.	 Harvey’s	 re-interpretation	 of	 Marx’s	 notion	 of	capitalism	 and	 his	 proposed	 concept	 of	 spatial-fix	 incited	 a	 series	 of	 attempts	 in	theorizing	the	relation	between	society	and	space	(Harvey,	1999).	For	Harvey,	space	is	 a	 relational	 concept,	 it	 lies	 in	 the	 social	 relations	 of	 actions.	 Thus,	 space	 is	 not	merely	a	static	technical	construction	of	landscape	where	things	exist	(Gregory	and	Urry,	1985;	Soja,	1985).	Post-structuralist	 theorists,	 such	as	Rose	(1999),	similarly	argue	that	space	is	a	matter	of	“performance”	or	“a	doing”,	instead	of	“a	terrain	to	be	spanned	or	constructed”	(cited	in	Gregory	et	al.,	2009,	p.	709).			
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Following	 post-structuralist	 thinkers,	 such	 as	 Michel	 Foucault,	 Gilles	 Deleuze	 and	Felix	Guattari,	human	geographers	employ	spatiality	to	indicate	“the	ways	in	which	mobile	 constellations	 of	 power/knowledge	 and	 subject	 positions	 are	 constituted	through	 the	 production	 and	 performance	 of	 space	 as	 an	 ‘ordering’	 rather	 than	 a	fixed	and	closed	order”	(Thrift,	2007,	p.	55	cited	in	Gregory	et	al.	2009).	This	chapter	draws	 from	 this	 notion	 on	 spatiality	 by	 seeing	 OMI	 as	 a	 set	 of	 practical	 and	discursive	 orderings	 constructed	 from	 particular	 configuration	 of	 diverse	governmental	 technologies	and	knowledge	that	 is	not	 fixed,	and	can	be	challenged	as	well	as	disrupted	by	other	knowledge	systems	that	it	tries	to	exclude.			Forest	 space	 as	 a	 social	 product	 means	 it	 can	 be	 constructed	 to	 serve	 particular	interests	and	therefore	might	prolong	social	inequality.	In	his	book,	The	Production	
of	Space,	Lefebvre	(1992)	looked	to	capitalism	as	a	key	component	of	the	formation	of	 spatial	 inequality.	 So	 is	 the	 case	 with	 Indonesia’s	 forestland	 governance;	 state	actors	in	league	with	capitalist	entities	“select	victims	at	their	convenience	and	write	the	 rules	 to	 legitimate	 their	 actions”	 (Li,	 2007c,	 p.	 5).	 This	 is	 apparent	 in	 what	(Peluso	 and	 Vandergeest,	 2001)	 called	 “political	 forests”,	 a	 terminology	 used	 to	explain	 the	 measures	 taken	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Forestry	 (MoF),	 as	 state	representative,	 to	dispossess	 land	 from	Indigenous	people	and	claim	 it	as	a	state’s	land	 (see	Chapter	Four).	These	measures	 include	 technologies	of	 territorialisation,	zoning,	 inscription	 of	 law	 and	 its	 enforcement,	 as	 well	 as	 “criminalizing	 many	previously	 common	 practices”	 (Peluso	 and	 Vandergeest,	 2001,	 p.	 763	 see	 also	Chapter	Four).			As	 the	 leading	site	 for	REDD+	finance	the	experiences	of	 Indonesia	with	 initiatives	like	 OMI	 will	 influence	 how	 REDD+	 evolves	 in	 other	 countries.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	chapter	is	to	analyse	how	OMI	is	transforming	forest	governance	in	the	Indonesian	context.	 The	 chapter	 explores	 how	 new	 forms	 of	 governmental	 technologies	 are	being	generated	 to	produce	 “governable	spaces”	 for	 forest	carbon	 investment,	and	the	consequences	this	 is	having	for	 forest	stakeholders.	The	chapter	 is	particularly	interested	 in	how	 the	processes	of	 producing	 spatial	 knowledge	provide	openings	and	 closures	 for	 more	 progressive	 forms	 of	 forest	 politics.	 	 I	 analyse	 the	 new	institutions,	 knowledges	 and	 practices	 that	 are	 becoming	 dominant	 in	 forest	
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governance	 and	 the	 role	 and	 influence	 of	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 (Ilcan	 and	Phillips,	2010).	In	adopting	an	environmentality	approach	I	outline	what	aspects	of	forest	 governance	 are	 being	 problematized;	 what	 technical	 solutions	 are	 being	constructed;	 and	who	 is	 influencing	 the	production	and	 content	of	 these	 solutions	(Agrawal,	2005;	Fletcher,	2010	see	also	Chapter	2).			My	 argument	 is	 that	 discourses	 of	 the	 green	 economy	 are	 transforming	 the	 way	spatial	 knowledge	 is	produced,	distributed	and	 stored.	The	 technologies	 are	being	used	to	problematize	certain	forest	governance	issues	in	non-confrontational	ways,	while	avoiding	and	obscuring	politically	sensitive	problems.	In	doing	so	they	seek	to	generate	 consensus	 amongst	 forest	 stakeholders	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 green	 economy.	However	 I	 also	 argue	 that	 the	 processes	 through	 which	 new	 forms	 of	 spatial	knowledge	are	produced	are	contested,	providing	new	opportunities	 for	non-state	actors	to	shape	the	production	of	forest	knowledge.	As	a	consequence	governmental	technologies	are	outcomes	of	negotiations	of	state	and	non-state	actors,	and	reflect	the	particularities	of	place.	Thus	I	argue	that	neoliberal	governmental	technologies,	such	as	REDD+,	should	be	seen	as	sites	of	struggle,	redefining	the	rules,	actors	and	forms	of	engagement	for	all	involved,	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways.				
6.3 REDD+	and	the	Problematizing	of	Indonesia’s	Forest	
Governance	In	 the	 following	 sub-sections	 I	 focus	on	 three	 governmental	 technologies	of	 forest	governance	that	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	OMI	and	Indonesia’s	interests	in	green	economies	 of	 REDD+:	 forest	moratorium	 policy;	 One	 Database	 of	 forest	 licensing;	and	 One	 Standard	 in	 participative	 mapping.	 	 In	 each	 case,	 problems	 of	 forest	governance	are	defined	and	technical	solutions	supplied.	However	rather	than	erase	forest	politics	by	rendering	 it	 technical	 this	chapter	explores	how	non-state	actors	and	particular	government	agencies	have	engaged	 these	 technologies	and	pursued	strategies	 to	 reflect	 their	 diverse	 political	 interests.	 	 Hence	 by	 examining	 this	moment	 of	 forest	 reform	 this	 chapter	 exposes	 the	 politics	 of	 rendering	 technical,	showing	 how	 new	 technologies	 are	 not	 imposed	 untroubled	 from	 above	 but	 are	
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negotiated	 through	 existing	 political	 economies	 of	 forest	 governance	 (N.	 Rose,	1999b;	Li,	2007c).				
6.3.1 The	Forest	Moratorium	as	a	Technology	of	Governance		In	this	section	I	examine	the	establishment	of	a	 forest	moratorium,	which	employs	elements	 of	 Fletcher’s	 disciplinary	 and	 sovereign	 environmentalities	 (Fletcher,	2010).	 	 According	 to	 Fletcher	 (2010)	 disciplinary	 environmentalities	 are	 pursued	through	 internalising	 norms	 and	 values.	 Disciplinary	 approaches	 aim	 to	 produce	docile	 subjects	 who	 will	 act	 according	 to	 shared	 values	 and	 ethics	 that	 are	considered	 to	 be	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 society	 (Agrawal,	 2005).	 Sovereign	environmentalities	are	accomplished	through	the	execution	of	top	down	regulations	which	establish	rules	for	how	people	should	behave	–	through	fences	and	fines	for	example	(Fletcher,	2010).			The	moratorium,	a	key	milestone	 in	Norway’s	$1	billion	commitment	 to	REDD+	 in	Indonesia,	has	two	key	objectives	(Sloan,	2014,	p.	37):		 (i)	 cease	 licensing	 in	 ‘primary’	 forest	 areas,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 in	 order	 to	dampen	 high	 rates	 of	 forest	 loss;	 and	 (ii)	 during	 this	 cessation,	 integrate	registries,	maps,	and	regulations	concerning	the	extent	and	status	of	licenses	and	forest	cover,	to	allow	for	rational	forest	management.			The	moratorium	policy	 renders	 current	 practices	 of	 forest	 governance	 visible	 and	problematizes	them	–	implicitly	positioning	current	arrangements	as	irrational.	The	policy	 recognises	 the	 need	 to	 slow	 forest	 loss	 and	 to	 improve	 forest	 data	 if	 green	economies	based	on	forest	carbon	economies	are	to	be	realised.				
The	Politics	of	the	Moratorium	Policy	From	 February	 -	 May	 2011,	 the	 ‘climate	 society’,	 a	 mailing	 list	 in	 which	environmental	 activists	 exchange	 news	 related	 to	 policy	 development,	 opening	 of	grants,	and	job	vacancies,	was	inundated	with	discussion	on	the	frustration	over	the	
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postponement	 of	 the	 long	 awaited	moratorium	 policy9.	 One	 of	 the	 emails	 sent	 by	WALHI’s	 activists	 highlighted	 the	 number	 of	 forest	 concessions	 that	 had	 been	granted	while	 the	policy	was	being	discussed.	My	observation	on	 the	 email	 traffic	shows	that	most	of	the	activists	accuse	the	MOF	of	an	intentional	postponement	to	give	a	window	of	opportunity	 for	 the	business	sectors	to	secure	permits	before	 its	execution	(A.	Dermawan	et	al.,	2011;	Surya,	2011;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2012).	When	finally	the	 President	 signed	 the	 instruction	 on	 20	May	 2011	 (Saloh	 and	 Butler,	 2011),	 a	total	 of	 111,419	 ha	 of	 forests	 had	 been	 approved	 for	 9	 companies	 in	 Central	Kalimantan,	 just	 in	 time	 to	 be	 exempted	 from	 the	 moratorium	 (Surya,	 2011).	Moreover,	a	total	of	6,763	ha	of	Central	Kalimantan’s	forests	that	fall	under	letters	of	
principle	approval	will	also	be	spared	from	the	moratorium	(Surya,	2011).	This	data	strengthens	 the	 activists’	 cynical	 view	 that	 the	development	 of	moratorium	policy	was	 influenced	 by	 vested	 interests	 in	 the	 business	 sector	 (Interview,	 Yunus,	 July	2013).			In	an	interview	with	the	Jakarta	Post	-	a	national	newspaper,	the	head	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce,	 Kuntoro	 Mangkusubroto,	 expressed	 similar	 frustration	 over	 the	production	of	the	policy	by	saying,	“Our	move	[on	the	forest	moratorium]	has	been	sharply	observed	by	 lobbyists	such	as	mining	companies	and	oil	palm	plantations”	(Simamora,	2010).	During	 an	 interview	with	 a	World	Bank	 consultant	who	 serves	the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 as	 a	 governance	 expert,	 he	 revealed	 the	 contestations	 that	took	place;		 There	were	three	drafts	available	on	President’s	table.	One	comes	from	UKP4	and	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 which	 was	 the	 strongest	 in	 terms	 of	 effort	 to	protect	forests,	the	second	draft	proposed	by	the	MOF,	and	the	last	one	which	was	 also	 the	 weakest	 comes	 from	 the	 Coordinating	 Ministry	 of	 Economic	Affairs.	This	latest	draft	 is	the	one	that	accommodating	toward	the	business	sector’s	 interests.	 UKP4	 and	 the	 Taskforce	 worked	 hard,	 they	 pushed,	however,	the	political	deal	is	a	process	that’s	hard	to	predict,	especially	when	your	enemy	has	more	connections	and	power.	You	know	…	the	Minister	[for																																																									9 I obtained the information from a personal observation as one of the members of the mailing list. 
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the	Coordinating	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs]	is	soon	to	be	the	President’s	in	law	and	that	the	Minister	also	shares	the	same	political	party	with	the	MOF’s	Minister.	We	cannot	deny	such	things	played	role	…	and	particularly	because	business	sectors	have	a	lot	of	money	to	hire	lobbyists	to	make	sure	they	got	what	they	want	(Interview,	Mursidi,	May	2013)		The	statement	above	shows	that	decision	making	in	the	forestry	sector	in	Indonesia	occurs	behind	closed	door	and	thus	likely	to	be	influenced	by	the	interests	of	the	few	rather	 than	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 (Ross,	 1996;	 Saich	et	al.,	 2010;	A.	Dermawan	et	al.,	2011).			The	 moratorium	 was	 finally	 announced	 in	 May	 2011	 through	 the	 issuance	 of	Presidential	 Instruction	Number	 10/2011,	which	 prevents	 a	 range	 of	 government	authorities,	 including	 the	 MOF	 as	 well	 as	 district	 heads,	 from	 issuing	 new	 forest	licenses.	 Covering	 around	 60	 million	 ha	 of	 forest	 areas	 (peatlands	 and	 primary	natural	 forests),	 the	Presidential	 Instruction	on	Moratorium	exempts	 four	 types	of	activity	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010b;	Murdiyarso	 et	al.,	 2011;	 Indrarto	 et	al.,	2012).	First,	 the	moratorium	excludes	 forest	 lands	 that	have	been	subjected	 to	 in-
principle	approval	prior	to	moratorium	(Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2011).	This	approval	is	a	step	in	gaining	a	forest	permit	that	means	the	application	has	been	approved	by	the	Minister	of	Forestry.	In	the	forest	licensing	system,	the	approval	is	then	be	followed	by	a	process	of	forest	boundary	delineation	and	finalized	with	concession	granting.	Second,	the	policy	exempts	areas	that	are	required	for	activities	considered	as	vital	for	national	development	projects,	including	for	instance,	geothermal	development,	extraction	of	oil	and	natural	gas,	electricity	(coal	or	hydropower),	and	the	opening	of	forest	for	rice	and	sugarcane	plantations	(Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2011).			Third,	 the	 policy	 also	 excludes	 land	 that	 is	 already	 burdened	 by	 existing	 forest	licenses	(Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2011).	The	last	exception	is	for	land	that	is	proposed	for	ecosystem	restoration	concessions	(ERC)	(Saloh	and	Butler,	2011).	ERC	is	a	permit	to	 manage	 production	 forest	 for	 conservation	 activities	 that	 was	 first	 introduced	through	 the	 MOF’s	 regulations	 No	 159/2004	 and	 No	 18/2004,	 and	 subjected	 to	revisions	in	2007	and	2008	(Sitompul	et	al.,	2011).	ERC	is	the	only	forest	concession	
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that	can	be	used	by	the	private	sector	to	propose	a	REDD+	project	in	Indonesia.	By	owning	 ERC,	 a	 REDD+	 project	 proponent	 will	 be	 granted	 the	 right	 to	 sell	 carbon	credits	 to	 carbon	market	 (Sitompul	 et	al.,	 2011).	 This	 latest	 exemption	 is	 perhaps	the	 only	 one	 that	 can	 bring	 positive	 impact	 to	 the	 nation’s	 effort	 to	 reduce	deforestation	 (A.	 Dermawan	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Murdiyarso	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 Those	 that	breached	the	guidelines	would	be	breaking	the	law.	As	such	the	Instruction	seeks	to	govern	 how	 government	 officials	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 conduct	 themselves	 at	various	 scales	 of	 authority,	 including	 national,	 province	 and	 district	 levels	 of	government.		However,	 the	moratorium’s	 focus	on	peatland	protection	was	widely	 contested	by	the	 business	 sector,	 particularly	 from	 the	 Association	 of	 Palm	Oil	 Companies	 that	accuses	 the	 moratorium	 of	 being	 unconstitutional	 (Bisnis	 Indonesia,	 2010;	Simamora,	 2010;	 Lang,	 2013;	 Lubis,	 2013).	 The	 association	 argues	 that	 the	moratorium	is	overruling	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture’s	regulation	Number	14/2009	that	 prohibits	 exploitation	 only	 in	 peatland	 with	 more	 than	 3	 meters	 depth	(Interview,	 Januarto,	 July	 2013).	 Promoting	 economic	 rationalities	 regarding	 the	threat	 to	 national	 economic	 growth	 and	 loss	 of	 employment	 opportunities,	 the	association	 opposed	 implementation	 of	 the	 first	 moratorium	 (Bisnis	 Indonesia,	2010;	 Medan	 Bisnis	 Daily.com,	 2011;	 Astuti,	 2013).	 The	 Secretary	 General	 of	 the	association	expresses	his	rage	in	an	interview	saying,		 I	 don’t	 know	 why	 the	 government	 bows	 to	 other	 government’s	 order	 just	because	we	are	promised	to	be	paid	1	billion	dollar.	Where	is	our	dignity	and	sovereignty?	…	 that	 amount	 of	money	 is	 nothing	 compared	 to	 the	 revenue	from	palm	oil	sector	 that	reach	18	billion	dollar	per	year.	Palm	oil	sector	 is	the	 hero	 of	 the	 nation’s	 economy!	 But	 we	 got	 attacked	 domestically	 and	internationally	by	a	lot	of	NGOs	…	Do	you	know	who	sponsored	these	NGOs?	The	US	and	other	countries	that	want	to	sell	their	vegetable	oils	and	get	rid	of	palm	oil	from	the	market.	It’s	all	about	economic	war!	Nothing	else,	let	alone	environmental	 protection!	 They	 are	 smart,	 they	 use	 it	 [environmental	protection	issue]	as	their	strategy!	(Interview,	Januarto,	July	2013).		
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Problematization	of	Forest	Governance	through	the	Moratorium	Policy	To	 legitimise	 this	 substantial	 shift	 in	 forest	 governance,	 where	 the	 autonomy	 of	government	agencies	in	allocating	licences	was	suspended	in	favour	of	shifting	to	a	green	economy,	REDD+	proponents	sought	to	problematize	existing	arrangements.	The	 UKP4	 and	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 criticised	 how	 forest	 spatial	 information	 was	manufactured,	distributed,	and	stored	by	the	MOF	and	other	technical	ministries	or	local	government	agencies.	They	drew	on	data	discrepancies	 in	 the	 forestry	sector	that	 have	 caused	 confusion	 over	 forest	 spatial	 information	 and	 led	 to	 land	 tenure	conflicts	and	concessions	overlap.	 	Such	discrepancies	are	common,	resulting	 from	the	interest	of	particular	actors,	both	at	the	district	or	national	level,	that	profit	from	retaining	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 forest	 spatial	 information	 (Fay,	 Sirait	 and	 Kusworo,	2000).			In	 its	 latest	 study	 on	 the	 overview	 of	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 situation,	 Forest	 Watch	Indonesia	 -	 a	 national	 environmental	NGO	 -	 asserts	 that	 there	were	 seven	million	hectares	 of	 overlapping	 forest	 concessions	 and	 a	 total	 of	 2585	 tenure	 conflicts	during	 the	period	of	1990	–	2010	(Purba	et	al.,	2014).	The	REDD+	Taskforce	used	this	 sort	 of	 information	 to	 legitimize	 the	moratorium,	 cognizant	 of	 the	 need	 for	 a	cleaner	 and	 more	 stable	 forest	 landscape	 to	 attract	 REDD+	 investors.	 Carbon	investment	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 successful,	 and	 space	 more	 governable,	 if	 it	 is	implemented	 in	 a	 conflict	 free	 landscape	where	 there	 is	 clarity	 over	who	 has	 the	right	to	the	carbon	(Brockhaus	et	al.,	2012).			The	forest	moratorium	renders	problematic	both	the	practices	in	which	forest	lands	are	being	governed	and	the	governing	institution	(the	MOF)	which	is	positioned	as	lacking	the	political	will	and	capability	to	implement	the	moratorium.		A	tactic	used	by	 UKP4	 and	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 officials	 was	 to	 draw	 on	 a	 map	 depicting	 two	different	 versions	 of	 primary	 forests	 on	 Papua	 Island	 to	 problematize	 the	asymmetrical	 coordination	 and	 information	 exchange	 between	 different	 state	agencies	(Figure	6.1)	(Samadhi,	2012).	One	of	the	maps	came	from	the	MOF,	while	the	other	came	from	the	MOE	and	they	were	both	presented	as	official	maps	in	the	cabinet	 meeting	 chaired	 by	 former	 President	 Yudhoyono	 to	 discuss	 the	implementation	of	moratorium	policy.	The	maps	reflect	the	degree	of	uncertainty	in	
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Indonesia’s	 forest	 spatial	 data	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 underlie	 the	 more	 complex	problems	 in	 its	 governance.	 Due	 to	 unclear	 forest	 boundaries,	 different	methodologies	 in	 mapping	 and	 inconsistencies	 in	 defining	 what	 is	 considered	 as	primary	and	secondary	 forests,	 there	are	at	 least	 two	different	official	 sets	of	data	pertaining	to	primary	forest	in	Papua	Island.	Data	from	MOE	shows	59.8	million	ha	of	 forest	 cover,	 while	 MOF	 data	 records	 only	 around	 44.2	 million	 ha	 (Samadhi,	2012).			 	
	Figure	6.1	Maps	of	forest	cover	in	Papua	Island	(Samadhi,	2012)			Having	established	the	problem,	the	REDD+	Taskforce	and	UKP4	position	the	forest	moratorium	as	a	technology	of	government	that	can	overcome	the	fragmentation	of	forest	 spatial	 information	 and	 knowledge	 (Government	 of	 Indonesia,	 2010b).	 To	implement	 the	 moratorium	 required	 new	 practices	 utilising	 what	 Scott	 (1998)	defines	 as	 a	 process	 of	 simplification.	 That	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 generate	 a	 particular	reality	of	the	object	of	governance	by	showing	only	information	that	will	support	the	authority	of	the	governor	instead	of	more	complete	and	complex	representations	of	
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the	 issue.	 The	 moratorium	 policy	 introduces	 new	 terminologies,	 in	 this	 case	“primary	 natural	 forest”,	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	 technically	 classify	 diverse	 Indonesia’s	forests	 into	two	types:	primary	natural	 forest	and	secondary	forest	(Murdiyarso	et	
al.,	 2011;	 Sloan,	 2014).	 The	 first	 article	 of	 the	 Presidential	 Instruction	 states	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 moratorium	 will	 cover	 only	 primary	 natural	 forest	 and	peatland.	This	has	caused	considerable	confusion	and	contestation	over	its	meaning	(Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2011).	For	instance,	the	new	terminology	has	been	interpreted	by	some	as	primarily	undisturbed	forests,	which	means	the	moratorium	covers	only	a	proportion	of	forests	that	are	already	protected	under	the	administration	of	national	park	and	wildlife	sanctuaries	(Permatasari,	2011).			The	 moratorium	 is	 being	 implemented	 and	 mainstreamed	 through	 a	 range	 of	participative	technologies	that	were	introduced	by	the	REDD+	Taskforce	and	UKP4.		This	 includes	 a	 requirement	 for	 six	 key	 state	 agencies	 to	 collaborate	 in	 order	 to	produce	and	disseminate	an	 Indicative	Moratorium	Map	 (IMM)	 that	 shows	 forests	and	peatlands	covered	in	the	moratorium	area	(UKP4	and	Satgas	REDD+,	2013).	In	addition	a	Working	Group	on	Forest	Moratorium	was	formed	with	members	being	composed	 of	 government	 agencies	 as	 well	 as	 civil	 society	 groups	 monitored	 by	UKP4.	 	 These	 groups	 and	 particular	 government	 agencies	 were	 to	 report	 on	 30	technical	moratorium	activities,	each	with	its	standards	of	achievement	(UKP4	and	Satgas	 REDD+,	 2013).	 For	 example	 the	 IMM	 is	 subjected	 to	 six	 monthly	 reviews	based	on	public	 feedback	and	findings	from	field	research.	 Its	public	availability	 in	digitalised	 format	 means	 forest	 stakeholders	 can	 challenge	 or	 monitor	 the	effectiveness	 of	 the	 policy.	 	 These	 activities	 and	 standards	 provided	 UKP4	 and	REDD+	Taskforce	with	a	means	to	measure	and	discipline	government	agencies	and	other	participating	groups.			These	 strategies	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 rendering	 technical	 some	 of	 the	 complexities	 of	Indonesia’s	 forest	political	 ecology.	 	 It	 obscured	 sensitive	 issues	of	 corruption	and	rent	 seeking	 practices	 in	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 governance.	 Instead	 the	 problems	 of	forest	 governance	 in	 Indonesia	 are	 constructed	 as	 being	 technical	 issues,	 deriving	from	a	lack	of	comprehensive	spatial	data	and	weak	inter-ministerial	coordination.	Following	 Li	 (2005)	 I	 recognize	 how	 this	 practice	 of	 rendering	 technical	 is	
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generating	 new	 methods	 of	 governance.	 By	 appearing	 apolitical,	 outright	accusations	 are	 avoided	 and	 government	 agencies	 are	 able	 to	 sit	 at	 one	 table	 to	discuss	 technical	 solutions.	 While	 NGOs	 risk	 depoliticisation	 by	 participating	 in	policy	making,	the	formation	of	these	new	technical	policies	can	also	be	“politically	productive	 as	 it	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 open	 up	 new	 sites	 of	 political	 contestations”	(Barry,	 2001,	 p.	 208).	 	 NGOs	 are	 using	 OMI	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 raise	 questions	about	social	and	environmental	justice	concerns.			Relying	 on	 data	 collected	 through	 field	 verification,	 for	 example,	 the	NGO,	WALHI	Central	Kalimantan	has	highlighted	 illegal	activities	of	 several	palm	oil	plantations	that	 are	 still	 clearing	 forests	 despite	 being	 included	 in	 the	 areas	 protected	 by	 the	moratorium	 (Fandi,	 Nugroho	 and	Niun,	 2013).	 Such	 practises	 use	 the	 rules	 of	 the	moratorium	to	pursue	social	justice	outcomes.	WALHI	Central	Kalimantan’s	director	expresses	his	fury	over	the	impotency	of	the	Presidential	Instruction	in	addressing	tenure	conflicts	and	environmental	destruction	by	saying,			 The	 hive	 is	 in	 Jakarta,	 here	 [Central	 Kalimantan]	 is	 different,	 the	 everyday	situation	 that	we	 [WALHI	 Central	 Kalimantan]	 face	 is	 to	witnessing	 people	get	beaten	and	even	go	 to	 jail	 just	because	 they	want	 to	protect	 their	 land.	The	moratorium	is	far	from	addressing	the	problems	the	people	face	on	the	ground.	 Sorry	 to	 say	 this	 …	 but	 this	 is	 just	 another	 impotent	 policy!	(Interview,	Rajiman,	October	2013).			Such	 critique	 is	 powerful	 because	WALHI	Central	Kalimantan	possesses	 fieldwork	data,	 consisting	 of	 GPS	 points	 of	 the	 plantation	 companies’	 locations	 that	 overlap	with	 the	moratorium	area.	 This	 kind	of	 data,	which	utilises	 the	 terminologies	 and	technologies	of	the	government,	are	hard	for	the	MOF	to	contest.			Despite	 improved	 transparency	 and	 opportunities	 for	 participation	 in	 forest	governance	 civil	 society	 has	 actively	 contested	 aspects	 of	 the	 moratorium.	 NGOs	were	 concerned	 that	 it	 only	 covered	 forest	 under	 the	 classification	 of	 “primary	natural	 forests”	 and	 peatland	 while	 leaving	 secondary	 and	 disturbed	 forest	
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unprotected10	(Murdiyarso	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Activists	 accuse	 business	 sector	 lobby	groups	for	the	new	terminology	which	can	serve	to	protect	their	economic	interests.	CIFOR11	scientists	 (Murdiyarso	 et	al.,	 2011)	 assert	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 secondary	forests	in	the	moratorium	means	leaving	more	than	46.7	million	ha	of	forests	rich	in	carbon	 and	 biodiversity	 unprotected.	 Raising	 similar	 concerns,	 a	 Greenpeace	campaigner	explains	his	view	on	the	moratorium,			 This	is	a	bold	move	from	the	government	in	an	effort	to	protect	what	remains	left	in	our	destructed	forests	…	the	only	problem	is	that	this	is	inadequate.	It	doesn’t	 add	 much	 to	 protect	 forest	 areas	 that	 currently	 sit	 outside	 the	existing	 national	 parks	 or	 other	 conservation	 and	 protection	 forests…	 It	undermines	 the	reality	 that	some	of	 the	areas	 that	 fall	under	 the	secondary	forest	 category	 are	 home	 to	 some	 of	 Indonesia’s	 iconic	 fauna.	 You	 know,	these	areas	are	more	prone	to	forest	clearing	from	business	expansion	than	the	areas	under	the	banner	of	a	national	park	(Interview,	Patrick,	July	2013).				An	 activist	 from	 HUMA,	 an	 environmental	 NGO	 based	 in	 Jakarta,	 further	problematizes	 the	moratorium	saying,	 “because	 the	secondary	 forest	 is	not	part	of	the	moratorium	area,	 the	policy	will	overlook	the	social	problem	caused	by	tenure	conflict	 that	mostly	 occurred	 in	 already	 allocated	 forests	 [for	 business	 activities]”	(Interview,	Kipeli,	March	2014).	Indeed	the	moratorium	policy	is	often	simplified	as	a	 contestation	 between	 ecological	 and	 economic	 rationales	 while	 social	 justice	considerations	are	left	aside.	This	reflects	Li’s	concerns	that	in	presenting	technical	solutions	 policy	 makers	 often	 ignore	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 factors	 in	designing	policies	and	programmes	(Li,	2007c).																																																											10	The	 MOF	 doesn’t	 officially	 adopt	 forest	 classification	 based	 on	 secondary	 or	 primary	categories.	The	terminologies	of	“secondary”	and	“primary”	forests	are	used	only	when	the	MOF	 submits	 reports	 to	 the	 Food	 and	 Agricultural	 Organization	 (FAO)	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	scientific	categorization	that	the	FAO	applies.	Primary	natural	forest	is	a	new	category	that	was	 formulated	by	the	MOF	to	denote	 forest	areas	that	are	never	been	subjected	to	 forest	licensing	(for	business	purposes,	such	as	logging	concession).				11	CIFOR	 is	 a	 non-profit	 international	 research	 institution	 that	 conducts	 research	 on	 the	intersection	 between	 forest,	 landscapes,	 and	 human	 interactions.	 CIFOR	 headquarter	 is	located	in	Bogor,	West	Java,	Indonesia.	
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While	 most	 of	 the	 environmental	 NGOs	 accuse	 the	 moratorium	 of	 intentionally	leaving	 secondary	 forest	 unprotected,	 Greenomics,	 a	 national	 environmental	NGO,	argues	 that	 the	moratorium	map	has	deliberately	 incorporated	nine	 large	blocs	of	secondary	forests	 into	the	moratorium	area	(Dabu,	2011;	Ekuatorial.com,	2011).	 It	argues	 that	 the	 MOF	 deliberately	 classified	 these	 secondary	 forests	 into	 primary	natural	 forests	 to	 depict	 Indonesia’s	 still	 expansive	 primary	 forest.	 According	 to	Greenomics	most	 of	 the	 blocs	 are	 located	 in	 conservation	 forests	 in	 Sumatra	 and	Kalimantan	 (Dabu,	 2011).	 This	 statement	 reflects	 the	 broader	 history	 of	 mistrust	civil	society	organisations	have	toward	the	MOF.			The	new	practices	and	policies	described	above	do	not	guarantee	improvements	in	forest	 governance.	 Instead	 they	 reveal	 some	 emerging	 strategies	 in	 governing	 the	production	of	 forest	knowledge	in	ways	that	fit	the	requirements	for	forest	carbon	investment.	 Through	 OMI,	 REDD+	 proponents	 have	 prescribed	 technocratic	approaches	 to	 fix	 spatial	 truths	 about	 forest	 land	 use	 in	 the	 hope	 to	 generate	governable	 spaces	 for	 REDD+	 implementation.	 The	 production	 of	 these	 spaces	entails	 the	 adoption	 of	 new	 rationalities	 of	 forest	 governance.	 	 For	 Indonesia	 to	attract	REDD+	investment,	UKP4	and	the	REDD+	Agency/Taskforce	have	attempted	to	 render	 technical	 the	 process	 of	 rearranging	 entrenched	 power	 relations	within	the	 forest	 sector.	 This	 has	 involved	 strategies	 that	 ultimately	 seek	 to	modify	 and	discipline	the	conduct	of	state	agencies	and	concessions	holders	in	apolitical	ways.	It	has	 also	 provided	 openings	 for	 NGOs	 to	 pursue	 their	 own	 politics	 through	participative	openings	in	the	technical	processes.	However,	success	has	been	varied.	In	 the	 following	 two	 sections	 I	 take	 a	 closer	 look	at	 two	other	 technologies	 in	 the	context	of	OMI:	the	One	Database	and	One	Standard	technologies.		
6.3.2 One	Database	as	a	Technology	of	Governance	One	Database	targets	the	conduct	of	the	private	sector,	forestry	officials,	and	district	authorities	to	make	them	more	accountable	for	effective	green	economy	investment	(Samadhi,	 2014).	 One	 Database	 enables	 the	 state	 to	 represent	 and	 classify	 the	messiness	 of	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 licenses	 data	 into	 an	 organization	 of	 centralized,	audited	and	standardized	knowledges	(Scott,	1998).	Li	argues	that	these	practices	of	
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homogenization,	 standardization	 and	 centralization	 “do	 simplify,	 but	 they	 also	generate	 something	 new”	 (Li,	 2005,	 p.	 389).	 In	 this	 case	 UKP4	 and	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce	 officials	 collect	 data	 and	 facilitate	 the	 implementation	 of	 One	 Database	pilot	projects	in	three	districts.	They	problematize	deficiencies	in	the	governance	of	forest	 concessions	 and	 propose	 technical	 solutions:	 1)	 collection	 and	 storage	 of	licenses	data	in	one	centralized	database,	and	2)	development	of	a	“situation	room”	-	a	 system	 of	 national	 surveillance	 that	will	 enable	monitoring	 through	 a	 real	 time	satellite	data.	However,	Scott	(1998)	reminds	us	that	experts	tend	to	produce	data	that	 only	 facilitates	 the	 connection	 between	 problems	 and	 their	 proposed	improvements,	 while	 obscuring	 other	 relevant	 information.	 Thus,	 improvement	projects	 often	 risk	 being	 compromised	by	 needing	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 solution	whilst	obscuring	 the	 sources	 of	 problems,	 as	 I	will	 show	 to	 be	 the	 case	 in	One	Database	technology.				The	REDD+	Taskforce	has	problematized	 forestry	and	district	officials	 for	utilizing	loopholes	 in	 forest	 governance,	 caused	 by	 the	 unavailability	 of	 consolidated	maps	and	lack	of	clear	forest	boundaries,	to	facilitate	corrupt	acts.	Consequently,	multiple	concessions	are	issued	for	the	same	area	creating	hotspots	of	land	contestations	and	conflicts.	As	argued	at	the	beginning	of	the	chapter,	carbon	investment	in	REDD+	is	likely	 to	 be	 more	 successful	 if	 it	 is	 implemented	 in	 a	 conflict	 free	 landscape.	Therefore,	 addressing	 the	 messiness	 of	 forest	 licensing	 governance	 became	 a	priority	for	UKP4	and	the	REDD+	Taskforce,	and	pursued	through	the	One	Database	technology	as	part	of	OMI.			Despite	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 set	 of	 regulations	 that	 governs	 the	 mechanisms	 for	issuing	 concessions,	 the	process	of	 getting	one	 is	often	 seen	 to	 rely	upon	securing	favourable	terms	from	close	political	ties	or	through	bribing	government	officials	(A.	Dermawan	 et	al.,	 2011).	 During	 an	 interview	with	 the	Director	 of	 Rimba	Makmur	Utama	 (RMU),	 a	 proposed	 private	 REDD+	 project	 in	 Central	 Kalimantan,	 he	describes	 the	 experience	 of	 seeking	 the	 Minister	 of	 Forestry’s	 approval	 for	 his	project,			
	 158	
More	than	four	years	past	by	and	I	have	personally	collected	350	signatures	required	for	the	concession	to	finally	reach	the	Minister’s	table.	I	did	not	pay	even	a	cent	for	under	the	table	transaction	[bribe].	It	was	hard,	but,	I	think	it	worth	every	step	that	I	have	been	taken.	It’s	a	green	business	…	I	want	to	do	it	right	 and	 to	 show	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 get	 things	 done	without	 bribery	 in	Indonesia.	 Everytime	 someone	 ask	 about	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 concession,	 I	jokingly	say	“I	think	the	Minister	forgot	to	bring	his	pen	everytime	he	intends	to	sign	it”	(Interview,	Wanmarda,	July	2013)		RMU’s	 case	has	been	utilized	by	REDD+	proponents	 to	highlight	and	problematize	corruption	 practices	 in	 the	 forestry	 sector.	 In	 contrast	 Rimba	 Raya	 Conservation,	another	 private	 REDD+	 project	 situated	 in	 Central	 Kalimantan,	 was	 widely	rumoured	 to	 get	 the	Minister’s	 approval	 because	 of	 some	 powerful	 figures	 on	 its	Board.	 The	 institutionalisation	 of	 closed-door	 decision-making	 and	 corruption	amongst	forestry	agencies	is	problematic	for	green	investment.			UKP4	 and	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 have	 initiated	 an	 improved	 licensing	 process	 in	three	 REDD+	 pilot	 provinces:	 Central	 Kalimantan,	 East	 Kalimantan	 and	 Jambi	(Samadhi,	 2014).	 Three	 districts	 in	 Central	 Kalimantan	 have	 been	 piloted	 for	 the	programme	 -	 Barito	 Selatan,	 Kapuas	 and	 Kotawaringin	 Timur.	 UKP4	 and	 REDD+	Taskforce	 officials	 describe	 the	 effort	 to	 transform	 licensing	 governance	 through	One	 Database	 as	 a	 radical	 measure	 in	 opening	 up	 forest	 licenses	 data,	 making	 it	available	 for	 public	 scrutiny.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 prevent	 discreet	 decision	 making	 in	granting	 concessions	 and	 “under	 the	 table”	 transactions.	 As	 previously	mentioned	this	 is	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 development	 of	 an	 online	 centralised	 licensing	registry	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 “situation	 room”,	 a	 national	 surveillance	 system	that	 relies	 on	 real	 time	 satellite	 data	 (Samadhi,	 2014).	 The	 registry	 collects	 and	digitises	concession	documents	and	improves	archiving	mechanisms.			The	 centralisation	 of	 licences	 data	 involves	 a	 licensing	 audit	 reviewing	 the	 legal	status	 of	 concession	 holders,	 legal	 status	 of	 permits,	 environmental	 sustainability	performance,	 land	 tenure,	 and	 tax/royalty	 payment	 compliance	 (Samadhi,	 2014).	The	consolidated	registries	will	make	visible	the	allocation	of	forestland	for	private	
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concessions.	Thus,	it	will	provide	a	platform	for	forest	governance	transparency	that	enables	more	 informed	contestation	and	 critiques.	 In	 addition	 to	 legal	documents,	companies	 are	 requested	 to	 send	 maps	 and	 coordinate	 points	 of	 the	 concession	location	to	the	audit	team.	The	spatial	data	is	used	to	generate	a	consolidated	map	of	forest	concessions	and	evaluate	the	overlaps	on	areas	that	are	subjected	to	multiple	claims.	A	REDD+	Taskforce	official	explained	that	in	the	near	future	the	consolidated	map	 of	 forest	 concessions	 will	 be	 overlaid	 with	 a	 map	 of	 tenure	 claims	 from	Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities	 to	 assess	 hotspots	 of	 contestations	 and	 seek	resolutions	(Interview,	Josyana,	September	2013).		In	each	district,	the	pilot	activity	for	One	Database	addresses	two	types	of	licenses;	mining	 and	 plantation	 concessions	 that	 have	 been	 issued	 both	 in	 the	 state	 forest	area	and	in	 forest	classified	as	other	 land	uses.	A	UKP4	official	explained	that	they	chose	 these	 two	 concession	 types	 because	 forest	 clearance	 from	 plantation	 and	mining	 expansion	 are	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 deforestation	 (Interview,	 Denis,	 July	2013).	Most	 land	 tenure	 conflicts	 are	 also	 found	 in	 these	 two	 types	 of	 concession	area.	 At	 provincial	 and	 national	 levels,	 the	 situation	 room	 functions	 as	 a	 control	room	 to	 store	digitalised	data	 of	 concessions	 registry	 and	monitor	 forest	 changes,	such	 as	 from	 deforestation	 or	 forest	 fires.	 The	 situation	 room	 provides	 a	 form	 of	centralised	surveillance	that	enables	the	monitoring	of	concessionaires’	activities	in	relation	 to	 their	 concessions	 areas	 from	 afar.	 Using	 satellite	 technology	 that	provides	 real	 time	 images,	 and	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 consolidated	concessions	map,	forest	monitoring	is	anticipated	to	become	much	more	effective.	It	is	 expected	 to	 reduce	 illegal	 logging	 by	 prohibiting	 concessionaires	 from	 illegally	appropriating	 forest	 lands	 by	 clearing	 areas	 beyond	 the	 defined	 boundaries	allocated.	 The	 digitation	 of	 licensing	 data	 provides	 a	 system	 for	 local	 and	 central	governments	 to	 track	 companies’	 compliance	 in	 accomplishing	 tax	 and	 royalty	payments.	 	 As	 a	 set	 of	 practices	 the	 One	 Database	 technology	 encourages	 forest	stakeholders	 to	 self	 govern	 their	 conduct	 in	 ways	 that	 fit	 broader	 forest	 sector	interests,	including	those	of	carbon	economies.			However	the	simple	action	of	collecting	concession	documents	has	proved	difficult.	UKP4	 estimates	 only	 5	 to	 40%	of	 the	 data	 is	 readily	 available	 at	 the	 district	 level	
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(UKP4	and	Satgas	REDD+,	2013).	Most	of	 the	documents	were	not	available	either	because	of	poor	documentation	or	the	intentional	action	of	hiding	information.	In	an	interview,	 a	 district	 official	 claimed	he	 is	worried	 that	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 audit	will	 put	 himself	 and	 his	 acquaintances	 in	 jail	 (Interview,	 Trigunawan,	 November	2013).	According	to	UKP4	one	of	the	challenges	of	collecting	concessions	documents	has	 been	 the	 objection	 from	 several	 District	 heads	 to	 share	what	 they	 classify	 as	‘sensitive’	data	(Interview,	Wandi,	September	2013).	Sensitive	data	usually	includes	illegal	concessions	that	were	issued	because	of	bribery	or	data	documentation	that	shows	how	officers	intentionally	overlook	noncompliance	activities.	Discontinuity	of	data	 documentation	 from	 one	 administration	 regime	 to	 another	 is	 another	major	obstacle.	To	ensure	the	cooperation	of	the	district	officials,	UKP4	officials	attempt	to	convince	district	authorities	that	the	findings	from	the	audit	process	are	not	going	to	be	 utilised	 for	 legal	 actions	 that	 could	 criminalize	 them	 as	 a	 form	 of	 compromise	(Interview,	 Wandi,	 September	 2013).	 Instead,	 the	 rationality	 of	 increasing	 local	revenues	 from	plantation	and	mining	 tax	 and	 royalty	 is	 employed	 to	 convince	 the	district	officials	to	cooperate	in	the	licenses	audit	process.			The	new	practices	of	governing	 forest	 licensing	system	through	One	Database	rely	on	the	technical	processes	of	consolidating	registries	and	other	spatial	information.	The	 registry	 database	 produces	 new	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 creates	 particular	truths	 about	 forests	 that	 are	 governable	 and	 will	 be	 beneficial	 for	 carbon	investment.	The	truths	that	emerge,	however,	are	compromises	negotiated	through	relationships	 between	 state	 and	 district	 officials,	 tempered	 by	 concerns	 about	accessing	sensitive	information	and	fears	of	illegality	and	prosecution.		In	promising	not	to	use	the	data	to	charge	corrupt	officials,	UKP4	and	the	REDD+	Taskforce	have	sought	to	render	technical	and	depoliticise	histories	of	corruption	and	injustice.	This	is	seen	as	the	trade-off	for	the	production	of	more	governable	forest	spaces.			
6.3.3 One	Standard	as	a	Technology	of	Governance	A	 further	 technology	 introduced	 through	 REDD+	 has	 been	 the	 “One	 Standard”	principle	 aimed	 at	 governing	 participative	 mapping	 practices,	 its	 proponents	 and	their	integration	in	OMI.	It	does	this	through	standardising	how	participative	maps	
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are	 made,	 circulated	 and	 used.	 The	 government’s	 approach	 is	 informed	 by	 the	necessities	of	the	broader	neoliberal	environmentalities	underpinning	REDD+,	while	opposition	is	structured	around	and	based	on	respect	 for	the	knowledges	of	 forest	communities,	making	claims	based	on	Fletcher’s	truth	environmentalities	(Fletcher,	2010).	 Truth	 environmentality	 is	 exercised	based	on	 “particular	 conception	of	 the	nature	 and	 the	 order	 of	 the	 universe”,	 for	 instance,	 beliefs	 in	 a	 non-material	relationship	between	humans	and	nature	as	is	common	in	some	Indigenous	societies	(Fletcher,	 2010).	 People	 come	 to	 govern	 themselves	 in	 accordance	 with	 spiritual	beliefs	and	traditional	rules	and	customs.				As	 argued	 earlier,	 in	 order	 to	 deliver	 effective	 governance,	 the	 state	 will	 try	 to	render	technical	their	object	of	governance,	however,	Scott	(1998)	argues	that	this	practice	 of	 simplification	 is	 routinely	 resisted	 by	 actors	 such	 as	 NGOs.	 Li	 (2005)	further	 extends	 Scott’s	 explanation	 by	 highlighting	 the	 possibilities	 of	 critical	engagement,	 as	 “resistance	 involves	 not	 simply	 rejection	 but	 the	 creation	 of	something	 new,	 as	 people	 articulate	 their	 critiques,	 find	 allies,	 and	 reposition	themselves	 in	 relation	 to	 the	various	powers	 they	must	 confront”	 (p.	391).	This	 is	the	 case	 with	 the	 network	 of	 Indigenous	 and	 environmental	 activists’	 resistance	toward	 the	 government’s	 version	 of	 participative	 mapping	 standard.	 However,	rather	 than	 outright	 refusal,	 activists	 have	 proposed	 a	 new	 standard	 aimed	 to	promote	 the	 integration	 of	 Indigenous	 spatial	 knowledge	 in	 the	 state	 geospatial	system	as	discussed	below.			Geospatial	 law	 Number	 4/2011	 requires	 all	 of	 maps	 recognised	 by	 the	 state	 to	follow	 a	 particular	 standard	 to	 ensure	 technical	 compatibility	 and	 validity.	 By	integrating	maps	 produced	 through	 participative	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 Indigenous	maps,	the	process	seeks	to	clarify	contestations	over	land	tenure.	This	is	important	for	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia,	 as	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	 the	 new	 carbon	economy	 relies	 on	 its	 capacity	 to	 emphasize	 its	 non-carbon	 benefits,	 including	Indigenous	tenure	rights.	The	development	of	a	standard	is	an	attempt	by	the	state	to	 produce	 a	 governmental	 technology	 to	 regulate	 and	 discipline	 the	 conduct	 of	participative	mapping	proponents	(Dean,	2009).	The	standard	envisions	a	unilateral	cartographic	 language	 that	 will	 ensure	 the	 conformity	 of	 participative	 mapping	
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practices	 into	 modern	 cartographic	 conventions.	 It	 requires	 the	 proponents	 to	submit	to	the	practices,	and	thus	values,	of	modern	cartography,	the	very	technology	that	has	previously	been	spatially	capitalized	by	the	state	to	dispossess	Indigenous	and	 local	 communities	 of	 their	 land	 and	 resources	 (Peluso,	 1995;	 Mundy,	 1996;	Wainwright	and	Bryan,	2009).			If	mapping	means	asserting	claims	and	controls	over	particular	territory,	a	standard	on	mapping	is	a	measure	to	govern	the	way	claims	and	controls	are	to	be	made.	A	standard	 can	 have	 both	 empowering	 and	 disempowering	 effects	 for	marginalised	communities.	 On	 one	 hand	 it	 becomes	 the	 means	 of	 translating	 the	 community’s	land	tenure	system	into	spatial	information,	which	will	technically	be	accepted	and	understood	 by	 the	 government	 (Peluso,	 1995).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 technical	standard	 strengthens	modern	 science	domination	of	 Indonesia’s	 state	 cartography	system	and	risks	marginalizing	traditional	or	Indigenous	spatial	knowledges.		The	Geospatial	Information	Agency	(GIA),	the	government	agency	whose	mandate	is	primarily	 to	 oversee	 the	 governance	of	 spatial	 information	 in	 Indonesia,	 prepared	the	first	draft	of	the	standard	during	late	2012.	The	draft	consists	of	four	technical	documents.	The	first	document	explains	the	procedure	of	geospatial	data	provision	for	 participative	 mapping	 proponents.	 The	 second	 document	 regulates	 the	mechanism	for	participative	mapping	proponents	in	updating	and	adding	names	of	places	 in	GIA’s	 geospatial	 system.	The	 third	document	 governs	 the	quality	 control	process	 for	 maps	 produced	 through	 participative	 mapping	 mechanisms.	 The	 last	document	standardizes	a	mechanism	for	acquisition	and	integration	of	 these	maps	in	 OMI	 system.	 GIA	 held	 a	 series	 of	 public	 consultation	 meetings,	 through	 which	NGOs,	 represented	 actively	 among	 others	 by	 Jaringan	Kerja	Pemetaan	Partisipatif	(Participative	Mapping	Network,	hereafter	 JKPP),	were	 invited	to	give	 feedback.	 In	an	 interview,	 a	 JKPP	 activist	 argues	 that	 despite	 its	 technical	 complexity,	 the	development	of	the	standard	is	a	sign	of	the	government’s	political	will	 to	create	a	platform	that	will	engage	communities	 in	 the	production	of	spatial	knowledge	and	policy;		
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The	standard	is	complicated,	it	uses	a	lot	of	technical	language	…	I	don’t	think	the	 communities	 or	 even	 NGOs	 that	 facilitate	 the	 participative	 mapping	process	will	easily	understand	the	meaning	of	all	the	technical	terminologies.	We	 have	 to	 create	 a	 standard	 that	 reflects	 the	 needs	 and	 level	 of	 technical	knowledge	 that	 the	communities	and	NGOs	own,	while	 seeking	 to	meet	 the	technical	 requirements	 of	 mapping	 in	 Indonesia.	 For	 the	 communities,	 the	maps	 they	 produce	 are	 their	 weapons	 to	 defend	 their	 land	 …	 we	 cannot	create	a	system	that	will	limit	the	effectiveness	of	the	communities’	weapons	(Interview,	Nagara,	June	2013).		In	addition	to	the	proposed	standard,	GIA	and	the	REDD+	Agency	launched	an	online	application	system	for	participative	mapping	in	late	August	2014	(Saturi,	2014).	The	online	 application	 theoretically	 enables	 every	 citizen	 or	 community	 group	 in	Indonesia	 to	 add	 spatial	 information	 to	 the	 basic	 map.	 This	 information	 can	 be	added	 directly	 by	 the	 local	 community	 through	 the	 participative	 mapping	application	system	and	will	be	followed	with	data	verification	by	GIA	to	determine	its	 validity	 and	 technical	 compatibility	 according	 to	 national	 cartography	conventions	(Saturi,	2014).			JKPP	have	also	problematized	the	paradigm	of	participative	mapping	developed	 in	GIA’s	online	application.	They	have	challenged	some	of	the	core	assumptions	within	GIA’s	 approach	 and	 have	 been	 developing	 an	 alternative	 standard	 for	 forest	authorities	 to	adopt.	 In	GIA’s	 standard	 the	meaning	of	 ‘participation’	 is	 reduced	 to	the	 involvement	 of	 community	 or	 other	 non-state	 actors	 in	 naming	 places,	 rivers,	lakes,	 or	 drawing	 village	 boundaries	 through	 the	 online	 system.	 As	 such,	 one	 can	argue	 that	 GIA’s	 participatory	 technology	 has	 set	 limited	 terms	 for	 stakeholder	engagement.	Thus,	 the	 technology	 renders	 the	political	 complexities	of	 Indigenous	communities’	 land	 tenure	 claims	 into	 bland	 practices	 of	 inputting	 and	 digitizing	spatial	 information.	 This	 perspective	 differs	 from	 some	 NGOs	 understandings	 of	‘participation’	as	a	mechanism	that	carefully	involves	community	members	in	a	set	of	political	processes	from	the	initial	planning	phase,	making	of	the	map,	up	to	the	decision	taking	as	well	as	control	over	the	use	of	the	map	(JKPP,	2014).			
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In	contrast	JKPP	proposes	a	standard	in	which	counter	mapping	characteristics	are	employed	 as	 the	 fundamental	 paradigm	 (JKPP,	 2014).	 JKPP’s	 standard	 emphasises	the	 nature	 of	 participative	 mapping	 as	 a	 social	 movement,	 through	 which	dispossessed	 communities	 can	 employ	 mapping	 as	 a	 technology	 of	 resistance	(Peluso,	1995).	Cobarrubias	and	Pickles	(2009,	p.	42)	define	counter	mapping	as	a	new	 cartography	 that	 “is	 used	 by	 social	movements	…	 to	 refigure	 the	 relations	 of	power	that	structure	socio-spatial	life	and	to	remap	the	social	spaces	of	everyday	life	in	ways	that	produce	new	political	subjects”.	This	definition	represents	the	nature	of	the	participative	mapping	movement	in	Indonesia	proposed	by	JKPP,	which	employs	dialogue	 and	 inclusive	 participation	 in	 its	 production	 of	 spatial	 information.	Participative	 mapping	 embodies	 the	 relation	 between	 Indigenous	 or	 local	communities’	tenure	with	the	land	and	resources	they	live	in	(Roth,	2009).	As	such,	the	 constructed	 map	 becomes	 the	 technology	 of	 resistance	 in	 assembling	 tenure	claims	 (Hess,	 1995;	 Peluso,	 1995).	 JKPP’s	 standard	 advocates	 the	 integration	 of	Indigenous/traditional	knowledge	in	the	state’s	geospatial	system	by	insisting	on	the	existence	of	 traditional	 knowledge	 that	 has	predated	 the	 system	developed	by	 the	state.	 This	 of	 course	 has	 political	 and	 practical	 implications	 –	 potentially	 making	Indonesia’s	 forest	 governance	 more	 open	 to	 social	 and	 environmental	 justice	concerns.			In	 October	 2014	 JKPP	 finalised	 its	 draft	 of	 a	 participative	mapping	 standard.	 The	standard	 starts	 by	 describing	 the	 rationales	 that	 underpin	 participative	mapping.	The	rationales	emphasise	the	significant	role	that	Indigenous	and	local	communities	have	 in	 terms	 of	 mapping	 and	 spatial	 knowledge,	 and	 that	 need	 for	 this	 to	 be	acknowledged	 and	 represented	 in	 the	 nation’s	 spatial	 governance	 system.	 It	 also	emphasizes	 that	 the	 community’s	 possession	of	 spatial	 knowledge	 is	 dynamic	 and	exemplifies	the	community’s	tenure	rights	to	their	land	and	resources.			The	 JKPP	 standard	 employs	 several	 basic	 concepts	 originating	 from	 counter	mapping	 principles	 (Peluso,	 1995).	 For	 instance,	 it	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	Indigenous/traditional	 spatial	 knowledge	as	 an	essential	 tool	 for	 the	protection	of	and	 struggle	 for	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights.	 The	 standard	 addresses	 the	 fact	 that	modernism	 and	 development	 –	 including	 modern	 scientific	 cartography	 –	 is	 a	
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dominant	 knowledge	 system	 that	 tends	 to	 ignore	 and	 undermine	Indigenous/traditional	 spatial	 knowledge	 (Harley,	 1989).	 The	 standard,	 therefore,	proposes	that	the	state’s	geospatial	system	facilitates	communities	to	produce	their	own	spatial	knowledge;	they	are	referred	to	in	the	standard	as	the	‘knowing	subject’	(JKPP,	2014).	In	doing	so	truth	environmentalities	are	claimed	whereby	Indigenous	knowledges	are	valorised	and	positioned	as	having	a	 role	 in	governance	based	on	intimate	 connections	 with	 place	 (Fletcher,	 2010).	 Incorporating	 such	 approaches	only	 work	 when	 there	 is	 a	 mutual	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 worth	 of	 modern	scientific	 cartography	 systems	 and	 that	 of	 traditional	 spatial	 knowledge	 (Aicher,	2014);	a	basic	premise	advocated	by	the	JKPP	standard.			The	JKPP	standard	relies	on	two	philosophical	definitions	of	participative	mapping.	First,	 participative	 mapping	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 process	 of	 building	 a	 collective	understanding	 aimed	 at	 the	 improvement	 and	 sustenance	 of	 a	 community’s	 living	space.	Secondly,	it	is	also	defined	as	a	process	of	building	mutual	agreement	within	the	 community	 on	 the	 role	 of	 participative	 mapping	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 reinforce	 and	strengthen	 the	 community’s	 living	 space.	 These	 two	 broad	 definitions	 of	participative	 mapping	 emphasise	 how	 participative	 mapping	 can	 function	 as	 a	technology	 of	 resistance	 that	 allow	 less	 powerful	 groups	 to	 employ	 maps	 as	legitimate	proof	to	claim	land	and	resources	(Peluso,	1995;	Cobarrubias	and	Pickles,	2009;	Wainwright	and	Bryan,	2009).			The	 definitions	 emphasise	 social	 principles	 as	 well	 as	 technical	 ones.	 The	 social	principles	 require	 the	 participative	mapping	 to	 be	 initiated	 from	 the	 community’s	collective	agreement,	 in	which	the	agreement	has	to	be	arranged	through	the	Free	Prior	Informed	Consent	protocol.	Social	data	must	also	be	produced	to	represent	the	culture,	 language,	 Indigenous	 institutions,	 tenure	 system,	 and	 other	 social	 norms.	The	technical	principles	specifically	regulate	the	use	of	a	basic	map	(Peta	Rupa	Bumi	
Indonesia	or	RBI)	provided	by	BIG	as	the	reference	map.	It	therefore	guarantees	the	technical	compatibility	between	the	participative	maps	produced	and	the	basic	map.	The	principles	allow	for	any	kind	of	technical	utilities	to	be	employed	in	the	mapping	processes,	but	require	the	utilities	to	be	listed	in	the	report.	This	particular	principle	is	a	step	forward	compared	to	the	draft	proposed	by	BIG	which	requires	the	use	of	
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particular	utilities,	which	 according	 to	 JKPP	activists	 are	difficult	 to	be	 fulfilled	by	the	 communities	 and	 their	 facilitators	 (Interview,	 Nagara,	 June	 2013).	 Thus	 it	confines	and	 limits	 the	community’s	and	 facilitator’s	capacity	 in	conforming	 to	 the	standard.		However,	 despite	 these	 innovations	 REDD+	 investment	 requires	 certainty	 in	 the	form	 of	 fixed	 borders	 on	 a	 map.	 While	 this	 is	 a	 necessary	 step	 to	 delineate	 the	community’s	 land	 from	 the	 state	 or	 private	 sector	 territory,	 boundaries	 in	 an	Indigenous	 spatial	 system	are	 not	 exclusively	meant	 as	 fixed	 lines	 that	 demarcate	between	two	separate	compounds	(Roth,	2009).	In	some	Indigenous	spatial	systems,	the	boundaries	are	neither	static	or	fixed	but	fluid	and	negotiated	(Pramono,	2013).	It	 is	 a	 space	 “produced	 through	 practices	 related	 to	 dwelling,	 to	 procuring	 a	livelihood,	and	 through	 interaction	with	 the	environment	and	 they	are	continually	shaped	 through	 social	 relations	 at	 multiple	 scales”	 (Roth,	 2009,	 p.	 211).	 The	requirement	 for	 the	 production	 of	 fixed	 boundaries	 as	 the	 condition	 for	 legal	acknowledgement	of	particular	Indigenous	community,	stipulated	not	only	in	JKPP’s	standard,	but	also	in	most	other	state’s	regulations,	has	triggered	the	fabrication	of	imaginary	boundaries	and	creating	tensions	among	communities	(see	Chapter	7).			The	rest	of	 the	standard	administers	 the	mapping	 implementation	mechanism	and	the	 integration	 of	 participatory	 maps	 into	 the	 One	 Map	 (see	 Appendix	 1).	 The	mapping	mechanism	 is	 illustrated	 in	a	 flow	chart,	which	explains	 thirteen	steps	of	participative	mapping.	The	 flow	chart	 clarifies	 the	 role	of	each	of	 the	participative	mapping	actors,	the	input	and	output	documents	for	each	steps,	and	the	estimation	of	 required	 times	 for	 each	 activity	 (see	 Appendix	 2).	 The	mechanism	 emphasises	participatory	 principles	 and	 dialogues	 at	 each	 step	 of	 the	 mapping,	 treating	 the	community	members	 as	 the	 lead	 actors	 instead	 of	merely	 sources	 of	 information.	While	 the	 JKPP	standard	 is	 arguably	 ready	 to	be	adopted	as	a	protocol	 to	manage	participative	mapping	 in	 Indonesia,	 it	has	to	be	certified	by	a	national	certification	body.	 Commonly	 it	 takes	 almost	 two	 years	 for	 a	 document	 to	 be	 piloted	 and	certified,	 which	 will	 then	 have	 legal	 status	 as	 a	 national	 protocol.	 One	 of	 the	participative	 mapping	 activists	 expressed	 his	 concern	 about	 losing	 momentum.	Whereas	now	 Indigenous	 rights	 have	become	 the	 central	 attention	of	 government	
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institutions,	it	can’t	be	guaranteed	that	in	two	years	time	the	Indigenous	groups	and	their	 counterparts	 are	 going	 to	 receive	 the	 same	 level	 of	 attention	 from	 the	government	and	donor	agencies	(Interview,	Taksaka,	December	2014).			The	integration	of	participative	mapping	into	OMI	requires	not	only	a	standard	but	also	a	data	custodian	as	required	by	the	Geospatial	Law.	The	custodian	has	to	be	a	government	agency.	The	problem,	however,	 is	 that	no	ministry	 is	willing	 to	be	 the	custodian	for	participative	mapping,	citing	technical	incapability	as	the	main	reason.	The	REDD+	Agency	has	offered	itself	to	the	proponents	as	the	interim	custodian.	As	the	Operational	Deputy	of	the	REDD+	Agency	said	in	an	interview:	“if	no	government	agency	 is	willing	 to	 take	 the	 role	 as	 the	participative	mapping	 custodian,	 then	 the	REDD+	 Agency	will	 take	 the	 lead	 to	 do	 it”	 (Interview,	 Kuswanto,	 October	 2014)	 .	Some	 activists	 see	 this	 statement	 as	 an	 open	 challenge	 from	 the	 Agency	 to	 other	technical	ministries	 especially	 those	whose	mandates	 are	 related	with	 Indigenous	peoples’	welfare	such	as	the	MOF,	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	and	the	NLA.	While	the	REDD+	Agency’s	willingness	to	be	the	interim	data	custodian	will	accelerate	the	integration	 of	 participative	 maps	 into	 OMI	 system,	 the	 participative	 mapping	proponents	 realize	 the	 Agency’s	 fragile	 position	 in	 the	 new	 government	 structure	under	the	newly	elected	President	(see	Chapter	5).	Hence,	when	the	Agency’s	duties	and	functions	were	finally	dissolved	into	the	MOEF	in	January	2015,	the	integration	of	participative	mapping	into	the	state’s	geospatial	system	is	under	threat.				Nevertheless,	JKPP’s	standard	challenges	GIA’s	approach	to	Indigenous	mapping	as	being	 a	 technical	 exercise	 and	 provides	 an	 alternative	 process	 in	 which	 political	issues	 become	 recognised	 and	 embedded	 in	 a	 technical	 process.	 It	 respects	 and	reflects	 capabilities	 and	 categories	 of	 local	 and	 Indigenous	 communities’	 spatial	knowledge	 and	 brings	 counter	 mapping	 and	 the	 idioms	 of	 tenure	 rights,	 power	relations,	and	knowledge	systems	into	the	governance	of	Indonesia’s	land.		Through	engaging	with	openings	provided	by	REDD+	and	struggling	for	recognition,	JKPP	has	attempted	 to	 subvert	 neoliberal	 rationalities	 and	 modern	 mapping	 practices	 to	counter	 and	 contest	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 forest	 governance	 (Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	2015).	Whether	or	not	JKPP’s	standard	will	be	effective	for	countering	dispossession	of	 land	 and	 for	 defending	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights	 will	 depend	 to	 a	 great	 extent	
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upon	 how	 forest	 stakeholders	 continue	 to	 engage	with	 REDD+	 opportunities	 as	 a	means	 to	 mainstream	 Indigenous/traditional	 spatial	 knowledge	 systems.	 This	necessitates	a	spatial	governance	system	with	a	capacity	to	integrate	various	forms	of	socio-ecological	knowledge	systems	as	well	as	cultural	diversity	(Aicher,	2014).		
6.4 Conclusion	The	biggest	challenge	 for	the	REDD+	in	Indonesia	 is	 to	transform	the	messiness	of	forest	 governance	 and	 produce	 a	 “governable	 space”	 for	 international	 carbon	investment.	Through	the	execution	of	OMI,	REDD+	proponents	have	sought	to	bring	clarity	 to	 confusion	 over	 forestland	 use	 and	 allocation.	 Drawing	 on	 three	technologies	of	government	–	the	forest	moratorium	policy,	One	Database	and	One	Standard	 -	 this	 chapter	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce/Agency	 and	 UKP4	have	 developed	 strategies	 aimed	 at	 governing	 the	 production,	 distribution	 and	storage	of	spatial	knowledge.	In	the	process	they	have	sought	technical	solutions	to	entrenched	 political	 problems	 around	 corruption,	 power,	 land	 rights,	 poverty	 and	profit.		REDD+	has	provided	a	rationale	for	restructuring	forest	governance	through	the	 institutionalisation	of	new	 forms	of	knowledge	and	practice	while	maintaining	an	appearance	of	being	apolitical	and	in	the	interests	of	all.				Forest	stakeholders	have	responded	differently	to	the	technologies	applied.	 	 In	the	case	 of	 the	 moratorium	 many	 NGOs	 saw	 it	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 advance	 their	interests	 and	 participate	 in	 the	 moratorium	 Working	 Group	 that	 was	 set	 up.		Through	participation	 they	were	 able	 to	 contest	 the	 limits	 of	 the	moratorium	and	expose	 breaches	 where	 companies	 were	 clearing	 protected	 forest,	 opening	 the	possibility	of	prosecution.	Local	authorities	responded	much	more	reluctantly	to	the	One	Database	 initiative,	 negotiating	 an	 amnesty	with	 central	 government	 for	 past	breaches	 of	 forest	 laws.	 	 In	 centralising	 licensing	 processes	 and	 setting	 up	 a	“situation	 room”	 REDD+	 proponents	 are	 seeking	 to	 monitor	 and	 discipline	 their	conduct.	 Finally	 the	 One	 Standard	 initiative	 of	 OMI	 has	 been	 contested	 by	 some	NGOs	 who	 have	 challenged	 the	 basic	 tenets	 of	 the	 standard	 and	 advanced	 an	alternative	 that	 promotes	 Indigenous	 knowledges.	 	 One	 Standard	 has	 provided	 a	
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channel	for	more	radical	interpretations	of	participative	and	Indigenous	mapping	to	find	an	audience	amongst	the	more	conventional	cartographers	driving	OMI.			This	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 REDD+	 is	 being	 pursued	 through	 more	 than	 just	neoliberal	environmentalities.	Instead	elements	of	disciplinary,	sovereign	and	truth	environmentalities	are	also	present	in	the	governmental	strategies	being	adopted	by	state	and	non-state	actors.		This	chapter	has	identified	a	fertile	politics	underpinning	the	production	of	apparently	non-political	technical	processes.		Forest	stakeholders	are	 not	 responding	 to	 green	 economy	 initiatives	 in	 straightforward	ways,	 instead	they	are	exercising	agency,	strategically	engaging	in	different	initiatives	to	advance	their	interests.	As	such	initiatives	like	REDD+	should	be	seen	as	sites	of	contestation	where	 global	 priorities	 encounter	 diverse	 political	 ecologies	 that	 shape	 how	programs	unfold.	 	This	 is	 shaking	up	 forest	 governance,	 rearranging	 the	 roles	and	subjectivities	 of	 different	 actors.	 	 Some	 NGOs	 have	 found	 themselves	 working	alongside	state	agencies,	having	access	to	what	was	initially	inaccessible	spatial	data	and	 using	 this	 to	 problematize	 the	 quality	 of	 law	 enforcement	 and	 programme	implementation	in	the	forestry	sector.	District	officials	have	found	themselves	under	increased	 scrutiny	 and	 surveillance	 from	 the	 state	 while	 previously	 oppressed	Indigenous	 groups	 are	 finding	more	 receptive	 audiences	 for	 their	 customary	 land	rights	claims.				As	 such	 REDD+	 presents	 new	 opportunities	 and	 risks	 and	 reflects	 a	 not-quite	neoliberal	 nature	 project.	 NGOs	 have	 sought	 to	 realise,	 with	 some	 success,	 the	overlap	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 carbon	 investors	 in	 governable	 space	with	 their	interests	 in	 expanding	 social	 and	 environmental	 protections.	 Their	 new	 alliances	with	REDD+	proponents	 place	 them	 in	more	 influential	 positions	 than	 previously.	However	 risks	 emerge	 through	 the	 tacit	 approval	 these	 alliances	 provide	 for	processes	that	seek	to	render	forest	governance	a	technical	issue.	In	problematizing	the	 quality	 of	 knowledge,	 rather	 than	 the	 holders	 of	 that	 knowledge,	 the	 REDD+	avoids	histories	of	corruption	and	outright	conflict	with	the	stakeholders	 involved.	Past	injustices	are	left	unaddressed	and	existing	injustices	may	be	prolonged.		There	is	also	a	risk	that	in	working	with	the	rationales	of	the	carbon	economy,	where	social	justice	issues	are	often	considered	‘co-benefits’	rather	than	core	priorities,	that	they	
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reinforce	a	paradigm	and	set	of	technologies	that	may	ultimately	work	against	these	interests	 (Corbera,	 2012).	 Afterall	 there	 are	 other	 ways	 of	 producing	 governable	space	 based	 on	 exclusions	 rather	 than	 inclusions;	 rules	 being	 designed	 at	 the	national	 scale	 don’t	 necessarily	 translate	 well	 across	 scales	 (McGregor,	 Eilenberg	and	Coutinho,	2015;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015).			However	 this	chapter	has	described	how	the	visibility	of	social	and	environmental	justice	 discourses	 are	 improving	 as	 REDD+	 proponents	 in	 Indonesia	 engage	 with	civil	society,	Indigenous	groups	and	carbon	market	rationales	during	the	readiness	processes.	This	trend	cannot	be	guaranteed	into	the	future,	and	must	be	monitored	as	 full	 scale	 REDD+	 implementation	 based	 on	 reducing	 carbon	 emissions	 moves	forward	 in	 2016.	 Despite	 progress	 in	 mainstreaming	 values	 of	 transparency,	participation,	 and	 Indigenous	 recognition	 there	 are	 still	many	 challenges	 ahead	 to	comprehensively	shift	forest	governance	from	state	processes	of	land	appropriation	into	 mechanisms	 of	 land	 redistribution	 and	 reterritorialization.	 On	 paper	Indonesia’s	OMI	appears	sound:	new	disciplinary	and	participatory	technologies	are	emerging	to	shift	the	flaws	in	current	forest	governance.	However,	when	examined	on	 the	 ground,	 many	 of	 the	 technical	 approaches	 prescribed	 by	 the	 REDD+	proponents	rarely	suit	 the	political	economic	reality	of	 forest	governance.	Without	taking	into	considerations	the	diverse	political	 interests	shaping	forest	governance	regimes	and	addressing	the	conditions	these	regimes	obscure,	OMI	may	yet	do	little	to	improve	forest	governance.				 	
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7 Case	Study	Three	~	Assembling	Indigenous	Land	
Claims	within	the	New	Political	Conjuncture	of	
Forest	Governance	in	Indonesia			
7.1 Introduction	In	Chapters	5	and	6	I	have	focussed	on	REDD+	mainstreaming	activities	through	the	REDD+	 Taskforce	 and	 the	 production	 of	 new	 governmental	 technologies	 through	OMI.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 third	 case	 study	 of	 the	 research	 to	 answer	research	objective	1(c).	 I	analyse	how	REDD+	related	processes	and	OMI,	 together	with	a	Constitutional	Court	decision	to	acknowledge	hutan	adat	(customary	forest)	have	created	a	new	political	conjuncture	in	forest	governance.	Together	these	forces	are	 reshaping	 Indonesia’s	 forest	 politics	 and	 transform	 the	 old	 forest	 political	ecology	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 4	 into	 a	 new	 conjuncture.	 By	 combining	 concepts	 of	governmentality	 (Foucault,	 1991a)	 with	 notions	 on	 practice	 of	 assembling	 (Li,	2007b)	and	Indigenous	territorialization	(Peluso,	1995)	I	trace	how	AMAN	and	the	Bahanei	 are	using	 this	moment	 to	assemble	a	 set	of	 governmental	 technologies	 to	propose	 a	 land	 claim	 in	 Gunung	 Mas	 District,	 Central	 Kalimantan.	 	 As	 such	 the	chapter	focuses	on	how	REDD+	govermentalities	are	unfolding	at	a	more	local	scale	than	previous	chapters.		As	has	been	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	the	data	for	this	chapter	was	collected	using	a	“scholar	activism”	approach;	that	is,	an	approach	that	sees	“research	as	a	process	of	working	together	with	those	whom	we	are	researching”	(Whatmore,	2003,	p.	90).	I	delved	 to	 a	 series	 of	 advocacy	 activities	 that	 the	 Bahanei	 and	 AMAN	 Central	Kalimantan12	(AMAN	 CK)	 organised	 as	 part	 of	 the	 land-claims-making	 processes.	Apart	from	being	able	to	observe	the	conversations,	negotiations	and	contestations	
																																																								12	AMAN	Central	Kalimantan	 is	AMAN’s	regional	branch	that	 is	based	 in	Palangkaraya,	 the	capital	 of	 Central	 Kalimantan	 Province.	 The	 branch	 is	 mandated	 to	 oversee	 AMAN’s	members	in	Central	Kalimantan.		
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that	took	part,	I	also	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	for	practical	critique	(McGregor	et	
al.,	2014b)	and	became	part	of	the	assemblage	I	studied.	This	embedded	interaction	produced	 empirical	 data	 that	 has	 helped	 in	 comprehending	 the	 assemblages	 and	practices	of	Indigenous	land	claims-making	and	their	relation	to	the	in-situ	political	conjuncture.	 I	 focused	my	 analysis	 on	 the	 governmental	 technologies	 the	 Bahanei	and	 its	 supporters	 devised	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 secure	 land	 tenure	 and	 seize	opportunities	within	the	new	forest	carbon	politics.		The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 sections.	 In	 the	 first	 section	 I	analyse	the	new	political	conjuncture	(what	I	refer	to	as	forest	carbon	politics)	that	is	evolving	in	Indonesia.	In	the	second	section	I	show	how	disjointed	practices	and	diverse	elements	are	drawn	together	to	assemble	Indigenous	claims-making	 in	the	context	of	Bahanei.	I	also	illustrate	the	implication	this	assemblage	has	for	Bahanei’s	desires,	 practices	 and	 identities.	 The	 third	 section	 highlights	 the	 tensions	 and	fractures	produced	within	 the	assemblage	and	how	 these	 trouble	 simple	divisions	between	 land	 grabs	 and	 land	 claims.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 discussing	 the	progress	and	obstacles	 towards	more	 just	 forms	of	 forest	governance	emerging	 in	this	new	phase	of	forest	politics	in	Indonesia.			
7.2 The	New	Forest	Political	Conjuncture	and	its	
Implications	to	Indigenous	Land	Claims	
“Map	your	ancestral	territory	before	it	is	mapped	by	others…!”	
	This	 statement	was	made	 by	 AMAN	 as	 a	 call	 for	 its	 community	members	 to	 start	claiming	 their	 land	 and	 other	 natural	 resources	 in	 response	 to	 the	 new	 forest	political	conjuncture.	Funded	with	REDD+	readiness	grants,	millions	of	hectares	of	forests	are	being	mapped	by	communities	with	the	help	of	NGOs	such	as	AMAN	and	JKPP	to	make	land	claims	(Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015).	These	are	not	insignificant,	AMAN	 is	 intending	 to	 claim	 40	 –	 70	 million	 ha	 forests	 by	 2020	 on	 behalf	 of	Indigenous	 communities	 (Saturi,	 2013;	 AMAN,	 2014).	 Indicative	 of	 the	 changing	politics	of	forests,	such	actions	are	not	seen	as	counter-claims	against	the	interests	
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of	 the	 state	 (Peluso,	 1995),	 instead	 they	 attract	 support	 and	 financing	 from	important	 authorities.	 REDD+	 Agency	 chairman,	 Heru	 Prasetyo,	 for	 example,	supports	AMAN’s	claim,	saying	that	“Indigenous	groups	were	estimated	to	hold	the	rights	to	around	45	million	hectares	of	forest	currently	being	misused	as	commercial	concessions”	(The	Jakarta	Post,	2014).	AMAN’s	Secretary	General	believes	the	claims	“will	change	the	face	of	the	nation’s	land	ownership”,	as	it	targets	more	than	half	of	the	state	forests	(Interview,	Bonar,	October	2013).			Dewsbury	(2011)	calls	 for	assemblage	scholars	 to	delve	deeper	 into	 the	“intensive	environment”	 through	which	a	particular	assemblage	emerged.	 In	 this	section	I	do	this	by	outlining	the	new	political	conjuncture	in	forest	governance	that	is	providing	the	 context	 through	 which	 new	 land-claim	 assemblages	 are	 forming.	 The	 new	political	 conjuncture	 represents	 an	 opportunity	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 common	portrayal	of	Indonesia’s	forests	as	messy	landscapes	characterized	by	chronic	tenure	problems	 and	 systemic	 corruption	 (Ross,	 1996;	 Robertson-Snape,	 1999;	Resosudarmo,	2005;	Saich	et	al.,	2010).	It	also	contests	the	authority	of	the	MOF	who	currently	 governs	 the	 70%	 of	 Indonesian	 territory	 currently	 considered	 “forest	estate”	(see	Chapter	4).			Chapter	4	has	discussed	the	context	of	forest	politics	and	governance	in	Indonesia,	however,	in	this	section	I	will	recall	several	information	that	are	essential	to	frame	this	 chapter’s	 discussion.	 The	 concept	 of	 “forest	 estate”	 (kawasan	 hutan)	 was	adopted	in	the	BFL	in	1967	(Barr	et	al.,	2006).	It	is	a	concept	that	was	created	by	the	New	Order	regime	to	provide	legitimacy	for	the	state	to	control	and	claim	land	from	communities,	by	 ‘legally’	claiming	the	majority	of	 the	 forest	estate	as	state-owned-forests	(Barr	et	al.,	2006).	The	state’s	monopoly	of	forested	land	was	inherited	from	the	 colonial	 system,	 which	 adopted	 territorialisation	 technologies	 such	 as	 forest	zoning	and	 law	enforcement	 to	produce	what	 (Peluso	and	Vandergeest,	2001)	call	“political	forests”.	In	total,	143	million	hectares	of	the	nation’s	land	was	declared	as	forest	estate	(Barr	et	al.,	2006),	providing	the	MOF	with	legal	authority	to	govern	the	forest,	while	the	rest	of	the	state	land	(outside	the	forest	estate)	is	managed	under	the	NLA.			
	 174	
The	BFL	divides	forest	ownership	into	two	categories:	State	and	Proprietary	forest.	The	Proprietary	forest	is	defined	in	Article	1.5	as	“forest	situated	on	a	piece	of	land	covered	 by	 proprietary	 rights”.	Meanwhile	 State	 forest	 is	 defined	 in	Article	 1.4	 as	“forest	 located	 on	 lands	 bearing	 no	 ownership	 rights”	 (Wright,	 2011,	 p.	 126).	Customary	forests	have	been	classified	within	the	latter	category	that	made	the	state	their	 legal	 owner.	 Justified	 by	 discourses	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	 national	development,	 the	MOF	 allocates	 lucrative	 forest	 concessions	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	neglecting	de	facto	conditions	on	the	ground	where	particular	forest	areas	have	long	been	 managed	 and	 used	 by	 forest	 dependent	 communities,	 including	 Indigenous	groups	and	ethnic	minorities	 (Fay,	Sirait	and	Kusworo,	2000;	Resosudarmo,	2005;	Tsing,	2005).			A	 report	 published	 by	 Greenpeace	 International	 (2010)	 highlights	 Indonesia’s	potential	carbon	loss	of	38	Gigatons	Carbon	(GtC)	in	the	next	30	years	due	to	various	ministries’	 economic	 development	 plans	 to	 open	 an	 additional	 63	 million	 ha	 of	forests	for	expansion	of	extractive	industries	including	for	palm	oil,	mining,	timber,	and	 biofuel.	 The	most	 interesting	 part	 of	 the	 report	 is	 the	 explanation	 that	 these	plans	 are	 based	 on	 the	 MOF’s	 analysis	 of	 forest	 areas	 that	 are	 still	 ‘empty’	 of	economic	activities	(Greenpeace,	2010).	The	definition	of	 ‘empty’	rarely	represents	the	real	situation	on	the	ground	where	millions	of	Indigenous	peoples	and	migrants	rely	upon	Indonesia’s	forest	for	their	livelihoods.	This	clash	of	interests,	in	the	more	open	post-New	Order	political	environment,	has	contributed	 to	 the	propagation	of	tenure	 conflicts.	 A	 government	 official	 revealed	 in	 an	 interview	 that	 in	 Central	Kalimantan,	the	pilot	province	for	REDD+	implementation,	800	of	the	1400	villages	in	 the	 province	 are	 heavily	 infested	 with	 either	 vertical	 conflicts	 between	communities	 and	 companies	 or	 horizontal	 conflicts	 between	 locals	 and	 migrants	(Interview,	Bapa	Samadikun,	November	2013).		Following	the	fall	of	Soeharto	in	the	wake	of	widespread	protests	in	1998,	farmers	and	Indigenous	communities	reclaimed	and	reoccupied	lands	taken	over	by	the	state	and	private	companies	associated	with	 the	New	Order	regime	(McCarthy,	2000;	L.	Bakker,	2009).	Environmental	and	Indigenous	rights	activists	assembled	practices	of	opposition	that	included	Indigenous	mapping,	campaigning,	and	physical	opposition	
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through	 land	enclosure	and	protest	 (Pramono,	2013).	Trainings	have	been	held	 to	enable	communities	to	use	simple	tools	-	such	as	compasses	and	Global	Positioning	Systems	 (GPS)	 -	 and	 to	 draw	 maps	 and	 record	 their	 landscape	 histories	 and	boundaries	 as	 a	means	 of	 contesting	 state	 authority	 (Peluso,	 1995).	 This	marks	 a	substantial	 shift	 from	 the	 New	 Order	 period	 when	 being	 Indigenous	 was	 widely	perceived	and	constructed	as	traditional,	wild,	backward	and	poor,	resulting	in	few	communities	 declaring	 themselves	 as	 Indigenous	 (Li,	 2000).	 In	 addition,	 claiming	indigeneity	was	 politically	 risky,	 as	 the	 New	 Order	 regime	was	 implementing	 the	
SARA	 (Suku,	 Agama,	 dan	 Ras	 or	 Ethnicity,	 Religion,	 and	 Race)	 policy	 (Li,	 2001).	Under	 this	 policy,	 any	 struggle	 for	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights	 in	 Indonesia’s	 outer	islands	risked	being	labeled	a	separatist	movement,	while	in	Java	and	Sumatra	they	were	associated	with	persecuted	communist	groups	(L.	Bakker,	2009).	Conversely,	post	1998,	more	communities	are	politically	choosing	to	articulate	their	indigeneity	as	part	of	the	strategy	for	(re)claiming	rights	over	land	and	other	natural	resources	(L.	 Bakker,	 2009).	 Assembling	 Indigenous	 land	 claims	 has	 subsequently	 become	 a	core	 component	 of	 many	 NGO,	 donor,	 and	 community	 agendas.	 In	 the	 next	 sub-sections	 I	 outline	 three	 components	 of	 the	 new	 political	 conjuncture	 and	 their	implications	to	Indigenous	land	claims.		
7.2.1 The	Constitutional	Court	Decision	No	35/2013	The	 possibilities	 of	 a	 new	political	 conjuncture	 are	most	 evident	 in	 Constitutional	Court	 Decision	 Number	 35	 or	 what	 is	 known	 as	 MK	 35	 (Keputusan	 Mahkamah	
Konstitusi	No	35).	The	Constitutional	Court	of	 Indonesia	decided	to	partially	accept	the	 judicial	 review	 brought	 forward	 by	 AMAN	 and	 representatives	 of	 two	Indigenous	communities,	 the	Kasepuhan	Cisitu	and	the	Kekhalifahan	Kuntu	in	May	2013.	The	judicial	review	has	resulted	in	hutan	adat	 (customary	forests)	no	longer	being	categorised	as	hutan	negara	 (State	 forests).	 Instead	they	have	become	hutan	
hak	(Proprietary	forests)	the	second	of	two	categories	of	forest	listed	in	Article	6	of	the	1999	Forestry	Law	(BFL)	(Roewisastuti,	2013).	The	court	ruling	opens	up	new	political	 opportunities	 for	 Indigenous	 peoples	 and	 their	 supporters	 for	 securing	territory	and	resources	threatened	by	state	and	private	interests.			
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One	of	the	activists	I	interviewed	defines	the	Constitutional	Court	ruling,	as	a	“post-colonial	decision”,	as	he	saw	it	as	an	attempt	to	fight	against	“categorical	inequality”	that	 discriminated	 against	 Indigenous	 peoples	who	were	 not	 recognized	 as	 right-bearing-subjects	 in	 Indonesia’s	 land	 tenure	 system.	He	 adds,	 “I	was	 shaken	…	 the	MOF	 as	 the	 biggest	 land-holder	 state	 institution	 was	 finally	 declared	 as	unconstitutional	 after	 more	 than	 20	 years	 governing	 70%	 of	 Indonesia’s	 land”	(Interview,	Ojiyanto,	June	2013).	By	introducing	a	new	term	for	Indigenous	peoples	as	penyandang	hak	(right-bearing-subjects)	the	court	ruling	is	commonly	perceived	by	Indonesian	Indigenous	movements	as	a	new	opportunity	to	improve	the	status	of	Indigenous	 communities	 as	 legal	 custodians	 of	 their	 customary	 lands	 (Rachman,	2013).			Along	with	the	government	target	to	allocate	12.7	million	hectares	of	forestland	for	community	 forestry	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 court	 decision,	 12	 state	ministries/agencies	are	 engaged	 in	 an	 initiative	 to	 accelerate	 the	 gazettement	 of	 forest	 boundaries	(Safitri,	2014	see	also	Chapter	4).	The	 initiative	 is	 intended	 to	revisit	 the	“political	forests”	 the	 colonial	 government	 of	 Indonesia	 employed	 to	 appropriate	 land	 from	Indigenous	 and	 local	 communities	 (Peluso	 and	 Vandergeest,	 2001).	 Under	 this	initiative	 a	 new	 policy	 was	 issued	 in	 October	 2014	 to	 provide	 a	 tool	 for	 the	acknowledgement	of	Indigenous,	individual	and	collective	land	tenure	rights	within	the	forest	estate	(Safitri,	2014).	The	policy,	known	as	Perber	(Peraturan	bersama	or	Joint	regulation)	guides	the	procedures	for	settlement	of	land	claim	inside	the	forest	estate.	According	to	one	of	the	team	members	who	assisted	the	government	to	draft	the	 regulation,	 Perber	 translates	 the	 “spirit	 of	 land	 reform	 by	 recognizing	Indigenous,	 individual	 or	 collective	 land	 rights,	 among	 others,	 in	 the	 forest	 lands	that	have	been	used	for	20	consecutive	years	or	more”	(Interview,	Marina,	October	2014).	Following	the	recognition	and	validation	of	land	claim,	the	MOF	will	allow	the	NLA	 to	 enter	 its	 juridical	 territory	 and	 issue	 a	 land	 certificate	 for	 the	 claimant	 as	proof	of	ownership	 (see	Chapter	Four,	Safitri,	2014).	While	 the	policy	 is	 still	 in	 its	infancy,	 and	 contested	 by	 some	 groups,	 it	 is	 expected	 to	 provide	 greater	opportunities	for	recognising	Indigenous	land	claims	in	Indonesia	(Safitri,	2015).		
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Despite	 slow	progress	 in	 its	 implementation,	 the	 court’s	 decision	has	 been	widely	discussed	among	forest	stakeholders.	A	mix	of	responses	has	come	from	the	private	sector	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 expressing	 fear	 over	 the	 court	 ruling	 that	 has	ignited	 extensive	 Indigenous	mapping	 and	 land	 claims.	 In	 contrast	 the	 Indonesian	Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 as	 the	 umbrella	 organization	 of	 the	 business	 sectors,	officially	 supports	 the	 government’s	 initiative	 to	 address	 confusion	 over	 land	 use	conflicts	 (Dewan,	 2014).	 The	 support	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 acquire	 legal	certainty	 over	 land	 status	 for	 business	 security	 and	 investment.	 Drawing	 on	 the	same	 reasons,	 the	 court’s	 decision	 is	 widely	 praised	 by	 REDD+	 proponents.	 In	collaboration	 with	 AMAN,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Office	 for	 REDD+	 Coordination	 in	Indonesia	(UNORCID)	organized	a	national	seminar	discussing	the	implication	of	the	court’s	decision	for	Indigenous	peoples’	tenure	security	and	REDD+	implementation.	In	 an	 interview,	 an	 officer	 from	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	 tenure	security	in	increasing	the	chance	for	having	a	successful	REDD+	programme,	saying,	“better	 forest	protection	 is	 easier	 to	be	 achieved	 in	 a	 regime	of	 forest	 governance	that	respects	Indigenous	communities’	rights	over	land	tenure”	(Interview,	Josyana,	September	2013).		
	
7.2.2 REDD+	Readiness	and	Indigenous	Peoples’	Rights	The	 Constitutional	 Court	 decision	 came	 at	 a	 convenient	 time	 for	 REDD+	development	 in	 Indonesia.	 	 As	 part	 of	 its	 design	 REDD+	 proponents,	 under	 the	theme	 of	 “Beyond	 Carbon,	 More	 than	 Forest”	 (see	 Chapter	 5)	 promotes	 tenure	security	 for	 Indigenous	 peoples.	 The	 REDD+	 National	 Strategy,	 for	 example,	promotes	 land	 tenure	 reform	 through	 Indigenous	 land	 survey	 and	 mapping;	supporting	an	out-of-court	tenure	dispute	resolution	mechanism;	and	strengthening	the	 implementation	of	 FPIC	 (Indonesian	REDD+	Task	Force,	 2012).	A	 set	 of	 social	and	 environmental	 safeguards	 (PRISAI)	 and	 FPIC	 guidelines	 have	 been	 produced	and	tested	in	several	 Indigenous	communities	 including	in	Central	Kalimantan	and	Central	Sulawesi	(for	a	critique	see	Howell,	2015).	Indigenous	mapping	is	 included	among	 ten	 imperative	 actions	 that	 the	 newly	 established	 REDD+	 agency	 has	 to	implement	in	its	2014	–	2016	programme.	Moreover,	the	agency	claims	to	have	been	successfully	 securing	 representation	 from	 Indigenous	 experts	 in	 its	 multi-
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stakeholder	 committee	 (Komite	 Pemangku	 Kepentingan)	 in	 order	 to	 increase	participation	of	Indigenous	peoples	in	REDD+	decision-making.	A	national	program	for	 Indigenous	rights	recognition	and	protection	through	REDD+	implementation	was	launched	in	September	2014,	where	an	idea	about	a	special	Indigenous	trust	fund	is	being	 explored.	 The	 national	 programme	 was	 launched	 by	 former	 Vice	 President	Boediono	and	endorsed	by	nine	related	ministries	and	the	REDD+	Agency	(Agustine,	2014).	Further	action	plans	and	activities	are	being	developed	by	the	AMAN	national	office	 for	 funding	 by	 the	 REDD+	Agency.	 This	 indigenization	 of	 forest	 politics	 is	 a	result	 of	 what	 an	 academic	 I	 interviewed	 termed	 a	 “honeymoon	 phase”	 between	AMAN	and	REDD+	institutions	(Interview,	Yandiman,	August	2013).			A	 particular	 vision	 of	 Indigenous	 people	 is	 shared	 between	 REDD+	 Agency	 and	AMAN.	The	vision	imagines	Indigenous	people	as	homogenous	communities	that	are	deeply	rooted	with	their	origins	and	committed	to	protecting	the	forests	they	live	in.	AMAN’s	activist	statement	explains	that	they	are	“communities	that	have	been	living	there	 [in	 the	 forest],	 nurturing	 the	 forest	 even	 before	 Indonesia	 existed”	(MacDonald,	2014).	The	former	head	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce	envisions	Indigenous	people	as	“communities	that	will	not	survive	living	in	a	forest	that	is	replaced	with	palm	oil	plantations	and	no	longer	have	mouse-deer	(Tragulus	javanicus)”	(Witoelar,	2013).	 The	 Head	 of	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce’s	 Working	 Group	 on	 Multi-stakeholder	Engagement	states	that,	“Indigenous	people	owned	the	wisdom	of	treating	the	forest	with	care,	the	wisdom	that	respects	nature	and	the	cultural	spiritual	values”	(Satgas	REDD+,	 2013b).	 Such	 statements	 perpetuate	 a	 romantic	 image	 of	 Indigenous	peoples	that	have	little	interest	in	extractive	industries	and	modernity,	instead	being	associated	with	 traditional	 forms	of	hunting	 and	gathering.	 Indigenous	knowledge	and	wisdom	is	revered	 for	 living	harmoniously	with	 the	nature.	Such	 framings	are	contributing	to	a	particular	romantic	environmental	imaginary,	which	I	refer	to	here	as	the	‘imaginary	REDD+	Indigenous	community’.	I	use	“imaginary”	to	emphasise	its	difference	 from	 the	 reality	 on	 the	 ground,	 where	 communities	 are	 often	 more	heterogeneous	 in	 terms	of	origin	and	possess	multiple	 interests,	 including	aims	 to	benefit	from	extractive	industries	(Li,	2014b).				
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Despite	several	studies	that	highlight	improvements	in	forest	governance	since	the	inception	 of	 REDD+	 (Agung	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 the	 program	 has	 attracted	 plenty	 of	criticisms	 (McGregor,	 2015).	 An	 environmental	 activist	 interviewed	 during	 the	fieldwork	emphasises	how	NGOs,	especially	those	which	focus	on	Indigenous	issues,	are	 becoming	 more	 tolerant	 toward	 the	 ‘faulty’	 design	 of	 REDD+’s	 market	 based	mechanism,	 saying,	 “REDD+	 is	 like	 a	 ship	 that	 everyone	 now	 takes	 a	 lift	 on	 to	 go	somewhere	they	think	is	better,	but	it	actually	sails	in	the	sea	of	a	capitalistic	mode	of	 development;	what	 is	 good	 is	 only	 temporary”	 (Interview,	 Ginting,	 June	 2013).	However	some	studies	are	illuminating	the	downsides	of	this	form	of	development	for	 Indigenous	 people	 in	 Kalimantan.	 Howson	 and	 Kindon	 (2015)	 highlight	 the	escalation	 of	 local	 conflicts	 among	 Indigenous	 Dayak	 villagers	 in	 REDD+	demonstration	activities	areas.	Pearse	(2013)	underlines	the	inability	of	a	particular	REDD+	project	to	address	fundamental	social	problems	faced	by	Indigenous	Dayak	communities,	 such	 as	 land	 tenure	 conflict,	 despite	 the	 amount	 of	 project	 money	being	 disbursed	 to	 pay	 for	 consultants’	 fees.	 Hence,	 even	within	 the	 “honeymoon	period”,	different	Indigenous	communities	are	being	affected	by	REDD+	projects	in	different	ways.		
7.2.3 The	One	Map	and	Indigenous	Mapping	The	final	component	of	the	new	political	conjuncture	is	the	OMI	initiative	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		In	its	implementation,	the	government	expects	that	OMI	will	identify	 private	 rights,	 including	 adat	 (Indigenous)	 claims,	 to	 acquire	 integrated	information	 on	 land	 use	 and	 ownership	 in	 Indonesia.	 In	 this	 context,	 OMI	 has	provided	 important	 opportunities	 for	 Indigenous	 maps	 to	 be	 officially	acknowledged	 and	 integrated	 into	 the	 government’s	 spatial	 policies.	 OMI	 is	providing	 communities	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 security	 by	 defining	 new	 spatial	arrangements	and	protections	within	the	state	apparatus.			From	 a	 governmentality	 perspective	 the	 rush	 of	 Indigenous	 groups	 to	make	 land	claims	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 successful	 application	 of	 OMI	 as	 a	 governmental	technology	reshaping	human-forest	interactions.	Indigenous	communities	and	their	supporters	 have	 engaged	 in	 behaviours	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 in	 their	 own	 self	 interest	
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and	 that	 of	 broader	 Indonesian,	 and	 even	 international,	 climate	 interests.	Establishing	 land	 tenure	and	ending	histories	of	 conflict	and	uncertainty	produces	“governable	spaces”	for	REDD+	projects	(see	Chapter	6).	It	is	in	the	interests	of	the	REDD+	 agency,	 donors	 and	 REDD+	 investors	 to	 secure	 Indigenous	 tenure	 rights,	which	provides	a	level	of	security	for	REDD+	investment	in	a	particular	community	(Agung	et	al.,	2014).	However,	securing	land	tenure	in	this	new	political	conjuncture	has	many	more	meanings	 than	 just	 that,	and	 is	 leading	to	new	territorialities,	new	subjectivities,	and	new	forms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	across	Indonesia.	I	explore	this	 further	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 village	 of	 Bahanei	 in	 Gunung	Mas	 District,	 Central	Kalimantan	Province.			
7.3 Assembling	Indigenous	Land	Claims	This	section	looks	 into	what	elements	are	being	assembled	to	constitute	and	make	Indigenous	 land	claims	 in	 the	 context	of	 this	new	political	 conjuncture.	 I	 adopt	an	assemblage	approach	that	focuses	on	the	activities,	labour	and	materials	involved	in	making	claims,	drawing	on	the	village	of	Bahanei,	in	Central	Kalimantan,	as	my	case	study	area.	Following	Li	(2007b)	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	practice	of	assembling,	that	 is	 “the	 hard	 work	 required	 to	 draw	 heterogeneous	 elements	 together,	 forge	connection	between	them	and	sustain	 these	connections	 in	 the	 face	of	 tension”	(p.	264),	 rather	 than	 approaching	 assemblage	 as	 a	 final	 and	 complete	 product	 of	actions.	Furthermore,	 this	chapter	adopts	a	governmentality	 framework	to	analyse	how	 this	 assemblage	 is	 reshaping	 Indigenous	 peoples’	 desires,	 practices	 and	subjectivities	in	this	case	study	area	(Foucault,	1991a;	Dean,	2009).		Bahanei	 is	 located	 in	 the	 upstream	 part	 of	 the	 River	 Kahayan’s	 tributaries,	 in	 the	Gunung	Mas	District,	Central	Kalimantan	Province	(Figure	7.1).	Spanning	over	8,888	hectares	of	forested	and	non-forested	land,	two	thirds	of	Bahanei’s	land	is	included	in	the	State	owned	Forest	Estate.	Bahanei	is	inhabited	by	352	households	comprised	of	at	least	four	different	ethnic	groups:	Dayak	Ngaju,	Dayak	Manyan,	Java	and	Banjar.	The	Dayak	Ngaju	ethnic	group	dominates	85%	of	 the	population,	 followed	by	10%	
Banjar,	 and	 the	 remaining	 5%	 coming	 from	 ethnic	 Java	 and	 Dayak	Manyan.	 The	
Dayak	Ngaju	 ethnic	 group	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Bahanei,	 thus,	 they	
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enjoy	the	privilege	of	perceiving	others	as	pendatang	(migrants)	especially	the	Java	and	Banjar.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 Bahanei	 depend	 on	 rubber	 tapping	 as	 their	main	livelihood	 in	which	 the	Ngaju	owns	100%	of	 the	 rubber	plantations.	The	migrants	usually	work	for	owners	of	big	rubber	plantations	whose	access	to	land	can	reach	up	to	 20	 to	 50	 hectares	 per	 household.	 This	means	 that	 the	Ngaju	 controls	 access	 to	land	 in	 the	 Bahanei	 while	 migrants	 gain	 access	 only	 through	 marriage	 with	 the	Ngaju	and	land	sales.					Facilitated	by	AMAN	CK	and	partially	funded	by	the	REDD+	Taskforce,	the	Bahanei	people	seek	to	produce	what	they	call	 the	Tumbang	Bahanei	 Indigenous	Territory.	The	 identification	 of	 the	 Bahanei	 and	 their	 Indigenous	 domain	 emerged	 in	 the	context	of	 opposition	 to	 the	 threat	of	 land	appropriation	 from	a	 logging	 company,	East	Point	Indonesia,	that	has	been	given	concession	by	the	MOF	to	exploit	timber	in	areas	 covering	 50,665	 ha	 forests.	 AMAN	 CK	 has	 adopted	 particular	 governmental	strategies	to	assist	the	Bahanei	people	in	assembling	an	Indigenous	land	claim	as	an	attempt	 to	exclude	 their	 land	 from	 forest	exploitation.	This	 section	highlights	how	AMAN	 CK	 and	 the	 Bahanei	 have	 pulled	 together	 diverse	 elements	 to	 make	 their	claim	and	situate	themselves	strategically	within	the	changing	political	conjuncture.			In	 establishing	 jurisdictional	 borders	 and	 social	 boundaries	 through	 mapping	strategies	 and	 obtaining	 consent	 from	 the	 neighboring	 communities	 the	 Bahanei	have	pursued	a	process	of	territorialisation	(Peluso,	1995).	In	the	process	they	have	sought	 to	 intensify	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 Bahanei’s	 identity	 through	 the	articulation	 of	 a	 conservation-oriented	 Indigenous	 territory	 and	 subjectivity.	 In	assembling	this	homogeneity	however	class,	gender	and	ethnicity	based	inequalities	have	tended	to	be	overlooked	in	order	to	secure	and	collectively	mobilise	the	 land	claim	(Hall,	Hirsch	and	Li,	2011).	While	acknowledging	other	forms	of	exclusions	in	Bahanei	I	focus	here	on	ethnic	exclusion	as	the	most	visible	tension	in	the	land	claim	assemblage.						
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	Figure	7.1	The	Bahanei	Indigenous	territory	in	Central	Kalimantan		(Source:	Rini	Astuti,	2015)		
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7.3.1 Producing	Indigenous	Territory	Positioning	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘trustee’,	 AMAN	 CK	 assists	 the	 Bahanei’s	 territorialisation	process	 by	 encouraging	 them	 to	 fit	 certain	 Indigenous	 characteristics	 AMAN	 has	developed	 in	 Indonesia.	 Trustee	 is	 a	 position	 defined	 “by	 the	 claim	 to	 know	 how	others	should	live,	to	know	what	is	best	for	them	[community],	to	know	what	they	need”	 (Li,	 2007c,	 p.	 4).	 Trustees	 aim	 to	 empower	 and	 improve	 others’	well-being.	This	definition	was	described	well	by	one	of	the	AMAN	CK	leaders	when	asked	how	they	frame	their	activities	in	the	Bahanei:			 [Our	 activities	 are]	 an	 attempt	 to	 fulfil	 AMAN’s	 mandates	 to	 help	 its	community	 members	 to	 defend	 their	 rights	 to	 land,	 identity,	 and	 a	 life	 of	dignity	as	Dayaks	that	have	freedom	and	prosperity	…	to	realise	a	life	that	is	in	 a	 harmonious	 relationship	 with	 nature,	 fellow	 human	 beings	 and	 the	unseen	spirits	(Interview,	Bredana,	November	2013).		To	 accomplish	 idealistic	 aims,	 AMAN	 CK	 works	 through	 everyday	 practices	 and	encounters	 that	 influence	 the	 Bahanei’s	 dreams,	 passions,	 and	 actions.	 Various	governmental	 technologies	 have	 been	 adopted	 to	 change	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	Bahanei	population.	Here	I	explore	the	ramifications	of	AMAN	CK’s	strategies	for	the	land	claim	being	assembled.			In	an	interview	with	a	leader	of	AMAN	CK,	he	argues	that	they	situate	the	Bahanei’s	land	claim	within	 the	REDD+	Agency’s	agenda	as	a	strategy	to	cohere	support	and	resources	that	otherwise	would	be	difficult	to	gain:			 We	were	approached	by	the	REDD+	Central	Kalimantan	Joint	Secretariat	and	asked	 what	 kind	 of	 support	 and	 collaboration	 that	 AMAN	 CK	 and	 REDD+	institution	could	do	together.	We	both	have	common	interests	in	supporting	communities’	 mapping	 efforts.	 So	 we	 [AMAN	 CK]	 decided	 to	 apply	 for	 the	REDD+	 grant	 and	 worked	 on	 the	 proposal	 assisted	 by	 the	 REDD+	 Joint	Secretariat.	 I	 can	say	 that	AMAN	CK’s	position	within	 the	REDD+	agenda	 in	
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Central	 Kalimantan	 is	 quite	 strong;	 we	 have	 more	 than	 400	 community	members	and	of	course	it	will	be	of	interest	for	the	REDD+	Joint	Secretariat	to	support	 AMAN	 CK.	 For	 us	 [AMAN	 CK],	 I	 have	 to	 admit	 that	we	 don’t	 have	many	options	 for	 financial	 support	 for	 the	program.	We	usually	 depend	on	AMAN	 national	 secretariat	 to	 finance	 the	 program.	 The	 pouring	 of	 REDD+	money	in	Central	Kalimantan	as	a	pilot	province	has	provided	new	sources	of	financial	and	moral	supports	for	us,	that	otherwise	would	be	difficult	to	gain	(Interview,	Dormano,	November	2013).			A	 REDD+	 Agency	 official	 explained	 that	 the	 Agency’s	 interest	 in	 supporting	 the	struggle	 is	 based	 on	 the	 rationality	 of	 “securing	 tenure	 for	 successful	 REDD+	implementation	 and	 investment”	 (Interview,	 Kuswanto,	 June	 2013).	 This	 mutual	relationship	 seemingly	 gives	 advantages	 to	 the	 Agency,	 AMAN	 CK	 and	 the	 land	struggles	of	the	Bahanei.	To	further	realize	the	implementation	of	REDD+,	AMAN	CK,	the	REDD+	Agency	 in	Central	Kalimantan	and	Kemitraan13	have	organized	a	 set	of	REDD-related	 activities	 for	 the	 Bahanei.	 Community	 representatives	 have	participated	 in	 a	 workshop	 on	 Payment	 for	 Environmental	 Services	 (PES)	 and	benefit	 sharing	mechanisms.	 The	 workshop	 introduced	market	 environmentalism	rationalities	 to	 the	 Bahanei	 by	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 commodifying	 the	intangible	benefits	forests	provide.	A	series	of	other	capacity	building	programmes,	which	 were	 oriented	 at	 creating	 responsible	 REDD+	 subjects,	 were	 held,	 ranging	from	 organization	 management	 to	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 FPIC	 and	safeguards	(Li,	2014a).			These	new	initiatives,	alongside	existing	practices	and	governance	structures,	were	assembled	 to	 create	 Indigenous	 land	 claims.	 Several	 government	 regulations,	 such	as	 Forestry	 and	 Village	 Laws,	 define	 characteristics	 of	 Indigenous	 people	 in	Indonesia,	however	while	some	overlap	others	contradict	each	other.	According	to	AMAN’s	own	interpretation,	a	community	has	to	have	four	main	characteristics	to	be																																																									13	Kemitraan	 also	 known	 as	 Partnership	 for	 Governance	 Reform	 is	 a	 non-for	 profit	organisation	 in	 Indonesia	 that	 was	 established	 through	 a	 joint	 initiative	 between	governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 representatives,	 including	 the	 UNDP	 and	 the	World	Bank	in	1999.	The	organisation	provides	financial	assistance	to	NGOs	in	Indonesia	through	small	grants.		
	 185	
qualified	as	an	 Indigenous	community.	These	are	a	definitive	 territory,	 Indigenous	or	adat	law,	adat	 culture,	 and	adat	 structure	 (Nababan,	2013).	AMAN	CK	employs	these	four	characteristics	to	assist	the	Bahanei	in	articulating	and	assembling	their	indigeneity	 amidst	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 government	 definitions.	 The	 mapping	practices	to	define	Indigenous	territory	began	in	late	2012,	initiated	by	discussions	facilitated	by	AMAN	CK	activists	to	heighten	awareness	and	participation	within	the	community.	A	weeklong	training	on	basic	cartography	was	held	to	teach	the	Bahanei	how	 to	 use	 GPS	 technology	 and	 to	 draw	 a	 map	 and	 thereby	 interact	 with	 OMI	processes.			Two	 young	 members	 of	 the	 community	 were	 appointed	 by	 AMAN	 CK	 as	 the	community’s	cartographers.	By	forming	expertise,	particular	authority	is	generated,	a	 necessary	 means	 acknowledged	 by	 an	 AMAN	 CK	 activist	 as	 “a	 mechanism	 to	increase	the	community’s	self-confidence”.			 I	have	no	higher	education	degree	and	I	am	just	a	simple	rubber	farmer.	The	furthest	I	have	ever	traveled	was	to	Palangkaraya,	 the	capital	of	 the	Central	Kalimantan	 Province.	 Being	 the	 community	 cartographer,	 I	 am	 going	 next	month	 to	 Jakarta	 for	 a	workshop.	 It	will	 be	my	 first	 time	 ever	 to	 travel	 by	airplane.	 Most	 importantly	 I	 am	 so	 proud	 because	 I	 feel	 like	 I	 have	 an	important	position	in	the	community.	I	have	a	skill	aside	from	rubber	tapping	that	is	significant	for	my	family	and	my	community.	There	is	a	possibility	that	I	will	 also	help	AMAN	CK	 to	 facilitate	 the	community	mapping	processes	 in	Tehang,	 Karetau	 Sarian,	 Tumbang	Malahoi	 and	 Tajah	 Antang,	 and	 I	will	 be	more	than	happy	to	do	 it	even	 if	 it	means	I	have	to	stop	tapping	rubber	 for	few	days	(Interview,	Bapa	Rara,	October	2013	).		This	 mechanism	 is	 a	 form	 of	 responsibilisation,	 a	 process	 defined	 by	 (N.	 Rose,	1999a)	as	“inculcation	and	shaping	of	responsibility	 for	…good	order	within	…	the	individual	 [and	the	community]	by	means	of	expert	knowledges”	 (p.	74).	 	The	aim	was	to	develop	the	Bahanei’s	sense	of	ownership	of	the	process.	The	cartographers	lead	 the	 process	 of	 manually	 drawing	 the	map,	 which	 then	was	 converted	 into	 a	digital	 map	 by	 AMAN	 CK’s	 staff	 member	 (Figures	 7.2	 and	 7.3).	 In	 addition,	 the	
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cartography	experts	were	assigned	to	accompany	groups	of	community	members	to	record	 GPS	 points	 along	 the	 borders	 of	 Bahanei	 territory.	 In	 January	 2014,	representatives	from	the	REDD+	Agency	came	to	Bahanei	to	verify	and	validate	the	territorial	 borders	 with	 more	 sophisticated	 GPS	 tools.	 According	 to	 the	 REDD+	Agency’s	GIS	expert	who	came	to	Bahanei	the	verification	process	is	aimed	to	boost	Bahanei’s	 legal	 profile	 that	 will	 support	 the	 land	 claim	 process	 and	 the	 planned	REDD+	activities,		 I	went	to	visit	the	Bahanei	for	a	week.	The	aim	of	the	visit	was	to	verify	the	Bahanei	 Indigenous	map	 using	 GPS	 tools	 that	 are	more	 advanced	 than	 the	tools	 that	 the	 Bahanei	 had	 used	 during	 the	 mapping	 processes.	 I	 verified	some	of	the	points	along	the	Bahanei	territorial	borders	and	compared	them	with	the	data	that	the	Bahanei	had	collected.	I	checked	for	the	precision	of	the	lines	 that	 they	 drew	 and	 found	 just	 a	 little	 deviation.	 I	made	 a	 report	 and	submitted	 it	 to	 the	REDD+	Agency	and	 I	hope	 that	 this	 verification	process	can	 be	 employed	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Bahanei’s	 attempt	 to	 obtain	 formal	recognition	 for	 their	 Indigenous	 territory	 or	 for	 the	 mapping	 of	 potential	carbons	in	the	Bahanei’s	territory	(Interview,	Nurwajono,	April	2014).						
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	Figure	7.2	Process	of	manually	drawing	map	of	the	Bahanei	territory	(Source:	Rini	Astuti,	2013)		
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	Figure	7.3	Manual	map	of	the	Bahanei	territory	(Source:	AMAN	CK,	2013)			Despite	 the	 effort	 to	 create	 a	 sense	of	 belonging	 among	 the	Bahanei,	 the	mapping	processes	 were	 mainly	 led	 by	 the	Mantir	 or	 Adat	 leader	 who	 is	 also	 the	 village	
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secretary	 official.	 The	Mantir	 took	 a	major	 role	 in	 defining	 the	 Bahanei’s	 borders	which	was	 seldom	 contested	 by	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 villagers.	 The	Dayak	Ngaju	 ethnic	group	 were	 most	 active	 in	 their	 involvement	 with	 the	 mapping	 processes.	 Aside	from	enjoying	the	position	as	the	majority	in	the	community,	almost	all	of	the	formal	and	 informal	 leadership	positions	are	held	by	the	Ngaju.	Other	ethnic	groups	have	had	minimal	engagement	in	the	mapping	processes.	As	migrants,	the	Banjar	people	came	 to	 Bahanei	 as	 rubber	 tappers;	 some	 married	 local	 villagers	 and	 sell	 their	labour	to	work	on	their	in-law’s	lands.	In	the	context	of	intimate	social	bond	enabled	by	the	relatively	small	scale	of	the	Bahanei	population,	the	Banjar	cannot	freely	open	forests	 to	 set-up	 their	 own	 rubber	 plantations.	 Thus,	 the	 Banjar	 are	 deprived	 of	having	 access	 to	 land	 unless	 they	 can	 afford	 to	 buy	 from	 the	 Ngaju	 or	 through	marriage.	 Similar	 conditions	 apply	 to	 the	 ethnic	 Java.	 These	 differences	 in	 land	access	 set	 the	 tone	 of	 participation	 in	 mapping	 processes.	 Therefore,	 while	 the	Bahanei’s	 Indigenous	 land	claim	counters	how	the	state	and	the	private	sector	has	traditionally	 appropriated	 land,	 the	 assemblage	 formed	 intensifies	 intimate	exclusions	within	the	community	 itself,	as	I	discuss	further	below	(see	Hall,	Hirsch	and	Li,	2011)			For	 the	Bahanei,	a	map	acts	as	a	 type	of	spokesperson	 for	 them	as	 it	can	be	easily	understood	by	others.	Maps	have	 the	capacity	 to	both	render	visible	and	 invisible,	highlighting	or	hiding	political	and	technical	data	depending	on	what	the	creators	of	the	map	want	to	reveal	(Scott,	1998).	Bahanei	maps	illustrate	densely	forested	areas	as	 the	Bahanei’s	 sacred	sites	 that	have	 to	be	 respected,	prohibiting	 the	opening	of	forests	 for	 non-spiritual	 activities.	 As	 such	 the	map	 helps	 the	 Bahanei	 promote	 a	particular	eco-spiritual	identity	and	highlight	conflicts	where	sacred	forests	overlap	with	 logging	 concessions	 (see	 eg	 Li,	 2001).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 map	 also	 hides	information	that	could	have	a	detrimental	impact	on	their	claims,	such	as	social	data	on	the	heterogeneous	ethnic	make	up	of	the	community	that	may	detract	from	their	land	 claim	 narrative,	 which	 assumes	 a	 relatively	 homogenous	 local	 Dayak	 tribe.	Instead	the	mapping	technology	enables	the	necessary	spatial	data	to	be	assembled	to	express	a	particular	vision	of	Bahanei	indigeneity.				
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The	map	 is	one	of	 the	most	 important	elements	 in	assembling	an	 Indigenous	 land	claim.	 It	 was	 also	 an	 important	 tool	 to	 encourage	 action.	 A	 sense	 of	 crisis,	 for	example,	was	introduced	through	the	mapping	processes	when	a	map	of	Bahanei’s	land	was	overlayed	on	one	 showing	 the	 companies’	 concession	areas.	The	overlap	encouraged	 action	 to	 prevent	 the	 loss	 of	 their	 forests.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 community	leaders,	states:			 	We	knew	that	the	logging	company	was	going	to	take	our	rubber	forest,	but	we	never	realized	how	far	the	concession	area	was	going	to	intrude	into	our	land.	Knowing	that	they	would	take	more	than	two	thirds	of	the	village	land	just	made	me	so	angry	(Interview,	Bapa	Rara,	April	2014).		Mapping	practices	act	as	governmental	technologies	for	AMAN	CK	to	steer	decision-making	 processes	 within	 the	 community.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 when	 AMAN	 CK	asked	 the	 Bahanei	 to	 manage	 their	 land	 according	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 forest	conservation	and	sustainable	development.	AMAN	CK	helped	facilitate	this	through	practices	 of	 spatial	 ordering	whereby	 zones	 were	 established	 in	 which	 particular	rules	are	enforced.			 	We	know	that	the	Bahanei	has	all	the	knowledge	about	their	land	and	forest.	We	 help	 to	manifest	 the	 knowledge	 into	 the	 Bahanei’s	map	 in	 the	 form	 of	zoning	system	so	 that	 it	will	be	visible	 to	both	 the	Bahanei	 themselves	and	the	outsider.	We	listen	to	the	stories	told	by	Adat	leaders	about	which	forest	is	for	what	function	and	who	are	allowed	to	access	them.	We	help	the	Bahanei	to	 formulate	a	set	of	 rule	 that	can	be	employed	 to	govern	 the	 forests	zones	and	declare	the	Bahanei’s	authority	over	their	territory	(Interview,	Bredana,	November	2013)		The	construction	of	zones	and	 its	categorisations	were	mainly	defined	by	the	Adat	leaders	 coming	 from	 the	 Dayak	 Ngaju	 ethnic	 group,	 who	 claim	 to	 have	 the	authoritative	spatial	knowledge	on	the	territory	and	the	 legitimation	powers	to	do	so.	 Public	 consultations	with	 the	 community	members	were	 held	 several	 times	 to	
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reach	 consensus,	however	 they	had	 low	attendance	 from	non-Ngaju	 ethnic	 groups	and	passive	participation	from	female	members	of	the	community.		The	map	of	the	Bahanei	territory	is	divided	into	ten	zones	for	living,	rubber	farming,	reserve	 forest,	 conservation	 forest,	 production	 forest,	 and	 five	 types	 of	 sacred	sites/sacred	 forests	 (Figure	 7.4).	 Named	 using	 Dayak	Ngaju	 language,	 each	 zone	specifies	the	types	of	practices	that	are	accepted	and	which	are	not	(Table	7.1).				 	Table	7.1	Zoning	system	in	the	Bahanei	Indigenous	territory	
Zone	 Remarks	
7.3.1.1 Himba	Gita	 7.3.1.2 A	forest	zone	that	is	used	to	cultivate	rubber	trees.	The	rubber	trees	are	planted	through	intercropping	system	with	the	endemic	species	to	retain	the	biodiversity	of	the	forest.		
Himba	Lakau	 is	defined	as	a	forest	zone	in	which	no	one	is	allowed	to	open	forests	for	mining,	farming	or	hunting,	as	there	are	many	rare	Ulin	trees	(Eusideroxylon	
zwageri)	and	rare	animals	living	in	the	particular	area	
Himba	Duyun	 a	forest	zone	that	is	home	to	various	medicinal	herbs	and	big	plants	and	where	it	is	not	permitted	for	non-community	members	to	enter	without	permission	by	
adat	leaders	
Himba	Rutas	 a	forest	zone	that	is	considered	sacred	because	of	its	tragic	history	as	a	place	where	some	members	of	the	community	were	killed	during	the	time	where	the	Dayaknese	still	practicing	headhunting.	This	forest	zone	is	prohibited	for	agriculture	activities	and	is	communally	owned	by	the	Bahanei	
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Himba	Tajahan	 is	a	forest	area	that	is	believed	to	be	the	place	for	the	Bahanei’s	ancestor	to	worship	their	gods.	The	places	for	worship	are	usually	signed	with	wooden	statues	and	these	areas	are	not	available	for	agriculture	activities	
Himba	Pukung	
Pahewan	 is	a	forest	area	that	the	Bahanei	believed	to	be	the	home	of	kind	spirits	who	help	them	during	difficult	times.	This	forest	area	can	be	opened	for	agriculture	activities	but	have	to	be	with	caution	in	order	not	to	disturb	the	spirits	
Bukit	Kules	 are	hilly	areas	near	the	village	that	is	planned	for	eco-tourism.	Himba	Cagar	Eka	Malan	is	a	forest	zone	that	is	allowed	for	agriculture	expansion	and	the	Bahanei	can	cut	down	trees	from	this	forest	to	utilize	its	woods	
Kaleka	 are	sacred	sites	that	scattered	around	Bahanei	and	is	believed	to	be	the	remains	of	the	Bahanei’s	ancestors’	villages	or	places	of	worship	
Keramat	 are	places	of	worship	for	the	Bahanei	that	are	still	practicing	Kaharingan,	the	ancestor-worshipping	religion.	Keramat	is	regarded	as	very	sacred	sites	and	usually	signed	with	wooden	mini	house	and	statues	
Lewu	or	Kampung	 an	area	designated	for	the	Bahanei’s	neighborhood	which	host	houses,	a	school	building,	and	a	village	head	office			Zoning	 simplifies	 the	 complexity	 of	 socio-ecological	 relationships	 into	 effective	spatial	abstractions	(see	Li,	2000).	In	this	case	zones	were	used	to	discipline	subjects	into	conducting	themselves	in	ways	align	with	the	broader	political	conjuncture	(Li,	2000).		
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	Figure	7.4	Zoning	system	in	the	Bahanei	territory		(Source:	AMAN	CK,	2014)			
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The	 zoning	 system	 is	 becoming	 the	 Bahanei’s	 vision	 for	 sustainable	 land	 use	planning,	with	more	than	20%	of	its	total	areas	being	dedicated	for	conservation	and	protection.	 Hence,	 AMAN	 CK	 has	 successfully	 assisted	 the	 Bahanei	 in	 articulating	their	position	as	forest	stewards,	an	important	step	for	assembling	Indigenous	land	claims	 in	 the	 context	 of	 REDD+	 politics	 (Li,	 2000).	 REDD+	 aims	 to	 facilitate	 the	governing,	 disciplining	 and	 normalising	 of	 Indigenous	 people’s	 forest	 conduct	 in	ways	that	conform	with	international	climate	finance’s	interests	in	conservation	and	development	(Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015).	By	aligning	with	this	ideal,	the	Bahanei,	through	AMAN	CK,	has	been	able	 to	successfully	assemble	REDD+	proponents’	 (eg	the	REDD+	Agency	and	Kemitraan)	and	their	resources	to	strengthen	the	land	claim	(see	Li,	2007b).			
7.3.2 Articulating	Indigeneity		Alongside	 territorialisation	 technologies	 AMAN	 CK	 also	 seeks	 to	 facilitate	 the	production	of	a	set	of	Bahanei	adat	rules	to	further	strengthen	the	community’s	land	claims	 (see	 Li,	 2000).	 Adat	 rules	 transform	 on-paper	 ownership	 into	 territorial	control	 in	 which	 particular	 ways	 of	 being	 are	 normalized	 while	 others	 are	invalidated	in	different	spaces	(see	Merry,	2001).	The	rules	govern	the	territory	by	defining	who	 is	 allowed,	 and	 not	 allowed,	 to	 access	 and	 use	 Bahanei’s	 forest	 and	land	resources	in	what	ways.	This	has	necessitated	series	of	activities	oriented	at	the	revival	or	reinvention	of	adat	amongst	the	Bahanei,	with	the	new	rules	formulated	and	 selected	 according	 to	 the	 Ngaju’s	 knowledge	 and	 identity.	 Members	 of	 the	community	 were	 charged	 with	 researching	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 community’s	relationships	with	 the	 forest	 (Li,	 2000).	 Two	 groups	were	 formed,	 however,	 with	low	participation	from	the	migrants.	One	group	explored	the	history	of	the	land	and	the	traditions	of	the	people.	Another	group	was	assigned	to	documenting	the	plant,	animal,	fish,	and	medicinal	herbs	present	within	the	territory.			The	subsequent	rules	discriminate	between	three	types	of	users:	private	companies	or	 enterprises;	 non-Bahanei	 people;	 and	 Bahanei	 people.	 The	 spatial	 ordering	 for	private	 companies	 specifies	 any	 forms	 of	 private	 company	 activity	 in	 the	 Bahanei	territory	as	trespassing	unless	permitted	by	the	adat	council.	Any	violation	against	
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these	 rules	will	 lead	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 sanctions.	 The	 particular	 designation	 of	rules	for	the	private	company	is	according	to	AMAN	CK	activist:		 A	 necessary	 weapon	 to	 fight	 against	 the	 land	 grabbing	 conducted	 by	 East	Point	that	is	backed	by	the	state.	We	learn	from	the	success	stories	of	other	Indigenous	 communities	 that	 had	 successfully	 sanctioned	 the	 private	companies	whose	activities	violated	the	communities’	territories.	Having	this	
adat	rule	in	place	has	bolstered	the	Bahanei’s	sense	of	confidence	and	tighten	their	Indigenous	identities	(Interview,	Bredana,	January	2014).			For	 Bahanei	 and	 non-Bahanei	 people,	 the	 rules	 manage	 the	 use	 of	 the	 natural	resources	 by	 categorizing	 the	 territory	 into	 accessible	 and	 non-accessible	 spaces,	with	 more	 restrictions	 placed	 on	 non-Bahanei	 people.	 	 The	 intimate	 social	exclusions	facing	migrants	previously	described	remain,	however	these	more	formal	
adat	rules	include	migrants	as	part	of	the	Bahanei	community.			A	 special	 group	 of	 watchmen	 has	 formed	 to	 monitor	 the	 violation	 of	 adat	 rules,	which	focused	in	particular	on	trespassing	of	Bahanei	borders.	Moreover,	to	ensure	the	 inculcation	of	 the	adat	 law,	 the	Bahanei	are	encouraged	 to	watch	and	monitor	others	in	the	neighbourhood	(Similar	to	Agrawal’s	(2005)	environmentalities).	The	Bahanei	 have	 been	 told	 in	 multiple	 discussions	 facilitated	 by	 AMAN	 CK	 that	protecting	the	forests	is	as	important	as	protecting	their	own	body.		As	an	AMAN	CK	activist	explained,			 If	the	forests	hurt,	they	hurt.	If	the	forests	thrive,	they	thrive.	The	forestland	defines	 the	 Bahanei’s	 identity	 and	 pride.	 This	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 rest	 of	Dayaknese	 identities	that	are	signified	by	their	connection	to	 land.	Once	we	lose	 this	 connection,	 we	 risk	 losing	 our	 identities	 (Interview,	 Dormano,	October	2013).			Thus,	 the	 Bahanei	 are	 asked	 to	 report	 to	 the	 adat	 leaders	 or	 watchmen	 if	 they	witness	 adat	 violations,	 such	 as,	 timber	 logging	 or	 animal	 hunting	 in	 sacred	 and	protected	 forests.	 Surveillance	 is	 conducted	 not	 just	 by	 those	 in	 authority,	 in	 this	
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context	 being	 the	 adat	watchmen	 or	 community	 leaders,	 but	 also	 through	 more	intimate	 monitoring	 by	 community	 members	 themselves	 (see	 Agrawal,	 2005).	 In	this	 way	 the	 community	 comes	 to	 self-govern	 its	 behaviour	 in	 order	 to	 assemble	territorial	 claims	 that	 fit	 international	 climate	 finance	goals	 (Rice,	2010;	Skoglund,	2014).			To	 assist	 in	 the	 process	 of	 assembling	multiple	 actors,	 AMAN	 CK	 encouraged	 the	adoption	of	FPIC	as	an	adat	rule.	FPIC	requires	every	project	affecting	the	Bahanei	or	their	 territory	 to	 get	 consent	 from	 the	 whole	 community.	 FPIC	 as	 a	 technology	encourages	what	Rose	(1999a)	describes	as	autonomisation	and	responsibilisation.	It	 assumes	 and	 considers	 the	 community	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 making	 appropriate	choices	 and	 weighing	 the	 cost	 and	 opportunity	 of	 a	 particular	 project	 as	 an	‘economically-rational’	 individual	 and	 collective	 (Milne	 and	 Adams,	 2012).	 FPIC	gives	 the	 community	 tools	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 responsible	 and	 well-ordered	 manner	according	 to	 the	 norms	 and	 rules	 ‘allowed’	 by	 FPIC	 principles,	 such	 as	 expressing	grievances	through	consultation	meetings	instead	of	more	confrontational	forms	of	opposition	 ((Li,	2014a).	Article	11.2	of	 the	Adat	 rule	 specifies	 the	 requirement	 for	FPIC	 implementation	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 private	 sector	 is	 planning	 to	 work	 on	 the	Bahanei’s	forestlands.		 [For	the	private	sectors	to]	implement	the	Free,	Prior,	and	Informed	Consent	Protocol	that	will	be	called	FPIC	for	short.	FPIC	is	a	process	that	will	ensure	the	 Indigenous	 communities’	 ability	 to	 enjoy	 their	 fundamental	 rights	 to	democratically	express	and	give	their	consent	or	not	to	a	particular	activity,	program,	 or	 policy	 that	will	 be	 implemented	 upon	 and	 bring	 impact	 to	 the	communities	and	their	resources	including	land,	territory,	and	other	natural	resources	(AMAN	CK,	2013).		In	 other	 words,	 FPIC	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 governmental	 technology	 that	 enables	 a	particular	community	to	conduct	 itself	as	an	accountable-entity	within	a	particular	project	capable	of	deciding	whether	 to	engage	or	not	with	 the	opportunities	being	presented.	As	a	participation	technology,	FPIC	assumes	that	an	affected	community	has	 the	 power	 to	 influence	 the	 way	 a	 particular	 project	 is	 designed	 (Milne	 and	
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Adams,	2012;	Mahanty	and	McDermott,	2013).	The	adoption	of	FPIC	in	the	Bahanei’s	
adat	rules	 shows	 that,	 not	 only	 do	 the	 Bahanei	 people	 articulate	 their	 indigeneity	through	their	local	connections	with	material	and	spiritual	worlds,	but	also	through	globally	accepted	Indigenous	policies	and	discourses	(Li,	2000).	Thus,	the	adat	rules	connect	the	scattered	dots	required	by	the	Bahanei	to	render	themselves	visible	and	at	the	same	time	dissimilar	to	the	world	outside.			The	(re)formulation	of	adat	rules,	establishment	of	adat	‘police’	and	the	inception	of	FPIC	are	apparatuses	of	indigeneity.	Combined	with	the	territorialisation	processes	initiated	through	the	mapping	technologies	they	allow	for	a	particular	expression	of	indigeneity	that	is	shaped	by,	and	most	likely	to	be	recognised	and	rewarded	by,	the	opportunities	 associated	 with	 Indonesia’s	 new	 political	 conjuncture	 in	 forest	governance.	However	they	also	consolidate,	and	in	the	process	restrain,	a	particular	homogenous	 vision	 of	 indigeneity	 that	 fits	 the	 imaginary	 Indigenous	 community	promoted	by	REDD+	developers.		
7.4 Tensions	and	Fractures	The	 forms	 of	 governmentality	 and	 assemblage	 described	 above	 do	 not	 guarantee	Indigenous	 claims	 to	 land.	 Instead	 they	 reveal	 some	 emerging	 strategies	 of	territoriality	 and	 ways	 of	 performing	 indigeneity	 that	 reflect	 Indonesia’s	 new	political	conjuncture.	However,	old	political	ecologies	are	hard	to	shift,	and	there	is	a	tension	 between	 national	 policy	 and	 local	 implementation.	 The	Bupati,	 or	 district	level	 governor,	 for	 example,	 is	 officially	 responsible	 for	 legally	 endorsing	 adat	forests	 and	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 ensuring	 local	 efforts	 are	 recognised	 in	national	 initiatives.	 However	 the	 Bupati	 often	 has	 other	 interests,	 including	 the	economic	 development	 of	 their	 region	 and	 funding	 re-election	 campaigns,	 both	 of	which	 can	 rely	 on	 exploiting,	 rather	 than	 protecting,	 natural	 resources.	Incorporating	 the	 Bupati	 into	 Indigenous	 land	 claims	 assemblages	 has	 proved	 a	difficult	 task.	While	 the	 elected	Bupati	 is	 currently	 in	prison	 for	 a	 corruption	 case	involving	the	issuance	of	illegal	forest	concessions,	the	interim	official	remains	more	supportive	of	 extractive	 industries	 than	 Indigenous	 land	 claims.	 In	 an	 interview,	 a	
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district	 official	 expresses	 his	 view	 by	 articulating	 the	 local	 political	 dynamics	 that	Indigenous	land	assemblages	face:				 How	could	the	Bupati	endorse	a	mapping	process	that	will	be	followed	by	all	Dayak	people	in	Gunung	Mas	District.	If	all	the	land	is	claimed	by	them,	then	where	 would	 the	 Bugis	 and	 Banjar	 people	 have	 to	 go?	 They	 represent	 a	significant	 number	 of	 voters	 in	 local	 elections.	 The	Bupati	 doesn’t	 want	 to	upset	them	(Interview,	Poniman,	April	2014).			AMAN	CK’s	effort	to	codify	and	modify	how	the	Bahanei	relate	to	one	another	and	to	the	forest	through	a	revitalised	adat	is	very	much	shaped	by	fractures	and	tensions	within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 community.	 Local	 artisanal	 gold	 miners,	 for	 example,	initially	 opposed	 the	 implementation	 of	 adat	rules,	 fearing	 it	 would	 restrict	 their	activities.	As	 the	price	of	rubber	has	been	plummeting	 for	 the	 last	couple	of	years,	many	members	of	 the	Bahanei	 community	 supplement	 their	 incomes	 from	mining	gold	sand	along	the	Bahanei	River.	There	are	around	ten	mining	machines	owned	by	elite	Ngaju	who	can	afford	to	buy	the	machine	and	the	fuels	required.	Each	machine	requires	four	to	six	miners	to	operate	–	mostly	migrants	and	poorer	Ngaju	who	have	smaller	rubber	plantations.			The	mining	processes,	which	use	mercury	to	filter	river	mud	for	the	gold	sands,	have	caused	 environmental	 problems,	 such	 as	 river	 siltation	 and	 the	 poisoning	 of	 the	water	 body.	 The	 government	 through	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 the	 MoF	 are	labelling	 the	 artisanal	 small-scale	 mining,	 particularly	 when	 conducted	 in	 forest	areas,	as	 illegal	and	destructive	activities	 (Spiegel,	2012).	Thus,	 forest	 rangers	and	the	police	can	prosecute	and	put	 local	artisanal	miners	 in	 jail.	These	unsustainable	practices	 also	 clash	 with	 the	 conservation	 subjectivities	 AMAN	 CK	 is	 promoting	within	the	community.	For	now,	AMAN	CK	has	convinced	the	miners	that	they	will	have	 more	 freedom	 and	 opportunity	 for	 mining	 when	 Bahanei	 territory	 is	 given	legal	 status	 as	 an	 Indigenous	 domain.	 AMAN	CK	 argues	 that	 legal	 endorsement	 of	Bahanei	 territory	 will	 allow	 the	 Bahanei	 to	 govern	 the	 land	 and	 its	 resources	without	 fear	 of	 being	 caught	 by	 the	 police	 or	 forest	 rangers.	 Once	 the	 territory	 is	
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legally	endorsed	a	practice	of	sustainable	mining	may	be	introduced	(for	the	context	in	Suriname	see	Haalboom,	2011).			However,	 there	 are	 clear	 tensions	 here	 as	 some	 Bahanei	 resist	 the	 green	subjectivities	being	thrust	upon	them.	In	an	interview	with	one	of	the	adat	 leaders	involved	in	a	different	community-mapping	struggle,	the	leader	saw	Indigenous	land	claims	 as	 an	opportunity	 to	 increase	 Indigenous	profits	 from	extractive	 industries	(Interview,	Bapa	Zuli,	April	2014).	For	 this	 leader,	 the	map	 is	a	 tool	 for	 increasing	profits	from	expanding	palm	oil,	rather	than	a	tool	to	protect	traditional	territories	from	them.					These	 fractures	 created	 by	 these	 non-performing	 Indigenes	 reflect	 broader	 subtle	tensions.	While	practices	of	territorialisation	play	a	vital	role	in	strengthening	claims	to	 land	 and	 codifying	 local	 Indigenous	 identities	 the	 process	 is	 contributing	 to	ongoing	 intimate	 exclusions	 -	 everyday	 practices	 that	 exclude	 some	 from	 the	benefits	 others	 are	 receiving	 (Hall,	 Hirsch	 and	 Li,	 2011).	 Exclusion	 is	 inevitable	when	 priviledged	 access	 and	 ownership	 to	 benefits	 is	 granted	 to	 a	 particular	individual	or	collective.	A	Bahanei	member	reflects	on	the	intimate	exclusions	in	the	case	study	area:		 One	of	the	elders	of	the	community	questioning	my	motive	of	being	active	in	AMAN	 CK’s	 activities	 …	 he	 provoked	 others	 to	 hate	 me	 since	 I	 am	 not	originally	 from	Bahanei	 and	 talked	behind	my	back	…	he	even	undermined	the	hard	work	I	have	done	for	the	community	and	he	wanted	my	position	[in	the]	 community’s	 committee	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 someone	 else	 (Interview,	Bapa	Nandita,	April	2014).		Culture,	 local	 political	 tensions	 and	 relational	 power	 play	 important	 roles	 in	facilitating	such	kinds	of	intimate	exclusions	(Hall,	Hirsch	and	Li,	2011).	As	such	the	practices	of	governmentality	and	assemblage	can	exacerbate	inequalities	in	pursuit	of	 broader	 collective	 goals.	 The	market	 environmentalism	 that	underpins	 the	new	political	 conjuncture	 can	 simplify	 and	 homogenise	 communities	 as	 “black	 boxes”	who	 can	 be	 packaged	 in	 particular	 ways	 for	 carbon	 investors	 (Milne	 and	 Adams,	
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2012,	 p.	 147).	 Homogeneity	 simplifies	 the	 political	 and	 technical	 configurations	needed	 to	 ‘modify’	 communities	 who	 are	 constructed	 as	 	 ‘economically-rational’	actors	 capable	 of	 responding	 to	 the	 contracts	 required	 by	 REDD+	 and	 other	mechanisms	of	market	environmentalism.		
	These	 exclusions	 raise	 concerns	 Indigenous	 land	 claims	 may	 be	 experienced	 as	Indigenous	land	grabs	by	those	who	are	excluded.	Indigenous	communities	favoured	by	the	new	political	conjuncture	and	empowered	by	Indigenous	and	environmental	networks	 may	 attempt	 to	 grab	 land	 from	 neighbouring	 communities	 that	 fit	 less	comfortably	within	idealised	visions	of	indigeneity.	Within	communities	the	process	of	 assembling	 land	 claims	 may	 involve	 intimate	 exclusions	 whereby	 a	 particular	homogeneous	indigeneity	is	performed	that	results	in	intensification	of	community	exclusions	 rooted	 in	 ethnicity,	 class	 and	 gender	 inequalities	 (Hall,	 Hirsch	 and	 Li,	2011).	 As	Hall	 et	 al	 (2011)	 argue	 in	 their	 analysis	 of	 exclusion’s	 double	 edge	 that	“every	 counter	 to	 one	 discourse	 of	 exclusion	 necessarily	 proposes	 exclusion	 on	other	grounds”	(p.	171).	At	this	local	scale	an	empowering	land	claim	for	some	may	be	experienced	as	a	marginalising	land	grab	by	others.				A	land	grab	is	characterized	within	scholarly	articles	as	involving	large	scale	changes	in	land	use	and	land	property	relations,	powerful	private	/	public	partnerships,	food,	fuel,	mineral	and	conservation	focused	activities,	and	involving	“the	restructuring	of	rules	and	authority	over	 the	access,	use	and	management	of	 resources”	 (Fairhead,	Leach	 and	 Scoones,	 2012,	 p.	 239)	 that	 often	 intensify	 local	 exclusions	 and	marginality	 (Borras	et	al.,	 2011;	Corson,	MacDonald	 and	Neimark,	 2013;	Margulis,	McKeon	and	Borras,	2013).	 In	contrast	 Indigenous	 land	claims	are	associated	with	specific	 small-scale	 territorial	 claims	on	 land	and	 its	 resources	based	on	collective	rights,	 historical	 connections	 to	 place,	 discourses	 of	 injustice,	 in	 opposition	 to	powerful	 state	 and	private	 sector	 actors	 (Peluso,	1995;	Hall,	Hirsch	and	Li,	 2011).	Whereas	 land	 grabs	 often	 marginalise	 those	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 within	 a	 vision	 of	improved	 resource	 use	 for	 economic	 development,	 land	 claims	 are	more	 likely	 to	prioritise	 “ethno-territorial”	 rights	 based	 on	 place-based	 homogenous	 “green”	subjectivities	of	connection	and	belonging	that,	similarly,	not	all	will	fit	(Hall,	Hirsch	
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and	Li,	2011).	 	Hence	land	claims,	 like	land	grabs,	risk	intensifying	local	exclusions	and	marginality	if	they	are	insufficiently	responsive	to	community	diversity.			As	 a	 trustee,	AMAN	CK	has	been	 slow	 to	 address	 the	 intimate	exclusions	 faced	by	migrants.	 Moreover,	 neighboring	 communities	 around	 the	 Bahanei	 question	 the	basis	upon	which	the	borders	are	determined	and	claims	made.	For	these	neighbors,	the	struggle	 to	establish	Bahanei	 territory	 is	seen	as	a	 local	 land	grab,	 threatening	their	 access	 to	 land	 and	 forest	 resources	 such	 as	 timber.	 Without	 careful	consideration	about	these	potential	tensions,	there	is	a	risk	that	those	communities	that	are	not	AMAN	members	and	cannot	perform	the	green	Indigenous	ideals	valued	in	 the	 political	 conjuncture	 will	 be	 further	 marginalised.	 As	 Pratt	 (2012,	 p.	 178)	observes,	“Indigenous	communities	are	never	the	intimate	and	cohesive	social	units	we	 anticipate”.	 In	 Indonesia	 forest	 communities	 have	 become	 increasingly	heterogeneous	 in	 their	 ethnicity	 characteristics	 and	 livelihood	 practices	 due	 to	transmigration	 policies	 during	 the	 New	 Order	 regime	 that	 brought	 million	 of	Javanese	to	the	outer	islands	of	Indonesia	(Hall,	Hirsch	and	Li,	2011).	Moreover,	the	presence	of	private	 investment	 in	 the	 forms	of	mining	and	plantation	have	 further	altered	 Indigenous	 livelihood	 practices	 as	 many	 move	 from	 forest	 dwellers	 into	laborers.	 REDD+	 then	 presents	 the	 possibility	 that	 Indigenous	 communities	 that	perform	in	ways	that	fit	REDD+	imaginaries	will	benefit	more	than	those	that	don’t.	This	 increases	the	vulnerabilities	of	the	 latter,	which	are	often	higher	compared	to	the	former	(Li,	2014b),	and	may	reify	an	Indigenous	definition	that	they	may	never	be	able	to	perform.				
7.5 Conclusion	In	this	chapter	I	have	argued	that	three	inter-related	processes	have	created	a	new	political	 conjuncture	 in	 forest	 governance	 in	 Indonesia.	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	decision	 recognising	 Indigenous	 land	 claims,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 carbon	 economies	through	 REDD+,	 and	 the	 national	 One-map	 initiative	 that	 seeks	 clarity	 on	 land	ownership,	 have	 all	 combined	 to	 provide	 new	 opportunities	 for	 Indigenous	 land	claims.	 There	 is	 renewed	 interest	 in	 Indigenous	 peoples,	 new	 resources	 and	technologies	 devoted	 to	 recognize	 their	 claims,	 and	 new	 Indigenous	 geographies	
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being	 produced.	 Governmental	 mechanisms	 are	 contributing	 to	 socio-ecological	assemblages	that	enable	Indigenous	propositions	that	challenge	the	status	quo.			At	the	core	of	the	Bahanei	assemblage	are	Indigenous	groups,	AMAN	CK,	AMAN,	the	REDD+	Agency,	REDD+,	the	Constitutional	Court,	GPS,	the	Bahanei’s	map,	Kemitraan,	OMI,	 the	 forest	 moratorium,	 expert	 subjectivities,	 gold	 miners,	 Indigenous	performances,	 FPIC,	 adat	 rule,	 forests,	 rubber	 prices,	 community	 consultations,	carbon	traders,	donors,	and,	hopefully,	local	authorities.	More	broadly	there	are	the	active	engagements	of	environmental	and	Indigenous	activists,	researchers,	national	and	 international	 governments,	 and	 donors	 in	 steering	 the	 direction	 of	 REDD+	policy-making	 and	 its	 implementations	 toward	 inclusiveness	 and	 socio-ecological	justice.	There	can	be	little	doubt	that	the	previous	status	quo,	which	favoured	state	and	 private	 interests	 in	 extractive	 industries,	 is	 being	 challenged	 in	 new	 creative	ways.	This	 assemblage	 is	 however	provisional,	 loose,	 disjointed	 and	 responsive	 to	shifting	political	developments	–	and	what	this	chapter	describes	here	is	constantly	changing.	Capturing	 this	dynamic	assemblage	of	 forest	political	 conjuncture	 in	 the	academic	writing	 process,	 however,	 is	 problematic	 and	 difficult	 given	 the	 pace	 of	change	on	the	ground.	In	conducting	this	research,	I	have	to	adapt	to	this	situation	of	researching	“a	moving	train”	with	flexibility	and	rigor	(see	Chapter	3).			This	 chapter	 has	 also	 shown	 that	 assembling	 Indigenous	 land	 claims	 through	 the	production	 of	 Indigenous	 territory	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 particular	 green	Indigenous	 identities	 are	 fraught	 processes	 that	 are	 changing	 Indigenous	subjectivities	and	human-forest	relationships	at	local	scales.	The	type	of	Indigenous	territory	 being	 produced	 bears	 the	 imprint	 of	 romanticized	 visions	 of	 indigeneity	circulating	 within	 REDD+	 communities,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 governmental	 tactics	 and	hopes	 of	 Indigenous	 rights	 NGOs	 such	 as	 AMAN.	 	 The	 chapter’s	 analysis	 suggests	that	 the	 tentative	 alliance	 between	 Indigenous	 groups	 and	 REDD+	 proponents	 is	producing	opportunities	for	Indigenous	land	claims	whereby	land	is	reclaimed	from	the	state	and	extractive	industries.		At	the	same	time	however	local	Indigenous	land	grabs	 based	 on	 powers	 of	 intimate	 exclusion	 and	 performance	 of	 particular	Indigenous	green	subjectivities	are	creating	frictions	and	forms	of	exclusion	within	and	 between	 communities,	 favouring	 those	 who	 can	 perform	 these	 quite	 limited	
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subjectivities	 over	 others.	 Migrants,	 miners,	 and	 others	 interested	 in	 converting	forests	 to	other	uses	 risk	being	excluded	 from	new	assemblages	and	 the	potential	benefits.			Ensuring	 that	 Indigenous	 land	 claims	 are	 not	 experienced	 as	 land	 grabs	 by	vulnerable	 groups	 requires	 acknowledging	 diversity	 and	 devoting	 attention	 to	overcoming	forms	of	intimate	exclusion,	based	on	categories	such	as	ethnicity,	class,	and	 gender	 (Hall,	 Hirsch	 and	 Li,	 2011).	 Incorporating	 more	 heterogeneous	understandings	 of	 forest	 communities	 into	 assemblages	 currently	 based	 on	homogenous	articulations	of	indigeneity	is	a	necessary	next	step	in	pursuing	fair	and	just	 outcomes	 from	 the	 new	 political	 conjuncture.	 Much	 will	 depend	 on	 the	governmental	 skills	 and	 approaches	 implemented	 by	 trustees	 steering	 these	processes,	 in	 this	 case	 AMAN,	 to	 form	 assemblages	 that	 enable,	 rather	 than	constrain,	 diverse	 local	 Indigenous	 aspirations.	 	 However	 it	 also	 requires	 greater	awareness	 of	 heterogeneity	 amongst	 the	 broader	 actors	 shaping	 the	 politics	 and	opportunities	 for	 forest	 carbon	 economies.	 	 The	 imaginary	 REDD+	 Indigenous	identity	 circulating	 amongst	 donors,	 investors,	 developers,	 policy	 makers,	 law	makers	and	technologists	associated	with	REDD+	is	both	enabling	and	constraining	at	 the	same	time,	 influencing	the	political	opportunities	and	strategies	of	others	 in	the	assemblage.	The	imaginary	Indigenous	identities	are	legitimized	and	facilitated	by	 the	 interests	 of	 state	 and	non-state	 actors	 in	 producing	 governable	 spaces	 and	environmental	 subjectivities	 that	 enable	 participation	 within	 market	 based	environmental	 governance.	 Moving	 beyond	 rigid	 stereotypes	 by	 recognising	 local	complexity	 and	 diversity	 may	 slow	 such	 efforts,	 but	 expand	 the	 possibilities	 for	more	 just	outcomes	 that	prevent	 the	potentially	 slippery	and	unwanted	 transition	from	Indigenous	land	claims	to	Indigenous	land	grabs.			 	
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8 Conclusion		
“Sometimes	we	simply	have	to	keep	our	eyes	open	
and	look	carefully	at	individual	cases—not	in	the	hope	of	proving	anything,	
but	rather	in	the	hope	of	learning	something!”	
Hans	Eysenk	(1976)			
8.1 Introduction	The	 acts	 of	 governing	 human	 –	 forest	 interfaces	 through	 REDD+	 are	 far	 from	straightforward.	Rather,	as	explored	in	this	thesis,	as	an	art	of	government	REDD+	is	developed,	 translated,	 shaped	 and	 contested	 in	 many	 ways.	 A	 new	 political	conjuncture	 in	 forest	 governance	 is	 emerging,	 driven	 in	 part	 by	what	 Indonesia’s	REDD+	proponents	call	“Beyond	Carbon,	More	than	Forest”.	Drawing	on	three	case	studies,	 I	 have	 argued	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 that	 this	 particular	 characteristic	 of	Indonesia’s	REDD+	has	modulated	 the	way	REDD+	governmental	 technologies	 are	being	produced,	applied	and	contested.	To	this	end,	I	have	presented	the	findings	of	the	 research	 in	 three	 chapters,	 each	of	which	addressed	 research	objective	one	 to	
examine	how	REDD+	governmental	technologies	are	being	developed,	applied,	
and	 contested	with	what	 effects,	within	 three	 different	 case	 studies.	 In	 what	follows	I	will	respond	to	research	objective	1	and	summarize	the	findings	that	have	been	 presented	 in	 Chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7.	 Following	 this	 summary,	 I	will	 extend	 the	discussion	 on	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 by	 employing	 the	 not-quite	neoliberal	 nature	 framework	 to	 answer	 research	 objective	 2	 (de	 Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).			During	the	three	years	of	this	PhD	there	have	been	three	changes	in	the	government	institution	charged	to	implement	REDD+	in	Indonesia:	the	REDD+	Taskforce	(2010	–	2013),	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	 (2014),	 and	 the	 Directorate	 General	 of	 Climate	 Change	under	 the	 newly	 merged	 MOEF	 (2015	 –	 present).	 The	 frequent	 changing	 of	 the	REDD+	 institution	 demonstrates	 the	 dynamic	 yet	 shaky	 ground	 in	 which	
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governmental	 strategies	 are	 devised.	 	 The	 recent	 decision	 by	 President	 Jokowi	 to	dissolve	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	 within	 the	 MOEF	 suggests	 the	 program	 may	 fade.	However,	several	REDD+	related	influential	programs	are	still	being	implemented	as	forest	reform	programs,	such	as	OMI	-	including	the	forest	moratorium.	Yet	several	of	 the	 applications	 for	 REDD+	 implementation	 have	 been	 finally	 granted	 by	 the	MOEF.	 The	 latest	 update	 is	 the	 release	 of	 Rimba	Makmur	 Utama’s	 project	 design	document,	a	private	REDD+	project	situated	in	Central	Kalimantan	(Rimba	Makmur	Utama,	2015).	The	document	states	the	annual	potential	sequestration	of	8	million	tons	 of	 carbon.	 However,	 responses	 from	 the	 news	media	 and	 oppositional	 NGOs	were	 unusually	 quiet.	 This	 raises	 questions	 as	 to	 whether	 REDD+	 opponents’	opposition	 based	 on	 the	 perception	 that	 REDD+	 is	 a	 neoliberal	 program	 has	changed.			This	chapter	engaged	this	changing	dynamic	by	addressing	research	objective	2	to	
examine	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 using	 a	 not-quite-neoliberal	
nature	 framework	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 constraints	 but	 also	 remain	 open	 to	
strategic	and	progressive	possibilities	embedded	in	this	mechanism	of	 forest	
governance	 reform.	The	 section	will	 discuss	 cross	 cutting	 elements	 that	 emerge	throughout	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 that	 enable	 the	 translation	of	REDD+	neoliberal	rationality	 into	 not-quite-neoliberal	 governmental	 technologies	 by	 “productively	explor[ing]	 possibilities	 for	 emancipatory	 politics”	 within	 forest	 governance	 (de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015,	p.	242).	I	will	then	outline	the	contribution	this	research	 makes	 to	 both	 the	 body	 of	 knowledge	 on	 neoliberal	 nature	 and	 to	 the	understanding	of	REDD+	as	an	art	of	government.	The	chapter	concludes	with	some	notes	on	the	future	direction	of	research	and	some	final	thoughts.		
8.2 Summary	of	Findings	The	 first	 objective	 of	 the	 research	 is	 to	 examine	 how	 REDD+	 governmental	technologies	 are	being	developed,	 applied,	 and	 contested	with	what	 effects	within	three	different	case	studies.		
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8.2.1 Research	Objective	1(a)	
To	 examine	 a	 selection	 of	 governmental	 technologies	 being	 developed	 and	
applied	 by	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 to	 mainstream	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia	 –	
particularly	at	the	national	scale.	The	case	study	focuses	on	the	participatory	
technologies	being	developed,	the	politics	surrounding	these	technologies	and	
the	new	subjectivities	emerging.			In	 Chapter	 5,	 I	 have	 discussed	 three	 governmental	 technologies	 produced	 by	 the	Taskforce	 to	normalize	REDD+	as	an	art	of	 forest	 government	 in	 Indonesia.	These	governmental	technologies	work	by	communicating,	visualizing	and	engaging	forest	carbon	 as	 the	 main	 rationality	 for	 REDD+	 programs.	 The	 technologies	 seek	 to	produce	REDD+	subjects	and	encourage	people	to	conduct	themselves	in	ways	that	favour	global	climate	governance.		In	addition,	however,	I	found	that	environmental	and	 Indigenous	 activists	 have	 shaped	 REDD+	 implementation	 so	 that	 it	 is	 more	socially	 progressive	 by	 focusing	 on	 more	 than	 conserving	 carbon.	 Governmental	technologies	 to	 communicate	 REDD+	were	 developed	 using	 specific	 concepts	 and	language	 such	 as:	 additionality,	 leakage,	 landscape	 and	 jurisdictional	 approaches.	Each	of	these	concepts	is	supported	with	scientific	knowledge	that	legitimizes	their	use	in	governing	human	and	forest	interfaces	(Holmgren,	2013).	Scientific	concepts	are	 applied	 throughout	 the	 Taskforce’s	 documents	 and	 policies	 to	 introduce	 new	ways	 in	 constructing	 and	 valuing	 forest	 and	 land	 use.	 I	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 that	these	 governmental	 technologies,	 like	 the	 scientific	 forestry	 that	 was	 originally	imported	to	Indonesia	during	the	colonial	era	from	Germany	(Hölzl,	2010;	Siscawati,	2012),	 risk	 marginalizing	 those	 without	 access	 to	 scientific	 knowledge	 while	advancing	those	who	have.		The	Taskforce	bolstered	 carbon	visibility	 through	mapping	 technologies	 to	 render	forest	carbon	as	an	entity	that	can	be	managed	and	governed.		AMAN	also	employed	this	 technology	 to	 render	 visible	 Indigenous	 territories	 by	 overlaying	 them	 with	forest	and	carbon	maps.	This	shows	that	REDD+	governmental	technology	can	be	co-opted	 and	 shaped	 to	 serve	 non-carbon	 interests.	 To	 engage	 wider	 REDD+	stakeholders	 the	 Taskforce	 developed	 their	 governmental	 technologies	 through	
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processes	of	participation	and	consultation.	The	findings	show	that	technologies	to	engage	 stakeholders	were	 often	 formalized	 as	 part	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 REDD+	institution,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 working	 groups	 in	 the	 Taskforce	 and	allocation	of	specific	representation	from	Indigenous	experts	in	the	structure	of	the	REDD+	 Agency.	 The	 technologies	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 attempts	 to	 render	 technical	political	 issues	 by	 shaping	 forms	 of	 engagement	 that	 incorporate	 activists	 as	“insiders”	rather	than	oppositional	“outsiders”	(Backstrand,	2004;	Li,	2007c).				My	analysis	shows	that	through	these	technologies	of	engagement,	new	pro-REDD+	subjectivities	are	emerging.	Activists	who	were	directly	 involved	with	 the	work	of	the	 Taskforce	 and	 the	 REDD+	Agency	 as	 part	 of	 their	 expert	 staffs	 or	 consultants	have	 found	 themselves	exposed	 to	 the	 complexities	of	 forest	governance.	Activists	were	 becoming	 less	 utopian	 and	more	 permissive	 toward	 the	 government’s	 slow	response	 as	 they	 learnt	 the	 “reality”	 of	 complex	 bureaucracies.	 	 Some	 activists	adopted	 subjectivities	 as	 REDD+	 experts	 and	 represented	 the	 government	 when	engaging	civil	society	colleagues	who	were	positioned	“outside”	of	the	government	system.	While	 this	 risk	 activists	 being	 depoliticized,	 the	 engagement	 also	 produce	new	 spaces	 for	 maneuver	 in	 which	 activists	 employed	 REDD+	 governmental	technologies	to	pursue	social	and	environmental	 justice	ends	(Mulyani	and	Jepson,	2013;	Agung	et	al.,	2014).		The	REDD+	Taskforce	went	 some	way	 in	normalizing	 carbon	 rationalities	 through	these	 technologies.	 They	 generally	 drew	 upon	 disciplinary	 and	 neoliberal	environmentalities	to	motivate	the	changes	in	the	conduct	of	the	forest	stakeholders	(Fletcher,	2010).	The	findings	in	Chapter	5	demonstrated,	however,	that	attempts	to	govern	 forest	 stakeholders’	 conduct	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 endeavour	 as	 they	 are	 also	actively	 shaping	 and	 contesting	 the	 governmental	 technologies	 that	 targets	 them.	Motivated	by	 their	particular	 interest	 forest	 stakeholders	 responded	differently	 to	REDD+	governmental	technologies.		In	 Chapter	 Five,	 I	 described	 the	 way	 palm	 oil	 companies	 rejected	 the	implementation	 of	 forest	 moratorium	 policy	 by	 employing	 the	 discourses	 on	national	 sovereignty	 and	 economic	 growth.	 Opposition	 to	 REDD+	 also	 came	 from	
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several	environmental	NGOs,	such	as	WALHI,	 that	were	not	politically	sympathetic	toward	 the	 neoliberal	 rationalities	 underpinning	 REDD+	market	mechanisms.	 The	findings	show	that	contestations	were	not	only	based	on	disagreement	about	REDD+	contents	and	policies	but	also	based	on	resentment	toward	the	institutional	standing	of	the	Taskforce	and	later	the	REDD+	Agency	as	the	new	player	in	the	forestry	and	land	 governance	 system.	 Affected	 ministries,	 such	 as	 MOF	 and	 House	 of	Representatives	 have	 expressed	 their	 disagreement	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 ad-hoc	institution	to	manage	REDD+	by	continuously	questioning	the	Taskforce’s	authority	and	capacity	in	managing	forest	related	programs	and	policies	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2012).	Opposition	to	REDD+	strategies	contributed	to	the	dissolution	of	the	REDD+	Agency	in	 2014.	 	 The	 case	 study	 shows	 that	 the	 production	 of	 new	 governmental	technologies	can	be	undone	and	reshaped	by	existing	political	ecologies.		
8.2.2 Research	Objective	1(b)	
To	 analyze	 the	 production	 and	 application	 of	 OMI	 as	 a	 governmental	
technology	employed	to	produce	governable	space	for	REDD+	investment.	The	
case	 study	 focuses	 on	 the	 design	 of	 OMI	 and	 the	 selective	 engagement	 by	
activists	seeking	to	reorient	OMI	towards	more	progressive	forest	governance.			Drawing	 on	 three	 elements	 of	 OMI:	 the	 Moratorium,	 One	 Database,	 and	 One	Standard,	 I	 showed	 how	 REDD+	 proponents	 problematize	 current	 forest	arrangements	 as	 irrational	 (Li,	 2007c).	 OMI	 emerges	 as	 a	 national	 initiative	 that	requires	all	spatial	policies	and	related	decision	making	to	refer	to	maps	issued	only	by	 GIA	 (Samadhi,	 2012).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 forest	 governance,	 it	 means	 all	 the	decisions	 related	with	 forest	 areas	 have	 to	 refer	 to	maps	 of	 forest	 cover	 that	 are	officially	 acknowledged	 by	 GIA.	 Findings	 in	 Chapter	 6	 demonstrated	 that	 each	technical	ministry	and	provincial/district	government	used	to	have	its	own	version	of	 a	map	 of	 state	 forest	 area	when	 issuing	 forest	 licenses,	 resulting	 in	 concession	overlaps,	 land	 tenure	 conflicts,	 environmental	 degradation,	 and	 forest	 corruption	(Dermawan	et	al.,	2011).	Based	on	the	findings,	I	argued	that	OMI	aims	to	control	the	production	 of	 forest	 spatial	 information	 and	 provides	 a	 greater	 role	 for	 national	government	 agencies	 in	 shaping	 where	 forests	 are,	 how	 forests	 are	 used	 and	 by	
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whom.	Chapter	6	illustrated	that	implementing	OMI	is	becoming	REDD+	proponents’	(the	Taskforce	and	UKP4)	priority	as	REDD+	can	only	be	effectively	implemented	in	a	 conflict	 free	 landscape.	 OMI	 is	 then	 employed	 as	 the	 Taskforce’s	 main	governmental	strategy	to	produce	governable	spaces	for	carbon	investment.			Chapter	6	explained	how	the	forest	moratorium	policy	was	firstly	implemented	as	a	governmental	 technology	 to	 temporarily	 halt	 the	 issuance	 of	 forest	 concessions.	Aimed	to	govern	private	sector	actors	and	government	officials,	Chapter	6	discussed	how	 the	 technology	 performs	 as	 a	 sovereign	 environmentality	 by	 establishing	regulations	 and	 punishing	 those	 who	 do	 not	 adhere.	 	 Drawing	 on	 a	 process	 of	simplification	 the	 complexity	 of	 Indonesia’s	 diverse	 forests	 were	 divided	 into	
primary	natural	forest	and	secondary	forest	(Scott,	1998;	Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2011).	As	Chapter	 6	 has	 argued,	 the	 classification	 provides	 scientific	 legitimacy	 for	 the	government	to	decide	what	is	included	and	excluded	in	the	moratorium.	By	stating	that	 the	 policy	 will	 be	 enforced	 in	 peatland	 and	 primary	 natural	 forest	 only,	 the	government	manufactured	an	approach	that	protected	private	sector	interests	while	appearing	to	be	progressive	and	non-political	(Li,	2005).				By	giving	temporary	pause,	the	moratorium	is	expected	to	provide	enough	time	for	the	forestry	authorities	to	address	the	messiness	of	forest	governance	-	in	particular	problems	related	with	spatial	arrangements.	Despite	its	simplification	and	apolitical	characteristics	 (Scott,	 1998;	 Li,	 2007d),	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	moratorium	has	facilitated	a	new	level	of	data	transparency	enabling	more	informed	contestation	 from	 civil	 society.	 Activists	 engaged	 with	 the	 moratorium	 used	 the	language	and	means	provided	by	 the	REDD+	proponents	 to	monitor	and	highlight	breaches.	The	publication	of	the	Indicative	Moratorium	Map	and	the	opportunity	to	express	contestation	and	grievance	were	widely	employed	by	NGOs	to	problematize	and	publicize	environmental	violations	by	private	sector	actors.			The	 One	 Database	 technology	 sought	 to	 create	 one	 registry	 of	 forest	 concessions	that	 will	 consolidate	 and	 store	 basic	 legal	 and	 spatial	 information,	 such	 as,	 the	location	of	the	concessions	and	its	legal	documents.	I	argued	that	this	governmental	technology	 is	 aimed	 at	 boosting	 data	 transparency	 and	 availability	 while	 also	
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establishing	a	central	point	of	knowledge	and	truth	about	Indonesia’s	forests	(Dean,	2009;	 Aicher,	 2014).	 Findings	 showed	 that	 governing	 of	 practices	 of	 collecting,	reviewing,	 digitizing,	 and	 archiving	 spatial	 information	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 seen	 as	 an	essential	step	in	disciplining	spatial	data	users	and	producers.	Chapter	6	illustrated	for	 example	 that	 by	 simply	 relying	 on	 satellite	 technologies,	 the	 One	 Database	enables	a	better	monitoring	system	by	highlighting	which	institution	or	company	is	responsible	 for	 a	 particular	 plot	 of	 forest.	 Thus,	 Chapter	 6	 proposed	 that	 One	Database	could	perform	as	a	surveillance	mechanism	for	policing	concession	holders	not	to	violate	regulation.	It	provides	a	platform	for	forest	governance	transparency	that	 enables	 more	 informed	 contestation	 and	 critiques	 while	 encouraging	 forest	users	 to	 conduct	 their	 conduct	 according	 to	 government	 goals	 (Foucault,	 1991a).		The	chapter	also,	however,	 exposed	 the	messy	actualities	of	 this	 seemingly	 simple	governmental	 technology	 implementation	 at	 the	 local	 level	 by	 describing	contestations	 coming	 from	 local	 government	 officials	 seeking	 amnesty	 for	 past	offences.				The	 third	 governmental	 technology	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 6	 is	 ‘One	 Standard’.	 This	technology	 regulates	 the	 production	 of	 spatial	 data	 to	 follow	 a	 certain	 technical	standard	that	have	been	defined	by	GIA	(Samadhi,	2012).	The	standard	ensures	the	map’s	 technical	quality	and	compatibility	with	 the	state’s	cartographic	convention.	Chapter	 6	 provided	 an	 example	 of	 GIA’s	 attempts	 in	 fostering	 the	 production	 of	participative	mapping	standard.	The	participative	mapping	standard	also	covers	the	governance	 of	 Indigenous	 mapping	 practices	 and	 is	 expected	 to	 perform	 as	 a	disciplinary	mechanism	intended	to	ensure	the	adherence	of	Indigenous	maps	with	the	 state’s	 geospatial	 criteria	 (Peluso,	 1995;	 Tahilramani,	 2013).	 As	 argued	 in	Chapter	6,	Indigenous	activists	are	critically	engaging	with	One	Standard	as	a	means	of	making	Indigenous	land	claims	more	visible	in	land	use	policy	making.	Indigenous	activists	 subverted	 GIA’s	 technical	 fixes	 to	 accommodate	 principles	 of	 counter	mapping	 (Hodgson	 and	 Schroeder,	 2002;	Wainwright	 and	 Bryan,	 2009;	 Pramono,	2013).	Accordingly,	one	of	the	most	discussed	issues	in	OMI	is	the	expectation	that	it	will	 finally	 clarify	 tenure	 conflicts	 and	bring	 recognition	 and	 justice	 to	 Indigenous	communities.		
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	Chapter	6	have	outlined	three	governmental	technologies	that	have	emerged	as	part	of	 the	 REDD+	 strategies	 to	 produce	 forest	 spaces	 and	 knowledge	 that	 fit	 the	requirements	for	forest	carbon	investment.	I	argued	in	Chapter	6	that	most	of	these	technical	fixes	attempt	to	modify	the	conduct	of	concession	holders	and	government	officials	 based	 on	 the	 processes	 of	 simplification,	 surveillance	 and	 rendering	technical.	 However,	 findings	 showed	 that	 these	 technologies	 have	 also	 created	hybrid	 spaces	 for	 activists	 to	 pursue	 progressive	 possibilities,	 in	 which	 REDD+’s	neoliberal	 nature	 rationality	 co-exists	 with	 a	 broader	 purpose	 to	 seek	 justice	 for	Indigenous	land	rights	and	environmental	protection.			
8.2.3 Research	Objective	1(c)	
To	track	how	REDD+	technologies	are	contributing	to	the	formation	of	a	new	
political	conjuncture	in	forest	governance	and	to	subsequently	trace	the	effect	
of	 this	new	conjuncture	 to	a	particular	 Indigenous	 land	 claim	assemblage	 in	
Central	Kalimantan.			The	third	case	study	illustrated	the	impact	of	REDD+	governmental	technologies	on	the	 process	 of	 assembling	 an	 Indigenous	 land	 claim	 in	 the	 Bahanei	 community	situated	 in	 upland	 territory	 of	 Gunung	 Mas	 District,	 Central	 Kalimantan.	 I	 have	outlined	the	new	emergence	of	a	new	political	conjuncture	in	chapter	4	–	shaped	by	three	 elements:	 the	 implementation	 of	 REDD+;	 the	 One	 Map	 Initiative;	 and	 the	Constitutional	Court	decision	Number	35/2013	 that	 acknowledged	 the	 Indigenous	community’s	 ownership	 to	 adat	 forest.	 The	 new	 conjuncture	 showed	 the	 shift	 in	Indonesia’s	forest	governance	where	Indigenous	rights	discourses	are	becoming	an	important	 component	 of	 rhetorical	 debates	 and	 practical	 policies.	 As	 explained	 in	Chapter	 6,	 this	 shift	 has	 driven	 Indigenous	mapping	 efforts	 undertaken	 by	 AMAN	and	 other	 activists	 and	 community	 members	 covering	 millions	 of	 hectares	 of	contested	forest	land.	Indicative	of	the	changing	politics	of	forests,	such	actions	are	not	 seen	 as	 counter-claims	against	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 state	 (for	 counter	mapping	see	 (Peluso,	 1995),	 instead	 they	 attract	 support	 and	 financing	 from	 REDD+	authorities.		
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	Based	on	this	new	conjuncture,	I	argued	that	the	mapping	and	claiming	of	millions	of	hectares	 of	 Indigenous	 land	 could	 potentially	 be	 experienced	 as	 Indigenous-style-land	 grabs	 at	 the	 local	 scale.	 However,	 instead	 of	 “powerful”	 actors	 such	 as	 big	companies	 being	 the	 grabbers,	 local	 communities	 become	 divided	 into	 those	who	can	perform	or	meet	the	requirements	for	assembling	an	Indigenous	land	claim,	and	fit	 the	 romanticized	 version	 of	 indigeneity	 supported	 by	 REDD+	 authorities,	 and	those	 that	do	not.	 	 I	 proposed	 thereafter,	 that	 to	 avoid	 the	 Indigenous	 land	grabs,	REDD+	authorities	need	to	acknowledge	diversity	and	give	attention	to	overcoming	forms	of	intimate	exclusion	that	REDD+	might	unintentionally	exacerbate.	Chapter	7	has	 argued	 that	 “incorporation	 of	 more	 heterogeneous	 understandings	 of	 forest	communities	 into	 assemblages	 currently	 based	 on	 homogenous	 articulations	 of	indigeneity	is	a	necessary	next	step	in	pursuing	fair	and	just	outcomes	from	the	new	political	conjuncture”	(Chapter	7,	p.	215).			Furthermore,	in	examining	the	grounded	actuality	of	the	above	political	conjuncture,	Chapter	 7	 examined	 the	 two	 main	 governmental	 technologies	 produced	 by	 the	Bahanei	to	assemble	a	land	claim,	these	are,	territorialisation	and	the	performance	and	articulation	of	Indigenous	subjectivities.	In	producing	Indigenous	territory,	the	Bahanei	 employs	 mapping	 technology	 to	 render	 visible	 the	 threat	 of	 land	appropriation	 from	 a	 logging	 company.	 The	 map	 of	 Bahanei	 territory	 is	 overlaid	with	 the	map	of	 logging	concessions	and	 is	employed	as	a	weapon	to	advocate	 for	Indigenous	land	recognition.	Facilitated	by	AMAN	CK,	the	Bahanei	received	attention	from	the	REDD+	Taskforce	and	gained	political	and	financial	support	as	a	result.	To	secure	 support	 from	 the	REDD+	Taskforce,	 AMAN	CK	 facilitates	 the	 production	 of	green	 Indigenous	 subjectivities	 to	align	 the	Bahanei	with	wider	REDD+	proponent	interests	in	producing	governable	space	and	subjects	for	REDD+	implementation.	As	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 the	 articulation	 of	 green	 Indigenous	 subjectivities	 were	made	 through	 zoning	 technologies	 and	 the	 production	 of	Adat	 law.	 Both	 of	 these	tools	 of	 government	 aim	 to	 discipline	 the	 Bahanei	 and	 govern	 the	 relation	 of	outsiders	 to	 Bahanei	 land	 and	 forest	 resources.	 The	 Adat	 law	 encourages	 green	subjectivities	among	the	Bahanei	and	legitimizes	the	implementation	of	surveillance	technology	through	the	formation	of	“Adat	police”.	
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	I	 argued,	 furthermore,	 that	 the	production	of	 the	Bahanei	map	and	Adat	 law	have	enabled	 the	 implementation	 of	 sovereign	 form	 of	 governmentality	 by	 forbidding	others	to	access	Bahanei’s	land	and	forest	resources	without	proper	permits.	These	two	governmental	technologies	work	together	in	articulating	the	indigeneity	of	the	Bahanei.	 The	 sovereign	 governmentality,	 however,	 was	 contested	 by	 the	neighbouring	 communities	 whose	 access	 to	 land	 was	 being	 restricted	 and	marginalized	by	 the	new	territorialisation	 technologies.	 I	 argued	 in	Chapter	7	 that	“while	practices	of	territorialisation	play	a	vital	role	in	strengthening	claims	to	land	and	 codifying	 local	 Indigenous	 identities	 the	 process	 is	 contributing	 to	 ongoing	intimate	exclusions	-	everyday	practices	that	exclude	some	from	the	benefits	others	are	receiving”	(Chapter	7,	p.	211).	Despite	these	risks	and	challenges,	Chapter	7	has	clearly	showed	that	 the	new	forest	political	conjuncture,	which	has	been	 influence	by	 REDD+	 governmental	 technologies,	 have	 provided	 new	 opportunities	 for	progressive	changes.		
	
8.3 REDD+:	Beyond	Neoliberal	Nature	Rhetoric	This	 section	 seeks	 specifically	 to	 address	 research	 objective	 2	 that	 is	 to	 examine	
REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 in	 Indonesia	 from	 a	 not-quite	 neoliberal	
nature	framework.	Following	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker’s	(2015)	framework,	I	discuss	cross	cutting	elements	that	emerge	throughout	the	three	case	studies	that	enable	 the	 translation	 of	 REDD+	 neoliberal	 rationality	 into	 not-quite-neoliberal	governmental	 technologies.	 As	 has	 been	 argued	 throughout	 this	 thesis,	 REDD+	governmental	technologies	are	produced	as	technical	fixes	to	address	existing	socio-spatial	problems.		However	they	have	also	given	rise	to	stronger	public	participation	mechanisms	and	improved	decision	making	practices.	Adopting	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker’s	(2015)	steps	in	assessing	not	quite	neoliberal	nature	projects	in	Latin	America,	 I	assess	 four	cross	cutting	themes	that	emerge	throughout	 the	three	case	studies	that	can	help	in	understanding	Indonesia’s	REDD+	governmental	strategies	as	 an	 assembly	 of	 calculated	 techniques	 that	 are	 modulated	 by	 place-based	discourses,	politics,	interests	and	agency	of	actors.			
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8.3.1 Flexibility	and	Ambiguity	of	REDD+	In	 this	 section	 I	 discuss	 flexibility	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 REDD+,	 which	 was	 clearly	apparent	in	a	Global	Partnership	Meeting,	a	workshop	organized	by	the	UN-REDD	in	2013	 in	Palangkaraya,	Central	Kalimantan,	where	participants	could	not	hide	their	puzzlement	 as	 they	 went	 from	 one	 site	 of	 REDD+	 activities	 to	 the	 next.	 I	 was	involved	as	a	participant	in	the	field	trip	organized	as	part	of	the	workshop.	The	first	site	shown	by	the	organizing	committee	was	a	village	in	which	we	met	with	groups	of	 women	 who	 had	 learned	 to	 weave	 baskets	 and	 other	 handicrafts	 using	 rattan	gathered	from	nearby	forests.	The	second	site	was	a	large	plot	of	wet	peatland	with	a	small	patch	of	 rice	cultivation.	According	 to	 the	group	of	 farmers	 that	we	met,	 it	was	a	variety	of	rice	that	can	live	in	wet	peatlands.	Both	of	these	groups,	the	women	weavers	 and	 the	peatland	 farmers,	were	 the	beneficiaries	of	 the	REDD+	 readiness	fund	 distributed	 by	 the	 REDD+	 Taskforce.	 The	 final	 site	 was	 a	 massive	 bamboo	building	 that	 is	 called	as	 the	Centre	 for	REDD+	Knowledge	Learning.	This	bamboo	hall	 was	 built	 using	 the	 REDD+	 readiness	 fund	 from	 the	 Government	 of	 Norway	which	functions	as	the	hub	for	REDD+	activities	and	training	in	Central	Kalimantan,	the	first	pilot	province	for	REDD+	in	Indonesia.			The	 diverse	 activities	 seen	 in	 the	 fieldtrip	were	 not	 the	 type	 of	 activities	 that	 the	participants	 of	 the	 workshop	 expected	 to	 define	 REDD+.	 Questions	 emerged	throughout	the	discussion	sessions	on	the	diversity,	highlighting	the	surprise	of	the	workshop	participants.	Some	of	them	expressed	appreciation	for	the	flexibility	that	the	 REDD+	 Taskforce	 created	 to	 include	 small	 scale	 livelihood	 empowerment	activities	 for	 local	 communities	 in	 broader	 REDD+	 programs	 and	 policies.	 Others,	however,	have	expressed	concern	over	whether	 these	activities	would	 lead	 to	real	carbon	 conservation	 mechanisms.	 Justifications	 were	 of	 course	 provided	 by	 the	REDD	 Taskforce	 experts	 team	 on	 the	 relation	 of	 these	 diverse	 activities	 with	avoiding	deforestation	and	forest	degradation.			This	event	reflects	 the	 flexibility	and	ambiguity	of	REDD+.	As	a	new	mechanism	in	environmental	 governance,	 REDD+	 is	 still	 being	 developed	 and	 thus	 its	 pilot	
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activities	are	rather	diverse	depending	on	how	REDD+	is	being	translated	into	sets	of	 activities	 by	 its	 proponents.	 This	 flexibility	 opened	 up	 opportunities	 to	 create	governmental	 technologies	 that	 do	 not	 necessarily	 correspond	 to	 carbon	conservation	and	offsets.	Thus,	the	flexibility	has	created	ample	room	for	manoeuvre	in	which	activists	 can	actively	 repurpose	REDD+	 initiatives	 to	better	 fit	notions	of	social	and	environmental	justice.		This	flexibility	avoids	a	binary	division	whereby	REDD+	“is	either	to	be	rejected	as	a	neoliberal	‘Trojan	horse’	or	embraced	as	the	new	market	panacea”	(McElwee,	2012).	Hence,	despite	REDD+	being	designed	to	be	a	neoliberal	instrument	at	one	level,	its	translation	in	the	three	case	studies	discussed	in	this	thesis	has	demonstrated	to	be	a	 hybrid	 of	 neoliberal	 and	 not-quite	 neoliberal	 nature	 projects.	 This	 flexibility	attracted	significant	attention	and	engagement	 from	diverse	non-state	actors.	This	implies	 that	 the	 success	 or	 not	 of	 REDD+	 mainstreaming	 as	 an	 art	 of	 governing	human	and	forest	relations	lies	in	the	socio	political	impacts	of	its	application	rather	than	in	its	functioning	as	a	merely	market	mechanism	(for	the	context	on	PES	see	eg	Mcafee	and	Shapiro,	2010;	McElwee,	2012;	Milne	and	Adams,	2012;	McElwee	et	al.,	2014).	 This	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 translating	REDD+	may	 become	narrower	 in	 the	 future,	 particularly	when	 forest	 spaces	 are	 locked	 into	 particular	contracts.	 	 However	 for	 the	 period	 examined	 ambiguity	 and	 flexibility	 provided	possibilities	for	progressive	engagement	and	change.			
8.3.2 Fluid	and	Multiple	Subjectivities	The	 second	 cross	 cutting	 element	 that	 characterized	 Indonesia’s	 REDD+	 as	 a	 not-quite	neoliberal	nature	project	is	the	productive	tension	arising	out	of	the	state	and	society	 relationships	 (de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015).	 Activists	 actively	negotiate	 the	 relationship	 through	 the	 embodiment	 of	multiple	 subjectivities	 that	enable	them	to	work	“with(in),	against,	and	beyond	the	state”	(de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015,	p.	243).	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	activists’	fluidity	in	occupying	“insider”	 positions	 as	 part	 of	 government’s	 expert	 team,	 while	maintaining	 active	engagement	 with	 activism,	 has	 helped	 in	 bridging	 communication	 and	 building	productive	 tensions	 between	 actors	 in	 both	 camps.	 While	 assuming	 positions	 as	
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experts	 for	 the	Taskforce,	activists	have	the	opportunity	 to	directly	modify	REDD+	neoliberal	 rationality	 by	 further	 articulating	 visions	 for	 progressive	 forest	 reform.	An	example	of	this	is	the	engagement	of	activists	who	work	in	the	REDD+	Taskforce	in	 convincing	 the	 broader	 REDD+	 proponents	 that	 success	 will	 depend	 on	 the	capacity	 of	 the	 program	 to	 fundamentally	 change	 forestland	 governance.	 This	includes	providing	clarity	over	where	forests	are	and	who	has	ownership	and	access	to	them,	and	resolving	conflicts	over	Indigenous	tenure	rights.			Aside	 from	providing	direct	 access	 to	 the	REDD+	program	and	policy	making,	 the	adoption	 of	 expert	 subjectivities	 has	 enabled	 activists	 to	 learn	 and	 practice	 the	language	 of	 bureaucracy.	 This	 is	 important	 in	 enabling	 activists	 to	 translate	 their	socio	 environmental	 justice	 interests	 in	 languages	 that	 will	 attract	 government	support	while	appearing	to	be	non-political.	This	contradiction	is	double	edged:	on	one	 side,	 activists	 can	 risk	 being	 depoliticized,	 while	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 there	 are	wider	opportunities	 to	 insert	 the	social	movement’s	agenda	 into	 the	government’s	policy	 and	 program.	 	 The	 insertion	 of	 the	 tagline	 “No	 Rights	 No	 REDD+”	 was	successfully	 employed	 to	 focus	 REDD+	 discourses	 on	 Indigenous	 rights,	 enabled	partly	 because	 several	 AMAN	 activists	 were	 adopting	 expert	 subjectivities	 as	members	of	the	REDD+	Taskforce.		
	
8.3.3 Tensions	and	Contradictions	De	 Freitas,	Marston	 and	Bakker	 (2015)	 emphasize	 the	 need	 for	 scholars	 to	 probe	evolving	political	agendas	that	influence	the	way	neoliberal	nature	projects	unravel.	REDD+	is	shaped	and	translated	by	the	socio-institutional	complexity	in	which	it	is	embedded	 (McGregor	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 REDD+	 programs	 are	 intertwined	 with	contemporary	 and	 historical	 processes	 of	 forest	 governance	 creating	 a	 messy	landscape	 with	 a	 gap	 between	 what	 is	 intended	 and	 what	 is	 accomplished.	Contradiction	comes	when	the	previous	governmental	tactics	and	rationalities	clash	with	 the	 new	 calculated	 technologies	 (Li,	 2007c;	 Boelens,	 Hoogesteger	 and	 Baud,	2015;	 Pieck,	 2015).	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 response	 from	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	officials	to	the	lobbying	by	a	project	manager	of	PT	Rimba	Raya	Conservation,	one	of	the	 large	 scale	REDD+	private	 investments	 in	 Indonesia	 covering	 an	 area	 of	more	
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than	 30	 thousand	 hectares.	 The	 project	 manager	 has	 several	 times	 pitched	suggestions	 for	 the	 Agency	 to	 buy	 Rimba	 Raya’s	 Certified	 Emissions	 Reductions	(CERs)	 using	 the	 Norwegian	 money	 to	 set	 an	 example	 of	 the	 government’s	seriousness	and	commitment	for	REDD+	to	work	in	Indonesia.	However,	despite	the	availability	 of	 both	 money	 and	 justification	 to	 buy	 the	 CERs,	 the	 REDD+	 Agency	decided	not	to	do	it	 for	the	fear	of	sending	the	wrong	message	to	the	broader	civil	society	 movement	 in	 Indonesia.	 A	 representative	 of	 the	 Agency	 stated	 in	 an	interview	that,		We	don’t	want	to	be	mistaken	to	prioritise	the	need	of	the	REDD+	investor	in	gaining	 profit	 over	 the	 need	 of	 the	 forest	 communities	 and	 Indigenous	peoples.	 Although	 it	 makes	 sense	 for	 us	 to	 buy	 the	 CERs	 to	 attract	 more	REDD+	investors	but	we	cannot	do	it	now.	Not	right	now…!			We	still	want	to	focus	 on	 empowering	 communities	 and	 a	 broader	 vision	 of	 good	 forest	governance,	because	that’s	how	REDD+	is	going	to	be	taken	seriously	by	the	district	governments	(Wandi,	interview,	September	2013).			The	 statement	 above	 shows	 that,	 despite	 the	 intention	 for	 REDD+	 to	 work	 in	Indonesia,	the	Agency	is	still	reluctant	to	get	 involved	directly	 in	the	purchasing	of	carbon	 credits	 from	 a	 large	 scale	 REDD+	 investment.	 This	 disinclination	 seems	 to	contradict	the	government’s	own	attempts	to	mainstream	neoliberal	rationalities	–	instead	more	 emphasis	 is	 being	 put	 on	 REDD+	 as	 an	 emancipatory	 forest	 politics	that	benefits	 local	and	Indigenous	communities.	The	new	governmental	rationality	of	 governing	 forest	 and	 forest	 people	 based	 on	 carbon	 commodification	 are	 at	 a	crossroads	 with	 other	 rationalities	 that	 are	 not	 necessarily	 prioritizing	 carbon	forestry	 conservation	 and	 offsets.	 This	 contradiction	 creates	 productive	 tensions	that	 can	 be	 exploited	 by	 environmental	 and	 Indigenous	 activists	 to	 repurpose	REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 to	 serve	 broader	 interests	 of	 social	 justice	(Anthias	and	Radcliffe,	2015;	de	Freitas,	2015;	Marston,	2015).			Another	example	of	contradiction	that	has	helped	in	producing	not-quite	neoliberal	REDD+	 projects	 comes	 from	 the	 overlapping	 of	 authorities	 between	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce	and	 the	MOF.	Political	 scholars	have	argued	 that	President	Yudhoyono’s	
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tendency	 to	 establish	 ad-hoc	 agencies	 created	 tensions	 between	 the	 existing	institutions	with	 the	newly	established	ones	 (Luttrell	et	al.,	 2012),	which	was	also	the	case	with	the	REDD+	Taskforce	as	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	The	establishment	of	the	Taskforce	can	actually	add	a	new	overlapping	layer	in	the	already	messy	forest	governance	in	Indonesia.	The	Taskforce	initiated	several	initiatives	that	intersected	with	the	MOF’s	programs	and	authorities.	This	resulted	in	the	tensions	and	rivalries	between	 the	 Taskforce	 and	 the	 MOF	 as	 well	 as	 confusion	 for	 other	 forest	stakeholders	(Astuti	and	McGregor,	2015).			For	 the	 civil	 society	 movement	 in	 Indonesia,	 however,	 this	 creates	 a	 good	opportunity	for	building	a	stronger	alliance	with	the	Taskforce	as	both	parties	have	a	more	common	interest.	For	the	Taskforce,	an	alliance	with	the	civil	society	sector	means	 a	 strong	 legitimacy	 for	 its	 existence	 and	 authority	 amidst	 broader	resentments	 from	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 existing	 government	 ministries	 (Astuti	 and	McGregor,	2015).	For	 the	activists,	 the	Taskforce	provides	a	new	space	 that	offers	hopes	and	flexibility,	as	it	has	autonomous	financial	resources	and	support	from	the	global	community,	facilitating	the	birth	of	new	initiatives	that	are	not	tightly	tied	to	the	complexity	of	forest	bureaucracy.		It	doesn’t	mean,	however,	that	the	two	parties	align	 neatly,	 as	 this	 alliance	 is	 fragile	 partly	 due	 to	 diverse	 interests	 of	 the	 civil	society,	 which	 is	 far	 from	 homogeneous	 in	 their	 views	 of	 REDD+	 (Mulyani	 and	Jepson,	2013;	Brockhaus,	Di	Gregorio	and	Mardiah,	2014).			These	 two	 examples	 of	 tensions	 and	 contradictions	 illustrate	 how	 overlapping	political	 processes	 and	 agendas	 have	modulated	 the	 production	 and	 execution	 of	REDD+	 governmental	 technologies	 that	 reflect	 the	 not-quite	 neoliberal	 nature	 in	REDD+.			
8.3.4 Dynamism	The	 research	has	 shown	 that	 it	might	 be	necessary	 to	 rethink	neoliberalisation	 of	nature	projects,	such	as	REDD+,	as	the	stories	that	emerge	are	far	from	simple.		It	is	not	a	straightforward	case	of	turning	forests	into	commodities	to	accumulate	wealth	and	profit	for	the	few	(Castree,	2011;	Milne	and	Adams,	2012;	McElwee	et	al.,	2014).	
	 219	
The	discussion	 in	 the	core	chapters	of	 this	 thesis	showed	that	even	this	neoliberal	nature	project	is	continuously	being	contested,	(re)shaped,	and	subverted	by	social	movements.	This	 attempt	 to	 continuously	 repurpose	a	neoliberal	nature	project	 is	enabled	by	the	final	element	that	arises	out	of	the	three	case	studies:	dynamism	(de	Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	 2015;	 McGregor,	 Eilenberg	 and	 Coutinho,	 2015).	Dynamism	 is	 enabled	 by	 the	 continuous	 process	 of	 refurbishing	 the	 attempt	 to	govern	and	improve	the	relation	between	“men	and	things”	(Foucault,	1991a).			In	 explaining	 the	 nature	 of	 governmentality,	 not	 as	 a	 finished	 and	 secure	accomplishment,	 Li	 (2007c,	 p.	 10)	 argues	 that	 projects	 will	 always	 be	 contested.	Opponents	will	find	deficiencies	and	“questions	that	experts	exclude,	misrecognize,	or	 attempt	 to	 contain,	 do	 not	 go	 away”.	 These	 conditions	 will	 incite	 experts	 to	propose	 new	 projects	 of	 improvement.	 This	 process	 is	 a	 cycle	 of	 attempts	 to	continuously	 re-arrange	 human-nature	 relationships.	 Sometimes	 experts	 will	 be	confronted	by	their	failure	in	taming	their	targets	of	government	or	by	the	problems	that	 cannot	 be	 contained	 in	 the	 process	 of	 rendering	 technical.	 Li	 (2007c,	 p.	 19)	further	 argues	 that	 governmental	 intervention	 produces	 contradictions	 and	 a	perverse	 effects	 that	 “is	 caused,	 in	 part	 at	 least,	 by	 the	 overlapping	 of	 various	governmental	 programs	 in	 historical	 sequence	 or,	 concurrently,	 one	 program	 at	cross	purpose	with	another.”			Improvement	 programs,	 such	 as	 REDD+,	 may	 inadvertently	 stimulate	 a	 political	challenge,	“the	way	they	do	this,	moreover,	is	situated	and	contingent”	(Li,	2007c,	p.	26).	De	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker	(2015,	p.	243)	argue	that	“dynamism	therefore	creates	 the	 conceptual	 space	 amidst	 so	much	ambiguity	 to	 appreciate	 the	ways	 in	which	 actors	 exploit	 and	 enlarge	 political	 openings	 (no	 matter	 how	 seemingly	inauspicious)	 that	 might	 allow	 them	 to	 strengthen	 and	 elaborate	 upon	 their	continually	evolving	agendas”	(see	also	Ferguson,	2010).			
8.4 Contribution	In	this	thesis,	I	have	made	several	contributions	to	knowledge.	The	thesis	represents	one	of	 the	 first	attempts	 to	employ	governmentality	as	a	 theoretical	 framework	 in	
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analysing	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	 I	have	examined	the	way	a	global	neoliberal	nature	project	 becomes	 translated	 into	 place-based	 governmental	 technologies	 and	 are	subverted,	 in	 turn,	 by	 the	 politics	 of	 place.	 I	 have	 highlighted	 the	 messiness	 that	accompanies	 attempts	 to	 neoliberalise	 nature.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 have	 advanced	understandings	 of	 neoliberal	 natures	 by	 avoiding	 simplification	 around	 a	 grand	narrative	of	capital	accumulation	(Ferguson,	2010;	de	Freitas,	Marston	and	Bakker,	2015).		By	conducting	empirical	analyses	I	have	shown	how	place	based	discourses,	politics	and	actor	agencies	influence	how	neoliberal	projects	unfold	(Muradian	et	al.,	2010;	McElwee	et	al.,	2014).				This	thesis	has	also	made	an	important	contribution	to	advancing	the	understanding	of	not-quite	neoliberal	projects	in	the	context	of	a	non-Latin	American	country	(for	Latin	 American	 context	 see	 for	 example	 Anthias	 and	 Radcliffe,	 2015;	 Boelens,	Hoogesteger	 and	 Baud,	 2015;	 de	 Freitas,	 2015;	 de	 Freitas,	 Marston	 and	 Bakker,	2015;	Marston,	 2015;	 Pieck,	 2015).	While	most	 studies	 on	 post-neoliberalism	 are	located	in	the	context	of	Latin	America,	there	is	a	growing	interest	in	finding	out	the	expression	 of	 emerging	market	 based	 environmental	 governance	 in	 other	 tropical	developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 Indonesia.	 Hosting	 more	 REDD+	 projects	 than	anywhere	 else	 in	 the	world,	 Indonesia	 has	 proven	 a	 fertile	 ground	 to	 explore	 not	quite	 neoliberal	 environmental	 governance	 (McGregor,	 Eilenberg	 and	 Coutinho,	2015).		Thirdly,	this	research	has	made	a	contribution	to	the	understanding	of	REDD+	as	an	emerging	 governmentality	 (Tikly,	 2003;	 Fimyar,	 2008).	 By	 investigating	 the	production	 of	REDD+	governmental	 technologies,	 and	 looking	 at	 the	 tensions	 that	emerged	 when	 new	 governmental	 technologies	 encountered	 old	 discourses	 and	practices,	 this	 thesis	has	 advanced	understandings	of	how	governmentalities	 form	(Li,	2007c).		Investigating	REDD+	in	Indonesia	as	it	was	designed	and	implemented	provided	a	unique	opportunity	 to	unravel	 the	politics	 that	 takes	place	behind-the-scenes	in	the	production	of	governmental	technologies	–	while	they	are	young	and	fluid	rather	than	set	and	old.		This	captures	both	continuity	and	discontinuity	of	the	Indonesian	 case	 with	 neoliberal	 practices	 and	 discourses	 of	 the	 global	 REDD+	paradigm	(McGregor,	2010;	McGregor,	Eilenberg	and	Coutinho,	2015;	McGregor	et	
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al.,	 2015).	 The	 understanding	 of	 how	 REDD+	 projects	 are	 intimately	 interwoven	with	other	place	based	discourses	and	power	helps	reconceptualize	and	de-fetishize	REDD+	as	a	top	down	neoliberal	environmental	governance.	This	research	has	also	contributed	 to	 the	 scholarly	 thinking	 on	 hopeful	 research	 that	 attempts	 to	understand	 the	 slippages	 and	 spaces	 through	which	 social	 change	 is	 a	 possibility,	instead	of	focusing	on	despair	that	inhibits	the	excitement	conducive	to	finding	and	highlighting	alternatives	and	hopes	(Gibson-Graham,	2008).			
8.5 Further	Research	Many	of	the	observations	recorded	in	this	thesis	will	benefit	from	further	research.		In	particular	 research	needs	 to	be	done	on	how	 full	 implementation	of	REDD+,	 as	opposed	to	the	current	REDD+	readiness	phase,	will	change	the	dynamics	of	REDD+	governmentalities.	 It	will	 be	 interesting	 to	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	whether	 greater	capital	 investment	 will	 influence	 the	 implementation	 and	 focus	 of	 not-quite	neoliberal	 governmental	 technologies.	 Similarly	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 follow	through	on	the	effects	of	new	technologies	–	such	as	how	will	the	implementation	of	standards	 for	 participative	 mapping	 affect	 the	 clarification	 of	 Indigenous	 tenure	rights?	 	 How	 will	 REDD+	 impact	 Indigenous	 territorialisation	 and	 the	 ensuing	intimate	exclusion	that	follows	in	the	years	to	come?			Further	 research	 is	 needed	 on	 private	 sector	 influences	 on	 environmental	governance.	 	 This	 includes	 the	 behind	 the	 scenes	 influences	 touched	 upon	 in	 this	thesis	 but	 also	more	 broadly	 how	 carbon	 rationalities	 in	 the	 governing	 of	 natural	resources	management	in	Indonesia	will	reflect	private	interests.	The	latest	example	is	the	signing	of	a	pledge	by	five	biggest	palm	oil	companies	operating	in	Indonesia,	and	whose	refining	capacities	account	for	80%	of	the	global	market	share,	to	pursue	the	 vision	 of	 developing	 “sustainable	 palm	 oil	 that	 is	 deforestation	 free,	 respects	human	 and	 community	 rights	 and	 improves	 Indonesia’s	 market	 competitiveness”	(Witoelar,	2015).	To	the	surprise	of	many	actors,	the	government	raised	objections	to	 the	pledge,	calling	 it	a	mechanism	that	“hurts	 farmers,	usurps	 the	government’s	authority	and	might	constitute	a	cartel	dominated	by	foreign	interests”	(Saturi	and	
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Nugraha,	2015).	The	government	statement	could	be	 the	starting	point	 for	 further	research	 that	 looks	 into	 how,	 post-REDD+	 inception,	 carbon	 rationalities	 are	adopted	by	the	private	sector	and	what	new	calculative	techniques	are	going	to	be	produced	 and	 implemented	by	 the	 signatories	 of	 the	pledge?	What	 impacts	 it	will	have	 on	 other	 actors,	 such	 as	 small	 scale	 palm	 oil	 growers?	 What	 particular	subjectivities	are	being	engendered?		
8.6 Concluding	Remarks	To	conclude,	 I	will	 come	back	 to	 the	quotation	 that	 I	 cited	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	chapter.	It	is	risky	to	claim—and	I	do	not	intend	to	do	so—that	the	findings	in	this	research	 represent	 the	whole	 reality	 of	 REDD+	 in	 Indonesia.	 It	 is,	 as	 I	mentioned	earlier	in	the	Introduction,	merely	a	snapshot	of	the	messy	actualities	of	REDD+	in	a	country	 considered	 “ground	 zero”.	 This	 research	 has	 been	 uniquely	 shaped	 by	 its	particularity	 in	 terms	of	 the	 timing	of	 the	 study,	 the	 case	 studies	 that	 I	 chose,	 the	positionality	 that	 I	embodied,	and	the	collaborators	 that	 I	worked	with.	Therefore,	the	findings	have	to	be	read	whilst	contextualizing	and	keeping	in	mind	all	of	these	elements.	 Arguing	 through	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 that	 REDD+	 in	Indonesia	 is	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 not-quite	 neoliberal	 nature	 project	 do	 not	necessarily	 erase	 the	 possibility	 that	 it	 will	 later	 be	 fully	 implemented	 through	neoliberal	 rationalities	 and	 technologies.	 I	 hope	 that	 by	 conducting	 this	 research	that	 I	 have	 learned	 things	 that	 can	 inform	 my	 future	 contributions	 to	 scholarly	activism,	and	that	perhaps	this	research	will	inspire	further	critical	discussion.			 	
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9 Appendices		
9.1 Appendix	A:	List	of	Indonesia’s	Government	
Ministries	Related	to	REDD+	
Abbreviation	 Government	
Agency	
Roles/Functions/Mandates	 in	 relation	 to	
forest,	land	or	REDD+	
	MOF	 Ministry	of	Forestry	 Ministry	 of	 Forestry	 is	 a	 government	 agency	responsible	 for	 overseeing	 the	 use	 and	protection	 of	 forestland	 in	 Indonesia.	 	 MOF	responsibility	 covers	 Indonesia’s	 lands	 that	 are	classified	 as	 forest	 estate.	 MOF	works	 based	 on	the	 roles	 and	 functions	 defined	 in	 the	 Basic	Forestry	Law	(BFL).		MOE	 Ministry	of	Environment	 Ministry	of	Environment	is	a	government	agency	responsible	 for	 coordinating,	 planning	 and	monitoring	of	Indonesia’s	environment.			NLA	 National	Land	Agency	 National	 Land	 Agency	 is	 a	 government	 agency	responsible	for	managing	and	issuing	certificates	of	ownership	 for	 lands	outside	 the	 forest	estate.	NLA’s	 mandates	 are	 described	 in	 the	 Basic	Agrarian	Law	(BAL).		MOA	 Ministry	of	Agriculture	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 is	 a	 ministerial	 level	government	 agency	 which	 relates	 to	 REDD+	issues	 through	 its	 responsibilities	 to	 oversee	plantation	sector	in	Indonesia	(palm	oil).				GIA	 Geospatial	Information	Agency	 Geospatial	 Information	 Agency’s	 relation	 with	Indonesia’s	 REDD+	 is	 formed	 through	 the	 One	Map	 Initiative.	 GIA	 is	 the	 only	 ministerial	 level	agency	mandated	to	oversee	the	management	of	Indonesia’s	spatial	information	including	the	task	to	 produce	 one	 common	 basic	 map	 of	 the	country.		UKP4	 President's	Delivery	Unit	for	Development	Monitoring	and	Oversight	
UKP4	 is	 a	 special	 body	 that	 was	 formed	 during	President	 Yudhoyono’s	 presidency	 to	 address	silos	 among	 ministries	 and	 monitor	 the	completion	 of	 national	 strategic	 programs.	 The	UKP4	was	heavily	involved	in	REDD+	through	the	appointment	 of	 Kuntoro	 Mangkusubroto,	 the	
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head	 of	 UKP4,	 as	 the	 head	 of	 the	 REDD+	Taskforce.	Since	then,	UKP4	played	a	key	role	as	REDD+	proponent	in	Indonesia.		The	REDD+	Taskforce	 The	REDD+	Taskforce	 The	 Taskforce	 is	 an	 ad-hoc	 ministerial	 level	government	 agency	 that	 was	 formed	 to	accelerate	 the	 implementation	 of	 REDD+	 in	Indonesia.	 Having	 Kuntoro	 Mangkusubroto	 as	the	 head	 of	 both	 UKP4	 and	 the	 Taskforce	 had	deemed	 very	 strategic	 as	 most	 of	 UKP’s	 staffs	also	work	in	the	REDD+	Taskforce.		Bappenas	 National	Development	Planning	Agency	
Bappenas	 is	 a	 government	 level	ministry	 that	 is	responsinle	to	develop	the	road	map	for	national	development	planning.		The	REDD+	Agency	 The	REDD+	Agency	 The	REDD+	Agency	was	established	in	December	2013	 to	 replace	 the	 Taskforce.	 The	 Agency	was	expected	 to	 be	 a	 permanent	 agency	 responsible	for	 REDD+	 implementation	 in	 Indonesia.	However,	 in	 January	 2015,	 President	 Jokowi	decided	to	dissolve	the	Agency	within	the	newly	formed	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry.			MOEF	 Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry	 Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Forestry	 is	 the	newly	 formed	 government	 agency	 under	President	 Jokowi.	 The	 ministry	 is	 the	 result	 of	merger	 between	 four	 government	 bodies:	 the	Ministry	 of	 Forestry,	 the	 Ministry	 of	Environment,	 the	 REDD+	 Agency,	 and	 the	National	 Council	 on	 Climate	 Change.	 The	 new	ministry	 established	 a	 new	 Directorate	 General	on	Climate	Change	 to	 fill	 the	vacuum	 left	by	 the	REDD+	 Agency	 and	 the	 National	 Council	 on	Climate	Change.			 	
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9.2 Appendix	B:	Human	Ethics	Approval		
		 	
 
 
 
Phone  0-4-463 5676 
Fax  0-4-463 5209 
Email Allison.kirkman@vuw.ac.nz  
 
TO Rini Astuti 
COPY TO Andrew McGregor 
Sophie Bond 
FROM Dr Allison Kirkman, Convener, Human Ethics Committee 
 
DATE 7 May 2013 
PAGES 1 
 
SUBJECT Ethics Approval: 19805 
REDD+ Governmentality: governing forest power and politics 
in Indonesia 
 
Thank you for your application for ethical approval, which has now been considered by 
the Standing Committee of the Human Ethics Committee.  
 
Your application has been approved from the above date and this approval continues 
until 30 August 2015. If your data collection is not completed by this date you should 
apply to the Human Ethics Committee for an extension to this approval. 
 
 
 Best wishes with the research. 
 
 
 Allison Kirkman 
 Human Ethics Committee  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 226	
9.3 Appendix	C:	Information	and	Consent	Forms	
	
 
REDD+ Governmentality: Governing forest power and politics in Indonesia 
Information Sheet for Interview Participants 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Please read this information sheet before deciding 
whether or not to participate. 
 
This research is being conducted to gain an understanding of the politics and governance issues arising around 
the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (REDD+) Programme in Indonesia. The 
research explores how REDD+ is changing forest politics in Indonesia and is being shaped by those same politics. 
The research is interested in the strategies of organisations to implement the program as well as the ways in 
which the program is being politicised and contested.  While the research is primarily focused on the national scale 
it also seeks to explore the relationship between national stakeholders and more local actors in a particular case 
study. The research will explore how forest stakeholders (for instance: Ministry of Forestry, palm oil industries, 
environmental NGOs and forest dependent communities) engage with REDD+ implementation and governance in 
Indonesia. 
 
To conduct this research, I wish to interview REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia. Participants include 
representatives from: government officials, NGOs, International NGOs, research organizations, donor agencies, 
related private sector, affected communities, and academics. 
 
Interview Format 
This interview will take approximately 45 – 60 minutes of your time and will be audio recorded. It is based on a 
semi-structured format so the exact nature of the questions have not been determined in advance but will depend 
on the way that the interview develops. Should the line of questioning progress in a way that makes you 
uncomfortable you can decline to answer any question(s) at any stage. 
 
Participation 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you can leave the interview at any time and retract any statements 
made before 28 February 2014 without any disadvantage to yourself. On the consent form, you are given the 
option of using an organisation’s name (you must have the authority or have obtained prior permission to allow the 
researcher to name your organisation), or a code name to maintain anonymity (for instance, Participant One or a 
fictional name).  
 
 
Data Use and Storage 
All the data will be kept confidential and securely stored in a password-protected computer, only my supervisors 
and I will have access to the raw data. The raw data will be transcribed by a transcriber who has signed a 
confidentiality agreement. At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately, except 
that on which published results rely. These data will be stored securely for a period of five years.  
 
It is intended that this research will form the basis of the researcher’s PhD thesis, articles and book publications, 
and also conference presentations. Direct quotes will be used in the publications and that although every effort will 
be made to keep your identity confidential, anyone close to the issues may be able to identify you through your 
comments.  
 
Feedback  
You may receive a final report with the findings if you wish (please indicate on the consent form). You may also 
receive a copy of any interview transcript. Any request for transcript change will be taken into consideration. 
 
This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington and is 
funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand through the Marsden Fund.  
 
If you have any further questions at any time, please contact either Rini Astuti (primary researcher) or Dr Andrew 
McGregor (supervisor) on the details below. 
 
Researcher: Rini Astuti, rini.astuti@vuw.ac.nz, +64224099200 
Supervisor: Dr Andrew McGregor, andrew.mcgregor@vuw.ac.nz, +61298507993 
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REDD+ Governmentality: Governing forest power and politics in Indonesia 
Consent Form for Interview Participants 
 
 
You have been asked to take part in a research study by Rini Astuti from the School of Geography, Environment and 
Earth Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), New Zealand. This study will explore REDD+ implementation 
and governance in Indonesia. The results of this study will be included in the researcher’s doctoral thesis, it is also 
anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publications.  
 
Thank you for taking part in this research.  
 
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet and listened to an explanation about the research. 
• I am aware that participation is purely voluntary and I can withdraw at any time, refuse to answer any questions, 
or retract any statements before 28 Feb 2014 without any disadvantage 
• I understand that I can request more information at any time. 
• I am aware that I may be quoted in any results or publications, but that my name will not be used. A pseudonym 
or identifier such as interview 1 or Participant One will be used. 
• I understand that that information I give will not be used for any purpose other than those listed below and in the 
information sheet without my consent.  I understand that such information will be treated in accordance with the 
terms of the Data Protection Act applicable both in New Zealand and Indonesia. 
 
I would like to receive a copy of the transcript of my interview  Y / N  (please circle)  
I would like to receive a final report of the research Y / N 
I give consent for the researcher to use my organisation name Y / N 
My contact details are:   Email:____________________________________ 
  Address:__________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
I ________________________________________________agree that the research project named above has been 
explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 
 
 
 
Signed 
 
 
……………………………………….. 
Date 
 
 
…………………………………………. 
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9.4 Appendix	D:	Transcriber	Confidentiality	Agreement	
		 	
 
Transcriber Confidentiality Agreement 
 
REDD+ Governmentality: Governing forest power and politics in Indonesia 
 
This research is being undertaken by Rini Astuti, PhD candidate in Geography, Victoria University of 
Wellington. This research is being conducted to gain an understanding of the politics and governance 
issues arising around the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus 
(REDD+) Programme in Indonesia.  
 
As a transcriber of this research, I understand that I will be hearing recordings of confidential interviews. 
The information on these recordings has been revealed by interviewees who agreed to participate in 
this research on the condition that their interviews would remain strictly confidential. I understand that I 
have a responsibility to honour this confidentially agreement. I agree not to share any information on 
these recordings, about any party, with anyone except the Researcher of this project. Any violation of 
this and the terms detailed below would constitute a serious breach of ethical standards and I confirm 
that I will adhere to the agreement in full.  
 
I, __________________________________________________________ agree to:  
 
1. Keep all the research information shared with me confidential by not discussing or sharing the 
content of the interviews with anyone other than the Researcher. 
2. Keep all research information in any form or format (e.g. audio files, CDs, transcripts) secure while 
it is in my possession.  
3. Return all research information in any form or format (e.g. audio files, CDs, transcripts) to the 
Researcher when I have completed the transcription tasks. 
4. After consulting with the Researcher, erase or destroy all research information in any form or 
format regarding this research project that is not returnable to the Researcher (e.g. CDs, 
information stored on my computer hard drive).  
 
 
Transcriber:  
_________________________ ______________________ ___________________  
(name)                                        (signature)                            (date)  
 
 
 
Researcher:  
_________________________ ______________________ ___________________  
(name)                                       (signature)                             (date)  
 
 
This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington 
and is funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand through the Marsden Fund.  
 
If you have any further questions at any time, please contact either Rini Astuti (primary researcher) or 
Dr Andrew McGregor (supervisor) on the details below. 
 
Researcher: Rini Astuti, rini.astuti@vuw.ac.nz, +64224099200 
Supervisor: Dr Andrew McGregor, andrew.mcgregor@vuw.ac.nz, +61298507993 
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9.5 Appendix	E:	JKPP’s	Participative	Mapping	Procedures	
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Provide accessible 
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(1)Information 
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Independent 
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Yes Rejected 
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Participative)Mapping)
Geospatial)
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%%
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%
%
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%
%
%
%
%
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%
(2)Lodging request 
for PM facilitation 
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letter 
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(4)Workshop on PM 
Facilitate community 
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Facilitate workshop 
Sending approval 
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(5)%
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participative mapping  
Community decision 
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30 days 
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rejected  
Information on PM 
methods 
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15 days 
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Provide Basic Map 
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Reference Map 
 
Capacity building for facilitator 
Facilitate training (6)Technical training 
on PM 
Training manual 
Mapping tools 
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draw map 
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Facilitate (14)Handover of 
the map 
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